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Abstract 
 
Over time, the predominant tendency of many governments’ agencies has been to 
evaluate a programme or policy investing large amount of resources in supporting 
policy evaluation. However, recommendations suggested by policy evaluators are 
not always taken up. Moreover, there is relatively little evidence of the extent of 
policy evaluation effectiveness (i.e. the influence of evaluation on the programme 
evaluated) and the factors which have significant impact on it. This dissertation aims 
to shed light on this issue by focusing on the Mexican and Chilean experiences of 
policy evaluation in the health care sector. 
 
It provides a detailed analysis of the extent to which evaluations have led to changes 
in policies and programmes and reveals a rather limited effectiveness of policy 
evaluation in these countries. I argue that shortcomings in the effectiveness of policy 
evaluation can be explained by institutional and political factors, primarily the 
nature of Intra Governmental Relations (IGR), but also the quality of bureaucracy, 
the level of democracy, the autonomy of policy evaluators, and the type of policy 
evaluation framework. While all of these factors seem to have some influence, the 
relationship between the executive and legislature is clearly the key determinant of 
the take up of recommendations.  
 
Thus, the findings of this thesis suggest that strengthening coordination between the 
different parts of government is needed to enhance the effectiveness of policy 
evaluation. In addition, the analysis also suggests that policy evaluation is likely to be 
more effective when it incorporates budgetary incentives. 
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Introduction 
 
In recent decades, evaluation has become a byword within public management 
discourse for most governments. There has been considerable interest in using 
evaluation for policy improvement, enlightenment and learning. Given this interest it 
might be assumed that the findings of evaluations would be utilised for further 
improvements on policies and programmes. The use or utilisation of evaluations 
highlights the issue of the effectiveness of evaluation as the extent to which the 
evaluation of a policy or programme leads to changes in that policy. In practice, 
however, the evidence indicates that this rarely takes place. 
 
For the most part, the existence of recommendations resulting from evaluations does 
not ensure that they will be taken into consideration in the policy process. The gap 
between evaluation and policy change is the main focus for this research. Indeed, the 
central research question for this dissertation is whether evaluation is effective across 
the Mexican and Chilean policies, in other words whether or not evaluation is utilised 
in policy making process. Moreover, this research builds on the examination of 
evaluations to analyse the institutional factors that might affect the effectiveness of 
evaluation.  
 
The effectiveness of policy evaluation has to be understood in the context of attempts 
to improve the performance of the State as an entity that aims to develop policies to 
address public problems. When such policies do not achieve the expected results the 
credibility of the State is eroded. This was particularly the case in the 1980s, when 
many States (e.g. Canada, the UK, the USA, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, etc.) faced a 
crisis due to inefficiencies and a lack of capability to tackle these public problems. As 
a result, over the following years many countries engaged in a process of 
administrative modernisation according to the paradigm of the New Public 
Management ‘NPM’ (see Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). This has been the basis of the 
State modernization agenda, including administrative reforms and focus on 
performance evaluation.  
 
Initially, these reforms were introduced in developed countries such as Australia, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom (Rhodes, 1991) amongst others. Later on, the 
emerging economies followed a similar process of public sector reforms (see Aguilar, 
2013, Cabrero, 2003, and Uvalle, 1994). This research focuses on the experience of 
reforms in such economies, conducting a comparative study of the effectiveness of 
evaluation in the Chilean and Mexican policy processes. Although some scholars have 
argued that these strategies seemed more as a “paradigm” than administrative 
reforms1 (Arellano, 2002, Cejudo, 2008, Hood & Peters, 2004, Jones, 2002, Jones & 
Kettl, 2003 and Manning, 2001), the NPM brought the Results-based Budgeting2 to 
the epicentre of policy evaluation. In this context, evaluation is seen as a tool, which 
aims to improve government performance across all sectors (energy, security, 
education, health, etc.) and to administer efficiently the resources allocated by the 
government.  
                                                          
1
 More focused on government outputs than outcomes (Jones, 2002), especially in developing countries, where 
hierarchical bureaucracies had not been downsized or replaced by market mechanisms (Cejudo, 2008 and Manning, 
2001). 
2
 Essentially, the Results based Budgeting systems (RbB or PbR acronym in Spanish) and the Performance Evaluation 
System (SED) developed under this model, are based on the principle that the public sector needs an administrative 
culture that emphasizes the management and measurement of inputs, activities, and outcomes. Although, references 
to RbB might raise discussion on budgeting this is not provided in this dissertation. 
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In order to do this, evaluation enables agencies to assure whether their programmes 
are coherent and congruent with their goals. As Howlett et al. (2009: 186) suggest, 
the goal of evaluation is to find out whether the programme – policy, plan or project 
– is doing what it is supposed to do or whether it needs to be adjusted. Looking at 
the policy process as a whole, evaluation is often regarded as a final stage in assessing 
the State’s actions. It ‘should be’ closely linked to the political process that determines 
the selection, funding, modification, extension and termination of projects 
(Bamberger, 1991: 326).  
 
Why is effectiveness important?  
Over time, the predominant tendency of many governments’ agencies has been to 
evaluate a programme, project, plan or policy, on the basis of investing large 
amount of resources in supporting evaluation and developing evaluators’ expertise 
and data collection, and then making the results publicly available. However, the 
making of recommendations as a result of evaluations does not guarantee that they 
will be adopted by the policy process. The importance of this topic (effectiveness) is 
highlighted by the fact that, despite several evaluations and official data performed, 
there is relatively little evidence of their effectiveness.  
 
In other words, there is limited information indicating whether and to what extent 
policy-makers make decisions based on results and recommendations from the 
evaluation process. Besides, much of the existing body of research on the effectiveness 
of evaluation has been conducted by evaluators based on their experience. Such 
research is often prone to bias and usually offers a limited description of the method 
used (Herbert, 2014: 412) to determine the effectiveness of evaluation. Thus, this 
research is an empirical study of the relationship between evaluations of policies and 
programmes performed on the one hand and the extent to which recommendations 
of evaluations are taken into account by decision-makers in terms of policy change 
on the other.   
 
Contribution of the thesis 
In order to develop a comprehensive narrative, this research aims to address the core 
questions of effectiveness influencing the evaluation process from an objective 
perspective and the factors which have significant impact on it. This dissertation also 
aims to contribute to the debate on effectiveness by looking at the problems which 
policy evaluation has encountered in Chile and Mexico. 3  It also will attempt to 
explain the broad spectrum of the effectiveness to contribute to the theory of 
evaluation use. In general terms, the evaluation is considered fragmented, not timely, 
and disconnected from the policy process and the performance of the government 
agencies. Moreover, there is little evidence about how results are used in the 
budgetary process and there is rarely a systematic connection between evaluation 
and policy improvement. This may be a reminder that evaluation policy is also a 
political process (Dye, 2011: 336, Hill, 2009: 281-82 and Howlett & Ramesh, 1995: 169). 
 
The dissertation also seeks to explore whether or not evaluation is effective in 
supporting decision-making to improve programmes, policies and services, identifying 
factors (negative and positive), providing a complement to other programmes, and 
                                                          
3
 These problems are mainly a consequence of the ambiguity in the roles performed, lack of autonomy of evaluators 
and absence of leadership and coordination amongst agencies, ministries and branches. Besides, the lack of 
experience in evaluation and the quality of civil service also affect the capacity of other actors (e.g. academics, non-
government organisations, consultancy firms, audit agencies and citizenry) to analyse information of the 
government’s performance. Finally, there are few incentives for officials (bureaucrats), ministers or legislators to 
encourage learning and to improve decision-making on the basis of evaluations. 
~ 10 ~ 
 
 
 
in the case of the budgetary process, offering a rationale for increasing or reducing 
finances. While effective evaluation is needed to strengthen the public sector, 
especially for countries characterised by limited resources such as Mexico and Chile, it 
is necessary to ask whether in such emerging economies, public resources have been 
wasted on an ineffective evaluation process. This research aims to provide insights 
into the way evaluations are done, to explain whether policy evaluation matters for 
the public policy and budgetary process. 
 
This research goes far beyond to determine whether the policy evaluation is effective 
or not exploring the potential influence of institutional factors and whether these are 
the most pressing issues for closing the gap in the effectiveness. Lastly, the contribution 
of this research to the literature is empirical rather than conceptual to prove whether 
the recommendations are used or not and whether the achievement of these 
recommendations is linked either to the complexity of the task or to the costs of 
implementing changes. Morever, to enhance our theoretical understanding of the 
evaluation process. Indeed, the effectiveness of policy evaluation is central for 
understanding its value.4 
 
The central discussion of the thesis 
From the perspective of political science, this project will argue that shortcomings in 
the effectiveness of policy evaluation can be explained by institutional factors. The 
following chapters attempt to answer What are the most influential institutional 
(political) factors shaping the effectiveness of evaluation? In a way, the debate seems 
as a puzzle due to a variety of approaches and perspectives regarding the question 
of effectiveness. Recent studies focus on the human, contextual and evaluation 
factors (Alkin, 1985 cited in Fleischer & Christie, 2009) while others argue that the 
evaluation capacity building, the role of evaluator, stakeholders’ involvement, and 
intentionality facilitate the use of evaluation findings (Fleischer & Christie, 2009). A 
further group of studies tends to assume that the organisational and political context, 
and the intentions of those requiring evaluation (Teirlinck et al., 2013: 374) are the 
factors which influence the adoption of recommendations. 
 
This dissertation will, on the basis of qualitative case study research, explore the 
potential influence of a number of institutional factors: the Intra Governmental 
Relations (IGR), quality of bureaucracy, level of democracy and autonomy, and the 
policy evaluation framework, which are relatively under-explored by scholars. Indeed, 
little has been said in the evaluation literature about how these factors might 
influence the evaluation process. The thesis also explores the political ‘arenas’ in which 
evaluation becomes a powerful source of information for those actors who have the 
responsibility for achieving results, in order to conclude the policy process and decide 
whether to modify, eliminate, reallocate resources to or “learn” from policies.  
 
In exploring the influence of these factors, the dissertation seeks to test the following 
statement: The political factor in the IGR is decisive for the effectiveness of policy 
                                                          
4
 One of the most relevant examples of how programme improvements can be attributed to evaluation results is the 
social programme PROSPERA. Numerous scholars (see Essama-Nssah, 2013, Rubio, 2012) and international 
organisations (WB, OECD, and IADB) refer to this programme as an international practice of conditional cash transfer 
programme in developing countries. The programme PROGRESA was launched by the Mexican government in 1997 
and renamed as Oportunidades in 2001 and Prospera in 2014, with the aim to develop human capital and reduce 
both present and future poverty. To determine whether and to what extent this programme achieved its intended 
outcomes, have had performed several evaluations. Its innovative model of impact evaluation was pioneering in the 
social sector, having a relevant role due to the positive findings to enlighten the policy process, increase financial 
resources and coverage to more households, and eventually influenced the spread of evaluation across the Mexican 
public administration. 
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evaluation. As explained in the methodology chapter, the IGR are those patterns of 
interaction among actors, agencies and branches of government. A first assumption is 
that the IGR are the condition either present or absent during the decision-making 
process and the way the IGR are arranged reflects the political factors which 
influence the decision made by actors involved.  
 
Though the comparative case study, the analysis of programmes evaluated will 
demonstrate they (actors) have the power to achieve evaluation. Comparatively to 
other factors, this explanation seems stronger for the purpose of utilisation than other 
potential explanations mentioned above. To answer the above questions, a central 
task of the research is to find alternative explanations and cases, which can be 
compared in terms of the factors identified above.  
 
Studying results across countries allows some conclusions to be drawn on how 
institutional factors influence the effectiveness of policy evaluation. The emphasis in 
most studies of the utilisation of evaluation findings is on developed rather than 
emerging economies (Askim, 2007, Dahler-Larsen, 2000, Fleischer & Christie, 2009, 
Ledermann, 2011 and Teirlinck et al., 2003). The focus of this research is a 
comparative analysis of the effectiveness of policy evaluation in Chile and Mexico, 
taking as a case study the use of evaluation in each country’s health sector as the 
focus for an examination of the effectiveness of evaluation. It examines the extent to 
which evaluations have lead to changes in the policies or programmes carried out by 
the government. The decision for the comparative analysis of these countries is 
because these along with many Latin American countries have a tradition of policy-
transfer5 of administrative reforms, policies and programmes.  
 
In addition there are a number of similarities between the cases including economic, 
language, cultural and most importantly administrative features. In this context, 
Dussauge (2013) claims that political systems based on presidential principles, 
transitions from authoritarianism to democracy are relevant features possess in 
common. Moreover, in recent administrations both the Management Improvement 
Programme and results-based budgeting travelled from Chile to Mexico associated 
with cross-national policy learning (Dussauge, 2012b; 2013) as a familiar approach 
considering political, economic and geographic circumstances. Whereas the most 
crucial difference found were in banking and bankruptcy procedures (Bergoeing et 
al., 2002).  
 
Indeed, the Chilean policy evaluation is key for this analysis due to its characteristics 
such as an emerging economy pioneering a M&E system and being recognized 
worldwide as one of the strongest system. From which, the Mexican government 
adopted the evaluation model further explained in the methodology chapter.  
 
Bergoeing et al. (2002) also note that the relevance is the recovery paths of the 
economic crisis during the 1980s, which differed markedly. On the one hand, the 
standard monetarist and real-wage story for Chile, help this country to recover more 
rapidly, while on the other hand, the debt overhang and structural reforms story of 
Mexico (e.g. trade policy, fiscal policy, privatization, the banking system and 
bankruptcy laws) were the principal causes for its slow recovery and stagnation while 
                                                          
5
 Also called transfer-learning, lesson-drawing, cross-national policy or benchmarking. Some of the policies adopted 
come from those devised by developed countries such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, France, Canada, etc. The citizen charters, New Public Management, results-based budgeting and 
management are some examples of these influential models to Latin America. 
~ 12 ~ 
 
 
 
Chile grew. Moreover, regarding administrative features, Dussauge (2013) adds low 
levels of administrative corruption, professionalization, the constitutional and legal 
authorities that Congress possesses, and the size of public administration, which are 
positive attributes in the Chilean government and contrasting in the Mexican. 
 
Despite the potential bias when small-n cases are considered, these commonalities 
and variations in these features and comparing data in the outcomes from these 
countries produce a focused study research.  By taking such an approach the study 
provides an original contribution by contrasting how institutional factors influence the 
effectiveness of evaluation in countries at different stages in the development of their 
evaluation systems (the relatively mature Chilean system and the still-evolving 
Mexican system). It will also offer a better understanding about the contribution of 
policy evaluation to good governance and administrative reform in emerging 
countries. The study needs to contrast institutional factors to show how these are 
connected with the effectiveness of evaluation.  
 
Chapter outline 
The first chapter is a literature review, which provides an overview of the state of the 
art in evaluation studies, focusing on current debates regarding the effectiveness of 
evaluation as a part of the strategic planning and public policy process. The 
literature review also explores how evaluation has been pursued in developing 
countries, in the context of debates regarding public sector reforms and the doctrine 
of the New Public Management, with particular reference to their contribution to a 
‘rethinking of governance’ in emerging economies. Building on related literatures this 
section reconceptualises the theory of evaluation use and the relevant institutional 
factors contributing to such theory. 
 
The second chapter presents the methodology in detail to explain the research 
question, the dependent and independent variables, and the research strategy for 
data collection and analysis. Regarding the concept of effectiveness, this chapter 
explains the operationalisation of this variable, indicating the different approaches 
taken in the literature to its conceptualisation and measurement. Moreover, it also 
explains how various outcomes of evaluations are classified and related to 
effectiveness. It outlines the qualitative approach used to answer the research 
questions and to conduct the comparative study of the evaluation of programmes of 
the health sector. The chapter introduces the institutional or political factors identified 
in the academic literature, which will be tested in the following chapters.  
 
The third and fourth chapters set out a documentary analysis of the historical 
evolution of evaluation activity in the Mexican and Chilean government. The 
chapters focus on identifying the major innovations in this field as well as the 
weaknesses of the evaluation systems, which might interfere in their effectiveness. The 
fifth and sixth chapters are concerned with the case study of the effectiveness of 
policy evaluation in the health sector in Mexico and Chile. In the Mexican case, the 
fifth chapter presents the evaluations conducted through the PbR/SED as the core of 
the Mexican system of policy evaluation and provides a comprehensive analysis of 
each factor in order to test the hypotheses regarding effectiveness, drawing upon 
documentary and interview material.  
 
In the Chilean case, the analysis examines the evaluations performed under the 
results-based budgeting system at the core of the Chilean system of policy evaluation. 
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This is followed by a discussion of the level of influence of each factor to shed light on 
current practices of decision-making regarding its effectiveness.  
 
The seventh chapter is centred on a comparative analysis between the institutional or 
political factors reviewed separately in previous chapters. It discusses whether the 
Chilean policy performs better than the Mexican based on these factors. The chapter 
then provides an in-depth analysis of the taking-up of recommendations per 
programme in order to examine whether the achievement of these 
recommendations is linked to the complexity of the task or the costs of implementing 
changes. Moreover, it also explores the factors shaping the effectiveness of the 
evaluation process through the comparative analysis of these factors within and 
across countries. 
 
For instance, the differences found amongst these countries were the indicators 
regarding the variable IGR such as the reliability and quality of data; as well as the 
indicators of the variable of policy evaluation framework measuring perception of 
operationalization and methodological rigor. All these conditions impacting positively 
on the effectiveness of evaluation present in the Chilean but absent in the Mexican 
policy evaluation. At contrary, the availability of data and distribution of public 
resources of the variable IGR are outcomes present in Mexico, whereas in Chile were 
not identified in the course of time. 
 
The final chapter summarises the findings of the dissertation and explores the 
theoretical and policy implications of the effectiveness of evaluation. In doing so, it set 
out some proposals for improving the effectiveness of evaluation in both countries 
and highlights the importance of adopting policy evaluation as an institutional 
process to improve public management and create public value. 
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CHAPTER 1. Broadening understandings of policy evaluation 
and effectiveness 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the debate on policy evaluation 
and its effectiveness, identifying the significant literature and current debates 
regarding evaluation and its utilisation/use. Furthermore, it aims to identify the 
factors (institutional/political), which influence whether or not the recommendations 
made in evaluations are adopted. However, it cannot jump straight into these issues 
before introducing the contrasting approaches towards the evaluation process and 
the underlying theoretical frameworks regarding policy evaluation. The first section 
discusses some central concepts of this discipline and provides an overview of the state 
of the art in evaluation studies. Also, it reviews the historical evolution of evaluation 
and its emergence as a mechanism for improving management.  
 
The second section examines how evaluation has developed in emerging countries as 
part of a wider trend towards public sector reform, transformation of the budgeting 
process and results based management, developments which are associated with the 
paradigm shift towards “the New Public Management”.6 This section also emphasises 
the gap in terms of the State’s capability to understand and adopt policy evaluation. 
The third section will look at the debate on the effectiveness of evaluation as part of 
a broader re-conceptualisation of the theory of evaluation use. Furthermore, this 
section explains the importance of political and institutional factors in shaping the use 
of evaluation. Finally, the concluding remarks will review the importance of the 
effectiveness of evaluation in influencing decision-making, recognising the role of 
evaluation in improving public management and creating public value. 
 
The roots of evaluation 
Evaluation began in early 2000 B.C. in China with the examination of officials in the 
civil service (Fitzpatrick et al., 2004: 31 and Guba & Lincoln, 1981: 1). Later on, during 
the 1800s, evaluation was directed towards education, social and health sector 
programmes in the UK as well as in the USA. These efforts continued in the 1900s with 
rapid advances thanks to technology, techniques and new methods of researching 
and assessment. Evaluation has come a long way since its beginnings in the last 
century. In the early years, it emerged as a tool to examine programmes, and 
eventually, evaluation approaches7 became more formal, professional, systematic, 
rigorous and multidisciplinary cutting across several fields and disciplines.  
 
The development of evaluation has been motivated by a number of rationales 
including to provide information and gain feedback of public policies; to increase 
knowledge of how programmes either contribute to the outcomes achieved or are 
implemented in complex organisations, and; to take better and effective decisions in 
the future.8 
                                                          
6
 This is confirmed by Power (1995, 1997, 2000 cited in Rose et al., 2006: 86) saying that technologies of budgets, 
audits, standards and benchmarks [implicit on policy evaluation] are forms of new public management developed 
under advanced liberalism (neo-liberalism). 
7
 In evaluation field it would be more appropriate to use the term approaches or models (Alkin, 2004: 4-5). 
8
 Mejía (2005) affirms that the most interested on evaluation systems are: i) citizenry seeking for information of how 
their taxes are used or the effectiveness of government in following electorate’s wishes; ii) politicians interested on 
learning about the quantity and quality of goods and services produced, and the extent that social problems have 
received attention and resources have been used properly; iii) officials interested on weakness and risks of 
management systems, programmes’ relevance, and whether public resources are sufficient; iv) policy makers 
seeking for the impact of their efforts and performance. 
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Since the 1960s and 1970s evaluation has been a commonplace in many developed 
countries, particularly in the USA, UK and some countries in Europe (most of the 
policy evaluation literature has dealt with these countries’ experiences). Compared to 
developing countries in Asia, Africa or Latin America, the former properly developed 
theoretical knowledge and expanded the scope of evaluation (Alkin & Christie, 2004 
and Rossi et al., 2004: 28). Moreover, recently, the topic has potentially increased its 
development mainly in the social field (e.g. education, health, housing, employment, 
agriculture) largely due to the large budget invested in these areas, where 
evaluation produces findings about programme’s outcomes with the aim of 
improving them.  
 
Another explanatory reason for expansion assumes that evaluation goes far beyond 
the immediate impact on society and focuses more on the control of finances, to 
provide accountability about how funds have been allocated given spending 
constraints. Indeed, it could be argued that evaluation emerges or expands more 
effectively in contexts where financial crises dominate, serving as a crucial tool to 
address inquiries about the efficiency of policies adopted and to control limited 
resources. 9  The development of evaluation in the 1960s and 1970s, drew upon 
methods such as Planning, Programming and Budgeting Systems (PPBS). First used 
in the Ford Motor Company, these approaches were extended to the public sector to 
improve their efficiency and effectiveness and to inform budget allocation decisions 
(Fitzpatrick et al., 2004: 36).  
 
Clearly, performance-based and results-based budgeting become quite significant in 
terms of being a good incentive for management improvement. 10 In this context, 
evaluation has received notable attention by governments and international 
organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), World Bank (WB) and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and 
through paradigms such as New Public Management, which will be later explained. 
 
Moreover, the literature suggests that evaluation can be conducted in numerous 
ways and with equally numerous approaches (e.g. methodologies and techniques), 
depending upon the purpose, resources and time.11 Inasmuch as a government wants 
to know about the real impact of programmes, more complex and costly methods 
are required. International organisations such as the World Bank12 propose a number 
of methodologies, which are widely accepted due to the influence they exert over 
governments. The principal methodology adopted – the ‘logical framework 
                                                          
9
 This is visible by the UK HM Treasury’s statement (2011: 9), which says that evaluation is more related to public 
resources ‘... to underpin practical resourcing and policy making exercises, and to provide accountability about how 
funds (public resources) have been spent’. 
10
Undoubtedly performance measurement has some implicit effectiveness or efficiency criteria (Knill & Tosun, 2012: 
184). 
11
Models are developed under several visions and take different forms such as: cost-free evaluation; goal-free 
evaluation (Scriven, 1991); functional, tailored, comprehensive, and theory-driven evaluation (Chen 2004, Chen & 
Rossi, 1981, Rossi et al., 2004 and Weiss, 1997, 2007). The classification continues with naturalistic evaluation 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1981), which attempts to present the structure of reality based on informal reasoning of people’s 
concerns, beliefs, perceptions and understandings (House, 1976: 37 and Wolf & Tymitz 1976-77: 6 cited in Guba & 
Lincoln, 1981: 78). The utilization-focused evaluation (Patton, 2004, Stufflebeam, 2004 and Weiss, 2004) for making 
decisions in collaboration with primary users focusing on intended uses; the CIPP model (Stufflebeam, 1983, 2004); 
and the administrative, judicial and political evaluation (Howlett et al., 2009 and Wu et al., 2010). Other scholars refer 
to the relation of costs to benefits and utility, performance and experiments (Parsons, 1995); prescriptive and 
descriptive model developed by Alkin (2004); objectives, management, consumer, expertise and participant-oriented 
approaches (Fitzpatrick et al., 2004); and the multiplist, design and naturalistic approaches (Parsons, 1995). 
12
The World Bank. Monitoring & Evaluation: Some Tools, Methods & Approaches. 
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approach’ – has been promoted by these organisations to get homogeneity in the 
method,13 followed by those countries utilising the Results based Budgeting approach.  
 
Other authors such as Dye (2011: 326, 328) argue that many governments’ approach 
to evaluation emphasises effectiveness reviews. For example, in developing countries 
involved in budgetary reform, administrative evaluation is widely accepted as the 
main mechanism given its emphasis on the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
services carried out within government bodies. Despite these developments, for most 
developing countries evaluation has emerged slowly compared to other stages of the 
strategic planning process (tailoring/design, implementation, control and monitoring), 
and seems to be the least developed discipline in terms of the State’s capacity 
building.  
 
Moreover, in practice, informal practices have prevailed over formal or scientific 
evaluations. Such outcomes might be due to the potential harm of evaluation to the 
manager’s reputation [when results are not positive], the technical challenges 
presented in terms of expertise and data (Wu et al., 2010: 2), or the threats to the 
powerful when the programme evaluated is contentious (Scriven, 1991: 41).  
 
The study of the use of evaluation has gained currency (Weiss, 1998) to monitoring 
such evaluation practices. Research has highlighted the importance of reviewing the 
effectiveness of evaluation as a method for closing the policy cycle and to 
acknowledge creation of public value. However, as Stiglitz (1998: 287 cited in Wiesner, 
2011: 27) indicates ‘Evaluation itself is an institution…’ this perception might be due to 
all circumstances both internal and external to be considered in order to make 
evaluation effective. After discussing the evolution of evaluation and the utilisation of 
evaluation in multidisciplinary fields such as engineering, business, spatial, health, 
agriculture, army, politics and so on, this diversity might be the reason for the large 
number of definitions of evaluation according to theorists, academics and scholars in 
different contexts.  
 
The more comprehensive concept of evaluation as assessing the performance of 
government and covering the entire public administration relates to the final and 
essential phase in the policy process, providing an explanation of the outputs, a 
learning process to find out about the consequences of public policy, an 
understanding of how and why it works or does not work, and an assessment which 
involves value judgments of the overall effectiveness of policies and public 
programmes in terms of the objectives, targets and goals that should be achieved 
(Cochran & Malone, 2010, Dye, 2011: 323, Hill, 2009: 8, Howlett & Ramesh, 1995: 168, 
Stufflebeam & Shinkfield, 2007: 9 and Weiss, 1997: 51, 2007: 77). Scholars also point 
out how evaluation should be linked to the government’s commitment to the 
creation of public value.  
 
The latter concept refers to the equal satisfaction of the human needs e.g. poverty 
reduction, improvement in education or health (Hintze, 2001: 40; 2003: 3), 
embracing a wider concept of people’s living conditions. The worth of evaluation 
depends on the extent to which they can provide better quality in policy adoption 
and decision-making regarding the allocation of public resources oriented to produce 
such public value. Moreover, from a holistic perspective of policy, in order not to be 
                                                          
13
In Mexico and Chile have been introduced the logical framework approach as a planning tool to interconnect through 
indicators, institutional inputs with outputs, outcomes, institutional, sectorial and national objectives. This 
methodology is compulsory by law and operates through their evaluation systems.  
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judge and jury the evaluation should be operated by external organisations 
independent from the executive or through the legislative branch – whose role is to 
represent constituency demands – or the agency that implement those public policies. 
Thus, the state of art in the conduct of evaluation is where the operation of 
evaluation is located at a superior level and is autonomous from the State structure.  
 
Evaluation in emerging countries and the New Public Management 
The so-called third wave of evaluation14 emerged during the late 1980s and 1990s 
(Wollman, 2003: 14), and recently, the growth of evaluation of public management 
has been closely associated to a wider process of public sector reform. The well-known 
cases of such reforms took place in New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America (Rhodes, 1991). In Latin America, efforts to develop reforms 
have been in response to historical problems in the region, such as the quality of 
public management and its capacity to implement policies and allocate resources 
efficiently. These efforts belong to the second generation of reforms15 following the 
macro economical adjustments in the 1980s (Naím, 1994). 
 
In the study “El gobierno del gobierno” (the governing of government), Aguilar (2013: 
27) claims that there were two motivations for boosting public administration reforms 
in these countries. Firstly, the debt crisis, which forced them to implement a fiscal 
adjustment policy to achieve fiscal equilibrium, which in turn required the 
improvement of programmes, policies, public goods and services’ efficiency and of 
government performance. Secondly, the political crisis of these regimes characterized 
as corrupt and inefficient, forced them to democratize and introduce a more 
participative way of governing, one which was transparent, legal, and accountable. 
These issues converge into the New Public Management ‘NPM’, which responds to the 
State’s desire to be competitive, efficient, and to improve the macroeconomic 
performance of the national economy.  
 
The NPM focused on ensuring citizen consumer satisfaction through greater use of 
market and contractual mechanisms, government transparency (Jones, 2002: 84 and 
Jones & Kettl, 2003: 10), and performance-related pay in public organisations (Hood 
& Peters, 2004: 278). These principles (Barzelay, 2001: 3, Hill, 2009: 291, Hood, 1995: 
96, Osborne & Gaebler, 1992 and Peters, 1996: 13) belonged to a wider movement of 
a ‘rethink of governance’ in many developing countries following the example of 
developed economies. For Arellano & Ramírez (2000: 1-2) proposals to reconfigure 
the public sector were implemented to create governments based on results and real 
impacts.16 In this context, the NPM (Hill, 2009: 291) responded to dilemmas about 
public bureaucracy and accountability, emphasizing the need to adopt an ‘evidence-
based learning’ approach (Hood & Peters, 2004: 278).17 A key factor in the reforms of 
                                                          
14
Wollman (2003: 13) says that public-sector reform and evaluation are interlinked and in sequence over time: “the first 
wave of evaluation during the 1960s and 1970s; the second wave beginning in the mid-1970s; and a third wave 
related to the New Public Management (NPM) movement”. 
15
The Washington Consensus dates back to 1989 and is a set of guidelines of policy and economic reforms imposed 
by the Washington-based international financial institutions to developing countries in Latin America that should be 
adopted in order to reform their economies. The first-generation of reforms include macroeconomic stabilization, 
reduction of inflation, budget cuts and privatization, whereas second-generation focus on reforms of the State, civil 
service, better regulation, tax collection, delivery of public services and so on. For further information see Naím, 2000, 
2000b, Navia & Velasco, 2003 and Williamson, 2002, 2003. 
16
This new way of government started with a management strategy, which was focused on performance achievements, 
through key performance indicators as well as effective monitoring and an evaluation system (Rhodes, 1991; 
Schedler, 2003). 
17
Hood (1995: 96) identifies seven ‘doctrines’ i) Hands-on professional management in the public sector; ii) Explicit 
standards and measures of performance; iii) Greater emphasis on output controls; iv) …disaggregation of units in the 
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public administration proposed by the NPM is the transformation of the budgeting 
process, which means moving from a system of control of expenditures towards a 
system oriented to results.18 
 
However, based on some arguments regarding the experience of and evidence from 
those countries where reforms originated (Jones, 2002: 84, Jones & Kettl, 2003: 2 and 
Manning, 2001: 297), it could be asserted that the NPM as a global trend is more a 
paradigm inspiring other countries than a guideline to promote public sector reforms. 
It appears to be ‘somewhat mystical in essence’ (Hood & Peters, 2004: 268), but 
without a consensus about its features and evidence of the real impact. For Manning 
(2001: 297) “the victory of NPM was very partial”. For some developing countries the 
results may have been slightly better in terms of improving public sector 
responsiveness and efficiency to the political principals. However, in other respects it 
appears that hierarchical bureaucracies have not been downsized or reformed by 
market mechanisms (Cejudo, 2008 and Manning, 2001: 300).19 
 
While emerging countries – at least in Latin America – arrived late to such reforms, 
compared to developed economies, the important factor to take into account is that 
such waves of reform were important in fostering the use of evaluation in policy-
making. However, these countries have developed less systematic evaluation 
processes than was predicted and they have been more focused on government 
outputs than outcomes for citizens (Jones, 2002: 84). Hill (2009: 299) also identifies 
the potential contradiction within the NPM, which stresses accountability on the one 
hand, but on the other hand, advocate the traditional forms of top-down control.20  
 
A common mistake in the NPM reforms is that they frequently adopted a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ approach to bureaucracy (Hood & Peters, 2004: 278); as Ormond & Löffle 
(1999: 2) suggest, this kind of ideal form of ‘Weberian’ public administration never 
survives in reality. For Arellano (2002: summary), the solutions offered by the NPM 
do not fit in public administration with dominant constraints, 
In other words, no administrative reform consider itself as an exclusively technical 
transformation and based on concepts such as ‘quality’, ‘innovation’, ‘client’, ‘results-
based evaluation’ succeed in the short term. In administrative “habitats” based on 
loyalty with extensive clientelism, less accountable, who are used to lack of transparency 
and over regulation. 
 
While the NPM’s doctrines appear to have been implemented, and have followers in 
developing countries, the extent of change has been only superficial.21 Consolidation 
of the State’s democracy is attractive for such countries in ‘transition’, in which the 
NPM makes promises for greater public service responsiveness, accountability, and 
entrepreneurial public sector to grow their economies. Indeed, such waves of reform 
linked the adoption of policy evaluation to a process of developing the state’s 
                                                                                                                                                                         
public sector; v) …greater competition in the public sector (to this may be added actual privatization); vi) …private 
sector styles of management; vii) …greater discipline and parsimony in resource use. 
18
Some of those characteristics are the basis of a new managerial management and organisational cultural model 
(SHCP, SED, 2007: 13) in order to create public value inside the Mexican public administration.  
19
The article by Cejudo (2008) suggests that not all reforms were inspired by the New Public Management, these were 
a consequence of political democratization and economic liberalization in the Mexican public sector. 
20
Aguilar (2013: 28) adds that the NPM and New Governance agree on something, a narrow interest to discern the 
decisional process within the governing of government, ‘…how the government decide about objectives, priorities, 
regulations, organisation, rules, actions, actors, resources, auditing and control systems and the performance of 
evaluation of the agencies inside public administration…'  
21
As those suggested by Jones & Kettl (2003: 2), a smaller, less interventionist and more decentralized government, 
and the visible improvements on governments’ efficiency and effectiveness, despite such reforms are often ‘evidence 
free’ (Hood & Peters, 2004: 278). 
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institutional capabilities.22 These capabilities are built upon technical-administrative 
and political capabilities (Repetto, 2003: 1,3), where interaction among individuals 
(officials) and groups operate within the framework of rules (formal and informal), 
organisational routines and practice.  
 
Increasing administrative capacity through institutional development has been an 
important component for ensuring the State modernization, facilitating democracy 
and sustainable development (Prats, 1997).23 In this sense, the adoption of evaluation 
can be seen as closely linked to these reforms efforts, signaling the modernization of 
the State, especially for those developing countries seeking to change their 
authoritarian and bureaucratic image in the world. Beyond everything, a major 
achievement of the NPM was bringing up the Results-based Budgeting as the 
epicentre of policy evaluation. The experience observed in developed countries (USA, 
UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand), which positioned budgeting reforms as the 
core of evaluation, indicates that incentives should be the basis to influence budget 
decision-making.24 Indeed, the value of such reforms given by political actors within 
the ministries or departments of finance was due to their power, leadership and 
experience. 
 
Exploring whether and how evaluation ‘demand’ arises, scholars agree that the 
growing interest in appraising government performance in all dimensions (individual, 
programme, policy, organisational) is primarily linked to the scarcity of resources and 
interest in being efficient.25 For Bangura & Larbi (2006: 83) it was more linked to the 
second-generation of state reforms during the 1990s, which emphasized the 
effectiveness of the public sector among others. 26  In general, the priority of 
governments is to seek through public expenditure the provision of services and deal 
with the demands of the public. However, public resources are insufficient to meet 
such demand, at least in developing countries.  
 
Therefore, in principle the more evaluation is pushed forwards by government the 
less economic uncertainty and scarcity of resources the government have to deal with 
(see Bamberger, 1991 and Wiesner, 2011). Given this, evaluation should have become 
a powerful tool to determine whether programmes are effective and where to 
allocate these resources. For others, evaluation has been promoted by international 
                                                          
22
To explain the utility of institutional capability, it is important to note that everyday public institutions and their 
stakeholders make decisions to solve problems distressing society under a fundamental premise (Barzelay, 2001: 3) 
that policy decisions amount to a substantial shift in the governance and management. The way to respond 
effectively to these public issues is closely linked to the rules, routines, practices, as well as other key factors pointed 
out by Repetto (2003: 6-8) such as the legitimacy and accountability of priorities and the particular interests of those 
involved in public-decision making, amongst others. Nonetheless, there is a gap between these countries and 
developed nations in terms of capability building. The reasons could be attributed to their position and control under 
donor agencies, or the consequences (transparency and accountability) that evaluation could bring to their 
governments’ stability. 
23
To consolidate institutional capability it is not enough to have meritocratic and encouraged bureaucracies, with the 
ability for management under uncertain contexts (Repetto, 2003: 35). It is more related to institutional strengthening, 
which means the relation between the State, politics, market, administration, constituency and international context. 
24
Incentives align the process to efficient and sustainable solutions. Whether politics achieve linking results with the 
more budget allocation, evaluation will act as an incentive and the evaluation market will develop (Wiesner, 2002: 
139). However, a study by the OECD (2009) argues that most countries have few incentives for bureaucrats, 
ministers or legislators to encourage learning or to base their decisions on performance data. 
25
Wiesner (2002: 140, 142) notes three sources: i) countries have to assess whether to do budgetary cuts or remain it; 
ii) governments cannot be passive if they do not want to pay high political costs; and iii) civil society has become 
more aware of its capacity to claim accountability from governments. 
26
This is known as the ‘four Es’: the effectiveness of public sector intervention in terms of coverage and quality of 
service; the economic efficiency of service delivery; the improved equity of service delivery; and the creation of an 
enabling environment for private sector development. 
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organisations or donor agencies27 (Bamberger, 1991: 329, Dahler-Larsen, 2005: 621, 
Horton & Mackay, 1999: 11 and Wiesner, 2002: 132), whose aim is to support the 
improvement of evaluation capacity at the central government level.  
 
What factors help to explain the attempts to develop evaluation systems in Latin 
American countries? The analysis of the circumstances under which evaluation 
emerged in developing countries shows numerous possible reasons: pressure by 
international organisations to develop best practice models, measure performance 
and create data systems (Andrews, 2008: 5); the influence of wider NPM reforms28 
(Ormond & Löffle, 1999: 1); the result of the economic liberalization and political 
democratization processes (Cejudo, 2008: 120-3), or; a state’s interest in improving 
results due to domestic pressures.  
 
Moreover, this seems to be the tendency of policy evaluation and one of the open 
questions might be elucidated in Rossi et al.’s (2004: 14-5) work. They suggest that 
the 21st century is dominated by conservatism on fiscal policy, the devolution of 
responsibility to the states and skepticism about programmes and their social impacts. 
Thus, the question since the 1990s is whether they (policies) are poorly or properly 
conceived, appropriately or inadequately implemented, and effectively or 
ineffectively administered and how effective the policy evaluation implemented is.  
 
A re-conceptualisation of the theory of evaluation use 
According to the dictionary, effectiveness is the degree to which something is 
successful in producing a desired result; success (Oxford, Merriam-Webster), and the 
quality of being successful in achieving the results of what is wanted (Cambridge). 
Much of the literature refers to effectiveness as use or utilisation of evaluation 
(evidence-based policy). Within the evaluation literature, Leviton & Hughes (1981: 
526) confined the concept of utilisation to the evaluation results for programmes and 
policies only; whereas Teirlinck et al. (2013: 369) refer to usefulness as a standard of 
evaluation “measured in terms of policy consequences related to the conduct of the 
evaluation”.  
 
For Dahler-Larsen (2005: 623), the utilisation dimension is based on the premise that 
evaluations are produced to play a role in future ‘practical action situations’ 
although they are not always used. A literature pioneered by Weiss (1998: 31) 
describes a connection between use and change based on findings “Any theory of 
evaluation use has to be a theory of change”. Moreover, the theory of utilization-
focused evaluation developed by Patton (2004: 278) is widely accepted because it 
attempts to identify a group of intended users within the decision-making process to 
improve utilisation.  
 
In this sense, scholars of evaluation have identified five ways in which evaluations are 
used: i) instrumental, when findings modify the programme evaluated (Rich, 1977 
cited in Leviton & Hughes, 1981: 528 and Stufflebeam & Shinkfield, 2007); ii) 
conceptual, when findings help staff to understand the programme in a new way 
(Fleischer & Christie, 2009, Rich, 1977 cited in Leviton & Hughes, 1981: 528, Sager & 
Ledermann, 2008 cited in Ledermann, 2011 and Weiss, 1998); iii) knowledge-
generating (Patton, 2012) or enlightenment (Stufflebeam & Shinkfield, 2007), when 
                                                          
27
The World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations, the United 
States Agency for International Development, the European Union and the Inter-American Development Bank. 
28
Albeit those developing countries often lack the evidence and results of developed countries, they still follow the NPM 
doctrines and reforming governments as a guide to construct their future. 
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Termination 
Allocation of Finances $$$ 
Unchanged status quo 
Learning process/knowledge dimension 
Transparency & accountability             
(interest groups) 
findings add knowledge to the field; iv) process, when findings produce cognitive, 
behavioural, program and organisational changes (Weiss, 1979); and v) persuasive or 
symbolic, when findings persuade stakeholders about programme or organisation’s 
accountability (Florio et al., 1979 cited in Leviton & Hughes, 1981: 528, Patton, 2012, 
Stufflebeam & Shinkfield, 2007 and Weiss, 1998). However, Alkin & Taut (2003 cited 
on Herbert, 2014: 391) describe this process as “conducting evaluation as a symbolic 
act without intending to use the findings”.  
 
In this research, the concept of “effectiveness” is employed instead of “utilisation” or 
“use” in order to illustrate how it can shed new light on the understanding of the 
evaluation process. The effectiveness of evaluation is defined in terms of the impact 
of evaluation on the policy itself, that is, the extent to which the evaluation of a 
policy or programme leads to changes in that policy. In other words, effectiveness is 
measured by assessing how many of the recommendations established in evaluation 
reports are adopted by policy makers and programme operators in response to those 
evaluations. 
 
Assuming public policy aims to solve specific problems, the effectiveness of evaluation 
can be assessed as the extent to which programme improvement in a particular 
policy area can be attributed to the evaluation performed.29 It is to find out how the 
key government outcomes compared to others are provided, considering contextual 
factors (Andrews, 2008: 36), and the criterion of evaluation about how an outcome is 
achieved (Dunn, 2012: 196), as a result of resource allocation and of sustainability of 
the desired results (Hintze, 2003: 4). The concept explained here is similar to that 
offered by Weiss30 in a broad way. Thus, effectiveness is the essence of evaluation 
results both in public and in private sectors (Hintze, 2001: 14), the core criterion to 
demonstrate the value of evaluation and the purpose of this research. In this context, 
the criteria for judging the effectiveness of evaluation could take simpler forms 
compared with the taxonomy already mentioned, as shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 1 
 
                         The effectiveness of policy evaluation 
                                                                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
        
                               Source: author’s own elaboration. 
                                                          
29
As Essama-Nssah (2013: 1) affirms “Effective evaluation can produce reliable information on what works, what does 
not, and why”, and presumably answer questions such as: i) whether they are doing the right things in the right way; ii) 
if what they are doing is working and worth the cost, and iii) how the observed outcomes can be explained, which 
policy makers need to know.  
30
For Weiss (1972: 18) is to decide whether to continue or discontinue the programme, improve practices and 
procedures, add or drop specific programme strategies and techniques, institute similar programmes elsewhere, 
allocate resources among competing programmes, and accept or reject a programme approach or theory. 
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In the first place, the evaluations might recommend some “amendments” or 
modifications to policy in order to improve it. Secondly, the evidence from 
evaluations might highlight risks, high costs or the need for improvements in current 
policy/programmes itself, thereby leading to their “termination”.31 In the third place, 
another indicator of change in the programmes is the “allocation of financial 
resources” during the budgetary process,32 as enacted in law either by the executive 
or legislature at Congress. The latter categories could be linked to the instrumental 
use mentioned earlier, as Herbert (2014: 390) notes, “This type of use depends on 
evaluation results being the basis of a decision”; as well as to the process use of 
evaluation involves either some amendments, allocation of resources or cancelation 
of the programme or policy evaluated.  
 
In the fourth place, the operators placed a programme in the “unchanged” category, 
which may indicate the maintenance of the status quo, with no consequences for 
programmes. Concerning this, an element gaining relevance in the literature on 
evaluation is the learning and knowledge dimension. Despite few indications of 
empirical links between learning and usefulness (Teirlinck et al., 2013: 369)33 many 
programmes are going through an internal “learning process” due to evaluation, 
which is not reflected in specific changes of the programmes, and which should be 
properly acknowledged. In the fifth place, this learning category includes the role of 
learning inputs, outputs, channels, the dimensions enabling learning processes in 
policy-making, the conditions of failure or success (Teirlinck et al., 2013: 367), and the 
nature of problems and solutions [active learning] (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995: 175).  
 
It also comprises the perspective of involving practitioners and what can be learnt 
from their experience (Coote et al., 2004: 9) as a way of achieving effectiveness. 
Similar to the conceptual use noted by Weiss & Bucuvalas (1980 cited on Herbert, 
2014: 390) “…where the use of an evaluation is not direct, but rather the information 
is absorbed into the common knowledge…” As Howlett & Ramesh (1995: 170) claim 
“the greatest benefit of policy evaluation is not the direct results it generates but the 
process of policy learning that accompanies it”. For Weiss’ (1979: 430) this is the 
enlightenment model, which claims,  
Research sensitizes decision makers to new issues and helps turn what were non-
problems into policy problems… In the long run, along with other influences, it often 
redefines the policy agenda.  
 
This is similar to Sundell’s (2014: 34) view of the indirect longer-term influence of 
evidence and evaluation studies on the organisational cultures of decision-makers. 
However, such “learning” processes (see knowledge dimension on Dahler-Larsen, 
2005) generally prove to be difficult to measure and classify unless those 
implementers or coordinators of policy evaluation refer to it. This leads to a 
perspective, which might seem contradictory to the definitions already mentioned, 
recognizing the validity of Picciottos’ view (2005: 348 cited in Wiesner, 2011: 30) that,  
                                                          
31
An example of disruption on the effectiveness of policy evaluation and main concern of this study is when termination 
of programmes is needed. In this sense, although the chances of programme termination increased with external 
consultants (Dahler-Larsen, 2000), according to his study in Danish municipalities shows they participation made no 
difference to the continuation, adjustment, and termination of programmes. This lack of uptake by policy-makers is 
attributed to institutional and ideological factors as mentioned above. 
32
At this point, it is important for the reader to keep in mind that results based budgeting is only an outcome of the 
policy process, and should be distinguished as part of a structure of incentives and not as a purpose in itself, 
because it only brings a partial perspective on policy evaluation. 
33
The three dimensions noted by Teirlinck et al. (2013: 369) of the learning effect of evaluation and factors to its 
utilization are: i) the evaluation content or the usable knowledge of recommendations and the evidence base of the 
study; ii) the process dimension from the angle of stakeholders’ involvement; and iii) the evaluation design and the 
methodological setting of evaluation studies.  
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If evaluation is only about learning, it does not make authority responsible. If it must 
churn out lessons to justify itself, it will generate an oversupply of simplistic and pious 
exhortations and platitudes. Worse: evaluators that do not encourage accountability 
for results fail to provide incentives for learning. 
 
Lastly, another source of use comes by the citizenry and the NGOs, mainly as a form 
of accountability of government’s performance and similar to the symbolic use of 
evaluations with the aim to legitimize its use. However, it is not the aim of this 
research to follow-up the use of evaluations by these actors outside the government 
due to limitations of time and length of the research. In any case, the evaluation 
should be used to improve the programmes in different forms such as those already 
mentioned either by the policy makers and officials, by the executive when tailoring 
the budget, by the legislative when approved the budget and/or by the citizenry. 
 
What explains the effectiveness of policy evaluation? 
In addressing this question, a primary observation is that potential recommendations 
become actions when policymakers assume their responsibility of decision-making to 
make real improvements in programmes. However, the way in which policy makers, 
politicians, officials and bureaucracies value results usually has some ethics and 
politics implicit in decisions, which could influence an effective conclusion of the policy 
process. Thus, the potential to impact the decision-making process through 
evaluation only exists to the extent that programme effectiveness is valuable for 
those actors involved (Weiss, 1972: 5). In this process, Wiesner (2011: 34) argues that the 
degree of the demand-driven approach is more effective than supply-side, because 
the former provides incentives that encourage and reward results.  
 
In other words, the demand for evaluation should emerge from those levels in which 
the policy is needed such as recipients and clients whose interest claim for results 
(effectiveness) from the government. It seems like a bottom-up approach of 
evaluation, yielding policy-makers, stakeholders and users’ opinions to formulate the 
policy rather than a decision only made by the top-level officials and politicians. 
Arguments about effectiveness go in both ways. On the one hand, Hill (2009: 169) 
and Dahler-Larsen (2005: 619) assert that there is rarely a connection between 
evaluation and policy improvement, and consequently, the conclusions of evaluation 
are rarely applied, 34  as Dye (2011: 335) affirms, even when there is evidence of 
negative findings. Teirlinck et al. (2013: 368, 370) refer to the lack of uptake of 
recommendations as a disruption to the policy cycle between the evaluation process 
and the agenda of policy design.  
 
Indeed, they offer this argument based on their case study saying “unexpected 
weakness with respect to the lack of broad stakeholder involvement in evaluation 
exercises” (Teirlinck et al., 2013: 368, 370). Seeking for the reasons why decision-
makers avoid or ignore findings, the UK Cabinet Office (2008 cited in Sundell, 2014: 
25) presents a realistic explanation of the process. For instance, they mention that the 
research itself was not always valued or well communicated within their own 
organisations; internally conducted research or commissioned research from 
consultants was more likely to be regarded as more relevant than academic research; 
external academic research was not seen as sufficiently timely, or as not sufficiently 
relevant to users’ current needs; and research was much less likely to be used when 
findings were controversial or when findings upset the status quo. 
                                                          
34
Reasons why it is so difficult to eliminate failed programmes and policies by governments are: i) concentrated 
benefits and dispersed costs; ii) legislative and bureaucratic interests; iii) incrementalism at work (governments 
seldom undertake to consider any programme as a whole in any given year).  
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On the other hand, from the perspective of other academics such as Askim (2007: 
454) and Pollitt (2006a: 38; 2006b: 5) there is empirical evidence about utilisation, 
especially by politicians, although they made little use of it. Indeed, Askim’s study 
(2007) proves that performance data and evaluations are used in the decision-
making process. However, utilisation appears to vary according to the circumstances 
in different policy sectors35 and countries. His analysis extends to particular patterns of 
use e.g. periods of time or interest groups. In surveying Norwegian councillors, his 
study sets the decision-making process in a timeline known as pre-decisional, 
decisional and post-decisional stage to explain how they respond differently over the 
policy cycle. He cited other scholars to show contradictory results around the topic. 
For example, Johansson (1995) claims there is more use of data when actors are 
dealing with ‘hard core’ tasks (e.g. technical services) than with ‘soft’ (e.g. social 
services).  
 
By contrast, for Greeve (2003), decision increases when the complexity of the task 
decreases, or as Askim (2007), Bogt (2003), Macintosh (1985, 1994) and Wilson (2000) 
observed, where observability over programmes is high. Therefore, as Askim argues 
(2007: 464) the difficulty here is to distinguish between a soft and hard task, high or 
less observable, and complex or easy policies. Patton (2012: 136) adds to the 
complexity of studies of evaluation use by highlighting that “Evaluation findings 
typically have technical and methodological weaknesses; data must be interpreted; 
[and] other contextual factors must be taken into consideration”. In another study, 
Melkers & Willoughby (2005) prove that data was most useful during budget 
preparation.  
 
A different perspective on exploring the conditions where evaluation leads to policy 
changes is developed by Ledermann (2011). Through a case study of 11 programmes’ 
evaluations commissioned by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
and carried out by external evaluators, factors were connected such as the level of 
conflict (low, high) among the stakeholders and the amount of pressure for change 
(low, high) acting as a mechanism (awakener, trigger, referee and conciliator) to 
measure how much these influence the use of evaluations. The study also adds the 
novelty value and evaluation quality as conditions sine qua non for changing 
decision-making. Ledermann concludes that in contexts of low pressure and conflict, 
evaluation contributes to decision-making to the extent that evaluations are of good 
quality and novelty. However, when high pressure and conflict prevails, evaluation is 
used as a referee to decide changes neither considering novelty or quality.  
 
Conversely, the findings of the study of Jennings & Hall (2012: 16) suggest that in high-
conflict environments, evidence-based decision-making is less likely to occur, whereas 
when a political conflict over the agency declines the evidence-based practices 
increase; although this autor noted that these depend on who controls the agency. 
However, this is a partial perspective based only in two conditions, leaving aside the 
inherent political factor. This means that despite factors are ceteris paribus or remain 
the same and keep controlled by the agency, the decision made by actors after 
evaluation is uncertain and unpredictable due to other conditions examined here.  
 
In reflecting on the insightful arguments of these academics, this research further 
discusses under what circumstances evaluation is more likely to be used. Although 
                                                          
35
Askim (2007: 464) concludes that “utilization is higher among councillors working with elderly care, administrative and 
educational affairs” and constant across policy sectors increasing during decisional stage (later on explained) working 
with administrative affairs and technical services. 
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evaluations are government-ordered, in general policy-makers, officials and policy 
analysts are rarely or unsystematically involved in closing the policy cycle. 
Appropriation of evaluation results by political actors remains a difficult task and 
varies from country to country. Moreover, in large administrative systems (e.g. the 
Mexican government) it is complex to isolate the causal effects of evaluation (Dahler-
Larsen, 2000: 77). To identify these causal factors, institutional or political, requires a 
case study to provide an explanation of the effectiveness of policy evaluation.  
 
Factors influencing the effectiveness of evaluation 
To determine which factors are likely to impact the use of evaluation results, a review 
of the literature regarding this topic is applied here highlighting a myriad of factors 
identified by many academics that might affect effectiveness. The discussion will focus 
on the extent to which this literature engages with the variables noted as the most 
relevant. In doing so, Leviton & Hughes (1981) agreed there are five variables on the 
utilisation between users: the relevance of evaluation addressing clients’ needs and 
timeliness of information and the importance of good communication between 
evaluators and potential users.  
 
Another issue is related to the information processing, as these authors claim “The 
way evaluation is presented to users affects their comprehension and thus the extent 
of use”. Thus, evaluators should be aware of the way reports are communicated to 
users. The credibility of the evaluation producer and the quality and objectivity of 
evaluation are also likely to enhance utilisation. Utilisation might also be influenced 
by user involvement and advocacy and the commitment of decision-makers.  
 
Other authors (Fleischer & Christie, 2009) identify four factors mainly related to the 
role of evaluator: organisational outcomes associated with evaluation capacity 
building (e.g. organisational support structures, capacity to do evaluation, evaluative 
inquiry); the role of evaluator, which can be influenced by the purpose and approach 
of the evaluation, stakeholders’ needs and evaluator’s epistemological preferences; 
stakeholder’s involvement; and misuse of evaluation findings based on intentionality 
(intentional, unintentional and nonuse). Cousins & Leithwood (1986: 347-8) grouped 
in two those factors affecting effectiveness. One set of factors related to the conduct 
of an evaluation such as relevance, credibility, quality, communication, findings and 
timeliness while the other set was concerned with decision or policy setting such as 
information needs, decision characteristics, political climate, competing information, 
personal characteristics and commitment/receptiveness to evaluation.  
 
However, the impact of the latter factors regarding decision or policy-making seems 
to be mixed. This group of factors not only include organisational characteristics but 
they extended to information, commitment and decisions, which might belong to 
another set of characteristics related to actors and policy makers’ decision who 
operates within a political context. More recently, the debate in the field also 
emphasizes different stances influencing effectiveness. Contandriopoulos et al. (2010) 
and Contandriopoulos & Brousselle (2012) identify the social structuring, level of 
polarization (problematization, prioritization and salience of the issue, and criteria to 
assess solutions) and cost-sharing dimension (knowledge exchange imply time, money, 
attention). However, as these authors affirm, these stances belong to the ‘collective-
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level knowledge use’36 to attain knowledge from cumulative experience, in which 
evaluation results could be used to the ‘learning process’ as explained here.  
 
In order to provide a comprehensive overview of factors facilitating the use of 
evaluation findings, these will be analysed from a different perspective and in order 
of importance as a narrative in terms of whether and how they are implicit in the 
effectiveness of policy evaluation. It is important to bear in mind that institutional or 
political factors studied here embrace those relatively under-explored by scholars and 
academics within a comprehensive approach. It is therefore of interest of this research 
to study those factors which are at the foundation of policy evaluation. This is the 
conceptual basis for the development of these M&E models in Chile and Mexico.  
 
With respect to the role and attitudes of individuals toward evaluation a key factor 
which might affect the effectiveness of evaluation and has not given much attention 
in the literature, is the nature of Inter/Intra Governmental Relations ‘IGR’. Despite the 
difficulty to identify the most relevant factors promoting the use of evaluation, the 
findings of a recent analysis of 41 empirical studies of evaluation use conducted 
between 1986 and 2005 (Johnson et al., 2009: 388) highlight the importance of 
engagement, interaction and communications between stakeholders, clients and 
evaluators as the “key to maximizing the use of the evaluation in the long run”. 
These are characteristics of the concept IGR, as explained in the methodology chapter, 
this structure of relationships embraces diverse forms of coordination such as 
negotiation, exchange and legal authority (Franz, 1985 and Kaufmann, 1985).  
 
It also endorses the idea that the availability, timing, reliability and quality of data, 
as well as economic resources represent a key input to make the evaluation effective. 
How these elements (forms of coordination, information and economic resources) are 
incorporated in the policy process will have an impact on the level of agreement or 
conflict in the IGR. As Franz (1985: 484) argues ‘the more intergovernmental linkages 
exist the more the single organisation gains some degree of autonomy as to its 
interorganisational behaviour’. A general agreement is that such forms of 
coordination often determine the decision or nondecision-making regarding 
effectiveness though they are difficult to validate. This may be because the decision-
making process occurs in the political arenas where the human relations, ethical issues 
and interests could bias any effort, 37  along with the difficulty of proving these 
intangible and subjective issues. 
 
For example, at Congress for the budgetary process where politicians need to pay 
more attention to programme performance when preparing budgets instead of 
discretionary decision-making. The importance of the coordination between these 
actors and the key role of Congress is also noted in Bundi’s study (2016) about the 
demand for evaluation in the parliament, who is “an important demander of 
evaluations” to make decisions and fulfil their oversight function. From a 
comprehensive standpoint, these are the subtle nuances of politics and ethics implicit 
on the decision-making of utilisation (effectiveness) of evaluation. However, some of 
                                                          
36
Contandriopoulos et al. (2010) and Contandriopoulos & Brousselle (2012) refer to it as “the process by which users 
incorporate specific information into action proposals to influence others’ thought, practices and collective action 
rules”. 
37
For instance, Fleischer & Christie (2009: 172) in their comparative study of the Preskill and Caracelli’s and the U.S. 
American Evaluation Association (AEA), as well as in Ledermann’s survey (2011: 15) pointed out to the hurdle for 
utilising evaluation data when most of decision makers reject conclusions based on beliefs and values rather than 
data. This belongs to the political arenas, which go further than the user or evaluator characteristics of the human 
factor identified above and will explained later on. 
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these characteristics are not referred to in detail by authors yet and considered here 
as a key matter.  
 
As was mentioned earlier, political factors shape every public decision (Mayntz, 1994: 
80-4) including the decision-making process around policy evaluation. Thus, the 
intentions of those demanding the evaluation (Teirlinck et al., 2013) along with the 
decisions of actors responsible to make effective the evaluation are influenced by 
such political circumstances, which could either modify or not the programmes 
according to the evaluation results expected. Indeed, it might not be wrong to argue 
that the possibility of success in expanding the use of evidence-based policy will 
depend on the ability of political actors to move away from the status quo to 
integrate a more results-focused approach based on the effectiveness of evaluation 
into the strategic planning process. 
 
Another perspective recently emerged from the debate is the theory of influence by 
Kirkhart (2000), in which dimensions (source of influence, intention and time frame) 
exert greater impact on the use/utilisation of evaluation. For this author, time 
dimension occurs in three stages: immediately, at the end-of-cycle, and in the long 
term of evaluation. However, the time dimension refers only to the influence of 
evaluations over time, this is in the short, medium and long term. To make effective 
evaluations, a main concern of this study is the need to provide data (evaluations) 
timely to actors shaping the decision-making and continuity of the process e.g. during 
the budgetary process. Indeed, this element is closely linked to the framework factor 
to strengthen the structure of the M&E system.  
 
Regarding the source of influence (agent of change), this identifies two elements: the 
results and process-based influence to generate change in the policy or programme. 
Whereas the intention (intended or unintended) dimension is explicitly described in 
the purpose of the evaluation, theory employed and evaluator-client contract. This 
dimension constrains the intentionality to the tailoring process of evaluation and does 
not identify an intentional/unintentional intervention of those responsible of decision-
making once they have the evaluations results. These are the subtle nuances of 
politics implicit in the study of the IGR as here is examined.  
 
Another discussion in debate is how mis-utilisation or ‘non-change’ decisions represent 
a risk to close the policy cycle (Teirlinck et al., 2013: 368). In situations where all 
conditions are settled such as the accepted rules of the game, instruments of force, 
values and power relations but there seems not to play for decisions effectively, 
presumably a non decision-making exists (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963: 641) and should 
be analysed on detail. Indeed, the mere existence of evaluations is not sufficient to 
call for decisions by actors and prevent a latent misuse of them despite these 
dominant values. For example, when findings suggest major changes or cancellation 
of the programme/policy but this represent a political risk in terms of votes, might be 
a nondecision-making prevails due to political consequences to the party in power. 
Here, power emerges as the realisation of preferences in the decision-making process 
(Hay, 1997: 46).  
 
For Lukes (2005: 22), this is the two-dimensional view of power operating as a 
“qualified critique” to prevent potential issues and conflict interests over decisions. 
The latter example indicates either a conflict within the structures of power38 relations 
                                                          
38
For Bachrach & Baratz (1962: 947) a power structure is “an integral part and the mirror image of the organisation’s 
stratification”. 
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or how the nondecision-making is also exercised excluding relevant issues from the 
process without any conflict and under apparent consensus, as Bernstein (2000: 5) 
asserts to say, power relations create, legitimize (relations of order) and reproduce 
boundaries between different groups, discourses and agents. Thus, the subtle nuances 
and meanings emerging from this process are closely linked to the relationship 
between actors and branches as well as the circumstances around the decisions made 
by actors are embraced into the IGR and these will be discussed here. Then, maybe 
the questions are Under what circumstances decision-makers are likely to use 
evaluation results? and Do some actors make more use of evaluations than others? 
 
Regarding the question that the political factor in the IGR is decisive for the 
effectiveness of policy evaluation it is assumed in the theory that the more intra-
governmental linkages are present, the more co-governance exists between branches 
of government and the more effective the evaluation is. If evaluation of public 
policies is closely linked to coordination, the latter enhances the efficiency and 
effectiveness of government programmes (Peters, 2006: 133, 135). Therefore, an 
effective coordination between actors seeking the effectiveness of evaluation 
enhances the performance of government programmes. The impact of this 
independent variable on the effectiveness of evaluation is a result of the combination 
of the above factors as well as the decisions made by different actors inside agencies.  
 
To ensure effective decision-making, the quality of the bureaucracy of those actors 
and stakeholders39 involved in the process should be taken into account. This is a core 
element of the State’s capacity to adopt policy evaluation as part of an institutional 
process. Alkin pointed out the experience, skills (know-how) and abilities as decisive 
for improving public sector performance. The so-called human factor e.g. user or 
evaluator characteristics 40  (Alkin, 1985) and the educational level to develop 
effectiveness (Askim, 2007) indicate that the role of the evaluator, evaluation 
capacity building (Fleischer & Christie, 2009) and the involvement of administrators 
(Dahler-Larsen, 2000, Ledermann, 2011 and Teirlinck et al., 2013) should become a 
professionalized area of work across the government and non-government sectors 
(Sundell, 2014: 31) introducing skilled and experienced cadres to strengthen capacity 
development.  
 
In essence, the quality of bureaucracy points toward the fact that policy-makers, 
politicians, officials and stakeholders involved in the evaluation process and 
operation of programme/policy should be skilled with a basic level of know-how, 
technical support to fulfil the needs of evaluation and monitoring systems. These 
capabilities help to perform efficient data-gathering, data-entry, analysis – these will 
be more sophisticated depending on the amount of data provided by programmes 
and government institutions – and most importantly to improve decision-making 
based on evaluations. The more they are involved from the beginning of evaluation, 
the more likely that the evaluation will impact upon the redesign and expansion of 
the policy (Teirlinck et al., 2013: 371). For Dahler-Larsen (2000: 85) and Ledermann 
(2011: 16), the involvement of administrators leads to a better understanding of the 
evaluation process influencing it.  
 
                                                          
39
Stakeholders are those policy-makers, politicians, ministers, officials and evaluation practitioners directly responsible 
of success or drawback in evaluations. 
40
The human factor concerns to characteristics such as knowledge, skills, and experienced cadres, which affect the 
quality of the bureaucracy necessary to lead changes on programmes. 
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Similarly, Teirlinck et al. (2013: 368) draw attention to their [bureaucracy] role and 
how far the lack of involvement, along with the design (methods and approaches) 
and content (formulation of recommendations and use of evidence base) of 
evaluation are linked to the failure of evaluations to influence policy. These factors 
can be broadly categorized into a widely acknowledged concept such as “civil 
service”. The literature on administrative reforms, new public management and 
governance agrees that the permanent civil service is central to improving public 
sector performance and to maximizing the chance of adequate policy 
implementation. The policymaking process could perform more efficiently if 
government gives an active role to the civil service because that is where experience 
can be found (Peters, 1996: 91-107).  
 
Overall the quality of the bureaucracy will have a decisive impact on policy making 
and the effectiveness of evaluation. On the one hand, public administrations 
characterised by personal loyalties, patronage networks and a lack of expertise will 
adversely affect governments’ ability to manage under uncertain contexts. Khan 
(1988: 322) argues ‘…a lack of training and lack of loyalty to the organisation put 
independence in reporting at risk’. On the other hand, a merit-based career civil 
service will ensure the officials’ commitment and experience to improve public sector 
performance and respond to citizen’s demands. Such a bureaucracy looks for 
coordination between departments and agencies to get the most from evaluations 
for the benefit of the programmes. As Peters (2006: 126) argues, the civil service 
provides a better possibility of adequate policy coordination, while its absence may 
be an impediment to effective coordination within government. 
 
In this context, it is assumed that the more professional officials working inside the 
areas operating the policy evaluation the more committed they will be to achieving 
the effectiveness of evaluation. Moreover, the variable is relevant in all systems but 
particularly important for those emerging countries, where the reform of the civil 
service has not been fully implemented. That is, the scale of complexity increases for 
developing countries due to their traditional bureaucracy, which has less regard for 
their value of being democracies ‘in transition’ (Lijphart, 1968 cited in Cabrero, 2000: 
197 and Linz, 1973). 
 
To that extent, it seems that all factors highlighted by academics are focused on the 
decisions directly made by the actors involved in the process but utilisation does not 
depend only upon the abilities of evaluators as Jennings & Hall (2012: 16) refer, 
The use of scientific evidence and EBP [evidence-based practice] does not simply 
depend on its availability, relevance, credibility, and staff capacity. It also depends on 
the mission and mandates of the agency, its political environment, and its internal 
characteristics.  
 
There are some other circumstances and/or contextual factors denoted here, which 
offer alternative explanations of the decision-making process as Hojlund (2014: 38) 
concludes in his article, “…the literature on evaluation use has been very good at 
describing the evaluation, its conditioning factors, etc. while neglecting the 
organisational context in which the evaluation organisation operates…” For instance, 
the democratic context and autonomy, in which operate those coordinating the 
policy evaluation, which are not constantly referred. This might due to the 
characteristics of the context in which use of evaluation has been analysed by many 
scholars i.e. most of the research has been conducted in democratic countries: 
Denmark (Hojlund; Dahler-Larsen), Switzerland (Ledermann; Bundi), Australia 
(Herbert) and the USA (Jennings; Hall) amongst others.  
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Given that evaluation has been promoted by developed countries such as these 
earlier mentioned, it is assumed that democracy is an implicit characteristic not 
usually measured. However, in emerging economies, conditions such as the flawed 
nature of democracy and the autonomy (control) of public agencies are issues that 
have not been solved yet. These conditions may offer alternative explanations for the 
effectiveness of evaluation and the foundation of policy evaluation frameworks. 
Alkin (1985 cited in Fleischer & Christie, 2009: 171) highlights organisational and 
political background, while Askim notes the political climate (Askim, 2007: 467), as 
potentially influential in terms of transparency and accountability systems.  
 
These factors are related to the impact of the level of democracy on the effectiveness 
of evaluation. This variable refers not only to free and fair elections, the right to vote, 
and freedom of expression but also the capacity to effectively implement and 
evaluate policies within a system of checks and balances (Dahl, 1971: 3 cited in 
Lijphart, 2012: 46; EIU democracy index, 2011) such as monitoring system and policy 
evaluation. In such a democratic context, evaluation becomes a powerful tool to 
ascertain whether the government’s actions are in accordance with those planned, 
thereby enhancing transparency and accountability.  
 
This is confirmed by Jennings & Hall’s (2012) survey of the use of information by US 
agencies, which indicates that the level of conflict in the political environment affects 
the degree to which decision makers are interested in utilising evidence “Differences 
in the degree to which decisions are driven by a variety of political considerations…” 
Moreover, after reviewing the experience of M&E systems in developed countries such 
as the USA, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand (Andrews, 2008, Bamberger, 1991, 
Bangura & Larbi, 2006, Cabrero, 2000, Horton & Mackay, 1999, Ospina et al., 2004, 
Pollitt, 2006, Sundell, 2014 and Wollmann, 2003), this variable seems especially 
relevant to economies ‘in transition’, seeking to change their authoritarian and 
bureaucratic image, in which evaluation represents an indication of modernization.  
 
This takes the discussion to the autonomy of coordinators and evaluators of the policy 
evaluation. This factor embraces both the organisational and political context 
(Teirlinck et al., 2013: 374), and should provide an external, objective and unbiased 
way to view the programmes. Scholars define the concept of autonomy as the extent 
to which agency [either the evaluation agency or the public agency coordinating the 
evaluation] can decide by itself what matters it considers important (Verhoest et al., 
2004: 14).  
 
It concerns the degree of discretion and responsibility to take control from 
government and execute decisions by itself (Rhodes, 1996: 659) insulated from full 
political supervision by the central head authority (Christensen, 1999). Whereas for 
Rhodes (1996: 660) to some extent, the degree of autonomy is a characteristic of 
governance, emphasizing a bureaucratic approach, 
Autonomous agencies possess externally differentiated and internally coherent 
preferences (primarily over policy outcomes) that they are able to achieve either 
directly, by setting policy, or indirectly, through the political process. An agency’s 
capacity to achieve desired outcomes depends on its organizational resources and on 
the extent to which other actors can veto, reverse, or punish the agency. Caughey et al. 
(2009: 17) 
 
Verhoest et al. (2004: 104) carefully provide a distinction between autonomy as: i) 
the level of decision-making competencies of the agency (concerning management 
and agency policy); and ii) the exemption of constraints on the actual use of decision-
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making competencies of the agency (structural, financial, legal and interventional 
constraints). Whereas Caughey et al. (2009: 2) also envision two key sub-concepts, 
the independent goal formation and the capacity to achieve desired outcomes but 
these distinctions do not necessarily examine other indirect factors influencing 
decision-making. Moving forward to a more comprehensive concept, the literature 
agrees that autonomy enjoyed by those responsible for evaluation entails the 
delegation of competences, power and functions from the hierarchical supervisory 
body, and enables the responsible agency to operate independently on the basis of its 
formal/legal status.  
 
Building on these ideas, for instance, the relative independence of the evaluator will 
affect the objectivity, transparency and accountability of the results obtained, as well 
as the credibility of the evaluation amongst scholars, citizens and even inside the 
public sector. To exemplify how autonomy affect effectiveness, Dahler-Larsen (2000: 
73) noted that external evaluators are less burdened by internal organisational 
culture and concerns over sanctions, and are more likely to recommend programme 
termination than internal evaluators, who prefer to make adjustment in 
programmes as a result of evaluation. In this context, the current view from studies 
conducted by Caughey et al. (2009: 18-24) include a set of characteristics concern the 
autonomy of any public agencies. These refer to matters which involve sources of 
information, investigative powers, internal veto points in making decisions about 
agency goals, politicization, and independent leadership, amongst others.41  
 
An additional factor to consider is the degree of centralization of the monitoring and 
evaluation system. On the one hand, centralization attempts to control the 
implementation of a homogenous policy but, on the other hand, could also 
jeopardize the flexibility and freedom to adjust policy in the light of particular needs. 
In this sense, control is the inverse of autonomy (Verhoest et al., 2004: 106), where the 
government could take control of agency behaviour to influence its decisions. As 
these authors indicate in their study, the positive effect of autonomy on one 
dimension can be offset by negative effects on the other, with consequent tensions.  
 
While we have so far focused on how evaluation might be affected by institutional 
and contextual factors, another influence may be the nature of the evaluation itself. 
Alkin (1985 cited in Fleischer & Christie, 2009: 171) and Teirlinck et al. (2013) both 
stress the design of evaluation as a factor shaping effectiveness, whereas Askim (2007: 
467) notes that the infrastructure and demand side of performance data operate as 
barriers to evaluation use. These categories relate to matters of the policy evaluation 
framework adding another variable to the research. Indeed, a review of a variety of 
evaluation systems from Australia, Colombia, United Kingdom, Japan, Spain, United 
States, Peru, France (Lopez-Acevedo et al., 2012 and Rist et al., 2011) confirms its 
importance to produce an effect. This variable is related to the formulation stage of 
the policy evaluation process and the impact of the framework on the effectiveness 
of evaluation and classifying the types of factors has been the subject of continuing 
discussion.  
 
This factor should consider evaluation within a comprehensive system and focuses on 
the importance to embrace two elements: a coherent design and a feasible system 
                                                          
41
Others are the autonomy to get qualified staff, money for investigation, report quality, organisational identity career 
stability, legal mandate, financial, human and time resources, case studies of “clash”, interest group alliances, 
reputation, public goods provided by agency, existence of multiple principals, numerical count of policy invalidation, 
legal factors, competing policies, relationships with interest groups (networks), constituency and salience of issue. 
See Caughey et al. (2009) 
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operationalization of evaluation (see methodology chapter). Ideally, coherence in 
evaluation design is needed and should strike a balance between gathering and 
obtaining relevant information on the one hand and enabling the evaluated to carry 
out their tasks on the other. At one extreme, the imposition of highly complex systems, 
accompanied by excessively legalistic obligations for regulation, monitoring and 
evaluation may impose high burdens and set ambiguous requirements on the 
evaluation framework and reduce the stakeholders’ ability to improve and innovate. 
At the other extreme, underspecified and weak systems may give too much 
discretion to actors such as officials, ministers, legislators and especially policy 
implementers and permit evasion.  
 
In rewiewing the debate on the design of policy to date, Ospina et al. (2004: 232) 
argue that a broad model should be consistent at the ‘vertical-horizontal’ levels of 
evaluation as outlined by the Latin American Centre for the Administration of 
Development (CLAD) and explained in the methodology chapter. In addition, 
evaluation requires a strong legal framework and participation of interest groups 
including citizenry, NGOs and target groups as key users, whose actions and 
behaviour of the demand side could alter government action (Wu et al., 2010: 69) 
gaining legitimacy and autonomy. Focusing merely on the coherence of design does 
not capture broader influences such as the importance of infrastructure of the system 
(Askim, 2007) to incorporate all performance information timeliness (Leviton & 
Hughes, 1981) and evaluation reports in a data system that should operate as a 
comprehensive model.  
 
In this sense, the structure of monitoring and evaluation system means the high 
technical level of sophistication needed due to the large amount of data to gather, 
interpret and use by agencies timeliness. An example of the issues linked to the 
structure and lack of coherence at the ‘vertical-horizontal’ levels of evaluation is 
when several monitoring and evaluation systems operate within organisations but 
without coordination between them. This is based on the assumption that all data 
have a purpose in providing results to different actors, which should be feasible to 
operate and interconnected between them. Thus, a complex scenario could 
jeopardize the decision-making process because they (actors) are puzzled over a 
“mountain” of data from different sources, which makes it difficult to process. Hence, 
the evaluation process could be hindered from providing objective and timely results 
which could lead to policy change.  
 
The policy evaluation framework also needs methodological rigor, for which many 
authors consider it as a characteristic of the quality factor (Cousins & Leithwood, 1986 
and Leviton & Hughes, 1981). The rigor concerns the order in which evaluations should 
be executed in order to be coherent with the strategic planning process. For example, 
in the Mexican case there are many types of evaluations e.g. design, consistency and 
results, indicator, process, impact, strategic, complementary and specific (see chapter 
‘Policy evaluation in Mexico’). However, the rigor of the framework suggests that the 
coordinator of evaluations should not recommend to an agency to develop an 
evaluation of impact or process before doing an evaluation of design or consistency. 
Similarly, the Chilean programmes, in which the evaluations of public programmes 
and of new programmes should be executed before others such as impact, 
comprehensive spending review and/or ex-ante. 
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Concluding remarks 
The discussion so far has sought to provide a basis for understanding how the most 
influential factors affect the effectiveness of evaluation. This chapter also reviewed 
the origins of evaluation and the evolution of the concept until recent decades when 
it became a multidisciplinary method and acquired visibility. Having reviewed the 
main literature on evaluation, some conclusions can be drawn on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the field. A first conclusion is that effectiveness of evaluation is valuable 
in government intervention, regardless of the approach, evaluation is a key 
analytical process, drawing upon a variety of disciplines to understand whether 
government interventions are effective. The chapter also noted how the growth of 
evaluation was due to the public sector reforms associated with the New Public 
Management (NPM). Indeed, the NPM brought the results-based budgeting to the 
core of policy evaluation practices in most emerging economies.  
 
At the present time there is a question mark over how these developing countries are 
dealing with the utilisation of evaluation and closing the policy cycle, especially given 
that governments have invested a large amount of money to improve the way in 
which evaluation operates. Thus, this research is trying to go further to the next step 
in the policy cycle, to analyse the effectiveness of such policy. However, significant 
research gaps remain in our understanding about what happens inside the process of 
the effectiveness of evaluation. Indeed, there is a fair level of agreement about the 
most influential factors, and how nearly all of these conditions explained above are 
necessary but not necessarily sufficient to achieve effectiveness. In some cases, critics 
ignore factors whereas others stressed particular issues, which cannot be used as 
generalizations and perceived as a limitation of such studies.  
 
However, having established the current debates around effectiveness and after 
looking across into different stances and factors implicit, and the discussion of the 
overall factors, which undoubtedly have a particular influence on effectiveness, the 
Intra Governmental Relations, quality of bureaucracy, democracy, autonomy, and 
policy evaluation framework will be tested in the following chapters to validate 
generalizations. As was mentioned, the institutional and political factors studied here 
have been relatively under-explored by scholars and academics. This research looks 
at these factors in greater depth through a comparative study of the Mexican and 
the Chilean experiences of policy evaluation to address the core questions of 
effectiveness.  
 
This research aims to contribute to filling the gap addressing the question Whether 
these are the most influential institutional (political) factors shaping the effectiveness 
of evaluation? The point of discussion is whether these factors influence the extent to 
which evaluations bring about policy change. The following chapter attempts to 
explore in detail these institutional and political factors and summarize the criteria 
for assessing their impact on effectiveness and presents the research strategy for the 
comparative case study. 
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CHAPTER 2. Methodological approach 
 
Introduction 
In his article “Where is political science going?” Sartori (2004: 351) argues that politics 
is the interaction between public organisations and behaviour, and there is a risk of 
creating a useless science when there is no linkage between theory and practice. In 
this context, the research strategy adopted here will be of a flexible design, using 
qualitative methods to determine those linkages. This research attempts to explain 
whether the policy evaluation is effective and what are the factors affecting such 
effectiveness. This chapter offers a detailed description of the qualitative method 
used to answer the research questions. After an overview of the research strategy, the 
chapter focuses on the dependent and independent variables. The dependent 
variable at the centre of the research is “the effectiveness of policy evaluation”.  
 
Effectiveness will be considered in terms of the extent to which the findings and 
recommendations from evaluations are associated with changes to the evaluated 
policies and programmes. This section elaborates on the possible effects that 
evaluation may or may not have including amendments to the policy, changes in 
allocation of resources, cancelation of programmes, maintenance of existing 
programmes and more general “learning processes” by the programmes’ operators 
following evaluations. The next section outlines the independent variables, the 
institutional and political factors that might influence effectiveness. These factors 
comprise the Intra Governmental Relations, quality of bureaucracy, level of 
democracy, policy evaluation framework and degree of autonomy.  
 
This dissertation aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the causal relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables, following the approach offered 
by Gerring (2008: 650). Using the case study will allow us to explore causal 
mechanisms and to confirm, disconfirm or reframe a hypothesis. The following section 
therefore, focuses on the case study as a research approach and explains the 
advantages and shortcomings of this method, for the analysis of the Chilean and 
Mexican health sectors. The analysis also outlines some of the characteristics of the 
health sector in the two countries.  
 
The final section outlines the empirical basis for the case study research and explains 
how the data was collected. The empirical resources comprise a mixture of 
documentary analysis, involving close examination of different sources across 
countries, complemented by elite interviews with officials, politicians and experts in 
academia and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These sources underpin the 
research strategy taken to reach the conclusions of the dissertation. 
 
Research strategy or how the research is to be carried out 
To answer the question raised by Pawson & Tilley (1994: 305) “What more do we 
know at the end of the evaluation about the patterns of outcome effectiveness of 
the initiative, and what else do we need to know?” it is necessary to investigate and 
test empirically the relationship between independent variables. In doing so, this 
dissertation is built upon a bottom-up or inductive approach of reasoning (Bernard, 
2013, Burnham et al. 2004, Hantrais & Mangen, 1996 and Pennings et al., 2006) to 
explore evaluation to establish broader assumptions. The research relies on a 
qualitative method, specifically a comparative study between the Mexican and the 
Chilean experiences of policy evaluation.  
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This study is based on a small-n sample of evaluation models e.g. health sector and 
country settings, which will be contrasted on the basis of economic, legal and political 
factors. In taking this approach the research draws upon what Pennings et al. (2006: 
5) called the crucial triad of what, when and how to compare.  
 
To examine the trends of decision-making over time as result of evaluation, i.e. the 
effectiveness of evaluation, it is important to identify whether the programme 
improvement could be attributed to evaluation. In order to identify this, the analysis 
is divided into two components. One is the review of programmes of the health sector 
and whether recommendations of evaluations performed from 2007 to 2014 led to 
changes classified as amendments, status quo, learning process, cancelation or no 
data available. The other examines the budgetary process at Congress to determine 
whether those recommendations of evaluations were used for programmes’ changes 
in the policy sector. It also examines the allocation of financial resources to identify 
whether they increased, decreased or were unchanged after evaluations took place. 
In both components is considered the role of political and institutional factors. 
 
These factors are potential influences in terms of policy (recommendations) take-up. 
Here, the most important factors in the decision-making process for effectiveness to 
measure are the following factors known as independent variables: 
IntraGovernmental/Interagency Relations, quality of bureaucracy, level of 
democracy, policy evaluation framework and degree of autonomy. These will be 
tested against each other across countries based on the assumption that some 
variables may differ in some way to explain differences in the effectiveness and to 
explain which one should be expected to be the most important and why this prevails 
over the others.  
 
Based on Pawson & Tilley’s (1994: 305) list of enquiries to address the problem of 
evaluation research, this thesis investigates the following questions as the most 
important interrelated to the object of study:  
What explains the differences in the effectiveness of policy evaluation across these 
countries? 
What are the most influential institutional (political) factors shaping the effectiveness 
of evaluation?  
Whether policy evaluation matters for the public policy and budgetary process? 
 
To investigate these questions, the research adopts a historical analytical approach of 
the evolution of the evaluation process and country settings in Mexico and Chile. 
Moreover, to shed light on the practices between branches of government, the 
analysis also uses primary data from interviews with politicians and officials. Through 
comparison of evaluations of both countries, the research will attempt to address the 
central problem investigated here whether policy evaluation is effective across these 
countries. 
 
1. Dependent variable and operationalisation of evaluation effectiveness 
According to Howlett, Ramesh & Perl (2009: 186), the task of evaluation is to find out 
if the programme is doing what it is supposed to be doing or whether it needs to be 
adjusted, based on its intended goals. With this in mind, the dependent variable is the 
effectiveness of policy evaluation in the Mexican and Chilean public administration. 
 
The operationalisation of this variable captures whether and how policy changes in 
response to evaluation. For Dahler-Larsen (2005: 623), the “utilization dimension” is 
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based on the premise that although they are not always used, evaluations are 
produced to play a role in future “practical action situations”. Effectiveness is the 
essence of evaluation results both in public and private sectors (Hintze, 2001: 14). For 
the purpose of this research, this effectiveness is defined in terms of the impact of 
evaluation on policy itself, specifically the extent to which evaluation of a 
policy/programme leads to changes in that policy or programme; in other words, how 
many of the recommendations noted in evaluation reports are adopted by 
programme operators in response to those evaluations.  
 
To examine the trend in decision-making over time, this research looks at those 
changes in programmes, which are made as a result of evaluations. Looking for such 
changes this research will use the formal evaluation and monitoring systems issued by 
government in both countries.  
 
In Mexico, the research uses the database developed by the Ministry of Finance 
(SHCP) called “Presupuesto basado en Resultados and Sistema de Evaluación del 
Desempeño” (Results-based Budgeting and Performance Evaluation System 
‘PbR/SED’) and by the National Evaluation Council of the Social Development Policy 
(CONEVAL),42 comprising the recommendations of evaluations issued by external 
evaluators. In Chile, the so-called “Sistema de Evaluación y Control de Gestión” 
(System of Evaluation and Management Control ‘SECG’) is the database developed 
by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to track the recommendations.43 In both cases, the 
research examines only the evaluations of the health sector as a sample to infer or 
generalize findings to other sectors (later on explained). 
 
In both countries, as a result of evaluation reports, programme operators then draw 
up the working report and the so-called “agency statement”. The former is the 
response by such operators to recommendations listed in the evaluations, indicating 
actions to be taken and the timeframe for implementation. The latter is the report 
establishing the position to be adopted (agreement or disagreement) by programme 
operators on behalf of the programme with regard to recommendations and 
evaluation. These reports can highlight problems faced by operators in addressing 
recommendations or indicate when these cannot be implemented. On that basis, the 
analysis in this dissertation uses these reports as the principal resource for 
operationalising the concept of evaluation effectiveness since they provide evidence 
of the extent to which agents have responded to the recommendations of evaluators. 
 
Concerning the speed of adopting changes, it depends on [institutional] agencies’ 
capacity and their commitment to addressing the recommendations, which could 
complicate the process of judging effectiveness; for example, when implementation 
takes longer than the timeframe established in reports. However, according to 
regulations regarding evaluation and implementation of recommendations in both 
countries, there is no criteria and limited timeframe of adopting changes 
(recommendations) neither sanctions for delays. Indeed, it is considered a 
participatory, gradual and progressive process, in which, decision-makers and 
programme operators indicate the deadline for implementation.  
 
                                                          
42
The “Mecanismo para el seguimiento a los aspectos susceptibles de mejora derivados de informes y evaluaciones a 
los programas presupuestarios de la Administración Pública Federal” (Mechanism to follow-up evaluation results) is 
the guideline to operate the database developed by government in which public agencies upload their evaluation 
results. This database is available at: http://www.transparenciapresupuestaria.gob.mx/ and 
http://www.coneval.org.mx/Paginas/principal.aspx  
43
The database is available at: http://www.dipres.gob.cl/594/w3-channel.html  
~ 37 ~ 
 
 
 
To address such cases, where programme operators are working on 
recommendations by the deadline, changes are considered within the category “in 
progress”, which means a positive effect regarding the outcome of effectiveness. 
Conversely, when programme operators do not indicate current situation of adopting 
changes by the deadline, these are classified as status quo. 
 
It is also important to note that identifying the precise drivers of any adopted 
changes is difficult if these are not specified explicitly in reports. It could be that 
decision-makers are improving their programmes, although, when the reasons for the 
actions to be taken are not explicitly expressed in such reports and data is not 
publicly available, it is difficult to clarify the motivations for such changes within the 
agencies. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude that changes made in line with 
recommendations are at least in part a response to those recommendations. 
Moreover, every aspect (recommendation) identified by the external evaluator 
during the assessment of the programme or policy should be listed in the working 
report, in order to avoid that evaluation might lead to an outcome that cannot be 
observed.  
 
However, when the analysis of each programme evaluated leads to an outcome not 
observed or expressed in the evaluation and working reports, this is noted in the case 
study chapters of both countries with no effect regarding the outcome of effectiveness. 
This is because the main purpose of this analysis is to prove that recommendations 
noted in evaluation reports are adopted by programme operators in response to 
those evaluations, this is the effectiveness of policy evaluation. 
 
Both reports (working and agencies’ statements) are open to the public in the SHCP, 
CONEVAL and DIPRES websites, which are regularly updated. However, some of the 
problems related to operationalising “effectiveness” were those reports, which were 
not easily accessible. Indeed, these documents were uploaded in pdf format in a data 
repository not in a database system as specified in the regulations. One of the 
consequences resulting from this pdf format is that these documents are easily 
interchangeable with one another with the risk that recommendations from those 
reported by evaluators and deadlines previously committed could be changed 
jeopardizing the following-up process (see case study chapters for relevant findings on 
this). Thus, the review of recommendations took longer than was expected in order to 
verify congruence between recommendations observed in evaluations and actions 
committed in working reports and agencies’ statements. 
 
Another challenge in operationalising the concept of effectiveness is related to 
acceptance of evaluation results by programme operators who could either accept or 
not such results due to many reasons usually explained in the agency statement. For 
example, a recommendation which requires additional financial resources will be 
difficult to implement and will depends upon the action of external actors such as 
Congress people, MoF or local authorities. This situation has to be considered by 
coordinators of policy evaluation but without any sanctions for non utilisation of 
recommendations. In dealing with such cases, the research considers the response 
made by programme operators in such agencies’ statements to classify each 
recommendation according to the criteria for judging the effectiveness explained 
further below. 
 
It should be stressed that it is not the purpose of this study to judge whether these 
recommendations are the right changes needed to the programme or any variation 
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in the precision with which recommendations are made. The rightness of these 
changes (recommendations) has already been determined by the external evaluator 
based on their judgement and responsibility to provide an impartial and objective 
assessment of the programme. However, where some data is different or missing e.g. 
actions taken are different from those recommended by the evaluator, this is assessed 
according to the criteria for judging the effectiveness of evaluation as explained 
below and classified in the status quo category. Moreover, this is pointed out in every 
programme reviewed in the case study chapters and table 3 and 6 annexed. 
 
Returning to the criteria for judging the effectiveness of evaluation, this refers to the 
relationship between evaluations and the response of programme operators to 
recommendations. In the review of the literature, the concepts regarding use or 
utilisation identified by many scholars refer to different categories such as conceptual, 
process or persuasive, amongst others. However, in practice, these are difficult to 
measure to prove utilisation and the reason to employ the concept of effectiveness as 
re-conceptualisation of the theory of use or utilisation.  
 
To operationalise this concept of effectiveness, it is relevant to define all possible 
outcomes once evaluation took place to determine whether this (evaluation) is 
effective or not. Thus, on the basis of the empirical research, it was found that 
effectiveness of evaluation could take various and simpler forms such as amendments, 
status quo, allocation of resources, cancelation or learning process in the programmes 
or policies, all discussed in detail in the review of the literature. This approach is the 
most effective and feasible way of determining whether an evaluation has 
accomplished its objective and whether decision-makers are utilising 
recommendations to lead changes on programmes. However, it is worth highlighting 
some relevant points regarding the effects.  
 
Concerning the category of status quo, to classify a programme evaluated in this 
category is important to keep in mind that such classification occurs when the 
implemented recommendations of the evaluation represent less than 30% of the 
total improved. In other words, the policy makers have only adopted 30% or less 
from the total of recommendations suggested by external evaluators in the 
evaluation’s report. The main reason to establish this percentage is based on the low 
rate of accomplishment of recommendations. Therefore, on the assumption that most 
implementers are contributing to the broader improvement of their programmes in 
some way, the study sets 30% as the threshold for classifying whether significant 
amendments are or are not made. The tables 3 and 6 in the annexes illustrate the 
low rate of recommendations achieved per evaluation and programmes.  
 
Another reason for policies remaining unchanged is when those responsible of the 
programme(s) do not consider any recommendations for further improvements or 
changes or when some data is missing and actions taken are different from those 
observed by external evaluators. This is, despite the recommendation was issued by 
the external evaluator, policy makers do not mention any action taken to solve the 
problem or they make different amendments from those recommended by the 
evaluators.  
 
Regarding the programmes of the category of learning process, despite the 
importance to acknowledge them, it is not possible to provide evidence in the later 
chapters to assume that some programmes or policies are going through an internal 
“learning process”. That is, it will not address any learning and knowledge processes 
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from evaluations due to the lack of information available to track either any 
recommendation or any action taken by policy-makers, which should be properly 
acknowledged to this category as analysed in the case study chapters. As mentioned 
in the review of the literature, another category refers to termination of programmes, 
when data from evaluations highlight risks or the need for improvements in such 
programmes.  
 
Another source of use comes during the budgetary process, when the executive (MoF) 
and Congress people use evaluations in order to reallocate finances. Finally, after the 
revision of programmes, it is also included the category “in progress”, which refers to 
these programmes in which operators are still working in the recommendations 
suggested. At the time this study was completed, if programme operators were still 
working on recommendations by the deadline as noted in the working reports, these 
were classified as “in progress” with no negative effect regarding the outcome of 
effectiveness. 
 
2. Independent variables 
A number of institutional and political factors were examined in the review of the 
literature including the institutional design of policy evaluation to establish whether 
they influence the effectiveness of evaluation. After the analysis of multiple factors it 
was determined that the independent variables to be tested comprised the following 
factors: IntraGovernmental/Interagency Relations, the quality of bureaucracy, the 
level of democracy, the policy evaluation framework and the degree of evaluator 
autonomy. This section complements the analysis of variables made in the review of 
the literature, providing a descriptive account of their characteristics and explaining 
how they are to be operationalized and measured.  
 
As noted below, for each variable there is a database from different sources, which 
complicate the task to code them into a single coding system due to different scales 
of measurement. For instance, regarding the variable of quality of the bureaucracy, 
some sources were identified such as the Governance Indicators Database (DataGov) 
by the Inter-American Development Bank or the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) by the World Bank both measuring either the degree of professionalism or the 
perception of the quality of service with some differences on the scale utilised. 
However, in the end, the decision to use the latter source for measuring this variable 
instead the former would not have produced different results in the analysis.  
 
With respect to the level of democracy of these developing countries, the following 
sources were considered: the democracy index by the Economist Intelligence Unit and 
the democracy ranking of the quality of democracy developed by the Democracy 
Ranking Association. However, the former index is the best measure for this variable 
because this provides a clearer scenario of four categories of democratic system.  
 
The same pattern was followed concerning the degree of autonomy, for which, the 
dimensions identified by Verhoest et al. (2004) capture the different levels based on 
a distinction between autonomy as: i) the level of decision-making competencies of 
the agency (concerning management and agency policy); and ii) the exemption of 
constraints on the actual use of decision-making competencies of the agency 
(structural, financial, legal and interventional constraints). Thus, this measure was the 
best choice for this variable. 
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Given this fact, when data come from various sources, which essentially are different 
measures, it was difficult to design an elaborate scale and therefore basic binary scale 
was devised. Their measurement is based on binary selection of every variable, where 
the variable is coded “0” if the analysis indicated that the condition is absent or it is 
coded “1” if the outcome is present or high. (Annex 1 illustrates the dichotomization of 
each variable according to the outcome analysed). However, any nuances that are 
lost through binary coding are revealed and discussed more fully in case study 
chapters. 
 
Intra Governmental and Interagency Relations ‘IGR’ 
Although this concept was identified in the first half of the last century by many 
scholars (Anderson, 1960, Bromage, 1943 and Wright, 1974), it remains important to 
explain the interaction between governments, branches and actors operating policy 
evaluation. While much of the literature refers to intergovernmental relations in 
terms of the “vertical” dynamics between the federal, state and local tiers of 
government, the focus of this analysis is on the “horizontal” dynamics between and 
within government branches and agencies at the federal level because the focus of 
this study is on the federal level of both countries, where most evaluations of the 
health sector have been developed.  
 
Moreover, in Wright’s overlapping model of IGR, the flow of authority of 
governmental bodies among national, state and local units (Agranoff & Radin, 2015: 
3) provides the conceptual basis for moving from the vertical to horizontal dynamics 
studied here. We refer to these horizontal dynamics as Intra Governmental Relations 
and Interagency Relations and considered as one category, hereinafter IGR. Indeed, 
the latter concepts are those examined along this research due to this is conducted at 
the federal level leaving aside vertical dynamics noted by InterGovernmental 
Relations. The focus is also a function of practical limitations to the conduct of the 
research, explained later.  
 
Thus, this dissertation is exclusively focused on the horizontal dimension, capturing the 
relationship between different branches of governments and the relationship 
between different agencies involved in policy making and evaluation. Regarding 
inclusion of the legislative branch as part of the government, as noted by Wright 
(1974: 3), the role of members of Congress and public officials such as governors, state 
legislators, appointed administrators, etc. is a characteristic of IGR. Indeed, scholars 
commonly refer to the three branches of government – executive, legislature and 
judiciary -.  
 
Although, the role of Congress might be an object of major criticism, for instance, 
when there is a minority government, the governing parties do not control the 
legislature and might not be considered as part of government or when a 
government has a strong majority in the legislature in the so-called dominant party 
systems, such as Mexico. In the end, the legislature is composed from different parties 
- including opposition – operating within government structure regardless minority or 
majority government in the legislature. Therefore, it is appropriate to treat it as part 
of government.  
 
Continuing with this concept, the IGR are those patterns of interaction among actors 
(officials, ministers, legislators, policy makers and politicians), agencies (ministries or 
ministries-state enterprises) and branches (executive-legislative-judicial) of 
government. When these operate between ministries, state enterprises and/or 
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agencies inside the executive or inside other branch (judicial or legislative) are called 
Interagency Relationships. Whereas these that operate between the executive 
(ministries/agencies), legislative and judicial branches are named Intra Governmental 
Relations.  
 
The importance of the IGR for the effectiveness of evaluation depends on the extent 
to which those evaluations results are acted upon and lead to changes in policies 
operated by actors within these branches. Incidentally, it is important to bear in mind 
that judicial and legislative branches are excluded from the evaluation process (e.g. 
object under evaluation) in both countries. Indeed, the legislative only operates as 
decision-maker regarding budgetary process and policy sector. However, later on it is 
explained the importance of these branches in a comprehensive view of policy 
evaluation.  
 
To understand the role of many actors in the effectiveness of evaluation, it is 
important to point out to different dimensions of political relationships within the 
variable IGR. After the analysis of these dimensions at the federal (horizontal) level,44 
the following relationships are identified. In the first place, there is a pattern of 
interaction between those operators (bureaucracy) of programmes and policies and 
coordinators of policy evaluation (DIPRES in Chile and SHCP/CONEVAL in Mexico) 
mostly located in the MoF. The former receives evaluations and implement those 
recommendations suggested by external evaluators while the latter is responsible for 
the coordination of policy evaluation but most important for the planning of the 
federal Budget.  
 
In the second place, there is a pattern of coordination amongst bureaucracy or 
programme operators of different agencies to solve problems related to 
recommendations of evaluations, for which two or more programmes are interlinked 
in some way. Lastly, it was identified the role of the president through the MoF and 
Congress. The former develops the budget through the MoF while the Congress 
authorizes it. Regarding evaluation, the MoF coordinates the policy evaluation while 
Congress oversees its effectiveness and use evaluations to lead changes on policy 
sector. These different dimensions of political relationship within this variable will be 
contrasted in the comparative chapter.   
 
Another matter is the lack of an index or indicator to determine the interrelations 
amongst agencies or public organisations. However, in order to have an inclusive 
variable with the most important characteristics describing these relations, there will 
be integrated different approaches by scholars. Indeed, the IGR settings vary in many 
ways and need to incorporate factors such as forms of coordination, information and 
economic resources, explained below to be more cooperative and coordinated to 
make effective evaluation. Franz (1985: 485) affirms that treasure (finances), along 
with legal authority, information and organisations are closely linked due to the high 
degree of complexity in these relationships. Thus, the variable (IGR) is based on 
characteristics highlighted by many authors to determine its impact on the 
effectiveness of policy evaluation. 
 
The first element is the “forms of coordination” which will be measured in terms of 
how of those mechanisms operate to improve relations between actors inside the 
government to empower policy evaluation. These forms are divided into: 
                                                          
44
The focus of this study is on the federal level of both countries. 
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i) Negotiation, common agreement/interest or partnership (performance), where 
objectives are worthwhile for the organisation’s purposes. This could be on an ad 
hoc or permanent basis and refers to an ideally strong form of coordination. 
ii) Opportunistic incentives (also called exchange), which produce conflicts sub-
optimal strategies as Kaufmann et al. (1985: 801) state. These occur where an 
asymmetry of roles prevails between principals and agents, 45  superiors and 
subordinates, the rulers and the ruled, and the few can easily collude to exploit the 
many. This represents a weak form of coordination. 
iii) Legal authority or obligation to enforce cooperation between those involved in 
the policy evaluation process; particularly relevant in countries where federalism is 
fairly achieved and power is not centralised, primarily by hierarchical coordination 
executed at the central level.46 This third mode is classified as the minimum form 
of coordination. 
 
The second component of this variable is the “information”. This essentially refers to 
whether a wider performance information database under the control of policy 
implementers is used for feedback and effective policy-making. The availability of 
data to key stakeholders involved in evaluation is essential to provide the necessary 
information for the continuity of the process, but also for accountability, informing 
citizens of the government’s results. There is also a need to provide data to the 
budgetary cycle and policy process in a timely manner to all users.  
 
The reliability and quality of performance data is also decisive for better decision-
making across the branches of government. In many countries the veracity of data in 
evaluation is taken for granted due to the use of external evaluators independent 
from the government, reducing the risk of bias and subjectivity. However, sometimes 
a source of power and political control emerge from the central authority when it has 
access to crucial information and has a monopoly of evaluation in some way, which 
jeopardizes such veracity. Thus, the aim is getting equilibrium between misutilisation 
and availability of data by operators given the control they have of the monitoring 
and evaluation system.  
 
The last element of this variable is related to the “economic resources”. This element 
produces a classification between even or uneven distribution of public resources and 
has an impact on the operation of policy evaluation. For Sharpe (1985: 166), resources 
are important for the central authority due to the control they can exert over other 
branches of government. Whereas for Peters (2006: 128) ‘The one major control 
instrument that remains in place is the budget, so that ministries of finance in 
particular become crucial in the process of controlling administration’. Apart from 
these references, finances also determine the capacity of implementers to boost policy 
evaluation and, regarding the strategy of results-based budgeting, the way 
incentives are applied via reduction, elimination or funding of programmes.  
 
Thus, the state of the art of these relationships is one in which policy and decision-
makers, users and actors involved (stakeholders) are willing to use and exchange 
                                                          
45
In the agency theory, there is an agency relationship between two or more parties, in which the principal delegates 
work to the agent, who is the performer. The aim is to resolve two problems that arise when the principal cannot 
verify whether the agent is doing or behaved appropriately, and when both actors have different attitudes toward risk 
and make different actions, which may conflict them. (See Eisenhardt, 1989, Mitnick, 1975 and Ross, 1973) 
46
Regarding this is characterized by the strong influence of the president and centralization of government. These 
relationships are often defined by the structure set by legal authority (Franz, 1985: 483) and could be a source of 
effectiveness or weakness. This premise is based on the definition offered by Ostrom & Ostrom (1965: 138) of the 
system of government.  
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data (evaluations) for further decisions. It also endorses the idea that the availability, 
timing, reliability and quality of data, as well as economic resources represent a key 
input to make the evaluation effective. Indeed, it might not be wrong to argue that 
the possibility of success in expanding the use of evidence-based policy will depend on 
the ability of political actors to move away from the status quo to embrace a more 
results-focused approach based on the effectiveness of evaluation into the strategic 
planning process. For this, these elements (forms of coordination, information and 
economic resources) will be measured according to binary selection to point out 
whether the element is present or not to prove the premises stated here as well as to 
address how these are incorporated in the policy process and their impact on the IGR 
to lead changes in policies and programmes.  
 
The criterion to assign a code depends upon the outcome is present or not in every 
indicator and subindicator mentioned above (see annex 1 for a description of each 
variable and indicators). For instance, regarding forms of coordination the variable is 
coded “0” when the analysis of these relationships results in minimum or weak 
coordination, whereas when the outcome shows there is a strong coordination, it is 
coded “1”. The second element of information measures the availability of data, 
timing and reliability and quality, when these are present a code “1” is assigned and 
when these are absent a code “0” is given. Lastly, even distribution of public resources 
ensures a code “1”, whereas a code “0” is assigned when there is uneven distribution. 
To complement the analysis questions such as perception of the relationships between 
actors as well as availability, reliability and quality of data are included. 
 
Quality of the bureaucracy 
As noted in the review of the literature the quality of bureaucracy is a key variable 
of the State’s capacity to improving public sector performance, in which policy 
evaluation maximizes the government efforts to perform efficiently. Based on the 
assumption that the more meritocratic the bureaucracy, the more effective the policy 
evaluation, units responsible of policy evaluation should be staffed by skilled and 
experienced members to fulfil the needs of evaluation. In this context, the research 
attempts to measure the variable in terms of the characteristics of the ‘Permanent 
civil service’.  
 
Lonti and Woods (2008: 27) define the Senior Civil Service as ‘a separate, structured 
and recognized system of personnel for the higher, non-political positions in 
government, in order to provide stability and professionalism at senior levels’ and 
include features such as competitive appointment based on merit, requirement for 
specific skills and being centrally managed.  
 
Taking into account complexities observed in the review of the literature including 
developing a specific indicator to measure this variable, the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) source developed by the World Bank will be used. The WGI47 reports 
on six broad dimensions of governance (voice and accountability, political stability 
and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and control of corruption) of 215 countries over the period 1996-2015. However, for 
the purpose of this research only the dimension of ‘government effectiveness’ will be 
considered, which includes among others perceptions of the quality of the civil service 
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See Worldwide Governance Indicatorshttp://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
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(Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010: 4). These results are approximate due to this 
indicator also measure other elements.48  
 
Moreover, the review is from 2007 to 2014 according to evaluations examined. Its 
score ranges from 0 for the lower degree of government effectiveness to 100 as the 
higher score indicating the opposite. For this, the variable is coded “1” if results of the 
country are above 50 in the scale from 0 to 100, whereas the variable is coded “0” 
when results are under 50. It is important to bear in mind that quality of 
bureaucracy should be implicit to all actors involved in the evaluation process. 
However, the quality investigated here is referred to those coordinating policy 
evaluation including Congress people and those being evaluated excluding external 
evaluators.  
 
For this, data from the interviewees of both countries such as background, skills and 
experience will be included (see questionnaire in annex 2) to determine the 
relationship between the bureaucracy and their capabilities to respond to evaluation 
recommendations and the consequences of that relationship for effectiveness. 
 
Level of democracy 
There is a reciprocal relationship between evaluation and democracy where the 
former operates as a tool helping to boost transparency and accountability. 
According to Dahl (1971: 3 cited in Lijphart, 2012: 46), democracy is measured by the 
right to vote, the right to be elected, the right of political leaders to compete for 
support and votes, elections that are free and fair, freedom of association, freedom of 
expression, alternative sources of information and institutions which depend on votes 
and other expressions of preference for making public policies. In democratic 
countries, people use their vote to obtain public value from the government.  
 
The public value of the government is the equal satisfaction of the human needs e.g. 
poverty reduction, improvement in education or health (Hintze, 2001: 40; 2003: 3) as 
well as providing the conditions for economic development, amongst others. In this 
sense, policy evaluation operates as a method used by governments to assess the 
creation of public value. In doing so, the Economist Intelligence Unit has developed 
the democracy index, which is based on the UNDP’s report and Latin American 
Barometer, and on the review of 167 countries divided into the five categories: 
electoral process, pluralism civil liberties, functioning of government, political 
participation and political culture,49 to determine how democratic the State is.  
 
Based on this index, democracy ranges into the four categories of democratic system 
from authoritarian regimes to fully democratic countries.  
1) In authoritarian regimes political pluralism is absent, many of them have dictators 
and media are state-owned or controlled, repression and no independent judiciary. 
2) An hybrid democracy is due to irregularities on elections, pressure on opposition 
parties by government and serious weaknesses in functioning of government, 
political culture and participation.  
3) Flawed democracies are characterized by a low level of democracy and also show 
various problems notably in terms of governance, political culture and 
participation. 
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It also captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies, and the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures already mentioned (see WGI methodology). 
49
The Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracy index 2014. 
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4) Full democracies demonstrate good governance in terms of more capacity to 
implement policies effectively within a system of checks and balances.  
 
This source will be used and to measure it, the indicator is coded “1” when the 
democracy index classifies either Chile or Mexico into the category of full democracy. 
Thus, the other categories will be coded “0”. The latter source and to demonstrate 
whether the more developed the democracy, the more goals of policy evaluation can 
be achieved, the historical evaluation context is referred to understand whether the 
democratic context shapes the policy evaluation. This offers a different perspective on 
whether policy evaluation is imposed upon or engages with stakeholders within these 
particular country settings.  
 
Degree of autonomy 
As mentioned in the review of the literature, the level of autonomy is the extent to 
which the agency [either the evaluation agency or the public agency coordinating 
the evaluation] can decide by itself50 what matters considers important (Verhoest et 
al., 2004: 14) and exempted from full political supervision by the central head 
authority (Christensen, 1999). Based on the statement the more autonomous those 
who are responsible for policy evaluation, the more credible and effective the 
evaluation, an implicit assumption is that the effectiveness of evaluation will depend 
upon the extent the agency that coordinates evaluation would be operationally 
independent from the central authority.  
 
The degree of autonomy will be measured following the dimensions offered by 
Verhoest et al., e.g. managerial, policy, structural, financial, legal and interventional 
autonomy, mainly due to these dimensions embrace most of the definitions reviewed 
in the literature. However, this study is primarily focused on the three aspects (policy, 
financial and legal) which are considered the most important. An analysis of them 
can shed light on the autonomy of evaluation agencies across countries, and will be 
used to determine how effective the autonomy granted to an agency is towards 
pursuing policy evaluation goals.  
 
These dimensions will be used to rank agencies into one of the two levels of agency’s 
autonomy as follows: 
1) Policy autonomy: low and high. 
2) Financial autonomy: low and high. 
3) Legal autonomy: low and high. 
 
Policy autonomy is the degree to which agency may or may not decide on individual 
applications of general rules or to issue policy instruments in general. Financial 
autonomy establishes the level of primarily financial resources, fully funded by central 
government, or partially funded by other governments, product sale or loans, or fully 
covered by agency including deficits. As can be noted from the description of the 
element of finances in the IGR factor, both are related on the extent to which these 
determine the capacity of implementers to boost policy evaluation and its 
effectiveness. Finally, legal autonomy covers status aspects such as if the agency is 
part of the central government, or has a separate one and does not own legal 
personality, or has a legal personality and is created by a parliamentary act or under 
private law.  
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Due to complexity for measuring leadership as an indicator, autonomy will be considered as a proxy of leadership for 
this case study. 
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For this, a code “1” is assigned when the level of policy, financial and legal autonomy 
is high, whereas a code “0” is when the level of autonomy is low. To complement the 
analysis questions such as perception of level of autonomy of public agencies and 
actors are included. Moreover, while autonomy may ultimately be desirable at any 
level and at any agency, the autonomy investigated here is focused on those 
coordinating policy evaluation including Congress and external evaluators to prevent 
them from playing the roles of judge and jury.  
 
Policy evaluation framework 
Based upon the broad definition of this concept in the review of the literature to 
analyse the institutional design of policy evaluation, the variable is divided in two 
sub-variables (see figure 2 below). The first sub-variable is the coherence in the 
design, an essential instrument for subsequent implementation. This includes 
matching policy evaluation objectives and outcomes based on the theory of cause 
and effect, 51  i.e. that these problems and targets identified, as well as expected 
outputs and outcomes are addressed by the policy. For this, the design of every policy, 
programme and project of government should be correlated between them at the 
vertical and horizontal levels (macro, meso and micro)52 as suggested by the CLAD 
(Ospina et al., 2004) in order to have a coherent policy design.  
 
Other subjects to measure are whether this could be overlapped with similar 
regulations and whether an inclusive policy should attempts to reach a consensus 
between stakeholders. It means, the extent to which policy coordinators hold hearings 
to allow interest groups including citizenry, NGOs and target groups to present 
arguments, counterarguments and evidence regarding the proposed policy 
evaluation and its regulation in order to find consensus between them. 
 
Figure 2 
Elements of the policy evaluation framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         Source: author’s own elaboration. 
 
The structure of monitoring and evaluation system is the second sub-variable 
entailing a technical mechanism to attain policy evaluation goals. The architecture of 
the system needs a high technical level of sophistication due to the large amount of 
data to gather, interpret and use by the government agencies. It also needs 
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A causal theory is about what causes the problem and what intervention would alleviate that problem (Birkland, 2011: 
241). 
52
The micro level refers to individuals, meso level to programmes and agencies, and the macro level or meta 
evaluation focus on sector, regional and national policies in the medium and/or long term goals. The macro level or 
meta evaluation identifies the impact of public policies on sector, regional and national objectives. For instance, in 
Mexico, those established in the National Development Plan (PND), whereas in Chile, those established in the 
Government Programme. Regarding the long term goals those established in the Sustainable Development Goals 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/  
POLICY EVALUATION FRAMEWORK 
Coherence in 
the design 
Matching policy 
objectives & 
outcomes  
Overlapping 
regulations 
Consensus actors 
Structure of M&E 
system 
Technical 
operationalization 
Perception of 
operationalization 
Methodological 
rigor 
~ 47 ~ 
 
 
 
methodological rigor to harmonize evaluations to specific needs of programmes or 
policies. The rigor concerns the order in which evaluations should be executed in order 
to be coherent to the strategic planning process and those evaluations performed. 
These issues along with the results of interviewees’ perception will be analysed to find 
out the complexity (difficult or easy) to operate the system by their users. The results 
clearly provide arguments attributable to the evaluation system’s operationalization 
to affirm that the more ambiguous and complex the framework of policy evaluation, 
the less effective the evaluation.  
 
The criterion to assign a code “1” is when policy evaluation objectives and outcomes 
match between them or regulations are overlapped or policy coordinators hold 
hearings with interest groups, when these are absent a code “0” is given. Regarding 
the structure of monitoring and evaluation system, a code “1” is assigned when 
technical operationalization is easy and “0” when operationalization is difficult. The 
perception of interviewees will determine whether operationalization is easy “1” or 
difficult “0”. Lastly, the subindicator of methodological rigor indicates whether 
evaluations are executed coherently to assign a code “1” or not “0”. See annex 1 for a 
description of each variable and indicators along with the countries used for 
comparison. 
 
The comparative dimension of policy evaluation 
A central task of the research is to study the effectiveness of policy evaluation from a 
comparative perspective. 53  This technique emerged as part of the post-war 
development of public administration as a discipline, which included an attempt to 
acknowledge best practices and benchmarks from other countries, and to draw 
general lessons from particular cases (George & Bennett, 2005 and Heady, 2000).54 
This practice also known as cross-national, cross-country, cross-systemic or cross-
institutional study (Hantrais & Mangen, 1996: 1)55 offers a different view of two or 
more objects of study for better comprehension of the diversity of political systems 
based on categories, characteristics, and interactions between political organisations 
and society (Einsestadt, 1962).  
 
Moreover, to respond to the core question of whether policy evaluation is effective 
across these countries, the cross-case study contributes to analysing the problem 
within a broad context. Some advantages of the comparative method for political 
scientists are mentioned by Hague & Harrop (2004: 69-71), including learning about 
other governments and the potential of prediction.  
 
To investigate the dependent variable the effectiveness of policy evaluation in the 
Mexican and Chilean public administration mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, the research design is based on Mill’s method of agreement and indirect 
method of difference. According to Ragin (2014: 36-8) the latter method attempts to 
approximate experimental design with non experimental data, while the former 
proceeds by the elimination of explanatory variables. This author noted that to use 
the indirect method of difference it is necessary to identify negative cases to reinforce 
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For Pennings et al. (2006: 3) the art of comparing is: “One of the most important cornerstones of the development of 
knowledge about society and politics and insights into what is going on, how things develop and, more often than not, 
the formulation of statements about why this is the case and what it may mean to all of us”.  
54
For better understanding of the comparative studies in the public administration see Heady (2000). 
55
These authors add that this method also aims to point to possible directions of being followed, to sharpen the focus 
of analysis by suggesting new perspectives, identification of gaps in knowledge by suggesting useful avenues for 
future research, offer possible explanations in terms of national similarity and difference (Hantrais & Mangen, 1996: 
3-5) 
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conclusions drawn from positive cases (Ragin, 2014: 41), e.g. countries in which there is 
an assumption that policy evaluation is not effective.  
 
It also involves searching for differences between variables that display an outcome 
and those where is absent. These differences among positive cases can address 
patterns of multiple causation (Ragin, 2014: 44). Based upon this method of 
difference, the main features to be considered in this comparative study are the 
following.  
 
In the first place, the decision to compare Chile and Mexico is related to the main 
advantage claimed by these authors, to contextualize and acquire knowledge in 
more formal political analysis, considering overseas events, which could help to 
interpret new developments and practical political relationships (Hague & Harrop, 
2004: 69-71).56 Although the countries have some differences in terms of the civil 
service, corruption, democracy and government effectiveness (see case study 
chapters), they also share some similarities regarding the political system 
(presidentialism) and administrative reforms e.g. the programme of administrative 
modernization, Managing for Results and Results based Budgeting. Indeed, various 
policies adopted by the Mexican government come from the Chilean context.  
 
Thus, these countries are worth studying in parallel to introduce a discussion about 
how institutional factors in Mexico differ (or not) from countries considered as more 
‘mature’ such as Chile in terms of their monitoring and evaluation system. In terms of 
Ragin’s approach, this would be a negative case compared to the positive. The 
premise is that these systems have different reputations for effective policy 
evaluation, so, to the extent that the institutional factors can help to explain different 
outcomes and identify gaps, they will also be able to explain their effectiveness.  
 
The experience of Chile will be included due to its importance as an emerging 
economy pioneering the development of a monitoring and evaluating system 57 
(World Bank, 2005). The Chilean National Budget Office’s introduction of 
performance indicators in the budget began in 1993 and was maintained with some 
ups and downs until 2001, when performance indicators were reintegrated into the 
budgetary process (Ministry of Finance, 2003). Since then the country has developed 
an ambitious evaluation agenda comprising performance indicators, evaluation of 
institutional programmes and comprehensive annual reviews (World Bank, 2005b: 
11).  
 
The Chilean system is one of the strongest and most recognized monitoring and 
evaluating systems in the world; as Mackay (World Bank, 2005b: 18) states: ‘the 
single most important factor is probably the location of the M&E system… in the 
finance ministry…’ These characteristics might explain its strength, power and 
capability to implement highly cost-effective policy evaluation and it is expected 
somewhat better and effective Chilean policy evaluation compared to the Mexican.  
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Other advantages are the following: it has the potential to improve the classifications of politics; it enables hypothesis 
testing for explaining the particular “So explaining the particular calls forth the general; only theories explain cases”; 
and to make predictions about politics once generalizations are validated. 
57
Indeed, “Chile’s system is one of the strongest government M&E systems in the world. In achieving this success, the 
single most important success factor is probably the location of the M&E system wherethe system was designed, 
progressively developed, and is still managed in the Ministerio de Hacienda, specifically its Budget Directorate 
(DIPRES). The Hacienda has succeeded in creating an ‘evaluation factory,’ which includes a well-developed process 
for planning, commissioning, managing, reporting, and using a range of types of evaluation”. (Keith Mackay, 
discussant at World Bank) 
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Therefore, studying asymmetries or similarities in the results of this comparative study 
could explain how these factors influence effectiveness, in terms of the success or 
failure of policy evaluation. Moreover, the differences between these cases help to 
identify whether these factors are sufficient conditions for the outcome as Mill (1843: 
455) suggests,  
If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in 
which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one 
occurring only in the former, the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is 
the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon. 
 
However, following the analysis presented in the case study chapters and comparing 
institutional factors, it appeared that the Chilean policy evaluation has not been 
more effective than the Mexican one; neither of the outcomes were constant over 
time. Therefore, the Mill’s method of difference was not sufficient to explain 
effectiveness across and within these countries in the course of time. Considering this, 
the method of agreement could be used to analyse the evidence, according to Mill 
(1843: 456), this method “stands on the ground that whatever can be eliminated, is 
not connected with the phenomenon by any law.”  
 
However, the latter method neither was sufficient to explain differences. As Ragin 
(2014: 43) noted “The method of agreement may show no common cause or set of 
causes”. At the end, the Mill’s method of agreement and difference was used jointly 
to find factors in common amongst all cases where utilisation of evaluations appears 
or when the factor is absent and effectiveness does not occurs. 
 
In the second place, the decision to select cases on the basis of a small-n comparative 
analysis essentially depends upon the availability of countries with similar 
characteristics for systematic and detailed analysis, and the reason for not being 
randomly selected. This is what Hantrais & Mangen (1996: 3-5) refer to as the three 
major problems in the management of research facing scholars: the availability of 
and access to comparable datasets, definition of research parameters and associated 
issues of equivalence of concepts. Although, on the one hand, the small-n scale studies 
might produce bias on selection, quality and comparability of data, on the other 
hand, bias is “a systematic error that is expected to occur in a given context of 
research...” (Collier & Mahoney, 1996: 59). Therefore, small studies should not be 
abandoned because they could provide insights into the most developed evaluation 
systems that any government attempts to achieve.58 
 
Returning to the research design and the “crucial triad” of what, when and how to 
compare raised by Pennings et al. (2006: 5) to respond to the question of how, the 
research will focus upon the evaluations of the health sector programmes in both 
countries to track the recommendations issued by evaluators. These programmes are 
the main case study for the evaluation of the hypotheses and the third factor to be 
considered in this comparative study. For this process, some considerations need to be 
highlighted.  
 
A main concern of this research is to isolate evaluations performed of the social sector 
(at least in the Mexican case) programmes, in order to get a wider perspective of use 
of evaluations across other sectors within public administration. For instance, in the 
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The ‘too many variables, not enough cases’ problem of comparison arises because the political world that is the 
research environment of political science is too rich and varied (that is, it consists of too many variables) for the 
researcher to be able to find enough cases to control for all the effects of these variables... (Ragin, 1987: 23-6 cited in 
Burnham et al. 2004: 71). 
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Mexican case, evaluations of the social sector programmes are coordinated by the 
CONEVAL, which operates exclusively for monitoring and evaluating this sector. 
However, this exceptional case (agency) does not operate to the remaining public 
agencies and sectors of public administration, excluding few cases in the energy and 
environment sector, better explained in the case study chapter. Moreover, the 
number of budgetary [public] programmes of the social sector is non-representative 
of the total of these programmes across the federal [central] government. 
 
Then, the next options were the energy and education sector, which are the largest 
sectors with public resources. However, during the period under review (2007 to 2014) 
only a few evaluations have been carried out. Therefore, the best option to 
investigate the effectiveness of evaluations performed was the health sector. The 
choice of the health sector is due to it being a key sector in the modern welfare state, 
in terms of budgetary importance, public interest and political focus (Bovens, ‘t Hart 
& Peters, 2001: 606).  
 
The ranking developed by the international World Health Organisation ‘WHO’ 
(Tandon et al., n.d., 2-3, 18-21) measures the health system performance and overall 
efficiency59 of 191 countries, where Chile is ranked 33rd and Mexico is ranked 61st. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that the aim of this study is to examine how 
the policies of the health sector change in response to evaluation rather than an 
exhaustive analysis of the health sector in these countries.  
 
Moreover, in the Mexican case, evaluations of the health sector were coordinated by 
three agencies 60  but currently coordinated by two agencies (Ministry of Finance 
‘SHCP’ and the National Evaluation Council of the Social Development Policy 
‘CONEVAL’), which can provide more elements to address the problem of 
effectiveness when this is compared to the Chilean policy evaluation. Regarding its 
importance, according to the PbR/SED strategy, which is the core of the Mexican 
policy evaluation, the health sector has 268 budgetary programmes representing the 
third largest sector with public resources,61 and in 2010, accounted for 6.2% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP)62. The sector comprises the Ministry of Health (SSA), the 
Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) and the Institute for Social Security and 
Services for State Workers (ISSSTE), as well as the health services offered to minor 
population by the Ministry of National Defense (SEDENA), the Ministry of the Navy 
(SEMAR) and PEMEX (Oil State enterprise).63  
 
By contrast, the Chilean policy evaluation highlights that in 2013, the health sector 
accounted for 7.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).64 It comprises two sectors, the 
public sector constitutes the National System of Health Services and the Health 
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This could be considered as the effectiveness of policy evaluation in the health sector. For instance, an effective 
country-led coordination mechanism to address problems identified in evaluations is an option, but also regular 
assessments or report of progress and performance of recommendations implemented. Clear linkages of the 
evaluation of key interventions in specific programme areas to the overall evaluation of the national health strategy. 
Systematic linkages between health sector reviews, disease and programme specific reviews, and global reporting. 
Comprehensiveness of review mechanisms in central and subnational levels. Key institutions and stakeholders have 
clear roles and responsibilities to adopt evaluation results and have mechanisms to provide routine feedback to sub-
national stakeholders. Finally, results from evaluations are incorporated into decision-making, including resource 
allocation and financial disbursement. 
60
Until 2015, the Mexican policy evaluation was coordinated by the Ministry of Public Administration (SFP) along with 
the Ministry of Finance (SHCP) and the Council (CONEVAL). 
61
Expenditure Budget of the Federation for fiscal year 2015 (PEF 2015). 
62
Health at a Glance 2013: OECD. 
63
See ‘Health system in Mexico’, Gómez-Dantés et al., 2011. 
64
Health at a Glance 2013: OECD. 
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Services for the Armed Forces, and covers 80% of the population and the private 
sector, which supplies medical services to the 17.5% of the population (mostly the 
upper middle-class and high income groups).65  
 
The focus of this study is on the federal level of both countries, where most 
evaluations of the health sector have been developed. However, the decision to focus 
on this level is also due to practical limitations such as availability of evaluations at 
the state level and the time and the length of the research. At this point, it is 
important to remind that the judicial and legislative branches in both countries are 
excluded to perform any evaluation (e.g. object under evaluation), consequently to 
be accountable of their performance. These exclusions are analysed in the case study 
chapters, including some progress recently made by Congress noted in the conclusions 
chapter. 
 
It should also be borne in mind that, although the quality of evaluations is constantly 
referred in this research, this characteristic is not analysed in detail neither have an 
impact on the outcome of this research. Finally, another factor to be considered is the 
period selected to review evaluations of the health sector. Following the triad of 
Pennings et al. (2006: 5) this period of analysis means the when to compare. The 
time under review is mainly determined by the Mexican case and the PbR/SED 
strategy, which initiated since 2007. Thus, despite the Chilean policy evaluation was 
developed earlier, the review is from 2007 to 2014 for both countries selected to have 
the same point of comparison.  
 
To sum up, this sector is a good reference offering an in-depth analysis of a set of 
evaluations of government programmes and how they may or may not lead to 
changes in policy. It is looking for a pattern in the occurrence of the effectiveness of 
policy evaluation in emerging economies in similar conditions. Hence, the findings of 
this sector across countries will also contribute to the investigation process providing 
crucial data for developing evaluation systems with regards to the problems inherent 
of different economies.  
 
Documentary and analysis sources 
The thesis carries out the fieldwork research through a deep documentary analysis of 
evaluation in both historical and contemporary contexts. This analysis consisted of a 
close examination of a range of governance and government reports including, 
National Development Plans, Account of Public Treasury, Congress reports, internal 
evaluation reports (administrative, accountability, government), internal 
organisation manual, expenditure budget, programme and legislative materials, 
daily debates in Congress, laws comprising initiatives, government plans, projects and 
programmes. The analysis also covered academic journal articles, PhD theses, 
statistical databases and international organisations reports. 
 
This analysis provide the basis for both tracking the evolution of policy evaluation in 
the two countries and for testing whether evaluation is effective, tracing programmes 
from their initial formulation and implementation, through their subsequent 
evaluation to the post-evaluation phase. Inspired by the historical analytical 
perspective the analysis also explores the development of evaluation in both 
countries highlighting important developments such as the actions taken to 
strengthen policy evaluation in Chile by Eduardo Frei during his administration 
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See ‘The health system of Chile’, Becerril-Montekio, Reyes and Manuel, 2011. 
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between 1994-2000 and in Mexico, during the presidency of Vicente Fox between 
2000-06. One of the main issues faced by this kind of study within different contexts 
is the difficult to find empirical evidence to assign values of every variable in each 
country, which makes analysis and operationalization particularly difficult.  
 
Hantrais & Mangen (1996: 5) also add that difficulties arise due to differences in 
research traditions and administrative structures. In this regard, the elements of the 
study are confined to description, due to constraints in terms of data sources, time 
and funding. The sections on the effectiveness of the policy evaluation of both 
countries will be more descriptive through a deductive method, starting from 
hypotheses and moving towards their analysis and verification deducting conclusions 
from these premises. 
 
Elite interviews 
Finally, the analysis is complemented by elite interviews with the main actors of the 
selected countries who basically are well-informed and connected people. This 
concept refers to an interview with an interviewee who is given special and non-
standardized treatment (Riesman cited in Dexter, 2006: 18) due to hierarchical or 
political position. For this purpose, a semi-structured questionnaire with open-ended 
questions is applied by the interviewer; who lets the interviewee explain the problem, 
question or situation investigated (Dexter, 2006: 19). However, the balance is usually 
in favour of the respondent due to high levels of knowledge of the subject matter 
under discussion (Burnham et al., 2004: 205). The interview is a tool to tap political 
constructs – involving political actors’ beliefs – that may otherwise be difficult to 
examine (Beamer, 2002: 87).  
 
In this context, the aim of interviewing is to understand the process of evaluation in 
these countries to identify patterns and circumstances, which explain shortcomings in 
evaluation’s strategy. It is important to note that some independent variables will be 
measured by indicators provided by organisations, whereas others that cannot be 
measured so easily such as the perception of operationalization of the monitoring & 
evaluation system depend upon interviewees’ opinion to determine whether the 
outcome is present or not. Moreover, interviews are helpful to complement the 
analysis of possible causal mechanism linking independent to dependent variable(s). 
For this, questions regarding the quality of bureaucracy such as background, skills 
and experience, perception of the relationships between actors (Congress, executive, 
policy-makers), availability, reliability and quality of data and level of autonomy of 
public agencies are included (see annex 2). 
 
Interviews are conducted on the basis of a small-n sample with officials in ministries 
and agencies, academic experts, specialists in NGOs, and politicians from legislatures, 
to understand the evaluation process from the point of view of those involved in it. 
These are structured in order to contribute to the discussion of the way in which 
evaluation is managed within the executive and between the executive and the 
legislature. As Beamer (2002: 87) suggests, this (elite interview) approach is the first 
stage to define concepts and the research question to be answered, and to examine 
important parameters guiding the elite’s definitions of problems and responses to 
them (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002: 673).  
 
Defining the sample entails compiling a complete list of key informants based on 
documentary analysis of administrative, government and accountability reports to 
identify representative people who have a say in this topic. As Burnham et al. (2004: 
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205) affirm “... one of the defining characteristics of elite interviewing is that some 
respondents may count more than others in terms of their influence on the decision-
making process”. For this purpose, the sample of people interviewed is as follows: 
 
Table 2 
 
Sources of elite interviews 
Position/Country 
MEXICO CHILE 
Congress 
(legislative) 
Ministry or 
agency 
(executive) 
Congress 
(legislative) 
Ministry or 
agency 
(executive) 
University 
Deputy 6  2   
Official (middle-level 
and senior) 
2 11  1 
 
Academic     1 
Total 8 11 2 1 1 
               Source: authors’s own elaboration. 
 
The sample is based on gathering a balance of interviewees from within the different 
branches of government and from outside. Firstly, to contrast views and perspectives 
regarding the evaluation sector, representatives from the legislative branch (deputies, 
officials and advisors) were selected. Secondly, the selection of interviewees within the 
executive embraced both those senior officials with a deep understanding of the 
latest reforms regarding evaluation and the most experienced middle-level officials’ 
view in their role as coordinators of the evaluation and policy makers and executors 
of programmes of the health sector. The final category of interviewee included 
respondents from academic institutions who have been involved in the policy 
evaluation process and could therefore provide a particular perspective on the issue 
from a broader perspective. 
 
The next step was to apply a standardized and semi-structured questionnaire with 
open-ended questions, starting with some closed enquiries to ensure that the 
interviewee knows about the research topic. To ensure confidentiality of personal 
information, and in order to prevent any inconvenience to those people interviewed, 
citations from interviews are anonymous. The first section comprises a set of closed 
questions seeking of general information of respondents such as gender, age, job 
position, length or years in public service, and formal education. Later on, open-
ended questions seek not to impose a rigid framework, allowing respondents to 
express themselves freely to engage in a wide-ranging discussion. This is especially 
useful for those contentious questions, which require more explanation by the 
interviewee.  
 
An example of this arises when referring to questions targeted at Congressional 
interviewees about the use of evaluation results for better decision-making within the 
budgetary process. Questions which provide important insights into the political 
factor or capacity building implicit on the adoption of evaluation findings within the 
policy process are not easily answered by the interviewees due to the risk of political 
retaliation. Hence, a follow-up question of whether Congress and the executive are 
coordinated to enhance effectiveness helps in providing a different approach to the 
subject.  
 
Another factor to guarantee the reliability of the questionnaire is to construct 
convergent questions, which aim to investigate whether a respondent has a consistent 
orientation toward the point of interest (research objective). For example, questions 
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on matters such as the origins of evaluation, and the role of those who are or were 
responsible for it, could offer another perspective in terms of the different contexts 
when policy evaluation was developed (i.e. the 1980s). In this way the interviews 
provide a comparison between the time when policy evaluation was launched and 
the point of view of key informants about policy evaluation currently operating. The 
questionnaire includes particular conditions of the policy evaluation and health sector 
such as perception of the system operationalization, forms of coordination, exchange 
agreement, incentives, information and economic resources as factors to respond to 
the variables under analysis (see annex 2).  
 
Lastly, as table 2 shows, there are considerably more interviewees from Mexico than 
Chile. This is a limitation as a result of the circumstances of this research and practical 
constraints for travelling to Chile. Thus, most of interviews conducted in Mexico were 
face to face and they kindly accepted being recorded. In other cases, they preferred 
to respond the questionnaire by e-mail. All the interviews conducted in Chile were 
coordinated and responded by e-mail.  
 
This chapter has outlined the underlying research design and methodology which has 
informed the dissertation. It has highlighted the factors underpinning the definition 
and operationalization of the dependent and independent variables as well as the 
rationale for the comparative case study approach which will be elaborated over the 
following chapters.  
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CHAPTER 3. Policy evaluation in Mexico 
 
Introduction 
This chapter places the study of the Mexican policy evaluation in an historical 
perspective. The main reason for doing so is because there is a general perception 
and concern that in every new administration new policies, programmes and projects 
are created without looking back to the past to identify facts and success but also 
failures in public policy making. Therefore, it is important for the reader to know 
about the evolution of evaluation and the relevant institutional and political factors 
which have influenced the effectiveness of policy evaluation across time. This chapter 
aims at presenting evaluation activity in the Mexican government and the major 
initiatives in the field, which were generated (mostly) by the executive. In considering 
the above, the information is presented for the period between the 1930s and 1970s, 
and thereafter in six-year presidential terms up to the present. The evaluation 
performed by the Mexican government emerged as a way of controlling and 
monitoring practices.  
 
Moreover, evaluation has been considered relevant to the extent that it is closely 
related to the budgetary process. As Mejía (2005:4) claims, the government interest 
was more linked to finance and public resources than to a review of the programmes 
and agencies’ results. In this sense, the power exerted by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) 
has been decisive in driving evaluation. Thus, after a long period of ups and downs 
since the 1930s, in 1983 the planning process was integrated into the regulatory 
framework as the Planning Law and National Democratic Planning System (SNPD). 
The chapter also confirms that administrative reforms and doctrines of the New 
Public Management (NPM) boosted evaluation and promoted its ‘virtues’ in terms of 
transparency, accountability and democracy. However, although political conditions 
favoured the consolidation of evaluation, its operation remains unstable due to 
multiple factors. The chapter explores whether or not the relevant institutional and 
political factors have worked in favour of effective evaluations over time. 
 
Historical perspective    
For much of its history, the Mexican political context has been characterized by an 
authoritarian regime and strong presidential system of government where the 
executive branch has an essential role of leadership and power. This power has even 
been apparent in the planning process and in the monitoring and evaluation 
practices. Meyer (2000: 50) claims that since Porfirio Díaz ruled the country from 
1876-1911, ‘el presidencialismo’ (presidentialism) has prevailed.66 This characteristic was 
emphasized in the figure of Lázaro Cardenas (president from 1934-40), who achieved 
the greatest level of control over the Mexican political system. Furthermore, Carpizo 
(1983 cited in Meyer, 2000: 50) defined this power as ‘metaconstitutional’ to explain 
the magnitude of power achieved by the presidency, especially in the second half of 
the 20th century. Moreover, the State was under the control of the political party PRI 
(Institutional Revolutionary Party).  
 
Writing during this authoritarian period, Grimes & Simmons (1969: 74) suggest that 
‘The special relationship between the PRI, the bureaucracy, and the functional 
interest groups has, up to now, prevented the formation of other significant political 
                                                          
66
Díaz recognised as a dictator ruled this era for more than 30 years (1876-1911). This period of rule is so-called 
presidentialism, in which the leader of the executive exerts authority over Congress through the majority of the party, 
and the latter cannot achieve independence to act as intermediary between citizenry and government (Duverger, 
1992: 213). 
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structures, and thus, at least in one sense, it has inhibited political development’. 
Another analysis refers to the lack of appropriate systems of checks and balances for 
a democratic State (Meyer, 2000: 53). These factors might help explain the attempt 
to establish a proper evaluation system in the earlier years of the past century. 
Indeed, there is no consensus regarding the beginning of evaluation. Arguably, the 
‘Special efficiency Commissions’ in 1926 were the earliest examples, which were 
developed to organise public services and to streamline government agencies. 
Oropeza (2005: 82) and Sánchez (1993: 943; 1996: 708) agree that there are 
precedents before 1930, when the First National Congress of Planning and the 
National Economic Congress were held. 
 
Other scholars argue that after the depression in 1929, a commitment was made to 
look for an effective method for allocating public resources (Grimes & Simmons, 1969: 
75). Indeed, in 1930 the General Planning of the Republic Law67 was enacted as one 
of the first government efforts, establishing a National Planning Commission under 
the supervision of the Ministry of Communications and Public Works. However, for 
these authors, the fact of belonging to this ministry explains why the planning process 
was more focused on geography, urban planning, natural resources, communication 
and infrastructure issues, rather than on modern planning as it is currently 
understood. 68  For other authors as Mejía (2005:4), the government’s interest in 
evaluation began in the 1940s and was more linked to finance and public resources 
than to a review of the programmes and agencies’ results.  
 
Some monitoring practices emerged in those years such as in 1947, when the Control 
Law of the Decentralized Agencies and State Enterprises was enacted to monitor 
agencies’ performance but it was abolished under the next administration. Between 
1958 and 1976, the absence of inter-agency plans, policy guidance of planning, 
methodologies, evaluation criteria and incentives to collaborate (Bailey, 1980: 16, 20) 
resulted in planning fragmentation and relegated evaluation to a secondary role 
whilst the budgeting processes were prioritised (see table 1 annexed). Economic 
planning became predominant due to the importance and size of the State’s activity. 
Bailey argues this emphasis was in line with the economic challenges and the ‘statist 
development’ model or the so-called ‘Mexican miracle’ for the achievement of 
economic growth. In the 1970s, the model of ‘desarrollo compartido’ (shared 
development) implemented at the national level by government, required the 
establishment of ‘internal commissions of administration’ by public agencies to 
improve their efficiency, control and evaluation.  
 
The Ministry of the Presidency became the implementing agency responsible for 
coordinating the reform of the public administration (Oropeza, 2005: 87). For this 
author, this was the first time (1970s) that the political discourse referred to the 
strengthening of the democratic state and the need for public sector reforms. 
Apparently, political factors interfered with these efforts from its inception. On paper, 
planning seemed to be an effective and ambitious policy instrument which aimed to 
control public resources and organize the expanding government. However, those 
                                                          
67
Official Journal (Diario Oficial de la Federación, 12/07/1930). 
68
At a first glance, Pichardo (1972: 16) summarizes all of them in a wide spread of agencies. The most representative 
before the 1940s was the Programme Commission of Revolutionary National Party [Comisión del Programa del 
Partido Nacional Revolucionario] created in 1933 and the precedent of the ‘Partido Revolucionario Institucional’ (PRI) 
party. It was integrated by government officials and party members to carry out the first six-year plan of social and 
economic reforms (1934-40). The Special Advisory Committee [Comité Asesor Especial] created in 1935 by the 
President Lázaro Cárdenas was in charge of coordinating national planning policies. 
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with political power had a remarkable ability to side-line the planning process and 
there was a sort of passivity and resistance to act on its recommendations.  
 
1976-1982 
In José López Portillo’s administration, and during his prior electoral campaign, he 
had repeatedly announced his intention to carry out a substantial government 
reform to increase economic and social development with “planning and 
programming as essential tools” (Lanz quoting Carrillo and García, 1981). Planning 
acquired significance within a wider vision of promoting federalism and regional 
balance (Chapoy, 2003:10-11). This strategy sought to tackle the economic crisis 
through government initiatives such as the political reform and the strategy ‘Alianza 
para la Producción’. In this context, the most important evaluation-related initiative 
was the streamlining of the federal bureaucracy through an administrative reform 
agenda (Bailey, 1980: 11). By attempting to link performance and management, the 
administrative reform was focused on the reorganisation of state enterprises and 
ministries, as well as on programme budgeting.69 
 
In addition, the executive created the Ministry of Programming and Budget 
[Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto ‘SPP’] responsible for the planning, 
programming, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation of public expenditure.70 The 
agency was also responsible for policy implementation which is the basis for the 
development of a policy evaluation framework. As Lanz (1987) indicates, ‘for the first 
time, the assessment role was institutionalized and assigned to this office; in the past, 
these functions were usually performed by the Ministry of the Presidency and the 
Ministry of National Heritage’. Although the aim was to centralize these processes 
(planning, budgeting and evaluation) under one ministry, the President was 
interested in promoting the autonomy of sector coordinators in setting their 
objectives, public resources and evaluation, providing the managerial and policy 
autonomy referred by Verhoest et al. (2004: 105). 
 
The autonomy given to agencies would help to release some pressure over the 
president – who controllled all public agencies –, rewarding top officials based on 
results and tackling problems of overlapping among agencies (Bailey, 1980: 23). 
However, the SPP was not very effective, at first glance, some reasons to modify the 
systems previously mentioned became evident in the next presidential-term. The 
obese State was the justification for amending the State legislation and 
implementing an administrative reorganisation to create the new Ministry of the 
General Controller of the Federation ‘’SECOGEF’ amongst others. Although the SPP 
had an Undersecretary of Evaluation, it only had an office (General Office of Analysis 
for Evaluation) without a formal evaluation system.  
 
From its inception, the SPP was modified several times to articulate the processes, did 
not have a clear evaluation process and was enforced to develop ad-hoc studies 
ordered by the President. Moreover, in 1978, a technical body called Accounting 
Office71 was established, whose objectives were closely linked to the SPP’s goals. At the 
end of 1977, evaluation functions were transferred from the SPP to the Ministry of the 
                                                          
69
For this purpose, the Legal Base and Guidelines for Organisational and Sector Performance in the Federal Public 
Administration was issued by the Presidency (22
nd
 July, 1977). Regarding reorganisation, around 900 state 
enterprises were grouped under the supervision of ministries as sector coordinators, while the budgeting programme 
represents a transition between the traditional way of budgeting based on resources to budgeting based on 
objectives/goals and the medium-term (Bailey, 1980: 22; SPP, 1988). 
70
The Federal Government Organic Law (LOAPF, art. 32). Official Journal, 29/12/1976. 
71
Replaced after 1999 by the Federal Superior Audit. 
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Presidency while its structure (bureaucracy) remained in the SPP (Moctezuma, 1989: 
88; Bailey, 1980: 27) and explained in the following period. 
 
1982-1988 
This presidential term is one of the most critical in terms of the economic crisis, which 
Mexico experienced throughout the 1980s and 1990s. According to the president 
Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado ‘The obese State has been a critical component of the 
fiscal crisis to the extent that public resources are used for its administration instead of 
for solving social problems…’ (Aguilar, 1996: 188). In those days a powerful new 
political grouping of ‘technocrats’ who belonged to the bureaucratic elite with a 
common background based on a neoliberal economic ideology (Llerenas & Huertas, 
2004: 230) emerged. Their ideas were reflected in the growing influence of new ideas 
on the management of public administration. Mexico like other Latin American 
countries adopted some management methods and techniques from the private 
sector, such as public services delivery and performance evaluations to tackle and 
transform the bureaucratic paradoxes of public administration.72 
 
The regime’s so-called “Moral Restoration of Society” strategy and the slogan of 
Moral Restoration [Renovación Moral],73 which referred to “an effort to return to 
sobriety and austerity related to the republican system…” was the driving force 
behind the amendments to the Federal Government Organic Law ‘LOAPF’ [Ley 
Orgánica de la Administración Pública Federal]74 and the creation of the Ministry of 
the General Controller of the Federation ‘SECOGEF’ [Secretaría de la Contraloría 
General de la Federación]. The reforms of the LOAPF75 (article 32 BIS) conferred 
powers on the ministry to regulate monitoring and evaluation activities: 
...to carry out the assessments of ministries and state enterprises of the Federal Public 
Administration (APF) in order to promote efficiency and verify the achievement of 
programmes objectives. 
 
This presidential term is well-known as the one that formalized the evaluation 
process in official documents. In 1983, a notable aspect was the creation of the 
National Democratic Planning System (SNPD) consolidated through the first 
National Development Plan (PND) 1983-1988 and the ‘Planning Law’ framed as part 
of the Constitution’s reform.76 This period marked the consolidation of the planning 
process for the first time since the 1930s, making it mandatory by law to have a 
planning document with detailed goals and objectives, to continue its 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of government performance in the 
medium term. Although evaluation functions including planning, programming and 
                                                          
72
Indeed, in those years the major elimination of state enterprises framed in the organic law began, continuing the 
administrative reforms undertaken by the previous administration; the argument to dissolve them was the high growth 
of this sector and their negative cost for the budget (Guerrero, 1989: 787). In 1983, there were approximately 1150 
state enterprises in the Mexican government. By 1988 this number was reduced to 595. At the end of the process in 
1991, the number of enterprises downsized was 969, which represented 16.75% in terms of Gross Domestic Product 
(Aguilar, 1996: 193, Rebollo, 1993: 157, Sixth Governance Report, 1988: 407 and Tamayo, 1992: 115). 
73
1st. Governance Report (Sep. 1, 1983).  
74
This law represented a challenge by the government to organize federal public administration and state enterprises. 
LOAPF, art. 32. Official Journal, 29/12/1976. 
75
Official Journal 29/12/1982. 
76
Regarding planning and conducting national development, the Constitution’s reforms include the articles 25, 27, 28 
and 115. The SNPD operates at three levels: global, sector and institutional. The law (art. 115) granted autonomy to 
the state and municipalities on the extent that the federal and state’s executives agreed to coordinate actions. The 
result of this coordination was the State Planning System. In terms of time, the tools of the SNPD are classified in: i) 
medium-term programmes such as the PND, sector, special, regional and institutional; and ii) short-term programmes 
such as the annual programmes which include operational activities, goals, policies, resources and priorities of 
medium-term programmes. Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto (1988) Planeación democrática. 
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control were shifted from the SPP to the SECOGEF, in practice, the operation was 
confusing even for these ministries, which were overlapping regulations and roles.  
 
Figure 3  
Planning and evaluation functions in the SPP and SECOGEF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Official Journal, Internal organisation manuals of the SPP and SECOGEF in 1983. 
 
Especially during 1983, the rules for internal organisation manual issued by both 
ministries were similar in terms of responsibilities (see figure 3). On paper, both 
ministries had an office of evaluation, of planning and of programming and 
budgeting but in practice, evaluation functions inside the SECOGEF were 
distinguished from the SPP, because the former was more focused on overseeing of 
public resources, audits and review systems while the latter focused on monitoring 
plans and programmes. However, despite some relevant results77 and the president’s 
interest in establishing a system for monitoring, controlling and evaluating 
government performance, evaluation had not impacted on such performance. 
Administrative reforms did not use evaluation as the main tool for changing 
government management. These reforms seem more a response to the economic 
crisis than a process where evaluation helped decision-makers to determine the 
agencies’ efficiency and dismantling “bureaucratic” structures. 
 
By 1985, there was no evidence of any evaluation unit and the General Office of 
Evaluation was eliminated from the structure of the SECOGEF due to economic 
restrictions. Furthermore, the government did not link the main evaluation system 
called the System for Government Control and Evaluation (SICEG) operated by the 
SECOGEF with the SNPD, so they took separate paths. The former aimed to review 
public resources and infrastructure, while the SNPD organized a complex 
government structure through programmes, plans and agreements between the 
state and executive and with regional authorities. 
 
1988-1994 
The presidential term of Carlos Salinas de Gortari achieved strong political power 
and influence over public administration. As Arellano & Guerrero (2003: 3) point out 
‘…the administrative structure became the arena in which contenders competed for 
the presidency and became the main channel through which conflict among social 
                                                          
77
According to the Government (Sept. 1984-Aug. 1985) and Work (1988) Reports, more than 800 evaluations were 
performed by Commissioners to improve the administration of state enterprises, such reports also refer to the 
SICEG’s implementation in states and municipalities, and to the promotion of self-evaluation reports. 
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sectors was managed’. There are some advantages and disadvantages of such power 
achieved. On the one hand, the disadvantage of a large structure of loyalties and 
oversight to control the government but on the other hand, such power was an 
advantage to the government in terms of the permanence and stability of policies, 
programmes and projects. In this context, the General Programme for the 
Simplification of the Federal Public Administration [Programa General de 
Simplificación de la Administración Pública Federal]78 was the result of government 
reorganisation and the State reforms (see Aguilar, 1996). It aimed to consolidate an 
administrative culture fostering efficiency and productivity in government 
management, promoting evaluation of public services and tackling corruption.  
 
The administrative reorganisation was also a response to pressures for economic and 
political reforms. However, for Arellano & Guerrero (2003: 10), this administrative 
reform is more difficult to understand than the other two major reforms undertaken 
by this government (economic and political). As these authors point out, substantial 
government transformation might have jeopardized the political control and power 
over resources, agencies and their bureaucracy. For example, the essence of the SPP 
– including evaluation functions – was transferred to other ministries until it was 
eliminated in 1992.79 This action took place despite the president’s power and interest 
to keep the SPP alive; the administrative reform had several allies but also 
opponents (Aguilar, 1996: 189), and the president did not secure for political support.  
 
To achieve any major reform needs consensus among political actors (inter/intra 
governmental relations), who should strongly believe in it towards the creation of 
public value. Hence, in regards of implementing evaluation based on the results 
achieved80 and failures of management of the economic policy during this presidence, 
the incentive to implement evaluation was probably ineffective due to the lack of 
political consensus between those assessed, and the consequences of bad or poor 
performance as a result of evaluations. The evidence of evaluation in this presidence 
is the evaluation of social programmes, which started in 1992 operated by the 
Ministry of Social Development [Secretaría de Desarrollo Social ‘SEDESOL’] and 
eventually transferred to other sectors.  
  
1994-2000 
The early years of president Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon’s administration were 
constrained due to the ‘error de Diciembre’, when the economy collapsed at the end 
of the year 1994 and during 1995. 81  The period was also characterised by 
democratization (even some scholars Navarrete, 2008, Reyna, 2006 and Sáenz et al., 
2007, argue that the process is incomplete), which was beginning to change the old 
                                                          
78
Agreement for implementation, coordination and evaluation of the General Programme for the Simplification of the 
Federal Public Administration.Official Journal, 09/02/1989. 
79
Reforms issued by the LOAPF. Official Journal, 21/02/1992. 
80
The report of activites 1992-1993 [Informe de labores] of the SECOGEF in the section ‘control, inspection and 
evaluation of public management’ refers to evaluation results as a mechanism for the oversight of public resources, 
training courses of control and evaluation of public management for bureaucracy and Internal Controllers. At the 
regional and local level, activities were focused on the mechanism of Social Controller in the National Programme of 
Solidarity and the effectiveness of resources. Finally, a monitoring and evaluation of the president’s campaign 
promises show that 5000 works and actions were executed. However, the report did not provide further information of 
these actions. 
81
The SHCP affirms that several factors occurred at the same time, the decrease in domestic saving, a rise in private 
consumption, deficit on public accounts, and external factors, such as an increase in interest rates on international 
markets which pushed investment capital towards other markets offering better benefits and less risk. See Decree of 
the PRONAFIDE, Official Journal 7/11/1997. 
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political system.82 Although these political and external factors had some effect in 
government, the hegemony of the ‘PRI’ prevailed in the form of presidential power 
over all branches of government (Legislative, Judicial and Executive), and even civil 
society including trade unions, confederations, groups representing peasants and 
teachers (Arellano & Guerrero, 2003: 2-3). 
 
Moreover, the democratic transition did not alter the immovable nature of the 
president as supreme leader. Indeed he was able to continue the administrative 
reform launched in the previous two administrations. From this moment until 2012, 
evaluation activities were conducted by the Ministry of the Controllership and 
Administrative Development83 [Secretaría de Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo 
‘SECODAM’] and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit [Secretaría de Hacienda 
y Crédito Público ‘SHCP’]. The former has the responsibility for organising and 
coordinating the SICEG, while the SHCP84 was responsible for the assessment of the 
banking system, state enterprises’ investment programmes, federal public 
expenditure and expenditure budget, and for the oversight of the compliance of 
national planning, programming, budgeting, accounting and evaluation. Figure 4 
presents the connection between these ministries and systems. 
 
Figure 4 
Modernization of the Mexican Federal Public Administration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Modernization of the Federal Public Administration and 
Budgetary System Programme, 1999.The SECODAM and SHCP. 
 
The Programme for the Modernization of Public Administration ‘PROMAP’ 1995-
2000 [Programa para la Modernización de la Administración Pública]85 was the first 
initiative of the SECODAM.86 The Programme comprised a scheme for the evaluation 
and measurement of public management, a comprehensive information system, and 
the Internal Control Bodies [Órganos Internos de Control ‘OICs’] for better control of 
                                                          
82
The first historic event was the elections of 1989, when Baja California became the first state dominated by the 
opposition party ‘PAN’ (National Action Party) and Mexico city also was led by the opposition party ‘PRD’ (Party of 
the Democratic Revolution). Afterwards, federal elections in 1997 transformed the power structure and the PRI no 
longer had a majority in Congress. The incorporation of Mexico into the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in 1994 also represented a major challenge to this administration leading to the need to 
transform the government. 
83
Afterwards the SFP (see table 1). 
84
Article 31, LOAPF. Official Journal 21/02/1992. 
85
See Decree of the PROMAP, Official Journal 28/05/1996. 
86
Through the Unit for Administrative Development ‘UDA’ [Unidad de Desarrollo Administrativo] responsible of the 
modernization project based on reforms’ experiences in the OECD countries and state governments in Mexico. See 
Cejudo (2008: 116) and table 1. 
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public resources. The National Programme of Development Financing ‘PRONAFIDE 
1997-2000’ [Programa Nacional de Financiamiento del Desarrollo] was the first 
special mid-term programme of the fiscal and financial sector issued by the SHCP.87 
Arellano & Guerrero (2003: 13) affirm ‘The SIAFF (Integral System of Federal 
Financial Administration), NEP (New Programmatic Structure) and SED 
(Performance Evaluation System) have also been ambitious efforts to transform the 
traditional budgetary system into a performance-driven budget system’.  
 
As Mejía (2005: 17) identifies, ‘these systems were in line with international trends in 
budgetary matters, seeking to achieve a results-based approach’. The NEP aimed, 
for the first time in public history, to establish a comprehensive system of strategic 
performance indicators for the monitoring and evaluation of programmes and 
government activities, and to classify such programmes – at federal, state and local 
level – into ‘budgetary programmes’ categories, organising public resources into the 
so-called ‘estructura programática’ as it is currently known. In this context, evaluation 
became part of the large-scale of reforms inside the public sector, and it is 
remarkable that for first time the SHCP and SECODAM worked by common interest 
and agreement – at least in theory – to promote an evaluation strategy along with 
other administrative reforms.  
 
However, these efforts were not enough to deal with the problem of control and 
power exercised by those who would have been evaluated. The implementation of 
the SICEG, NEP and SED could reduce discretionary control by political actors via 
evaluation results. In the end, the ambitious efforts to establish a large-scale of 
reforms could not secure support from such political actors. As Arellano & Guerrero 
(2003: 14) argue this might be a reason to reform public administration with a 
“neutral” technique instead of major reforms because the former is “painless” for the 
public sector and easier to implement. In other words, the government led the reform 
called ‘the managerialist strategy’,88 alongside the economic and political reforms 
(Arellano & Guerrero, 2003: 10-11).  
 
This strategy refers to the introduction of minor changes at the micro level 
(bureaucracy) through administrative techniques (re-engineering, total quality 
management, corporate planning, budgetary planning and service-oriented 
bureaucracy), which could transform the macro level and improve government’s 
efficiency without jeopardizing the government’s traditional way of functioning, 
The hope of this managerial proposal is that freeing bureaucrats from micro-
management (or over-involvement of Congress or controller agencies in specific 
management of the agency), pushing them towards evaluation of performance and 
competition, the administrative apparatus would be more efficient and responsive to 
society (Arellano & Guerrero, 2003: 10-11). 
 
In those years, the achievements of government were limited to some ‘Performance 
Agreements’ signed by State enterprises. In addition, Congress modified the draft 
budget in 1999 to reallocate public resources to strategic social programmes, though 
it is unclear whether or not these amendments were due to evaluations. Although 
the SICEG produced some relevant results (see sixth Governance Report, Sept. 1, 
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According to the SNPD, the PROMAP and PRONAFIDE are classified into the category of special programmes. The 
aim is to provide a stable macroeconomic framework, financial system and fiscal policy that enhance external and 
internal saving and investment, and stimulate growth in the long-term. Official Journal, 7/11/1997.It also establishes a 
quantitative baseline scenario for main macroeconomic variables, and stresses the importance of domestic saving to 
finance investment in order to reduce the economy’s vulnerability (OECD, 1998:63). 
88
An OECD’s strategy inspired and supported by global financial institutions and NPM practices (OECD, 1997 and 
Osborne & Gaebler, 1992 cited in Llerenas & Huerta, 2004: 232). 
~ 63 ~ 
 
 
 
2000), these were more related to audits and oversights than evaluation of public 
management. As regards evaluation, a first assumption of limited results is that the 
financial, fiscal and administrative reform required technical capacity and political 
consensus (Arellano & Guerrero, 2003: 13) between actors involved in the process. For 
instance, a civil service with experience and knowledge is certainly needed and 
important as a strategic factor to influence any administrative reform, public sector 
modernization, efficiency and political transformation (Arellano & Guerrero, 2003: 2-
3, 15 and Llerenas & Huerta, 2004: 233). 
 
However, according to these authors, public administration was characterized by 
personal loyalties, patronage networks by those people who were looking for a job, 
relations, political support or recommendation. This fact reduced any possibility to 
establish a career civil service to ensure officials’ skills and experience. Moreover, while 
an evaluation system needs time and proper data system for consolidation and 
homogenous implementation. This reform and evaluation system did not have 
sufficient time to achieve results. Additionally, indicators required by the system did 
not apply to some activities and ministries. Mejía (2005: 17) notes the cases of the 
Ministries of Internal Affairs, External Affairs, Commerce and the SHCP, and the 
difficulty of measuring their impact, their performance and other activities such as 
negotiations or promotions.  
 
Although it was expected that the NEP’s regulatory framework would be 
independent to avoid micro-management from controller agencies such as the SHCP 
and SECODAM (Arellano & Guerrero, 2003: 13), these ministries had to control it and 
deal with bureaucratic, inflexible procedures and regulations in order to implement 
the NEP homogenously. In addition, there was no development of institutional 
mechanisms which would facilitate the use of evaluation results by Congress, to 
enable the reallocation of resources, nor were instruments developed between 
government and the public to diminish the gap in public information.  
 
In the last year of this administration, the political system under the control of the PRI 
encountered a loss of confidence from the society, due to corruption scandals, 
mismanagement of public resources and inefficient public services (Llerenas & Huerta, 
2004: 234). This along with other factors,89 led the PRI to lose – for first time in seven 
decades – the presidency at the election in 2000. For Arellano & Guerrero (2003: 4), 
the change in the presidency marked the culmination of a long process of 
democratization.  
 
2000-2006 
During Vicente Fox Quesada’s administration, the PRI opposed to the majority of the 
executive reforms launched by the first president of the opposition party PAN 
(National Action Party), reinforcing the impression of the collapse of ‘presidencialismo’ 
(presidentialism). The assumption is that the previous presidency was the last stand of 
‘presidencialismo’. As Sáenz et al. (2007: 19) suggest ‘…not only was (government) 
alternated, currently we have in the presidency a leader who has to negotiate to 
enable him to govern, even with his own party – PAN – at Congress’. As noted by 
Reyna (2006: 131), ‘the Mexican government has not dismantled its authoritarian 
structure although it has undergone a political change, the public debate is more 
open and citizens tend to be more participatory’. In this context, the new image of 
                                                          
89
These include the citizenry politicization and organisation, loss of confidence in political parties combined with greater 
trust in electoral institutions, the continuing fall in the voting of PRI, media campaigns, political openness due to the 
negative image of the PRI, and the need to legitimize itself to the public (Sáenz et. al. 2007: 19). 
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the president still operates as key decision-maker (Arellano & Guerrero, 2003: 4), 
which indeed will help for further improvements in public policies.  
 
The emerging democracy saw the development of evaluation regarding social policy. 
Firstly, despite only a few cases of evaluation of social programmes in 1992 inside the 
Ministry of Social Development [Secretaría de Desarrollo Social ‘SEDESOL’], 
evaluation spread across the public administration, 90  thanks to the innovative 
evaluation model of impact of the programme Progresa (rebranded as “Prospera” in 
2014) implemented in this administration. Indeed, during 2000-01, Congress 
broadened the obligation to evaluate social programmes with ‘Reglas de Operación’ 
(operating rules) (Cardozo, 2006: 122 and Medina, 2007: 20).  
 
In these cases, Congress led the evaluations and was responsible for hiring external 
evaluators to develop them. By 2004, this proposal was formally enacted by the 
General Law of Social Development 91  [Ley General de Desarrollo Social ‘LGDS’], 
along with the creation of the National Evaluation Council of the Social 
Development Policy [Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo 
Social ‘CONEVAL’]. In 2005, the CONEVAL emerged as a state enterprise92 of the 
social sector to coordinate policy evaluation and to measure poverty, establishing 
criteria and methodologies for both purposes. In the medium term, the council 
worked in coordination with the SFP and SHCP to perform evaluation functions.  
 
Secondly, in 2000 Congress gave further capacity to the Superior Audit of the 
Federation [Auditoría Superior de la Federación ‘ASF’] also known as Congressional 
oversight or Audit Office for the oversight and control of public resources but also for 
programme evaluation,93 which aimed ‘(t)o assess goals and objectives set in federal 
programmes on the basis of strategic indicators approved by the budget to verify 
their performance and legality of public resources’. The ASF adopted new evaluation 
functions and units such as the Programme Evaluation General Office. As Guerrero 
(2002: 190) points out, ‘this was the result of a large transformation process of this 
agency inside the legislature’. In effect, this agency and the SECODAM performed the 
same activities concerning programme evaluation, albeit from the respective 
positions of the legislature and executive.  
 
Thirdly, in 2001 the Good Government Agenda [Agenda de Buen Gobierno] became 
the most important strategy by the executive, which incorporated amongst other 
priorities94 the Presidential Goals System [Sistema de Metas Presidenciales ‘SIMEP’] 
for performance measurement. The SIMEP operated in 2002 as a top management 
                                                          
90
Since 1992 (Official journal 25/05/1992) the organic law created the SEDESOL with the responsibility to conduct and 
evaluate the social development policy. In 1998, the budget reform embraced the obligation to evaluate social 
programmes, e.g. in 1999, subsidy and cash-transfer programmes should establish indicators to assess the effective 
budget execution. Moreover, in 2001 the Internal organisation manual (official journal 13/09/2001) ordered to put 
more emphasis on external evaluation by academic or specialized organisations. This operated through the 
Undersecretary of Prospective, Planning and Evaluation and the Social Programmes Evaluation General Office 
inside the ministry. 
91
‘To establish evaluation and monitoring mechanisms of actions and activities of the National Policy of Social 
Development’ (article 1).Official Journal, 20/01/2004. 
92
Official Journal, 24/08/2005. 
93
 Article 16 of the Superior Audit Law of the Federation [Ley de Fiscalización Superior de la Federación], Official 
Journal, 29/12/2000. Currently is the Audit and Accountability Law of the Federation [Ley de Fiscalización y 
Rendición de Cuentas de la Federación], Official Journal 18/06/2010. 
94
This agenda operated through six strategic areas (see table 1). Eventually, in 2002 (Official journal, 22/04/2002) the 
SIMEP along with the National Programme for Combating Corruption, Promoting Transparency and Administrative 
Development 2001-2006 [Programa Nacional de Combate a la Corrupción, Fomento a la Transparencia y Desarrollo 
Administrativo ‘PNCCFTDA’] were integrated into the ‘Agenda’ 
   http://innova.fox.presidencia.gob.mx/archivos/8/8/3/files/archivos/sip-2944.pdf 
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evaluation system, which identified high impact, processes and projects linked to the 
PND and set goals and deadlines for its sector programmes. Its main characteristic 
was the agreement between the head of the ministry or state enterprise and the 
president, under supervision by the SECODAM (Accountability Report 2000-2006: 
157, Diener, 2007: 85, Medina, 2007: 50-1, Mejía, 2005: 21-2 and Pardo, 2007: 899). 
 
Fourthly, the National Institute for Evaluation of Education95 [Instituto Nacional para 
la Evaluación de la Educación ‘INEE’] was established in 2002 as a public, 
decentralized agency with financial, technical, and operational autonomy for the 
assessment of the educational sector. Its roles were linked to the creation and 
development of educational indicators, statistics, tools, research and knowledge, as 
well as the measurement and evaluation of education issues and it was able to 
produce relevant findings within a relatively short period. Fifthly, in 2003 the 
Planning Law was modified.96 Article 9 points out the importance of a system that 
could measure government performance, 
The Executive shall establish an Evaluation and Compensation System for Performance to 
measure progress of ministries of the Federal Public Administration on achieving goals and 
objectives of the Plan –PND– and its sector programmes… 
 
Another element in the long list of existing evaluation practices and systems was the 
reform to the organic law97 (LOAPF) to transform the SECODAM into the Ministry of 
Public Administration [Secretaría de la Función Pública ‘SFP’]. Sosa (2011: 112-3) adds 
that the approach of this new ministry is based on a modified public management 
policy version of the Public Management Programme ‘PUMA’ of the OECD and by 
the Ministry of Public Administrations ‘MAP’ of the Government of Spain during the 
1990s. The SFP developed a number of evaluation-related initiatives. In 2003, after 
several failed attempts, the SFP issued the Professional Career Civil Service Law98 
[Ley del Servicio Profesional de Carrera en la Administración Pública Federal], a key 
element of which was a system for the performance evaluation of officials 
(bureaucracy). This law is particularly relevant in emerging countries to improve the 
operation of the public sector and evaluation system, and to provide stability at the 
senior levels.  
 
The following year, the SFP implemented the Integral Performance Model of Control 
and Oversight Bodies99 [Modelo Integral de Desempeño de Órganos de Vigilancia y 
Control ‘MIDO’]. The MIDO was a comprehensive performance evaluation and 
management model100 of the OICs designed to support public agencies in achieving 
their objectives and goals successfully (Franco, 2006: 69 and SFP, 2004).101 Finally, in 
2006 the Federal Law of Budget and Fiscal Responsibility 102  [Ley Federal de 
Presupuesto y Responsabilidad Hacendaria ‘LFPRH’] was enacted. This law 
                                                          
95
Official journal 8/08/2002. 
96
Official journal 10/04/2003. 
97
Idem. 
98
Idem. 
99
The model is based on a “modern” internal control approach of the COSO methodology (Committee of Sponsors 
Organisations) report published in 1992 in the USA, which emerged due to the failure of traditional control systems, 
which could not avoid and prevent financial and accounting frauds. Nowadays it is an international standard for public 
management (Medina, 2007: 57). 
100
The MIDO also was linked with the reform wave of the New Public Management, according to the CIDE, an 
academic institution that studied this model (SFP, 2004: 27). 
101
Guidelines for MIDO’s design, integration, operation, evaluation and control. Official journal, 7/10/2004. 
102
Official journal, 30/03/2006. 
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embraced the budgetary process and the evaluation results of the PND’s objectives 
and sector programmes, based on the ‘SED’.103  
 
This was related to the so-called Results-based Budgeting strategy ‘PbR’, seeking to 
link governmental planning, design, and implementation of public programmes to 
the budgetary process through evaluation:  
The SHCP and the SFP verify every two months the implementation of programmes 
and budgets in ministries and state enterprises. To identify the efficiency, economy, 
efficacy and quality of the Federal Public Administration, as well as social impact of 
public expenditure... These indicators (SED) emphasize the quality of goods and public 
services, as well as citizens’ satisfaction... (art. 111) 
 
Clearly, these strategies gave a boost to evaluation, which previously had been only 
a rhetorical commitment. According to the Report of execution of the PND 2006 
[Informe de Ejecución del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo], the 6th Government Report 
[Sexto Informe de Gobierno] and the Account of Public Treasury, the results were as 
follows. In the first place, the Evaluation and Compensation System for Performance 
was linked to the Professional Career Civil Service Law linking results of programmes 
and this system through bonuses.104 However, the reports did not provide evidence 
about this process and evaluation results were not used as an input and incentive for 
the improvement of a career civil service. Besides that, in those years the Austerity 
Decree arose as a measure for reducing wages, salaries and downsizing the 
bureaucracy, among other subjects, being this, presumably, the reason for these poor 
results. In other words, the decree was an opposite action by government against the 
compensation system to improve the quality of bureaucracy. 
 
The SIMEP and the Good Government Agenda had a similar ending. The main 
reason for their cancellation was due to the overlap of coordination between the SFP 
(the lead department) and the Office of the Presidency. Pardo (2007: 899) notes 
that this generated confusion amongst government agencies in terms of priority of 
actions and dual supervision. Regarding the SIMEP, she claims ‘This managerial 
(private sector) and short-term mechanism, in practice, nullified the accomplishment 
and assessment of the long-term goals…’ Another reason was the difficulty to achieve 
policy objectives. Initially, public agencies established ambitious goals but eventually 
they had to make amendments to deadlines and even to the goals in order to 
facilitate their achievement.  
 
The SIMEP was adopted based on the obligation to meet these goals. This obligation 
is a pattern of coordination referred in the Intra Governmental and Interagency 
Relations ‘IGR’ variable. As Medina (2007: 51) suggests based on interviews of SFP’s 
officials ‘No head of ministry or state enterprise wants to be questioned by the 
president about the red or yellow goals, if it was, they reacted immediately; in this 
sense it was effective’.105 Moreover, in practice, the consequences of the evaluation 
process were not as envisaged in the SIMEP’s framework. The sanctions promoted by 
the OICs were informal, moral in nature, and had limited potential to change 
decision-makers’ behaviour. Thus, the system worked only to the extent that the 
president was involved in following up its findings.  
 
                                                          
103
This system operates with indicators for measurement of coverage, efficiency, social and economic impact, quality 
and equality, based on the logical framework approach methodology [Matriz de Marco Lógico ‘MML’]. 
104
According to articles 2 and 68 of the LFPRH. 
105
The SIMEP was a system for performance measurement based in a traffic light system, in which the president 
monitored the level of achievement of specific goals set by agencies. 
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As for the evaluations led by Congress, the CEFP (2008: 36) asserts that the results 
were not as expected. Firstly, not all ministries submitted their indicators and 
evaluations to Congress and secondly, most government institutions had 
unsatisfactory marks or scores. This might be the reason for the creation of the 
CONEVAL. Finally, the executive agenda was focused on the SIMEP rather than the 
PbR/SED and the System for Government Control and Evaluation (SICEG). Although 
for Diener (2007: 85), the SIMEP was established on the basis of the budgetary system 
reform (explained in the following administration), the NEP, SED and SIAFF were the 
only established to do so ‘for real results-based budgeting’. According to the CEFP 
(2008: 33), the introduction of the SIMEP undermined the consolidation of the SED 
despite the importance it acquired in the Federation’s Draft of Expenditure Budget 
2001.106  
 
The PbR/SED emerged in the transition period between presidents Fox and Calderon 
but did not formally operate till the latter’s presidential term. The delay in its 
operation was mainly because the structure and evaluation staff required for its 
implementation were not finalised until the next administration was in power, and 
when there was a renewed interest in promoting results-based budgeting. 
 
2006-2012 
At the beginning of President Felipe Calderon Hinojosa’s administration, the most 
relevant components regarding evaluation were the SICEG along with the PbR/SED. 
Certainly, in recent years, the issue of evaluation in emerging countries has become 
more prominent. Administrative reforms and doctrines of the New Public 
Management (NPM) undertaken during the past decades by most developing 
countries seem to be the core of rethinking the policy process, in which evaluation 
plays an essential role. 107  The new Presidency’s commitment to evaluation was 
arguably reinforced by the financial crisis, which had a dramatic impact in Latin 
American countries.  
 
For instance, in Mexico the annual GDP108 growth rates fell from 3.3% in 2007 to -6% 
in 2009. Wiesner (2011: 32) argues that the world crisis in 2008 and 2009 increased 
interest in evaluation as an accountability and learning exercise, in order to 
determine its causes, implications and policy changes. Moreover, the need to address 
the budget problems caused by the crisis encouraged the implementation of systems 
for the monitoring, control and evaluation of public resources. In this context, the 
Mexican policy evaluation embraces various evaluation systems (see annex 4) but 
here is explained the two major systems. 
 
The first of these systems was the Results-based Budgeting/Performance Evaluation 
System ‘PbR/SED’. Although it was designed in the previous administration, this 
strategy was not pursued in a systematic way until the reforms of the LFPRH in 2006. 
For Vásquez (2006: 111), this budgetary reform was different from those implemented 
in the 1970s and especially from that in 1998, because it incorporated some elements 
of private sector management into the public budgetary process, such as the 
strategic planning, performance indicators and administration by objectives. There is 
                                                          
106
Decree of Federation’s Expenditure Budget 2001.Official Journal, 31/12/2000. See (ASF, 2007: 505) 
107
As mentioned in the review of the literature, political and public administration studies have underlined that 
evaluation must increase transparency and accountability, essential elements of a democratic state and efficient 
administration. (Arnold, 2004: 4, Cochran & Malone, 2010: 54-55, Hill, 2009: 278, 282, Jones, 2002: 84, Jones & Kettl, 
2003: 2, Knill & Tosun, 2012: 176, Ospina, Cunill & Zaltsman, 2004: 232, Palumbo, 1987: 40 cited in Parsons, 1995: 
545 and Wiesner, 2011: 30). 
108
Gross Domestic Product. International Monetary Fund www.imf.org 
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no doubt that its implementation acquired relevance during this administration. In 
2007, the SHCP’s initiative109 (Law) proposed the creation of the National Evaluation 
Council for Public Policies to replace the CONEVAL, with the aim of extending the 
scope of the PbR/SED across the whole federal programmes, not only the social sector, 
and providing it with greater authority and power. This initiative triggered friction in 
intragovernmental relations between the agencies (SHCP-SFP) competing to lead 
policy evaluation.  
 
Separately, a member of Congress proposed a Law of Government Management 
Evaluation, which envisaged the “institutionalisation” of evaluation and the creation 
of a National Evaluation Council of Government Management to replace the 
CONEVAL. 110  However, the initiative was not approved by the legislative. The 
PbR/SED was spearheaded into both ministries due to the obligation to do so, whilst 
the CONEVAL continued leading the evaluation of the social programmes. This 
represents a major achievement for the PbR/SED, even more than for the SICEG, 
because the SHCP was given a further boost due to its power (public resources) and 
control over public administration, even though the SFP was supposed to have a 
wider responsibility for evaluate at federal and local levels than the SHCP. 
 
To understand the structure of the Mexican evaluation system, it is important to refer 
to Ospina et al. (2004: 232) who suggest that a comprehensive evaluation model 
should considers the vertical and horizontal integration of the three levels of 
evaluation – micro, meso and macro – explained in the methodology chapter. In this 
context, the PbR/SED111 is located at the meso level, aiming to provide information 
about the performance of programmes through evaluation. The first element in the 
figure below, is the quality of public expenditure through the Medium-Term 
Programme112 (PMP), which was linked in 2008 to the Management Improvement 
Programme [Programa de Mejora de la Gestión ‘PMG’] run by the SFP, where even 
objectives seem to overlap. 
 
The former (PMP) foresees “the results of evaluation emphasizing the quality of 
goods and services as well as citizen satisfaction”, while the PMG’s objective is to 
“maximize the quality of goods and services supplied by the Federal Public 
Administration”. 113  These similarities were used to create synergies between these 
ministries to avoid overlaps, but this occurred more as a result of improvement 
measures promoted by the SFP rather than a planning process for establishing a 
common programme.114 
                                                          
109
The initiative also included the operational mechanism of the performance evaluation system and the medium-term 
programme for promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of public management. Eventually, they evolved into the 
SED and the PMP (later the PMG), respectively. Also, the evaluation of public resources will expand to state and 
local levels through the ‘Ramo General 33’. The planning, evaluation and mechanisms of transparency and 
accountability of public infrastructure projects are run by the SHCP. See: Iniciativa con proyecto de decreto que 
reforma, adiciona y deroga diversas disposiciones de las leyes Federal de Presupuesto y Responsabilidad 
Hacendaria; Orgánica de la Administración Pública Federal; de Coordinación Fiscal; General de Desarrollo Social; 
de Adquisiciones, Arrendamientos y Servicios del Sector Público, y de Obras Públicas y Servicios Relacionados con 
las Mismas. Official journal 1/10/2007.Available at: 
   http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/proceso/lx/052_DOF_01oct07.pdf  
110
See initiative of Law of Government Management Evaluation by Xavier López, deputy at Congress.  
111
The strategy design includes a world-wide concept “Managing for Development Results’ and ‘Results-Based 
Management’ of the United Nations Development Group, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development and the World Bank. See: http://www.mfdr.org/ 
112
Official Journal, 05/02/2009. 
113
Idem. 
114
Indeed, in the new special programme ‘Programa para un Gobierno Cercano y Moderno 2013-18’ mentioned there 
was deficient coordination inside public administration which reduced their efficiency and efficacy. This was caused 
by a disconnection of both programmes (PMP, PMG). Official journal, 30/08/2013. 
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Figure 5 
Results-based Budgeting/Performance Evaluation System 
 
                                   Source: SED, Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. 
 
A key mechanism is the Annual Evaluation Programme (PAE), jointly issued by the 
SHCP, SFP and CONEVAL. This programme establishes the obligation of all 
government agencies to design the Matrix of Indicators for Results [Matriz de 
Indicadores para Resultados ‘MIR’] of each budgetary programme, the type of 
evaluations (design, consistency and results, indicator, process, impact, strategic, 
complementary and specific), time of execution, and mechanism to follow-up 
evaluation result115 (recommendations) on an annual basis. The diagram below shows 
the process. 
 
The second relevant component of the Mexican evaluation system is the SICEG 
located at the meso level similar to the PbR/SED. Since the reforms 116 of 2009, it 
changed to its initial name ‘System for Government Control and Evaluation’ [Sistema 
de Control y Evaluación Gubernamental], under the control of the new Evaluation 
Management and Government Performance Unit (UEGDG) in the SFP. This was 
created as a response to the demands for improvement in government performance 
and Congress recommendations. It also introduced a distinction between evaluation 
and control functions probably as an attempt to boost the former. The system should 
embrace other systems such as the career civil service, budgetary-programmatic 
evaluations, performance agreements and the MIDO as figure in the annex 4 shows. 
However the SICEG was not interconnected with them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
115
Mecanismo para el seguimiento a los aspectos susceptibles de mejora derivados de informes y evaluaciones a 
programas federales de la Administración Pública Federal. 
116
Article 37 of the Federal Government Organic Law, official journal, 17/06/2009 and Internal organisation manual of 
the SPF (articles 24, 25, 76), official journal, 15/04/2009. 
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Figure 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
                
Source: author’s own elaboration based on the SED and PAE. 
 
The Ministry of Public Administration. An expected ending or an effective political 
decision? 
Although the SFP performed a key role in policy evaluation for a number of years, its 
leading role has diminished over time,117 A number of factors may have contributed 
to its collapse and dissolution at the end of 2012 and it was officially abolished118 in 
2013 and its functions should had been distributed amongst the SHCP, the new 
National Anti-Corruption Commission (in a stage of development) and the 
Presidency Office.119 
 
In fact, the decision was taken in 2009, when the executive PAN-led executive called 
on Congress to dissolve the SFP,120 along with the Ministry of Tourism and of Agrarian 
Reform. However, this initiative was rejected by Congress due to the opposition of 
deputies from the PRI party. Eventually, and perhaps ironically, when the PRI took 
over control in 2012, the new president made the same proposal and this time it was 
approved. Currently, it seems a regret on the decision made by the executive, 
because in the same presidential term, the president 121  promoted the new head 
responsible of the ministry (SFP), which it had already eliminated on the paper 
(Federal Government Organic Law) but currently still operating.  
 
By the middle of year 2016, the executive took a political U-turn and abandoned the 
initiative, which indeed was reversed through the new reforms of the Federal 
Government Organic Law.122 The latter reforms restored power conferred to the SFP 
(article 37). However, regarding evaluation, a year after, it was enacted the new 
                                                          
117
See Sosa (2011) for implications of the SPF in the budgetary process. 
118
Reforms to the Federal Government Organic Law (article 37). Official journal, 02/01/2013. 
119
As for evaluation functions, there are some evaluation systems and monitoring practices awaiting to be reassigned, 
such as the evaluation performance subsystem of the career civil service, evaluation system at state and local level, 
the MIDO, bimonthly evaluations (expenditure quality and performance evaluation), performance agreements, 
evaluation of actions to accomplish the PND, the OICs evaluation activities, evaluation of the institutional plan and 
evaluation reports of government institutions to the Presidency Office. 
120
The law (initiative) was sent in 15/09/2009 by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Senate.  
121
See “executive actions to tackle corruption and interest conflict” by the SFP. 03/02/2015  
122
Federal Government Organic Law (article 37). Official journal, 18/07/2016. 
Annual Evaluation Programme ‘PAE’ 
2007 to 2013 
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Internal Organisation Manual of the SFP,123 in which, evaluation operates separately 
from the PbR/SED focused on the public management. Moreover, the UEGDG 
formally disappeared and the roles and responsabilities were transferred to another 
unit within the same ministry.  
 
The current state of affairs of policy evaluation 
As this chapter has shown, while there have been numerous attempts to establish 
evaluation since the 1930s, they have been constantly undermined by a variety of 
political, economic, legal and external factors (see table 1 annexed for better 
reference of the historical evaluation context in the Mexican government). Despite 
efforts in recent years to promote “policy evaluation” in the form of the SICEG, two 
law initiatives and even new evaluation agencies, the Mexican government has been 
more focused upon reforming the budget process than on developing an integral 
evaluation policy. Many factors are imputed to the SPF’s role in this process, which 
results had a severe impact on this ministry. Another argument pointed out by 
Wiesner (2002: 134-6) is related to the downsizing of the public sector, where 
evaluation has played an essential role to reduce public expenses efficiently. The 
conclusion here is that although many evaluations have been performed over a long 
time they have not had any impact on such expenditure.  
 
For Sosa (2011: 117) ‘the main factor which has limited the SFP’s ability to respond 
effectively is what analysts called a return to political and discretionary management 
of technical institutions’, where discretionary decision-making trumps audit and 
control mechanisms and the professional civil service. Moreover, this confirms that the 
political control of the Ministry of Finance (SHCP) through budget has prevailed, 
despite the executive’s attempts to divide planning and evaluation functions into the 
SHCP and the SFP respectively.  
 
There are additional issues implicit as well. Firstly, although the career civil service 
was established in 2003, with the aim of enhancing officials’ commitment and 
experience to improve public sector performance, 124  the ministry (SFP) lacks 
competent and experienced officials with the specific skills required for evaluation 
purposes. Secondly, there has been no continuity in policy evaluation, even when the 
same party was leading government, for example, the PRI in 1988-1994 and 1994-
2000, and PAN in 2000-06 and 2006-12. Indeed, evaluation has not been 
considered as a formal element of the planning process while responsibility for it has 
shifted from the SPP, to the Presidency Office, SFP and SHCP. The SFP as 
coordinator of the PbR/SED has performed a secondary role.  
 
Lastly, the SHCP’s internal organisation manual 125  created the new Performance 
Evaluation Unit to perform evaluation functions regarding the PbR/SED, which 
impacted to eliminate the SFP and the coordination between them to implement a 
comprehensive evaluation not only focused on the budget as the SHCP currently 
does. Bailey’s argument (1980: 15) that ‘conflict seems foreseeable’ is valid in a context 
where two ministries are responsible for policy evaluation, and the SHCP keeps hold 
of power through the control of the budget restricting financial autonomy of agencies. 
Finally, there was no political consensus on the role of evaluation. This source of 
weakness in intragovernmental relations (Franz, 1985: 483) amongst agencies and 
                                                          
123
Internal organisation manual. Official journal, 19/07/2017. 
124
See Arellano & Guerrero (2003) for a better understanding of obstacles and problems in the implementation of the 
career civil service. 
125
Official journal, 10/10/2012. 
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stakeholders increased the complexity of joint action to carry out evaluations. In later 
chapter it will be analysed how this set of institutional and political factors influence 
the effectiveness of policy evaluation.  
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CHAPTER 4. Policy evaluation in Chile 
 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the reader to the evolution of evaluation in Chile from a 
historical perspective. Like most other Latin American economies, it is classified as 
“developing”, “emergent” or “in transition”. 126  As in these countries, the Chilean 
approach to policy evaluation has been transferred from administrative reforms 
carried out elsewhere and is based on a Results-based Budgeting ‘PbR’ strategy. 
However, while Chile and Mexico have borrowed from other countries’ policy 
approaches, they have taken separate paths in order to develop a unique system 
congruent to local settings. It is also important to bear in mind that Chile is one of the 
most developed Latin American countries. The analysis is organised on the basis of 
the different presidential administrations and follows the development of policy since 
the end of the military regime and the subsequent commitment to a modernization 
of the State.127  
 
The most important actions taken in every administration are included to explain 
how evaluation has developed to become more effective. Arguably, the golden age 
of evaluation occurred in recent years (2000s) under the responsibility of the DIPRES 
inside the Ministry of Finance (MoF). This unit developed a System of Evaluation and 
Management Control ‘SECG’ and a Management Improvement Programme ‘PMG’. 
The former operates as a mechanism for the achievement of agencies’ management 
goals established in the latter, which are linked to economic incentives.128 The positive 
results achieved by these mechanisms are well-recognized as a worthy and successful 
experience for further dissemination abroad and have been adopted by the public 
sector across Latin America region.  
 
The chapter explores the development of the Chilean approach over the last 25 years 
and examines some of the current changes in that approach which aim to improve its 
operation. However, regarding the data obtained, there is considerably more 
information of Mexico than Chile due to the circumstances of this research explained 
in the methodology chapter and practical constraints to gather additional data from 
Chilean policy evaluation and public management from other sources than those 
published online. 
 
Historical perspective 
The Constitution of 1980 enacted the Chilean political system as a democratic 
republic (article 4) and the administration of the State as decentralized (article 3).129 
The government is under the responsibility of the President as the State’s chief who is 
elected for a four-year term (article 24) with no re-election for the next period 
(article 25). The broad territory is divided into regions (intendencias) and 
municipalities (provincias) with financial and political autonomy from the central 
government (articles 99, 110, 107). To start the analysis it is important to mention that 
across the world, the State’s role was reduced in the 80s, given the economic and 
political crisis.  
 
                                                          
126
According to Heady (2000: 132), some relevant features shared by them are inequalities of economic development, 
high-level of poverty, agricultural under development and weak currency compared to developed countries.  
127
Most periods ruled by the Chilean presidents were of four years until 2000, where the Constitution was reformed to 
extend the period to six. However, since 2006 the period went back to the original presidential term of four years. 
128
To understand the operation of both mechanisms see:http://www.dipres.gob.cl/594/articles-60578_doc_pdf.pdf 
129
The country was ruled under a military dictatorship at the time.  
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In contrast to much of the rest of Latin America, where economic conditions were 
very difficult due to financial crises and where reforms of the state – including the 
development of evaluation – were required to improve its performance, in Chile the 
economy performed much better and public finances were in good shape, even 
running a fiscal surplus (Armijo, 2002: 275). 
 
In Chile, therefore, the State’s modernization took place later than elsewhere in the 
region and adopted some management methods later on and started the 
modernization – based on downsizing the bureaucracy –, mainly, due to the need to 
improve the economy and to address issues regarding social justice in the post-
authoritarian Chile. Oddly enough the State reform was implemented during the 
military regime of Augusto Pinochet 1973-90 inspired by the Chicago school and its 
economic theories (Figueroa et al., 2011: 70-1). Certainly, the first set of reforms was 
the privatization of public organisations, health care and pension systems, as well as 
the decentralization of public services to municipalities (Armijo, 2002: 269); whereas, 
the evaluation system emerged during the 1990s within the “Concertacion’s 
government” (Pimienta, 2002: 128). 
 
Muñoz (2005: 2) argues that the return to democracy in the 1990s led to growing 
pressure for the reform of State institutions. An ex-minister interviewed by Muñoz 
pointed out these challenges were complex to address because the country’s 
bureaucracy was part of the old authoritarian regime – despite a democratic 
President in power –, including most of Congress people in the Senate who lacked 
expertise to implement reforms. Moreover, these Congress people represented a 
majoritarian opposition to the President’s party. For this purpose, the creation of the 
Ministry for the Presidency’s General Secretariat (Ministerio Secretaría General de la 
Presidencia ‘MINSEGPRES’) represented a major innovation and acted as the 
coordinator for the modernization of the state following the end of Pinochet’s rule.  
 
1990-94 
The post authoritarian period of modernization is divided into two, the first during 
the presidency of Patricio Aylwin 1990-94 and the second during the presidency of 
Eduardo Frei (1994-98). Clearly, a key concern in the Aylwin Presidency was to 
preserve the fragile democracy, avoiding a return to the authoritarian regime, and 
downsizing the bureaucracy (Pimienta, 2002, Tello, 2011 and Waissbluth, 2005). A 
critical period prevailed in the Aylwin administration, in which he strived to restore 
the balance of power, reduce the influence of the military – the former dictator still 
commanded the armed forces – and cut the public debt which had grown due to 
mismanagement in previous decades.  
 
However, during that time there was not pressure from citizens to force the 
government to prioritise a State modernization agenda or any reforms. As Orrego 
(1998, cited by Armijo, 2002 and Tello, 2011) confirms, “There are no citizens’ claims 
for State’s modernization”. Moreover, according to Fazio (1996) the actions taken by 
the government did not impact the economic model inherited from previous 
government. As the ex minister of DIPRES [Budget Office] declared, “The State 
legitimacy crisis jeopardized consolidation of democracy and governance. It forced 
the implementation of some reforms” (Armijo, 2002 and Tello, 2011). For instance, his 
government introduced innovative programmes to reduce poverty and inequality, 
confronted the past by seeking consensus across different sectors and political parties 
and stimulated the economic growth (Armijo, 2002, Fazio, 1996 and Pimienta, 2002).  
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The President undertook some important administrative initiatives such as the 
Performance Management Agreements of the Nuclear Energy Commission, the 
indicators of the Budget Law, the Modernization Commitments and the Project of 
Management Improvement. Reforms also had impact in terms of evaluation. In the 
beginning of this administration the Ministry’s Goal System (Sistema de Metas 
Ministeriales) was created by the MINSEGPRES as the first governmental evaluation 
initiative130 (CLAD, 2001), and most important concepts such as efficiency and results-
based management spread across the government.  
 
1994-2000 
Under the Eduardo Frei’s ‘Concertación’ administration or Concertación de Partidos 
por la Democracia (Coalition of Parties for Democracy) an Inter-agency Committee 
of Public Management Modernization131 (Comité Interministerial de Modernización 
de la Gestión Pública) was established. To some extent, it arose as a response to the 
State crisis with the aim of introducing a managerialist strategy instead of a major 
administrative reform (see Armijo, 2002: 278 and Muñoz & Stefoni, 2002). It was not 
until 1997 that a leading group of qualified officials with expertise on modernization 
issues implemented the Strategic Modernization Plan 1997-2000 (Plan Estratégico de 
Modernización de la Gestión Pública). 132 According to Figueroa et al. (2011: 83-4) 
there were three main different actors who played a key role for the State’s 
modernization: international organisations, the “new” political classes, and the top 
executives running strategic public services. 
 
Although the plan was not regarded as a comprehensive reform, some components133 
were linked to the paradigm of the New Public Management ‘NPM’ (Armijo, 2002: 
293 and Waissbluth, 2005). Indeed, Waissbluth (2005: 10) argues that the ministry’s 
(MINSEGPRES) goals (such as linking budget to goals and performance indicators 
and incentives to improve the quality and innovation of services); reflected the 
influence of reformists within the administration, which gave a sign to the citizens of 
such modernization. While there were some attempts to implement monitoring 
mechanisms such as indicators for the budgetary process and some indicators were 
introduced in the draft budget law in 1995 by the executive through the Budget 
Office (Dirección de Presupuesto ‘DIPRES’) (Pimienta, 2002: 128), they were not used 
as an objective mechanism to inform policy-makers.  
 
It was not until 1998, when the first attempt to introduce evaluation as a formal 
process emerged with the purpose of improving public management. The 
Management Improvement Programme (Programa de Mejoramiento de la Gestión 
‘PMG’) was enacted by the law134 no. 19.553 to improve public utilities/services and 
agencies by linking policy goals to incentives ‘performance bonuses’ (in cash) 
incentivising officials responsible for programmes to accomplish the goals (see DIPRES, 
2001a and Guzmán, 2005). This process was thanks to the support and training from 
the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. This assistance 
                                                          
130
See: http://siare.clad.org/siare/innotend/evaluacion/chile2/todo.html 
131
The Committee consisted of the Ministry of Finance, Presidency, Government, Internal Affairs, Work and of 
Economy.  
132
Before this programme, the modernization of the government was a concept boosted by opposition parties claiming 
for the downsizing of the government agencies and bureaucracy and the more transparency on remuneration 
systems (Armijo, 2002: 292). 
133
The legislation focused on six areas of reform: strategic management, transparency and probity of public 
management, service quality and citizen participation, human resources, State’s institutional framework, 
communications and extension. 
134
Law no. 19553 of February, 1998 and Decree no. 475 of May, 1998. 
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addressed the limited experience of Chilean officials in evaluation subjects and 
focused on the ‘logical framework approach’ (DIPRES, 2001: 18-19; DIPRES n/d).  
 
However, branches such as the legislature or judiciary were excluded from the 
evaluation process. Indeed, Armijo (2002) and Tello (2011) highlight the fact that this 
process was discussed outside the parliament without any consensus between the 
legislature, executive and citizenry. Given the economic stability, the legislature was 
not consulted on these reforms. As these authors suggest, perhaps a stagnant 
evaluation process emerged mainly because this policy would not produce results in 
the short-term, which made it less profitable and attractive for them (Congress). 
 
2000-06 
In the following administration, the president Ricardo Lagos 2000-06 continued with 
this administrative reform but undermined the Political Reform and Modernization 
of Public Management ‘PMGP’ (Política de Reforma y Modernización de la Gestión 
Pública) carried out by the previous government. The reform implemented in this 
administration included the international experience of countries such as New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and the United States of America 
on the basis of the second generation of reforms framed in the Washington Consensus 
(see the review of literature). However, internal conflicts within the government for 
holding the power and leadership slowed the process of reform. In this context, the 
Project for State Reform and Modernisation ‘PRYME’ (Proyecto de Reforma y 
Modernización del Estado) was transferred from the Presidency to the Budget Office 
‘DIPRES’ inside the MoF but progress on reforms was undermined by the lack of 
consensus amongst officials of both agencies.  
 
It was only after several corruption scandals such as Coimas, MOP-GATE, MOP-
CIADE, MOP-IDECON (Figueroa et al., 2011: 74) and Corfo-Inverlink, – indeed, the 
president Lagos was directly involved on them –135 were exposed to the electorate 
that the pressure for reforms increased. The government embarked on discussions 
with opposition and business groups in favour to the PMGP. At this point, Armijo 
(2002: 296) states, citizens became more aware of the government’s action and 
concepts such as modernization became a part of the public debate. Political-
legislative agreements – after the corruption crisis – focused on the State’s 
modernization (public management, decentralization and human and financial 
resources), transparency and the promotion of economic growth. These reforms 
represented a major achievement for democracy in the post-authoritarian regime. 
 
Armijo (2002: 76) and Tello (2011: 259) highlight some factors, which might help to 
explain the success of these reforms compared with previous ones, notably the 
participation of technocrats or “tecnopols”, highly qualified professionals who were 
technically equipped to formulate and implement public policies. These authors add 
that the effectiveness of this policy was due not only to the context of crisis in the 
Lago’s presidency, but also to the continuity of such policy during the previous 
“Concertación” government and the president’s support for it. The importance of the 
role of the president is a characteristic of “presidentialist” regimes, where the leader of 
the executive exerts such authority over the legislature through the majority of the 
party(ies). In such regimes (Duverger, 1992: 213), the parliament cannot act 
                                                          
135
According to these authors, the “Coimas” case involved the bribery of a group of deputies who authorized – through 
the Ministry of Transport – the installation of an automobile’s factory. The “MOP” cases are related to the Ministry of 
Public Works (MOP) and different companies to which the MOP paid and the public works never finished or they had 
done it at inflated costs/price. 
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independently as an intermediary between citizens and government as it can do in 
parliamentary or classic presidential regimes. 
 
In Chile, these circumstances and the experience of an authoritarian legacy allowed 
these post-Pinochet administrations to promote a democratic government and 
implement reforms to overcome the events which occurred during that regime (Diaz, 
2000 & Boeninger, 1997 cited on Muñoz, 2005: 3). This was in contrast to Mexico, 
where social movements such as those which emerged in 1968 (students’ 
demonstrations) failed to mobilise the public into pushing for reforms such as greater 
democracy, openness and transparency of government. Here it is important to add 
that in Chile in 1998, the evaluation system was formally introduced by the DIPRES 
(Ministry of Finance), (Dussauge, 2012a: 185), which emerged from the PMG. Both the 
PMG and evaluation were coordinated by the DIPRES even though the 
modernization agenda – including evaluation – was coordinated by the 
MINSEGPRES (Presidency).  
 
What was the role of the DIPRES in devising the policy evaluation? DIPRES itself was 
created in 1927, when the decree no. 1.924 enacted formal operation of the Budget 
Office ‘DIPRES’ (Dirección de Presupuestos). In 1975, the law no. 1.263 further 
established its budgetary authority “The Budget Office is the technical agency for 
allocation of public resources, tailoring budgeting and monitoring its execution… 
Additionally, for implementing tools for public management’s improvement.” 
Moreover recently, the office acquired more power when the head of the DIPRES, 
Mario Marcel 2000-06 created the Division for Management Control ‘DCG’ (División 
de Control de Gestión) to run the System of Evaluation and Management Control 
(Sistema de Evaluación y Control de Gestión ‘SECG’). Since then, the DCG has been 
responsible for the evaluation of programmes, technical assistance and the 
improvement of public management.136  
 
The two major achievements of the DCG were the ‘SECG’ and ‘PMG’. However, the 
latter was revamped as a “system of benchmarking for the public sector” (Marcel, 
2006 cited on Dussauge, 2013: 146) during Lagos’ administration but eventually 
faced further changes during the Bachelet’s presidency of 2014-18 (DIPRES, 2014). The 
DIPRES (along with the DCG) is responsible for the SECG, which consists of many 
evaluations and subsystems as shown in figure 7. The system embraces the following 
monitoring and control mechanisms: the performance indicators, strategic definitions 
(both closely linked), institutional efficiency goals, the PMG, and the Presidential Unit 
for Delivery Management UPGC (not included here and explained below).  
 
It also includes some incentives (see quality of bureaucracy section in the chapter ‘The 
effectiveness of policy evaluation in Chile’), which operate as a mechanism for 
encouraging the achievement of agencies’ goals through the results of the PMG. 
Indeed, the incentive known as “public management modernization fund” was 
created to solve agency problems through incentives and feasible proposals tailored 
by universities or external consulting firms (DIPRES, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
136
See DIPRES’ background http://www.dipres.gob.cl/594/w3-article-3672.html 
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Figure 7 
 
System of evaluation and management control ‘SECG’ 
 
 
Source: Budget Office (DIPRES), Ministry of Finance. 
 
Regarding evaluations there are five main types: 
i) The evaluation of public programmes (EPG), which maps out the programme’s 
design, objectives, internal organisation manual as well as its management and 
outcomes. This evaluation is based on the logical framework approach, performed 
by three external experts and often used in the draft budget formulation.  
ii) The impact evaluation (EI) aims to measure whether a programme/policy affects 
its beneficiaries based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
approaches comparing the beneficiaries with the non-beneficiaries.  
iii) The evaluation of new programmes (EPN) aims to provide a baseline for future 
performance evaluation based on a control group from the beginning for a period 
of 2 to 3 years. Coordinated by an international advisory panel and the University 
of Chile’s Economy Department. This evaluation started to operate until the 
Bachelet administration. 
iv) The comprehensive spending review (ECG) or evaluation of organisational 
spending (EGI) (renamed afterwards)137 evaluates the set of agencies of a given 
sector. It embraces a comprehensive number of factors such as objectives, 
management processes, organisational structures and functions, and 
services/products provided (see Dussauge, 2012a). 
v) The ex-ante evaluation emerged with the aim of gathering relevant information 
for the preparation of budget.138 
                                                          
137
According to the DIPRES’ office letter no. 1761, in 2011 emerged the evaluación del gasto institucional (evaluation 
of organisational spending ‘EGI’) replacing the comprehensive spending review (ECG) with the aim to get more 
accurate data of each sector (see annex 3). 
138
Formerly started in the Ministry of Social Development for social programmes. Later on, in 2014 the DIPRES 
continued this effort with the same aim of those of social sector but focused to the non-social programmes regardless 
of the fact that these were new, being reformulated or had poor performance (as result of evaluation in 2013). 
Despite all these efforts to introduce evaluations, in the end, it seems that some of these evaluations disappeared 
 
Evaluation of programmes and institutions 
1997: Evaluation of Public Programmes (EPG) 
2001: Impact evaluation of programmes 
2002: Agency evaluation (Comprehensive Spending Review) 
2006: Increasing coverage – 155 programmes or agencies evaluated between 2006-2010 
2009: Creation of new line: evaluation of new programmes (EPN) 
1993: Performance indicators 
2001: Strategic definitions 
2001: Presentation of programmes (budget) 
2007: Technical assistance 
2008: Revising programme presentation  
1997: Comprehensive 
Management Report (BGI) 
2008: Public management 
modernization fund 
Institutional wage incentive mechanisms 
1998: Management Improvement Programme (PMG):  
 Basic framework programme (2001) 
 Advance framework programme (2003) 
2003: Incentive to doctors (Medical law) 
2007: Institutional efficiency goals 
2009: Management Improvement Programme – Framework programme of quality 
 
System of 
evaluation and 
management 
control and 
Results-based 
Budgeting 
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Another element in the process is the summary report. Although, it is not another 
type of evaluation, according to the DIPRES (2008), this comprehensive 
management report is the basis for gathering information of evaluations for the draft 
Budget Law into a standard report distributed by Congress and made it available to 
the public.  
 
The evaluations explained here are part of the SECG and were described in detail 
due to evaluations revised to test the effectiveness of evaluation belong to this system. 
However, the Chilean policy evaluation embraces a wider range of evaluation 
systems (see annex 7) such as the evaluation of schoolteachers’ performance, the 
environmental impact evaluation and the evaluation of the social sector. In the 
section of policy evaluation framework of the chapter ‘The effectiveness of policy 
evaluation in Chile’ is explained the aim and context in which these were developed. 
 
2006-10 
During the presidency of Michelle Bachelet, the SECG operated as a form of 
legitimization of public administration. It was praised by international organisations 
such as the World Bank (WB), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Latin 
American Centre for the Administration of Development (CLAD). As explained in the 
literature review chapter, the role of these organisations has a great influence 
exerting pressure over governments to adopt policy-transfer and promoting 
administrative reforms. Dussauge (2013: 61-5) noted that some developing countries 
in order to become members of such organisations “engage in a voluntary but 
constrained policy transfer”;139 whereas, others assume this influence to strengthen the 
capacity building of the State.  
 
Some examples of these transfer processes are the public service agreements (PSA) – 
later called service delivery agreements –, citizen’s charters and the Programme 
Assessment Rating Tool (PART),140 which traveled from the UK and USA, across many 
countries including Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Australia, Netherlands, among others. A 
major change in the first Bachelet’s administration was the introduction of the 
evaluation of new programmes (EPN) thanks to the influence of international 
organisations (Dussauge, 2013: 167). 
  
2010-14 
In 2010, at the beginning of Sebastián Piñera’s administration 2010-14, the president 
established the Presidential Unit for Delivery Management (Unidad Presidencial de 
Gestión del Cumplimiento ‘UPGC’) inside the MINSEGPRES and the Ministerial 
Coordination Division (División de Coordinación Ministerial ‘UCM’) to replicate the UK 
government’s Delivery Unit. According to the IDB (Dumas et al., 2013), the Chilean 
government wanted the Unit to fulfil four key roles: i) strategic planning; ii) 
coordination of governmental action; iii) a follow up of the key government’s goals; 
and iv) accountability.  
                                                                                                                                                                         
afterwards (see policy evaluation framework section in the chapter ‘The effectiveness of policy evaluation in Chile’). 
See DIPRES http://www.dipres.gob.cl/594/w3-article-111377.html 
139
This author highlights that mechanisms of influence of international organisations are coercive, normative, cognitive, 
executive, indirect political influence and the dissemination of best practices. 
140
This is a government’s tool emerged from the New Public Management reforms pioneered in the UK with the aim of 
improving standards of public service and service delivered that citizens expect to receive and seeking citizen’s 
empowerment (see www.parliament.uk). Whereas the PART is a tool developed by the US Office of Management 
and Budget to assess the performance of programmes for further consideration during the annual budget process 
(see expectmore.gov). 
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Despite its short life from 2010 to 2014, the UPGC had positive results141 such as the 
reduction of interministerial committees, institutionalization of the task of inter-
agency coordination, the strengthening of the president’s position, and the gaining of 
trust and credibility by the constituency.  
 
The current state of affairs of policy evaluation 
In the end, the UPGC (MINSEGPRES) could not survive political tensions with the 
DIPRES during the second administration of Bachelet 2014-18. An assumption of the 
UPGC’s dissolution is that the MINSEGPRES and DIPRES clash might be due to the 
prevailing role of the latter and similarities in their roles as coordinators of monitoring 
and evaluation practices, particularly those related to the UPGC’s objectives. As some 
interviewees by Dussauge (2013: 170) argue, the UPGC has an unclear approach, “…it 
is not as different in comparison to the way we were working already. The focus is 
now on the product, the result to the citizen. They assume we previously cared only 
about procedures, but that was not the case”. Currently, the UPGC has been 
abolished and no longer counterbalances the power of the Ministry of Finance 
(DIPRES) as had been intended while the DIPRES remains in place leading the 
evaluation.  
 
Nor do the SECG (DIPRES) operates in the way that it was originally designed. 
Instead, a number of adjustments to the system have been introduced. For instance, 
there are not any evaluations e.g. EI, ECG, EPN and ex-ante performed or at least 
there is no data of them in the last years. This means that from the beginning of this 
presidency, the only evaluation performed across sectors is of public programmes 
(EPG), thus, it seems that the SECG operates with only one type of evaluation. 
Although, the ex-ante evaluation has been proposed during this period (2014-18) and 
mentioned as the best (benchmarking) practice emulating the same type of 
evaluation already run by the Ministry of Social Development, so far no evaluations 
of this type have been performed.   
 
Moreover, the evidence indicates that evaluation is not as closely linked to the PMG 
as it used to be (see DIPRES, 2014). Instead, the coordination of evaluation is solely 
the responsibility of DIPRES without the involvement of the MINSEGPRES as was 
originally envisaged. Indeed, the DIPRES’ report (DIPRES, 2014) affirms it has 
improved the PMG’s mechanism and turned the management control and planning 
system into the “organisational performance monitoring system” (sistema de 
monitoreo del desempeño institucional) for monitoring outcomes and indicators. 
However, there is no reference of evaluation results linked to this new system. It 
seems they (DIPRES-PMG) took separate paths over time and are no longer part of 
an integral system.  
 
The current president’s agenda introduced significant changes to the policy 
evaluation as it used to be operated by establishing the National Evaluation Office, 
whose aim is to be the [only] agency responsible for evaluation and coordination of 
public agencies in the cycle of policy process. Indeed, the self-imposed goals are quite 
challenging. For instance, the attempt is to evaluate the 25% of the total of 
programmes each year. This means that by 2018 (at the end of present 
administration), all programmes will be assessed (see the government programme 
2014-2018).142 However, it is not yet clear whether this office will be placed separately 
                                                          
141
http://gestion2010-2014.cumplimiento.gob.cl/ 
142
http://www.gob.cl/programa-de-gobierno/ 
~ 81 ~ 
 
 
 
from the executive or whether it will continue to be supported by the Ministry of 
Finance (DIPRES).  
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CHAPTER 5. The effectiveness of policy evaluation in Mexico 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the results that test which factors are likely to influence the 
effectiveness of policy evaluation in Mexico. The first part is a case study of the health 
sector’s evaluations performed from 2007 till 2014, in order to analyse different 
pathways taken by evaluations. It is focused only at the federal level due to the 
complexity of implementation at the state level and the time available for the 
research. The evaluations conducted are part of the Results-based Budgeting 
‘PbR/SED’ process, which is the core of the Mexican policy evaluation, and the 
analysis is divided into two components. One is the review of programmes and 
whether evaluations performed led to changes classified as amendments, status quo 
or cancelation. The other examines the budgetary process at Congress to determine 
whether those evaluations were used for programmes’ changes that is their 
effectiveness. Previously, it is explained how the federal budget establishes the 
connection between evaluation and the PbR/SED.  
 
The second part provides a brief but comprehensive description of each variable, e.g. 
intra governmental relations, quality of bureaucracy, level of democracy, policy 
evaluation framework and degree of autonomy, in order to test their effectiveness. 
Also, in order to shed light on the practices between branches of government, the 
analysis draws upon other data, notably from interviews, which are needed to 
investigate the research question outlined in the methodology section. Thus, informal 
interviews with politicians and officials will be summarized.143  
 
Lastly, this chapter brings together conclusions from the earlier discussion of ‘Policy 
evaluation in Mexico’ to analyse the particular forms of interaction between actors 
promoting evaluation. To enlarge the study of policy evaluation and not merely the 
PbR/SED, other evaluations performed by different agencies with different purposes 
will be noted in order to provide a comprehensive view of policy evaluation. The 
chapter concludes by raising some issues regarding the level of fragmentation of 
those institutional factors or variables, and placing them in order of importance 
regarding their impact on the effectiveness of evaluation.  
 
Results-based Budgeting ‘PbR/SED’ 
In this section, the details of the documentary analysis of the PbR/SED evaluations 
results are presented. But first, an introduction to the process of planning the federal 
budget will offer a better explanation of how evaluation is associated with the 
PbR/SED.  
 
How is the federal budget made? 
Most public spending and country’s finances are included in the budget.144 The public 
budget reflects the priorities of constituencies, choices about what government will 
and will not do, but also political preferences influenced by the power of individuals 
and organisations interested in specific outcomes (Rubin, 2010: 345). For example, to 
accomplish a myriad of priorities in areas such as energy, health, education, and so on 
a large budget is needed. Thus, the way the Mexican government later divides such 
                                                          
143
The names of the people interviewed were changed in order to keep confidentially of personal data. 
144
Except for some financial funds such as PIDIREGAS, IPAB, national debt and loans by state and local authorities. 
These loans do not require the legislature approval due to the autonomy of the states. 
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large amounts of money per area is into “budgetary programmes” to ensure better 
control and accountability regarding the budget.  
 
A budgetary programme embraces the funds allocated per programme in areas such 
as poverty reduction, states or municipality finance, infrastructure, the oil industry, 
etc. According to the SHCP, the budget cycle has the following seven stages (see 
figure 8).145 Regarding evaluation, the system called Synthetic Model of Performance 
Data (Modelo Sintético de Información del Desempeño ‘MSD’) is the database of 
budgetary programmes’ performance. The strategy is hereafter known as PbR/SED 
(Results-based Budgeting/Performance Evaluation System). 
 
Figure 8 
                                                     Budget cycle in Mexico 
 
 
  
 
 
The evaluation stage is a systematic analysis 
of programmes performed by specialized 
external evaluators and organized into the 
Synthetic Model of Performance Data (MSD) 
 
 
The monitoring stage is based on the  
Performance Evaluation System (SED)  
a system to follow-up objectives of each  
public agency through performance 
indicators.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
                                             Source: Data from the SHCP, author’s own elaboration. 
 
Results of the programmes assessed  
Therefore, the core of policy evaluation is conducted within the context of the 
PbR/SED strategy and evaluations are mostly government-ordered per year and 
developed by external evaluators, which are independent from the government such 
as academic institutions, NGOs, independent consultant or consultancy agencies. The 
period of time under review was determined when the strategy initiated in 2007. The 
health sector is the focus of this examination of the effectiveness of evaluation. As 
mentioned in the methodology chapter, this is a key sector in the modern welfare 
State, in terms of budgetary importance, public interest and political focus (Bovens et 
al., 2001: 606). Bearing this in mind, this study will examine the results of evaluations 
regarding the extent to which they change the policy or programme itself.  
 
This study is more focused on the evaluations rather than on an exhaustive analysis of 
the Mexican health sector. This sector represents one of the largest sources of public 
resources of the Mexican government spending. For instance, in the Expenditure 
Budget of the Federation of the fiscal year 2015 (PEF 2015), this sector represented 
approximately 14% of the total budget. This means that the number was around of 
$511 millions of mxn pesos equivalent to $33.3 (millions US dollars) 146  plus those 
resources of medical services by PEMEX. This represents the third largest source of the 
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Available at: www.transparenciapresupuestaria.gob.mx 
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On June 2015, the exchange rate was of $15.30 mxn pesos per $1 us dollar. 
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budget, which was slightly less than the education and energy sector, which had the 
largest amount of the federal budget compared to the total. 147  In broad terms, 
according to the OECD data, in 2010 it accounted for 6.2% of Gross Domestic 
Product.148 
 
These figures illustrate the importance of this sector in terms of resources but also the 
vast amount of services and programmes offered by it. Indeed, the sector comprises 
268 budgetary programmes, plus 2 strategies and 3 budget accounts,149 being 273 in 
total. In comparison with the 889 federal programmes150 currently operating by the 
government, the health sector represents 31% of this total of programmes, which is 
representative in terms of number for the purpose of this study. It comprises the 
Ministry of Health (SSA), the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS), the Institute for 
Social Security and Services for State Workers (ISSSTE), as well as the health services 
offered to a minor population by the Ministry of National Defense (SEDENA), the 
Ministry of the Navy (SEMAR), and PEMEX (the State oil company).  
 
As mentioned in the methodology chapter, to examine the trends of decision-making 
over time as a result of evaluation (the effectiveness of evaluation), it is important to 
identify whether the programme improvement could be attributed to evaluation. 
This analysis, therefore, looks at changes in programmes, which could take various 
forms such as amendments or modifications, cancelation or elimination and the 
status quo or unchanged categories. It also examines the allocation of financial 
resources to identify whether they increased, decreased or were unchanged after 
evaluations took place.  
 
The effectiveness of evaluation in the health sector 
Table 3 annexed shows all evaluations performed between 2007 and 2014, based on 
the PbR/SED strategy. Of the total of 273 potential programmes mentioned earlier, 
only 45 have been assessed,151 which is equivalent to 16% of the total – at the time of 
the study, one evaluation was still in progress to sum up 45 programmes assessed – 
and some of them have performed more than one of the different types 152  of 
evaluations available (depending upon the need of each programme/policy).153 The 
following chart shows relevant results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
147
See http://www.apartados.hacienda.gob.mx/presupuesto/temas/pef/2015/docs/tomo_1/tomo_1_i14.pdf 
148
Health at a Glance 2013: OECD. 
149
Estrategia Integral de Asistencia Social Alimentaria ‘EIASA’ (Integral strategy for food security) by SSA-SNDIF, 
Sistema de Protección Social en Salud (System for social protection in health) by SSA, Ramo 19 Aportaciones a 
seguridad social (Social security contributions), Ramo 23 Provisiones salariales (Wage provisions) and Ramo 33 
Fondo de Aportaciones para los Servicios de Salud ‘FASSA’ (Fund of health services contributions). 
150
See http://www.transparenciapresupuestaria.gob.mx/ 
151
Data provided by the SHCP in 2013, available at: www.transparenciapresupuestaria.gob.mx 
152
According to the evaluation guidelines there are different types of evaluation: design, consistency and results, 
indicators, process, impact, strategic, complementary, and specific (Specific Evaluation of Performance), see chapter 
‘Policy evaluation in Mexico’. 
153
Besides that, during 2014, new forms of assessment were included, which are not considered as evaluation due to 
the methodology used. These forms are the monitoring and evaluation card (M&E) and diagnostic applied to some 
programmes included in the Annual Evaluation Programme ‘PAE’ 2014. For this purpose, 54 programmes recently 
performed the M&E (51) and diagnostic (3). However, despite evaluators made recommendations there is no 
evidence on how these recommendations are inserted into the mechanism to following up results, and their 
methodology is not considered as a formal method to assess a programme. 
~ 85 ~ 
 
 
 
Chart 1 
 
                       Effectiveness of evaluation in the Mexican health sector 2007-2014  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: data from the SHCP, SFP and CONEVAL. 
* Programmes selected for budgeting process belong either to the amendments 
or status quo categories. 
The classification of “no data” refers to those programmes in which there is no 
information available about them or any action taken by policy-makers. Thus, it 
is not possible to track neither the recommendation nor the evaluation. 
 
Regarding these 45 programmes evaluated, the amendments are the starting point 
to look at. A programme is classified as an “amendment” when policy-makers have 
adopted at least 30% or more of the total recommendations suggested by evaluators 
in order to improve it in some way. The findings indicate that 15 (33%) of the total of 
45 programmes evaluated achieved these results for improving them and continuing 
the strategic planning process. Some examples of these amendments are the 
programmes Atención a la salud pública (Provision of healthcare services) E001 and 
Prevención y atención contra las adicciones (Prevention of addictions) E025 operated 
by the IMSS and the SSA, respectively. 
 
The former programme of provision of healthcare services’ aim is to reduce morbidity 
and mortality of diseases and those related to reproductive health. After the EED 
(Specific Evaluation of Performance) in 2009 and the EED in 2010 took place, all 
recommendations regarding the programme’s performance in terms of coverage, 
reduction of mortality of cancer and inclusion of new indicators were implemented.154 
Another example of this category is the programme of prevention of addictions, 
where most of the recommendations suggested by the evaluation of design 
performed in 2011 such as implementation of operating rules and improvement of 
indicators were accomplished; only one recommendation is still being implemented.155  
 
Regarding the “termination” form, although two programmes of this sector were 
canceled, there is no evidence their termination was due to evaluation results. For 
instance, in 2007 the programme Cruzada Nacional por la Calidad de los Servicios 
de Salud (National crusade for the quality of health provision) operated by the SSA 
S041 performed an evaluation of design and ECR (Evaluation of Consistency and 
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See CONEVAL's report. Available at: http://www.coneval.gob.mx/Evaluacion/Paginas/Evaluacion.aspx 
155
See Ministry of Health’s report. Available at:  
http://portal.salud.gob.mx/codigos/columnas/evaluacion_programas/cenadic.html 
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Results) in 2007, however, there is no data of such evaluations. Besides that, in 2007 
the programme changed its name to Sistema Integral de Calidad en Salud 
responsible by the same ministry (SSA) S202 but there is no evidence that those 
changes were affected in some way by evaluations.  
 
In other cases, some programmes appeared in the budget only a few years before 
they were eliminated. Some examples are the programme Construcción de centros 
de especialidad para pacientes ambulatorios y de unidades de atención hospitalaria 
(Construction of medical specialized centers) ran by the SSA B001 or the programme 
Subsidios y ayudas para gastos de funeral (Grants for funeral expenses) by the IMSS 
J004, with no mention by the SHCP in the subsequent draft budget of the possible 
reasons of cancelation (see table 3 annexed).  
 
Regarding the programme Financiamiento equitativo de la atención medica 
(Equitable funding of health provision) run by the SSA U004, all recommendations 
(6) of the EED 2008 were implemented in the same year. However, it was eliminated 
and integrated into another programme, the so-called Seguro popular (Health 
insurance) U005 operated by the same ministry (SSA), in order to improve the 
indicators of the latter (as pointed out by policy implementers). While it seems 
evaluation had an effect on such decision, there is no explicit indication this was the 
case.  
 
Following the classification, conversely, in 13 programmes representing 29% of the 
total of programmes evaluated, the status quo category prevailed. For example, the 
programme Reducción de mortalidad materna (Reduction of maternal mortality) 
by the SSA U007 only considered 3 of 16 recommendations made by evaluators from 
the two evaluations performed in 2010 (design) and 2011 (strategic).156 Apart from 
that, during the review of evaluations performed some issues arose. For instance, 
there are two programmes with the same key code “budgetary programme” (S201) 
and objectives. The Seguro médico para una nueva generación (Medical insurance 
for a new generation) was run by the Ministry of Health from 2008 until 2012, but in 
2013 the programme merged into the Seguro médico siglo XXI (Medical insurance XXI) 
inside the same ministry sharing the same key code but without evidence of changes 
due to evaluations or other factors.  
 
The weakness identified in these programmes and also linked to the status quo is 
that there was no data available to classify them in each of these categories. Other 
examples are the programmes Fortalecimiento de las redes de servicios de salud 
(Reinforcement of health provision networks) operated by the SSA U006 and 
Mejoramiento de unidades operativas de sevicios de ingreso (Improvement of 
medical units) run by the IMSS E010, which were canceled with no mention of 
possible reasons for their elimination. Indeed, neither developed any of the 
evaluations designed by the coordinators of policy evaluation, in order to address the 
changes to these. A first assumption is that sometimes the lack of data regarding 
government actions and decision-making led the discussion to the learning 
categorization.  
 
In other words, it might be that one or some of these canceled programmes reflected 
a learning process. Alternatively, perhaps the decision to cancel was the result of low 
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See Ministry of Health’s report. Available at:  
http://portal.salud.gob.mx/codigos/columnas/evaluacion_programas/cnegsr.html 
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State administrative capacity to use the data from evaluations to support decisions 
such as this. The latter is in line with Howlett & Ramesh (1995: 178) reasoning where 
“simpler forms of formal and informal evaluations expect to occur without the 
necessity for any learning to actually occur within the state itself”. 
 
Lastly, the ECR performed in 2014 of the programme of social infrastructure projects 
of assistance and social security operated by the IMSS, which should have been 
executed in the same year (2014), is still in progress according to the agency. Thus, 
there will not be any actions taken neither comments made by policy operators until 
results are revealed.  
 
The effectiveness of evaluation in the Results-based Budgeting (PbR/SED) 
The analysis of budgeting is more extensive due to the complexity of the dynamics of 
the relations between actors and actions inside the executive power and the 
legislature. To examine the effectiveness of evaluation in the PbR/SED it is important 
to identify any connections between those changes in programmes due to 
evaluations and the allocation of financial resources, as well as any changes in the 
policy sector. Thus, the review of the evaluations performed indicates that they only 
had an effect on the budgetary process tailored in 2011 in eight programmes (see 
table 4), despite the attempts of the LFPRH (Federal Law of Budget and Fiscal 
Responsibility) to link governmental planning, design, and implementation of public 
programmes with the budgetary process through evaluation and the ‘SED’. 
 
The document called Sistema de Evaluación del Desempeño157 states that the main 
objective of the PbR/SED is that the “budgeting process is driven by results and 
boosting a new model to allocate public resources through evaluation of budgetary 
programmes…” Nonetheless, a review of the draft budget since 2007 shows that only 
in the budgetary process of 2011, the SHCP attempted to plan the budget based on 
the SED’s results,158 as enacted in articles 25 and 110 of the LFPRH, and hence provide 
useful data to Congress in order to allocate public resources objectively. In 2011, the 
allocation of public resources to eight programmes (see table 4) was modified based 
on the results of evaluations and not only based on the draft budget of the previous 
year. Thus, this draft budget was presented by the executive (SHCP) as the first 
exercise in allocating resources objectively but also considered by the legislature for 
the same purpose (as shown in table 4). 
 
However, it should be borne in mind that the programming of the budget is based 
on data from the year before. Indeed, due to the process implicit on developing 
evaluations, the data used is from two years earlier.159 That is to say, the federal 
budget 2015 is programmed during 2014 based on data of 2013, while evaluation’s 
results are based on data from 2012. Indeed, a preliminary finding is that such gaps 
on the time of data collected are the main reason for not using evaluations. As a 
politician160 who was interviewed affirmed, asymmetrical data received by Congress 
during the budget cycle is not useful for programming and budgeting. Here, what is 
important is whether the programme’s budget shrinks or increases, and what 
modifications to it were proposed.  
 
                                                          
157
The Performance Evaluation System was published by the SHCP in 2007. 
158
See ‘Proyecto de Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación para el ejercicio fiscal 2011, Exposición de motivos 
2011 – Avances para mejorar la eficiencia y la calidad del gasto público -’, SHCP. 
159
See Evaluation of the SED by the Superior Audit Office of the Federation (2012) for additional information. 
160
Interview #16. 25/march/2014. 
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Certainly, in the fiscal year FY 2011 the SHCP stated that six programmes achieved 
their goals and proposed an increase in budget due to their results, while only two 
programmes saw their resources reduced based on their evaluation results. For 
instance, the programme’s Seguro popular (Health insurance) aim is to protect 
households from the burden of out-of-pocket spending for medical care. Based on 
the external evaluation, the SHCP pointed out that the programme is well designed, 
it has indicators to measure results and achieved its annual goals. Thus, in the FY 2011 
its resources were increased by 14% compared to 2010. 
 
Table 4 
 
Allocation of financial resources based on evaluations in Budget (PEF) FY 2011 
Public 
agencies 
Key 
budget 
Budgetary 
programme 
Type of 
evaluatio
n 
Budget 
2010 
(million 
mxn 
pesos) 
Draft 
Budget 
2011 
(million 
mxn 
pesos) 
Budget 
approved 
2011 
(million 
mxn pesos) 
% of 
increase/reduction 
of public resources 
Comments 
Ministry of 
Health 
‘SSA’ 
E010 
Formación y 
desarrollo 
profesional de 
recursos humanos 
especializados 
para la salud* 
(Training and 
profesional 
development of 
health specialized 
human resources) 
Ev. of design 
2009, EED 
2009 
1,863.9 2,873.3 2,867.2 
In the PPEF 2011 public 
resources were increased 
by 65% compared to 
2010 by the SHCP, 
whereas Congress 
approved 64%. 
All recommendations (3) of the Ev. of design 
2009 and EED 2009 were the same and 
implemented. 
 
The SHCP mentions the programme achieved 
some progress on indicators. 
Ministry of 
Health 
‘SSA’ 
E022 
Investigación y 
desarrollo 
tecnológico en 
salud* 
(Research and 
health 
technological 
development) 
Ev. of 
design2009, 
EED 2009 
1,197.3 1,332.5 1,406.7 
In the PPEF 2011 public 
resources were increased 
by 10%, whereas Congress 
approved 15%. 
All recommendations (3) of the Ev. of design 
2009 and EED 2009 were the same and 
implemented.  
 
The SHCP mentions the programme achieved 
some progress on indicators. 
Ministry of 
Health 
‘SSA’ 
P016 
Prevención y 
atención de 
VIH/SIDA y otras 
ITS (Care and 
prevention of 
HIV/AIDS and 
other diseases) 
Ev. of gender 
2009 150.4 165.8 243.8 
In the PPEF 2011 public 
resources were increased 
by 9%, whereas Congress 
approved 62%. 
In the Ev. of gender 2009, evaluators pointed 
out five recommendations; however, these 
were not implemented by the health sector 
and not mentioned in the mechanism to 
follow-up evaluation results. 
 
The SHCP mentions the programme achieved 
progress on indicators. 
Ministry of 
Health 
‘SSA’ and 
the 
National 
System for 
Family 
Integral 
Developme
nt ‘SNDIF’ 
S150 
Programa de 
Atención a 
Familias y 
Población 
Vulnerable* 
(Programme to 
vulnerable people 
and families) 
EED Specific 
ev. of 
performance 
2009 
382.0 397.7 397.7 
In the PPEF 2011 public 
resources were increased 
by 4%, the same amount 
approved by Congress. 
There was only one recommendation of the 
EED 2009 and it was implemented.  
 
The SHCP mentions the programme achieved 
progress on indicators. 
Ministry of 
Health 
‘SSA’ and 
Ministry of 
Social 
Developme
nt 
‘SEDESOL’ 
S174 
Programa de 
estancias infantiles 
para apoyar a 
madres 
trabajadoras 
(Childcare centers 
for supporting 
working mothers) 
Diagnostic of 
gender 
equality 
2008 (Ev. of 
gender 
2009), Ev. of 
perception 
2009, 
Specific ev. of 
performance   
(EED) 2009 
124.3 202.4 202.4 
In the PPEF 2011 public 
resources were increased 
by 61%, the same amount 
approved by Congress. 
It doesn’t have indicator of budgetary process. 
 
In the Ev. of gender 2009, evaluators pointed 
out five recommendations; however, these 
were not implemented by the health sector 
and not mentioned in the mechanism to 
follow-up evaluation results. In the Ev. of 
perception 2009 there are no 
recommendations (4) in the mechanism to 
follow-up evaluation results. Only one 
recommendation of 2 of the EED 2009 was 
implemented.  
 
The SHCP mentions the programme achieved 
progress on indicators. 
Ministry of 
Health 
‘SSA’ 
S200 
Caravanas de la 
Salud* 
(Health caravans) 
Diagnostic of 
gender 
equality 
2008 (Ev. of 
gender 
2009),  
Specific ev. of 
performance   
(EED) 2009, 
Complement
ary ev. 2009 
734.3 726.9 726.9 
In the PPEF 2011 public 
resources were reduced 
by 1%, the same amount 
approved by Congress. 
In the Ev. of gender 2009,  evaluators  pointed 
out five recommendations; however, these 
were not implemented by the health sector 
and not mentioned in the mechanism to 
follow-up evaluation results. Only one 
recommendation of the EED 2009 was 
implemented; however there are more pointed 
out by evaluators (6). In the Complementary 
ev. 2009 only 3 recommendations of 33 were 
improved. 
 
The SHCP mentions the programme’s 
diagnostic does not have positive results and 
needs to measure impact. 
Ministry of 
Health 
‘SSA’ 
S202 
Sistema integral de 
calidad en salud 
(Integral system of 
health quality) 
 Specific ev. 
of 
performance(
EED) 2009 
164.3 162.6 166.5 
In the PPEF 2011 public 
resources were reduced 
by 1%, whereas Congress 
approved an 
increasement of 1%. 
The recommendations (3) of the EED 2009 are 
not mentioned in the mechanism to follow-up 
evaluation results. 
 
The SHCP mentions the programme needs to 
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Source: Data from SHCP (2010, 2011). 
*These programmes are considered as part of the social sector and coordinated by the CONEVAL. 
 
In contrast, results were not positive for the programme Caravanas de la salud 
(Health caravans), which aims to promote access to medical services in 
geographically remote areas where health care services are unavailable. The 
programme did not achieve its goals regarding coverage, conditions of medical units 
and provision of medicines; consequently, its resources were reduced by 1% compared 
to previous year. Additionally, as shown in table 4, Congress approved a different 
amount in the final budget from that proposed in the executive’s draft budget, 
which could be observed in the budget ‘PEF’ 2011. This indicates an attempt by the 
legislature to look at evaluation results for budgeting, thereby operating a strategy 
of results-based budgeting. 
 
Dissimilar to this effort is the report161 of the Superior Audit Office of the Federation 
(Auditoría Superior de la Federación ‘ASF’), which claims that the finances of 17 
programmes were allocated without any specific criteria for performance. The office 
points out that the PbR/SED did not identify efficiency, economy, efficacy, quality of 
programmes and social impact of finances as enacted by law. It also failed to identify 
the extent to which the evaluations were used for budgetary decision-making. 
However, currently they include most of these criteria in each programme’s indicator 
except for those data regarding budgetary decision-making.162 Another recent report 
(Account of Public Treasury 2013) of the ASF confirms the strategy (PbR/SED) has 
had few results:  
distributional mechanisms [public resources] do not incentive the achievement of goals nor 
do they sanction inefficiencies. In this sense, the PbR/SED strategy almost had zero progress 
regarding public expenditure at federal level. ASF (2013: 50, 57) 
 
Indeed, the office suggests training for local agencies supporting the strategy’s 
implementation along with effective sanctions to those (states and municipalities) 
that do not accomplish the accountability of resources transferred. The evidence 
collected indicates few attempts to establish evaluation. Such discontinuities in the 
results of policy evaluation should be analysed in detail focusing on different phases 
of interventions in order to explain the gaps of the phenomenon. In other words, over 
time there is no linearity in the decision-making by either branch of government, as 
observed here it is more an isolated effort to use evaluations than to close the public 
policy cycle. Thus, the case study cannot address all the actions and decisions in one 
single event to identify a unique causal chain to explain it.  
 
Here the problem of effectiveness is explained through diverse variables and under 
different circumstances. In analysing these attempts, for instance, the statement of 
purpose for the 2009 draft budget mentions some effects of evaluations. An example 
is the programme Financiamiento equitativo de la atención médica (Equitable 
funding of health provision) of the Ministry of Health (SSA) U004, which was merged 
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See Evaluation of the SED by Superior Audit Office of the Federation, 2012. 
162
Another result observed is the difficulty for monitoring evaluation results of the PbR/SED from its initial phase, it 
means when evaluator(s) publish(es) a final report until policy makers take public action in the following years. 
Another complexity is to find evidence of evaluation within the legislature. This becomes a challenging issue, which 
requires an exhaustive documentary analysis of legislative materials such as daily debates (chamber of deputies), 
evaluation reports, the draft budget and the one approved, as well as audits.  
improve its indicators and mechanism to 
evaluate results. 
Ministry of 
Health 
‘SSA’ 
U005 
Seguro Popular* 
(Health insurance) 
Specific ev. of 
performance(
EED) 2009 
48842.1 57267.8 56946.6 
In the PPEF 2011 public 
resources were increased 
by 15%, whereas Congress 
approved 14%. 
There are no recommendations (3) as result of 
EED 2009 in the mechanism to follow-up 
evaluation results. 
 
The SHCP mentions the programme achieved 
progress on indicators. 
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into the programme Seguro popular (Health insurance) U005 and Caravanas de la 
Salud (Health caravans) S200 to improve their indicators. However, there are 
further reasons to affirm that evaluation has not played a formal role in the decision-
making budgeting process, as the CONEVAL’s report163 states regarding the Ramo 33 
(budget account), 
the resources (economic) are paid out based on those received in previous years, when 
resources executed in every state depend on political arrangements instead of analysis of 
their needs… it seems there is no efficiency or equity criteria and it is assumed that the 
state’s needs do not change over time.  
 
The utilisation of evaluations by Congress is not limited to budget decisions. 
Evaluation could be used to support sector policies such as to target specific health 
needs of population, increase coverage of programmes, link different sector 
programmes to particular municipalities, etc. However, a review of daily debates 
under two different administrations from 2011 to 2013, in terms of the political party 
in power (PAN and PRI) undermines the potential value of evaluation over the 
health sector policy making process. In 2013, the initiatives of the law164 of retirement 
pension and unemployment should have benefited the health sector, however, it did 
not mention whether evaluations could have influenced over health policy changes. 
This is no different of what the Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas Públicas165 (Public 
Finances Studies Centre) ‘CEFP’ (2013a; 2014) indicates.  
 
The comparative analysis of the draft budget and decrees of 2012, 2013 and 2014 
indicates the importance of establishing mechanisms to modernize the budget cycle 
and use of data “gradually” from evaluations in the budget decision-making. 
Alongside, in the PEF (budget) 2012, Congress pointed out the obligation of the 
SHCP to evaluate the PbR/SED, including costs and whether these resources are 
properly allocated (CEFP, 2013). Thus, the exercise to allocate resources in 2011 by the 
legislature seems an isolated event, indicating that the intended role of evaluation 
has not been achieved. Demonstrating this branch has powerful reasons to keep old 
patterns in decision-making, even in the face of efforts to reform the budgetary 
process.  
 
A comparison between the budget cycles in 2012 and 2013 shows that public 
resources of the health sector increased by 5.6% without any consideration of 
evaluations. This translates into 418.7 mdp (million mxn pesos) equivalent to $27.2 
(millions us dollars)166 in 2012, while in 2013 it was of 443.7 mdp equivalent to $28.9 
(millions us dollars), with a further increase of 485.2 mdp equivalent to $31.6 (millions 
us dollars) in 2014. Another example is the discussion of the PEF 2013,167 where a 
senator requested from Congress more resources for vulnerable people. While it 
might be assumed that this decision would be supported by performance data, his 
petition was supported on health statistics with no mention of all evaluations having 
taken place.  
 
So far, this study has provided an empirical review of whether evaluations have been 
taken into account by both branches. An a priori summary of outcomes indicates 
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Informe de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social en México, 2008, p. 112, available at:  
 http://www.coneval.gob.mx/contenido/home/2509.pdf 
164
CEFP (2013b). 
165
The CEFP is a body inside Congress acting as a supplier of opinion studies, analysis and forecasting, especially 
those related to public finances. 
166
On June 2015, the exchange rate was of$15.30 mxn pesos per $1 us dollar. 
167
Senator Francisco Salvador López Brito (PAN). Daily of debates, 28/09/2012.Mexican Congress.  
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that the executive is more influenced by the evaluations to take action than Congress. 
Indeed, it can be affirmed that the trend is to increase public resources systematically 
without considering the importance of the evaluation even in programmes with no 
visible results168 such as the programme of care and prevention of HIV/AIDS and 
other diseases or the childcare centers for supporting working mothers (see table 4).  
 
Similarly, inside the executive, actors are [narrowly] pursuing the objective of greater 
utilisation of evaluation results. However, there are other implications when 
evaluation refers to the formulation of budget by the MoF. In order to infer the 
answers, avoiding an imposed theory or hypothesis (George & Bennett, 2004: 91) a 
question emerges: Why it is not available any supporting document - apart from 
that draft budget 2011 mentioned above - to imply to what extent the evaluation 
led decision-making in the tailoring process? The variance of utilisation may be in 
instance best described in terms of other factors and context in which the policy is 
embedded. 
 
What explains the effectiveness in policy evaluation? 
To explain variation of the dependent variables within this country, the following 
section focuses primarily on such institutional (political) factors, which according to 
the literature are salient attributes of an effective policy evaluation. The main reason 
to keep a separate chapter of the variables per country is due to the extensive 
analysis of data needed to explain such variations, which could be difficult to 
understand if both policies are scrutinised together. However, the comparative study 
across the Mexican and Chilean policies is done in another chapter.  
 
The section also analyses the gaps between those who operate programmes 
(executive) and decide upon expenditure (legislative) on the one hand and current 
practices of performance management on the other. For this purpose this section also 
uses another data source, the in-depth interviews with a sample of key informants 
(politicians, officials) representing actors involved in the development, 
implementation, monitoring, evaluation and auditing of policy to explore causal 
mechanisms of decision-making and identify the potential impact of the variables 
over public sector performance. Moreover, this section brings together the conclusions 
of the preceding chapters (methodology and policy evaluation in Mexico) to analyse 
particular forms of governance in Mexico. In order to do this, the variables here 
discussed are placed in order of their importance to influence the effectiveness of 
policy evaluation. 
 
Intra-Governmental Relations (IGR) 
Intra-Governmental and Interagency Relations (IGR) constitute the most important 
factor in explaining the effectiveness of evaluation. The relationship known as 
Interagency operates between actors inner ministries, state enterprises and/or 
agencies inside the executive, whereas patterns of interaction between the executive 
(ministries/agencies) and legislative (Congress) are called Intra-Governmental 
Relations. Regarding the results of evaluations, performance audits and analysis of 
the health sector in Mexico, the variable to determine the interrelation among public 
organisations is divided into: 
                                                          
168
The programme of HIV performed two evaluations (diagnostic of gender 2008 and ev. of gender 2009), which were 
merged into one. Of the five recommendations pointed out by evaluators none were not implemented by the health 
sector. Nonetheless, in the PPEF 2011 its resources were increased by 9%. Whereas the programme of childcare 
performed ten evaluations, in which, most of the recommendations 55 of 67 in total were not implemented. In the 
PPEF 2011 its resources of this programme were increased by 61%. 
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1) Forms of coordination: strong, weak or minimum. 
2) Information: availability of data, timing, reliability and quality. 
3) Economic resources to support policy evaluation: even or uneven  
 
The forms of coordination to support effectiveness are minimal, so according to annex 
1 the variable is coded “0” when these relationships result in minimum or weak 
coordination. During the implementation stage of evaluation, policy makers of 
programmes operate as administrators of data, whose job is to follow instructions by 
sector coordinators (SHCP, SFP, CONEVAL), 169  although they (coordinators and 
policy makers) are located at the same level as the executive. The task of 
implementation looks more complicated when actions need to be executed spanning 
two or more organisational settings (O’Toole, 2007: 143), such as integration of 
evaluation reports, which are developed by these three coordinators and the 
evaluation process itself. This means that the form of coordination is weak and the 
ministry (SHCP) responsible of the PbR/SED operates in its formal role as the main 
coordinator of this strategy.  
 
Conversely, some officials interviewed believe that the coordination between 
agencies and the strategy coordinators has improved, although they believe the 
SHCP should be responsible for leadership and there is a lot of room for improvement. 
At this level, there is a pattern of authority lead by the organisation that controls 
public resources. Indeed, lead coordinator agencies apply the formal mechanisms of 
interagency coordination such as the PAE (Annual Evaluation Programme) to assure 
horizontal relationships and to strengthen a higher level of accomplishment by those 
programmes evaluated. The scenario of coordination between branches seems to be 
the minimum required to strengthen the evaluation. The situation appears worse 
regarding the relationship between the executive and Congress, as 50% of those 
interviewed of each branch did not know – or did not say – what form of 
relationship exists between them.  
 
Only a few indicated that there was a relationship between Congress and the SHCP. 
Moreover, the relationship between the executive and legislative is constrained until 
the budgetary process starts and the evaluation results are sent by the executive to 
the legislature as required by law. Another example was found in the statement of 
purpose of the draft budget170 in 2009, which notes that Congress (deputies) should 
have access to the SED for supporting their duties. However, there is no evidence this 
ever actually happened. In this context, the availability of information for those key 
stakeholders is essential for effective policy decision-making at any level of inter-
agency relationships. Interviews conducted revealed some concerns about data 
availability as well as about timing, reliability and quality of data.  
 
From the total of 19 interviews, those with politicians at Congress confirm that even 
when information of budget is available, it is of little use for decision-making because 
it is based on data that is two years out of date, which minimises the usability of 
evaluations. This outcome shows that the variable of availability of data is present 
and coded “1”, whereas the timing of such data is absent and coded “0”. Regarding 
quality, whereas officials in the executive consider evaluations to be of good quality 
                                                          
169
From 2007 to 2009, the SFP did not have a special unit responsible for the PbR/SED strategy until 2010 when the 
Evaluation Management and Government Performance Unit (UEGDG) came into sight. Before that, evaluation was 
performed by the Unit of Control and Evaluation of Public Management (UCEGEP) inside the SFP. While in the 
SHCP, the Unit of Political and Budgetary Control (UPCP) used to lead the strategy until 2012 when the Performance 
Evaluation Unit emerged, although, in 2014 budget of the PbR/SED was allocated to the former (UPCP). 
170
See “PPEF 2009, exposición de motivos T.I.”, pp. 25-26, 47. 
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and reliable, for politicians, evaluations are perceived of dubious reliability because 
the executive coordinates them. Members of Congress therefore do not consider 
evaluations trustworthy, even though these are performed by external evaluators 
(such as academics or NGOs). 
 
Consequently, the quality of the information is questionable due to the data provider. 
Indeed, Congress people regularly use studies developed by the CEFP (Public 
Finances Studies Centre) as three politicians171 affirm. However, this finding is puzzling 
since the CEFP’s studies make use of the same data, (i.e. the external evaluations’ 
data coordinated by the SHCP, SFP, and CONEVAL). Thus, following the analysis of 
the variable measuring the reliability and quality of data, it is clear this variable 
should be and coded “0”. 
 
The third indicator is related to the economic resources. From the stakeholders’ view, 
these represent the necessary tool for having direct control and coordination over 
actors when executing any policy. A review of the budgets performed in these years – 
since the strategy started – shows an incremental trend as it follows: 
 
Chart 2 
 
Resources provided to coordinators of evaluation in Mexico 
 
 
 
Source: Data from 2008 to 2012 by the ASF. The chart figures are in Mexican pesos 
(millions).  
 
According to the ASF, 172  from 2008 to 2012, the coordinators (SHCP, SFP and 
CONEVAL) received $4.4 (millions mxn pesos) equivalent to $0.28 (millions us 
dollars)173 to implement the PbR/SED, including the funds provided by international 
organisations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). This amount 
                                                          
171
Interview #14.13/march/2014; interview #16.25/march/2014; and interview #17.27/march/2014. 
172
See Performance Evaluation System’s report by the ASF in 2012. The graph includes resources of four budgetary 
programmes linked to the Performance Evaluation System by each organisation such as the SHCP (P002, R005), 
the SFP (P005) and the CONEVAL (P003), as well as the Budget Account (Ramo 23) and funds by the Inter-
American Development Bank and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  
173
On June 2015, the exchange rate was $15.30 mxn pesos per $1 us dollar. 
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represents 0.025% of the federal budget in those years. As chart 2 shows there has 
been an increase over time, only the SFP has reduced its finances.174  
 
Regarding public resources, the continuity of policy evaluation requires a large 
amount of financial support to develop the PbR/SED, for which, coordinators have 
been ensured an even distribution of such resources to place the indicator as an 
outcome “1” present. As explained above, there was a commitment made by the 
executive but also by the legislature. In other words, despite misutilisation of 
evaluation data by Congress, this financial support was committed to the evaluation 
process through the approval of the budget presented by the executive (SHCP), as 
shown in chart 2, which responds effectively to the attempts of the executive to 
develop the PbR/SED. For this, the legislature approves funds to finance the 
operation of the evaluation (pay external evaluations) through their coordinators 
(SHCP, SFP and CONEVAL) and policy-makers inside the agencies.  
 
Generating a successful policy evaluation means coordination among interdependent 
actors, facing current relationship set by legal authority. As O’Toole (2007: 145) says 
“B cooperates with A because B feels it is an obligation to do so”. The main results 
evidence the importance of the IGR for supporting continuation of evaluation to the 
end. At last, although the policy is designed at central level, it must be implemented 
by officials at horizontal or vertical level. Thus, the centre provides the finance but 
the other parts of government provide the intention and action. 
 
Quality of bureaucracy 
To measure the second variable the following sources will be used: 
1) Government effectiveness (The Worldwide Governance Indicators ‘WGI’) 
2) Evaluation staff unit in the Mexican government: background, skills, and 
experience through interviews. 
 
Mexico has a long way boosting a civil service (Pardo, 1999) in an environment where 
political control has been a key for stability and good governance under the post-
revolutionary administrations. Although the Mexican government has promoted the 
goal of a career civil service175 since 2003, this does not ensure that personnel have 
become more skilled (see Guerrero, 2007, Pardo, 2005, 2007). Therefore, an effective 
policy evaluation requires the involvement of skilled and experienced cadres in the 
administration. Let us explore how the quality of both bureaucracy and the 
evaluation coordinators affects the effectiveness of evaluation. In 2013, regarding the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators176 Mexico was placed in the 50th and 75th percentile 
range in terms of the overall indicators.  
 
Concerning the indicator government effectiveness, which measures the quality of the 
civil service amongst others dimensions of governance, as table 5 shows, the result is 
an average of 61 in the scale of 0-100 from 2007 to 2014. This is reflected in attempts 
to improve the quality of officials, for example in the recruitment of more 
                                                          
174
In 2007, the SHCP attempted to give greater authority and power to the CONEVAL through the creation of another 
council to replace the CONEVAL but also to undermining the functions of the SFP, which caused friction between the 
two ministries (see presidential term 2006-12 in the chapter ‘Policy evaluation in Mexico’). 
175
Keeping in mind that the establishment of the civil service in the Mexican government is limited to the executive 
branch, excluding the legislative and judicial the adoption of the service in the states and municipalities depends 
upon the interest and support of local political actors. 
176
The Worldwide Governance Indicators measure on six broad dimensions of governance through a six percentile 
ranges in the scale 0-100
th
 of 215 countries over the period 1996-2013, however, here is only included the year 2013 
(see methodology chapter). 
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experienced cadres in evaluation i.e. the CONEVAL’s personnel, the ministries (SHCP, 
SFP) and agencies, whereas in the legislative – at least – there is a will to improve. 
 
Table 5 
Government effectiveness (quality of bureaucracy) in Mexico  
 
Country/year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
MEXICO 59 61 60 60 63 63 63 61 
Chile 87 84 85 87 86 86 86 84 
 
Source: Data from the World Bank (worldwide governance indicators WGI). 
 
As one deputy177 suggested, once the re-election of the members of Congress takes 
place, there will be more experienced cadres in the legislative, but the results will not 
be observable for the next 10 or 15 years. For instance, concerning the people working 
as coordinators of the PbR/SED, the evaluation of the SED by the Superior Audit 
Office of the Federation (2012: 54) points out that 141 officials are responsible for the 
PbR/SED.178 Moreover, the analysis of such staff units operating the PbR/SED based 
on 19 interviews shows that most officials and politicians in the executive and 
legislative have a masters degree (68%), 10 years or more of experience working in 
government (73%), and have evaluation experience ranging from 1½ to 18 years. 
These results corroborate that the outcome regarding the quality of bureaucracy is 
present and coded “1”. 
 
In spite of this, most of those interviewed emphasize the need for experts in this field 
including qualified external evaluators. Such experience should be reflected in the 
decision-making process. However, inside the legislature, the results (chart 1) showed 
that the existing Congress people is still subject to personal loyalties, patronage 
networks and lack of expertise, factors that reduce the possibilities to ensure that the 
skills and experience of actors help on improving the public sector. Indeed, some of 
those arguments described by Arellano (2000), Guerrero (2007) and Pardo (1999, 
2005, 2007) remain as valid in those years [referring to old regime practices] e.g. 
meritocratic practices, reliability of administration and structure of the system, the 
old spoils systems returning and lack of transparency amongst others.  
 
For instance, it is widely known that elected public officials grant public positions as 
political “booty” for their party supporters. An argument is that centralized 
administrations gain power 179  through the bureaucracy, establishing ostensibly 
objective rules to appoint new officials to perform professionally. In regimes like this, 
it is important for the president to keep some power through those officials who have 
to be loyal to him/her. These flaws co-exist (overlap) with those attempts to establish 
a formal civil service and might explain the problem in consolidating reform and 
keeping separately from the power of the State. 
 
This hierarchical and archaic model is a legacy of public administration practices, at 
least in Mexico, where top bureaucracy is highly well paid and positions are promised 
and committed even before governments come to power. Evaluation thus involves a 
clash of views between administrative officials and elected members over the 
boundary between technical decisions and political ones. Another consideration is the 
                                                          
177
Interview #16. 25/march/2014. 
178
From the total of 141 officials responsible of the PbR/SED, there are 65 (46.1%) people who work in the CONEVAL, 
50 (35.5%) in the SFP and 26 (18.4%) in the SHCP. 
179
As an organ of repression, power represses nature, class, and individuals (Foucault, 1980: 90). 
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gap on bureaucratic influence over the legislative regarding policy evaluation. By 
exploring bureaucratic influence in the policy process, it could be affirmed that in 
contexts where performance and results-based or oriented management reforms are 
undertaken, there is a positive effect over making bureaucracies more effective 
(Nicholson-Crotty & Miller, 2012: 348). 
 
However, as explained in the previous section of the “IGR”, the linkages between 
branches of government operate on the basis of legal authority and the executive 
bureaucracy influence over legislative process is narrowed until the budgetary process 
starts. Moreover, in less professionalized agencies – such as the Mexican Congress –, 
Nicholson-Crotty & Miller (2012: 366) argue that they did “do not find evidence that 
bureaucratic effectiveness has a larger impact on bureaucratic influence in less 
professionalized chambers”.  
 
Given these facts, context matters greatly and makes it difficult to manoeuvre a civil 
service promptly due to political parties, which need those positions to repay favours. 
Many positions in the hierarchy of government are linked to the governing political 
party and co-exist with the civil service. In this case, the asymmetries of experience 
and technical knowledge of the bureaucracies and politicians across the executive 
and legislature have affected the effectiveness of evaluation, mainly because these 
asymmetries produce inaction for decision-making once it takes place.  
 
The results seem as underestimated by both branches for further utilisation. The 
average of 7 years of experience in evaluation of people interviewed is not clearly 
linked to its effectiveness. This means, there is a need of staffed members with a high 
level of know-how to operate sophisticated evaluation and monitoring systems such 
as the PbR/SED, to perform efficiently data gathering, data-entry and analysis of 
evaluation. Thus, it can be affirmed that the quality of bureaucracy is necessary for 
achieving effectiveness but closely linked to political factors, at least in Mexico. A 
more meritocratic civil service plays a central role in making policy evaluation 
effective and factors explained above remain as potential obstacles to its 
effectiveness.  
 
Level of democracy 
Democracy comprises not only free and fair elections, the right to vote, and freedom 
of expression; it also refers to the capacity to implement policies effectively within a 
system of checks and balances (Dahl, 1971: 3 cited in Lijphart, 2002: 46 and EIU 
democracy index, 2014). As explained in the methodology chapter, to measure this 
variable the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) is included, which is based on the 
UNDP’s report and Latin American Barometer, and adds that concentration of 
power, social and economic inequalities, insecurity and violence endanger the 
democracy of Latin America.  
 
To analyse this function and whether policy evaluation is imposed upon or engaged 
with stakeholders, the democracy index has four categories of democratic system:  
1) Authoritarian regimes 
2) Hybrid democracy 
3) Flawed democracy 
4) Full democracy 
 
In 2014, the democracy index placed Mexico at number 57 in the ranking with an 
overall score of 6.68, regarded as a flawed democracy. The score of the country has 
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stayed at the same position since 2006 when the list was first published. Equally 
important is the result regarding codification of this variable, for which, the absence 
of a full democratic regime is either equivalent to a code “0” or an outcome not 
attained (see annex 1).  
 
An example concerning the functioning of government (a category of the democracy 
index)180 under a flawed democracy is through day-to-day routines, in which the 
bureaucracy has significant chances to influence and implement programmes and 
policies, but also to exert discretionary action for purposes beyond their formal 
authority. From one perspective, the exercise of discretion could be desirable for 
promoting democratic governance by bridging gaps between citizens and elected 
officials (Meyers & Vorsanger, 2007: 157). Conversely, it might undermine or 
jeopardize desirable goals, the effectiveness of policy and efforts to improve 
democratic governance.  
 
It should be borne in mind that evaluation becomes more effective in full rather than 
flawed democracies. Evaluation is not a necessary concomitant of a democratic 
system, but it could emerge under diverse circumstances and it has been imposed 
upon different actors over time and the same political arguments. At a first glance, 
the presidentialism regime uses monitoring systems as a form of control of the 
organisations and their resources. For example, in Mexico during the mid 80s these 
were used for strengthening the planning process enacted in the Planning Law and 
the National Democratic Planning System, in which evaluation of government 
performance was implicit in the end of the process.  
 
However, those measures were performed as result of the economic crisis, which 
required the reduction of government structures rather than as a process where 
evaluation helped to determine agencies’ efficiency, for transparency and 
accountability. Indeed, in those years the 969 out of a total of 1150 state enterprises 
were downsized (see 1982-88 presidential term in the chapter ‘Policy evaluation in 
Mexico’). Additionally, in those years the evaluation was under the responsibility of 
several ministries such as the Presidency, National Heritage, Programming and 
Budget, General Controller of the Federation, Public Administration and of Finance 
and Public Credit. The priority given to policy (evaluation) depends upon different 
actors and how much political power they exerted over the public administration.  
 
It is possible that the incentive to fully implement evaluation was ineffective due to 
lack of political consensus with those assessed and most importantly due to the 
consequences of bad or poor performance. To push forward democracy in these 
emergent economies, evaluation becomes a powerful tool to ascertain whether the 
government’s actions are in accordance to those planned. The evaluation process 
should also serve to create or maintain trust in officials or bureaucracy through 
accountability and transparency of the public administration operation, with the aim 
of achieving an effective and efficient performance. This extends to politicians, who 
gain legitimacy and trust from constituencies via public action and effective 
evaluation.  
 
Taking this into account, evaluation can be seen as a public matter that concerns 
both the governors and governed. Some explanations could be offered for the 
persisting modesty of citizens’ demands (Manning, 2001: 302) in terms of service 
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Other categories of this index are electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, political participation, and political 
culture. 
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quality. Therefore, the need of evaluation to acknowledge programmes’ 
performance has been underestimated by constituencies. The evolution of evaluation 
over time shows it was undertaken by officials and politicians at the central level in 
the absence of much interest from the citizenry in their governments’ performance 
though with increasing engagement from interest groups over time. 
 
Equally important is that consolidation of democracy brings up the significance of 
2000 in the political life of Mexico. In that year, for the first time, a non ‘PRI’ 
president came to power alongside the “collapse” of presidentialism. Nonetheless, the 
figure of the president still remained as the key decision-maker, a fact which helped 
ensure further improvements in government and public policies. Interest in 
evaluation increased further due to both the world economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 
(see Wiesner, 2011), and the international tendency to promote it and monitoring 
systems as ways of controlling public resources. 
 
For instance, although the Mexican government had not dismantled its authoritarian 
structure (Reyna, 2006: 131) in those years, it reinforced the need for a system of 
checks and balances, amongst others. Therefore, all the innovative actions performed 
by government were boosted thanks to the legacy of presidentialism exerted by the 
PRI party during 70 years. As noted by Reyna (2006: 131) ‘the Mexican government 
has not dismantled its authoritarian structure although it has undergone a political 
change, the public debate is more open and citizens tend to be more participatory’. 
An example was the Presidential Goals System (SIMEP) during the administration of 
Fox (2000-06). Its effective implementation was because the executive agenda was 
focused on it and the president monitored it, even more than the PbR/SED or the 
SICEG, which used to be the most relevant component of policy evaluation before 
the PbR/SED was implemented. 
 
Another example of the influence of political actors rather than democratic factors on 
the development of evaluation can be seen during the administration of Calderon 
from 2006 to 2012. Although, this president came from the same right party (PAN) 
and it was assumed that he would continue with most of the public policies 
implemented by his predecessor, the evaluation took another path due to the lack of 
consensus and joint action to continue previous policies regarding evaluation. 
Another example regards a further set of reforms including the New Public 
Management ‘NPM’ carried out in those years. Although the NPM was not directly 
linked to the reforms performed by the Mexican administration (see chapter ‘Policy 
evaluation in Mexico’), it attempted to alter the managerial jargon and 
administrative practices.  
 
The government moved towards an administrative reform as Arellano & Guerrero 
(2003: 11) note, “through a ‘neutral’ one”, which could be fully implemented in order 
to promote policy evaluation and government’s efficiency. Thus, the NPM paradigm 
influenced the adoption of evaluation and specific actions to make it more feasible. 
For instance, the programme ‘Prospera’ was pioneered due to its innovative model of 
impact evaluation. These positive findings enlightening the policy process rewarded 
the programme, with more financial resources and coverage was increased to benefit 
more households that eventually influenced the spread of evaluation across the 
Mexican public administration. Moreover, evaluation proves the importance of its 
effectiveness, in which the evidence comes as the “objective” authority for further 
improvements in public policy. 
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To sum up, it could be assumed that Mexico is still in a transition to democracy, with 
some gaps in the functioning of government that render it a flawed democracy. Thus, 
democracy was not determinant of the adoption of evaluation based on the 
historical context and political circumstances in Mexico but was relevant for its 
effectiveness. The transformation of the government has been difficult to achieve in 
the Mexican state due to the presidential control over the governmental apparatus 
(Arellano & Guerrero, 2003: 2-3), characteristic that prevails in hybrid regimes. Nef 
(2007: 325) states that “incomplete transition, restricted democracy and the receiver 
state have had significant effects upon the administrative systems…” and they also 
reduce the capacity of the State. 
 
However, the fact of being a flawed democracy has not been an obstacle to promote 
the effectiveness of evaluation from the central level. A comparison of non-
democratic and democratic administrations before and after 2000 corroborates an 
increasing trend of effectiveness after this transitional period. In the later years of the 
90s, public organisations only justified programmes’ costs, whether or not they 
produced the expected results from a cost-benefit analysis perspective, as Mejía 
(2005: 17) argues. Although evaluation was constantly mentioned (see chapter 
‘Policy evaluation in Mexico’) it did not evoke a rapid response from those evaluated 
to transform recommendations into actions to improve their programmes.  
 
In those years, evaluation was considered as a mechanism of control focused on 
audits and on the oversight of public resources, whose reports summarize the findings 
of audits instead of a performance measurement model using a results-based 
approach. In this century, evaluation gained acceptance inside the government 
branches, mainly due to political factors and other external factors. An important 
factor was the pressure exerted by international organisations such as the OECD 
among others, leading transformation of government but also as a result of the 
academics demanding the government’s accountability, transparency due to the 
world economic crisis between 2008-09. Later on, the evaluation’s effectiveness 
acquired importance thanks to programmes such as ‘Prospera’, which demonstrates 
the importance of policy take-up recommended by external evaluators. 
 
Regardless, it could not achieve effectiveness due to narrow demand-led by those 
interested, especially by constituency. The challenge might be is to design new 
institutions, strengthening capacity-building and the role of the state, rather than 
focusing on policies, as Hague & Harrop (2004: 319) suggest “in established 
democracies, institutions process new policies; in new democracies, the policy is to 
develop new institutions”. Currently, the risk is that the Mexican administration 
adopts a status-quo approach and retrograde tendencies regarding the system of 
checks and balances prevail, with consequences for the effectiveness of policy 
evaluation. 
 
Policy evaluation framework 
Implementation of complex policy initiatives is challenging in various ways. It requires 
effective coordination, network management, regulation, and information systems 
that reliably update stakeholders and policy implementers of the status of 
programmes’ outputs. To measure the balance between design and 
operationalization and how these impact the effectiveness of evaluation, the 
variable is divided in two with some sub-variables: 
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1) Coherence in the design: 
1.1) Matching policy evaluation objectives and outcomes. 
1.2) Overlap with regulations. 
1.3) Holding hearing of interest groups (consensus between actors). 
2) Structure of monitoring and evaluation system: 
2.1) Technical operationalization (easy/difficult). 
2.2) Perception of operationalization. 
2.3) Methodological rigor. 
 
As mentioned in the methodology chapter, this variable is related to the formulation 
stage of the policy process and has an effect on the effectiveness of evaluation. 
Indeed, evaluation is a source for ‘objective’ decision-making to lead to changes in 
policies/programmes. However, objective decisions could be erroneous because 
evaluation is a product of the design of policy-making created by human beings’ 
values, which are subjective (Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987 cited in Parsons, 1995: 564 and 
Miller, 1984). Thus, an ill-designed policy leads to unexpected or non-wanted 
outcomes, as Knill & Tosun (2012: 162) conclude, “distributional conflicts might lead to 
the formulation of ill-designed policies that are characterized by inaccurate 
assumptions about the causal relationship between policy problems and politically 
adopted remedies”. In this sense, all outcomes of this variable are absent and coded 
“0” due to the following reasons. 
 
Ideally, coherence in evaluation design should strike a balance between gathering 
and obtaining relevant information on the one hand and enabling the evaluated to 
carry out their tasks on the other. Firstly, an examination of the survey and 
observational data indicates that policy evaluation’s objectives and how these match 
with outcomes as established in regulations have different perspectives which are 
desirable but do not guarantee coherence in the design of policy. 
 
On the one hand, at the macro level the PbR/SED strategy shows coherence with the 
National Development Plan (see PND 2013–18), which also applies at the meso level 
where the ministries and CONEVAL are vertically integrated to sectors, regions and 
municipalities through various regulations. On the other hand, scaling up to policy 
evaluation as a comprehensive model, the scenario changes drastically at both 
horizontal and vertical level. At the micro level there is no correlation between 
individual (officials) performance and major goals established in programmes, at the 
institutional and national levels, nor with regulations, evaluation and monitoring 
systems coordinated by other public organisations.  
 
Given this context, regulations essentially provide a legal framework for 
implementation, avoiding discretionary judgments by policy implementers, but also 
risk making the evaluation process difficult to monitor. As Simon (1983 cited by 
Meyers & Vorsanger, 2007: 155) argues, “political efforts to control discretion through 
the promulgation of detailed rules and procedures often produce the contrary 
result…” Looking at evaluation as a fully integrated system, these systems are not 
harmonized and there is some overlapping. It appears that the evaluation process is 
characterized by a fragmentation of regulations. 
 
Secondly, the SFP executes a myriad of monitoring and evaluation systems such as 
the budgetary-programmatic evaluations every three months, coordinates the 
performance evaluation subsystem of officials (Career Civil Service), the performance 
agreements of the state enterprises jointly with the SHCP, the performance model of 
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control and oversight bodies (MIDO), and the system for government control and 
evaluation (SICEG). Certainly, all these systems that belong to the SFP are in the 
waiting list for relocation (see chapter ‘Policy evaluation in Mexico’). Thirdly, the 
evaluations of the social sector coordinated by the CONEVAL, which results are 
linked to the PbR/SED are more monitored by Congress than evaluations of other 
sectors.  
 
In the fourth place, the existing evaluation of the education sector is led by the 
National Institute for Evaluation of Education (Instituto Nacional para la Evaluación 
de la Educación ‘INEE’), a decentralized agency of the Ministry of Education for 
measuring students’ performance181 and other educational issues is not connected to 
the main strategy (PbR/SED). Neither the environmental impact evaluation 
performed by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT), 
whose aim is to be a preventive tool of the environment’s sustentability.  
 
Aside from that, since 2009 the National Statistics Office (INEGI) has been producing 
data on government performance – census of local government’s structure and 
indicators on public safety and administration of justice – but without any linkage to 
the PbR/SED. Another actors performing evaluation & monitoring activities are the 
National Institute of Climate Change and Ecology (Instituto Nacional de Ecología y 
Cambio Climático ‘INECC’,182 which was created in 2012 through the enacted General 
Law of Climate Change.  
 
The most recent evaluations performed were introduced by the Ministry of Energy 
(Secretaría de Energía ‘SENER’). In the manual of procedures of the General Office of 
Social Impact and Surface Occupied enacted by the end of year 2016, 183  it was 
established the obligation to perform evaluations of social impact, and consultation 
of indigenous people and communities, amongst others. Lastly, another actor in the 
legislative branch is the ASF, which has recently undertaken evaluations184 and aims 
“To assess goals, objectives set in federal programmes on the basis of strategic 
indicators approved in the budget to verify their performance and legality of public 
resources”185 (see annex 4).  
 
Evaluation thus has been implemented in diverse political scenarios embedded in a 
variety of monitoring and assessment activities. The government’s efforts to establish 
evaluation through the PbR/SED have produced the opposite of a comprehensive 
policy, leaving aside strategic political actors to increase its effectiveness such as the 
INEE, INECC, SENER, NGOs or ASF. Indeed, the latter exerts similar functions in terms 
of evaluation and its regulation seems to overlap with the PbR/SED in a way that is 
financially inefficient.  
 
In spite of this, there is no indication that results–based budgeting attempts to 
include these outputs as it should. This is mainly because there is some key data 
developed by these agencies waiting for stakeholders and politicians to use it for 
further improvement in government action. Regarding the structure of the PbR/SED 
as a system it has a complex design. Firstly, the mechanism to follow-up evaluation 
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E.g. Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) coordinated by the OECD.  
182
Official Journal, 06/06/2012. 
183
Manual of procedures of the General Office of Social Impact and Surface Occupied, 24/11/2016. 
184
Evaluation of the SED in 2012. 
185
It is enacted by the Audit and Accountability Law of the Federation [Ley de Fiscalización y Rendición de Cuentas de 
la Federación], Official Journal 18/06/2010. 
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results operates as a separate module, coordinated by the CONEVAL, SHCP and SFP. 
In addition, the same recommendations are registered into the Programme for a 
Close and Modern Government (Programa para un Gobierno Cercano y Moderno 
‘PGCM’), which is coordinated only by the SFP. This procedure duplicates activities to 
those programmes’ implementers across federal public administration186 because they 
have to report the same information in different formats and units inside the same 
ministry (SFP). 
 
Secondly, the system underlines – in the discourse – the need for results over 
procedures but the MIR’s methodology is based on the ‘logical framework approach’, 
which requires a set of indicators at four levels: impact, results, services and activities, 
emphasizing inputs rather than results, increasing the complexity of the evaluation 
system. 187  Thirdly, according to the OECD study, 188  the capacity and functions of 
authorities such as the SHCP and SFP are perceived similarly and even overlapping 
in operation: 
Mexico is unusual among OECD countries in having three institutions with overlapping 
roles and responsibilities for these reforms: the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Public 
Administration, and CONEVAL… In most OECD countries, only one institution has the 
lead responsibility, although that institution varies by country (OECD, 2009b: 116). 
 
In regard to the coordination of evaluation, the review of roles across branches shows 
that it is complicated to identify their sphere of responsibilities and scope of action. 
Yet, these ministries have not clearly defined the number of budgetary programmes 
under supervision of each one. Only the CONEVAL, which is responsible of the social 
sector, recently published a complete catalogue of the social programmes under its 
supervision.189 Notwithstanding this responsibility it is assumed that the social sector 
should include the entire health sector’s programmes reviewed here. However, the 
council is only responsible for a few of them while the others are coordinated by the 
SHCP such as the programmes Construction of medical specialized centers or 
Reduction of maternal mortality, which should be considered as key programmes of 
the social sector.  
 
Lastly, the involvement of interest groups in the design of the policy framework is the 
usual form of any inclusive policy process in a democratic government. Interest 
groups include NGOs and target groups whose behaviour is to alter government 
action (Wu et al., 2010: 69) as policy implementers through using public hearings 
statutorily defined, along with political, administrative and judicial activities to 
represent diversity of interests and expertise (Wu et al., 2010: 68) and thereby to 
ensure a flexible and feasible policy framework. Moreover, it guarantees 
implementation of the policy over public administration according to the proposal 
put forward by the executive. Far from consultative devices, however, the actual 
practice analysed here is an authoritative decision by those implementers along with 
the executive and legislative branches avoiding negotiations, discussions, empathy 
with those affected, and compromises with powerful groups.  
 
                                                          
186
According to the “Programa para un Gobierno Cercano y Moderno 2013-18”, evaluations and recommendations are 
perceived as a bureaucratic procedure rather than actions to improve the programme. Official journal, 30/08/2013. 
187
The utilisation of indicators, which represent the most objective technical criteria feasible for evaluation has faced 
some difficulties in their design due to the complexity of programmes. In some cases, such as the Ministry of External 
Affairs, the results are not tangible outcomes, instead consisting of political negotiations or agreements between such 
ministry and other agencies. Thus, the outcomes are inputs of another process even of another public agencies. 
188
The OECD issued the Review of Budgeting in Mexico in 2009 but this study was presented by the Presidency Office 
on January 7th, 2010. 
189
In 2015, according to the CONEVAL, there were 235 social programmes under its coordination. 
~ 103 ~ 
 
 
 
The second variable refers to the structure of the monitoring and evaluation system 
in which ideally should prevail a coherent and easy operationalization by users. 
However, officials and politicians surveyed about this, point out to a difficult, rigid 
and unfriendly operationalization system. They also refer to the problem of 
operationalization by policy implementers to the myriad of systems to report 
indicators and evaluation results e.g. the Performance Evaluation System (SED), the 
mechanism to follow-up evaluation results (SAS), the Integral Data System of 
Revenue and Public Expenditure [Sistema Integral de Información de los Ingresos y 
Gasto Público ‘SIIWEB’], the Synthetic Model of Performance Data (MSD) and the 
“Portal Aplicativo” (PASH).  
 
In theory, the SED should be the only database system as conceptualized in 
regulations but in practice, the range of systems can be considered as the side effects 
of poor design, in which implementers were not able to develop a major data system 
to manage the vast amount of information produced by diverse agencies. This brings 
practical difficulties for technical operationalization and monitoring purposes, which 
are different from those objectives established in the Results-based Management190 
(RBM), underlining results rather than procedures. The review of the SED by the ASF 
(2012: 79) confirms the position of this research about the complexity to follow 
recommendations once these are published in the mechanism 191  by programme’s 
operators. 
 
For example, as an external user it was encountered some difficulties in finding data 
in the health sector. As mentioned in the first section, there is no data available for 
two programmes Reinforcement of health provision networks and Improvement of 
medical units. In other cases, the results of evaluations are only published in the 
CONEVAL’s website and not available in the Ministry of Health’s website. In more 
specific cases, the recommendations do not appear in the mechanism to follow-up 
evaluation results such as in the EED 2010 (specific evaluation of performance) of the 
programme IMSS-Oportunidades. In other cases, recommendations were 
reformulated by agencies and different from those reported by evaluators such as in 
the EED 2012 of the programme of people with disability as well as in the process 
evaluation 2012 of the programme of childcare centers. 
 
Data collection through these systems is challenging and not easily available at 
central level. Complexity increases when data of budgetary-programmatic 
evaluations, performance agreements, evaluation of officials and economic 
evaluation of incomes and expenses refers to because information is not open to 
society via the official websites. These results suggest that internal conflict is present 
mainly because different authorities attempt to put different systems into operation 
without consensus. Based on the idea that data means power, those to whom 
database belongs to are sufficiently powerful to exert control over the rest and to 
restrict the accountability of government performance in a discretionary way. Policy 
evaluation determines not only what will be done or provided to whom, but also the 
resources, regulations and data system that stakeholders should have at their 
disposal.  
 
At the time of the study, the implementation of policy evaluation framework was 
making slow progress toward balancing the system, the scheme of regulations with 
                                                          
190
See Results-Based Management handbook, United Nations Development Group, available at: 
http://www.undg.org/docs/12316/UNDG-RBM%20Handbook-2012.pdf 
191
The mechanism to follow-up evaluation results and/or “Synthetic Model of Performance Data”. 
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the modernization processes undertaken by the public sector characterized by 
traditional legalistic obligations and complexity of systems. Taken together, all these 
factors have hindered the effectiveness of policy evaluation. 
 
Degree of autonomy 
As explained in the methodology chapter, in general terms, autonomy occurs when a 
public agency can decide by itself which matters are considered the most important 
(Verhoest et al., 2004: 14) and decisions concerning policy-making are independent 
and not subject to influence by external factors and actors. The emergence of 
“independent” agencies in Mexico such as the CONEVAL or INEE represents the 
government’s commitment to build credibility in its institutions. This is based on the 
premise that relative independence of the evaluator will have an impact on 
objectivity, transparency and accountability of results obtained, as well as amongst 
scholars, citizens and even officials.  
 
In the context of evaluation, autonomy implies the independence to decide which 
programmes will be evaluated, the type of evaluation required without the 
coordinator’s approval, and the delivery times of results from external evaluators. It 
also refers to self-ruling separately from the top of the power (government). Ideally, 
it seems more a bottom-up rather than top-down approach (Knill & Tosun, 2012: 
155), where implementers have more flexibility and autonomy to adjust policies 
based on evidence. Thus, to rank an agency’s autonomy, this variable is divided into 
the following three dimensions: 
1) Policy autonomy: low and high. 
2) Financial autonomy: low and high. 
3) Legal autonomy: low and high. 
 
Here, there are two approaches selected regarding autonomy in evaluation. The first 
one refers to the real scenario and political environment where evaluation takes 
place. For Karlsson & Conner (2006: 232-4), this is the value-sensitive evaluator 
position, in which the evaluator should not stay separated from politics at all and 
must take responsibility for the technical aspects of how the evaluation is done, and 
its ethical aspects and democratic values. Following this idea, the evaluator should 
consider countries’ issues, such as Mexico’s hierarchical bureaucratic structures, where 
the autonomy of the agencies does not guarantee homogeneity of the public policies 
or programmes implemented. This might appear to be the key reason for 
governments to move to more centralized control and evaluation systems.  
 
Although these moves could hinder any attempt to empowering interagency 
relationships, and could be contradictory to managerial movements such as the NPM 
(Barzelay, 2001, Hood, 1995 and Radin, 2007), which emphasizes the 
decentralization of systems, disaggregation of units in the public sector and inclusion 
of private sector forms of management, amongst other things, centralization is the 
key for operationalization. In Mexico, while the CONEVAL and INEE have attempted 
to be autonomous it is not sufficient for the purpose of autonomy. Certainly, in 2007, 
two initiatives were put forward for public debate to replace the CONEVAL192 in 
order to grant greater functions, authority and most important autonomy to the 
agency coordinating the policy evaluation (see 2006-12 presidential term in the 
chapter ‘Policy evaluation in Mexico’). However, it is important to bear in mind that 
                                                          
192
The creation of the National Evaluation Council for Public Policies and the National Evaluation Council of 
Government Management, the former submitted by the SHCP and the latter by a deputy at Congress. 
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the CONEVAL is only responsible 193  for approximately 20% of the total of 960 
budgetary programmes.194 
 
In this context, the attempt to give “more” autonomy to agencies is characterized by 
the level of decision-making competencies (Verhoest et al., 2004: 104). According to 
these authors’ premises (see methodology chapter), the SHCP, SFP, CONEVAL or 
INEE have achieved management and policy autonomy. The former refers to aspects 
of management decisions and the way they are taken, whereas the latter is related 
to individual decisions of general rules or policy instruments. However, in spite of 
recent reforms to the Constitution 195  yielding to the CONEVAL an own legal 
personality (autonomy), this still operates under supervision of the SHCP, and its 
partly funded by central government (financial autonomy), and does not decide on 
individual applications of general rules (policy).  
 
In this regard, while the legal initiatives discussed in Congress in 2007 (see chapter 
‘Policy evaluation in Mexico’) aimed to increase the leading role of the CONEVAL 
over the PbR/SED, they had not produced the results expected and its autonomy is 
still limited as mentioned in the previous chapter. As for the INEE, its autonomy’s 
status is alike to the CONEVAL in terms of operating under supervision of the Ministry 
of Education despite being a public, decentralized agency with financial, technical, 
and operational autonomy. Keeping in mind that financial autonomy is self-sufficient 
to operate resources, the budget remains as a tool to impose control over inter and 
intra governmental relationships, as Rubin (2010: 346) states “budgetary decision 
making provides a picture of the relative power of budget actors within and 
between branches of government”.  
 
Thus, a discretionary role prevails in Mexico in spite of the narrative that autonomy is 
key for the evaluation process. This statement is supported by interviewees’ responses, 
which mostly point out to autonomy as a condition needed rather than actually 
existing in the evaluation. According to officials interviewed who refer to autonomy 
as something essential that it has been achieved over time, but definitely not 
independent from the executive branch, as one informant196 said, “autonomy is [only] 
the agencies’ decision to hire an external evaluator to evaluate programmes”. 
Moreover, they consider the SHCP necessary to lead evaluation and standardization 
due to its technical experience. One interviewee197 mentioned “control of the SHCP is 
important to operate evaluation, to following up recommendations by public 
organisations” and “if it (SHCP) was autonomous it should not has power over 
programmes to make changes…”  
 
This perception is contradictory to that expressed by politicians from the legislature. 
For them, autonomy is still something aspired to, preferably separately from the 
executive, as an interviewee198 suggested, “it should be the fourth branch power”. 
Indeed, another politician199 surveyed affirms that autonomy in Mexico is a “myth” 
and should be the exception not the rule as nowadays “they (autonomous agencies) 
should not longer be employees of the executive”. For these reasons, the evaluation 
                                                          
193
In 2015, according to the CONEVAL there were 235 social programmes. 
194
Figures are based on data provided by the SHCP in 2013, available at: www.transparenciapresupuestaria.gob.mx 
195
Official Journal, 10/02/2014. 
196
Interview #7. 15/march/2014. 
197
Interview #2. 25/february/2014. 
198
Interview #15.25/march/2014. 
199
Interview #17. 27/march/2014. 
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agency and agencies coordinating the policy evaluation have a minimum or low 
level of autonomy in all dimensions (policy, financial and legal) and consequently 
assigned a code “0” as annex 1 shows. 
 
Another perspective in the debate on autonomy is the value-neutral evaluator 
position outlined by Karlsson & Conner (2006: 232), who recommends keeping 
evaluation away from political influences.200 The aim of this position is to emphasize 
the autonomy of evaluation in relation to political institutions and powerful interests 
in society. In the end, politics is power, and power could be a source of corruption, 
which jeopardizes objectivity, impartiality, and rationality of facts. Under this 
approach, the relative independence and credibility of the evaluator should be 
located in the legislative branch or through an agency operating independently from 
the executive.  
 
The legislature is representative of constituencies’ demands and must be the oversight 
body of government’s (executive and judicial) actions. Furthermore, the focus on the 
legislature leaves aside the potential role of interest groups and organisations 
influencing public policy on behalf of constituencies such as the NGOs. Unlike political 
parties, these pressure groups have autonomy from the government “their work 
quietly, their activity is nonetheless pervasive in established democracies” (Hague & 
Harrop, 2004: 166). They are necessary, especially in activities related to budgeting, 
adopting a pragmatic view questioning what government does or proposing 
alternatives in a predictable way. Regarding results-based budgeting, they should 
operate as a society’s watchdog of the State’s activity.  
 
Since the PbR/SED has developed, some NGOs have been involved following the 
budget’s outputs. “Curul 501”, “Borde politico” and “Visión legislativa” represent such 
pluralism exerting strong influence over a responsive government (Hague & Harrop, 
2004: 177), helping to link the space between society and the State in matters of 
public expenditure,201 and representing a strong pressure where decisions are formed. 
Indeed, in recent years these NGOs have been upheld by the SHCP in order to deploy 
some pressure over Congress to use evaluation.  
 
Notwithstanding the relevance of autonomy by the agency performing evaluations 
and coordinating the rest of the public administration, it becomes necessary to exert 
some control and political power over the rest at least in contexts such as the Mexican. 
At this point, it is important to note that autonomy is considered as a proxy of 
leadership and power due to the complexity for measuring them separately, whereas 
control is the inverse of autonomy (Verhoest et al., 2004: 106), a scenario in which the 
government could take control of agency behaviour to influence its decisions. Thus, it 
is not enough having agency’s autonomy in regimes with hierarchical bureaucracies 
such as Mexico. This statement is similar to that pointed out by Cabrero et al. (2003), 
where public agencies are developed in a particular context, have their own patterns 
of interaction and power struggles, and certain traditions, myths and organisational 
routines arise within them, each one with different meaning.  
 
                                                          
200
In terms of the selection of the evaluator, funding, information given to the evaluator, scope or approach, methods, 
subject pool selection, instruments used, data analyses, interpretation of data, recommendations and information 
disseminated (Turpin, 1989: 55 cited in Karlsson & Conner, 2006: 232)  
201
For this, they developed a website called “Open Budget” (Presupuesto Abierto) to following up the budgeting 
process. Available at: http://www.presupuestoabierto.mx/ 
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For example, while policy makers on the executive consider evaluations of good 
quality and reliable, for politicians’ evaluations are perceived as being of dubious 
reliability because the executive coordinates them. Congress people interviewed (42% 
of the total) confirmed they did not consider evaluations trustworthy although these 
are performed by autonomous (external) evaluators e.g. academics, NGOs. 
Essentially, these are strong reasons to classify this factor at the end of the variables 
hindering the effectiveness of policy evaluation and for explaining evaluation use. In 
this sense, the assumption that credibility, objectivity, transparency and 
accountability of evaluation results will depend upon the extent to which the agency 
that coordinates evaluation is operationally independent from a hierarchical 
supervisory body is valid depending on where one sits.  
 
Furthermore, the effectiveness is more engaged to the political arenas where 
decision-makers, the intragovernmental relations, power and political control are 
determinant for success. Lastly, in 2015 there was a change on the way the budget 
was designed, and the executive proposed the zero-based budget for the FY 2016. If 
the Ministry of Finance (SHCP) wants to be innovative, the evaluation should be 
included as enacted by law (LFPRH) utilising the tool to support decision-making on 
allocation of public resources. However, the results of this budget will not be included 
in the analysis due to limitations of time. The analysis of institutional and political 
factors examined above takes the discussion to the need of a more detailed 
comparison of variables across countries to determine which factors are the most 
relevant and the circumstances surrounding the effectiveness of evaluation. 
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CHAPTER 6. The effectiveness of policy evaluation in Chile 
 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the analysis of the Chilean policy evaluation and its 
effectiveness. The methodology utilised for this purpose, which was already 
mentioned in previous chapters is based mainly on the federal level as well as it was 
in the chapter about Mexico. Here indeed, the strategy was developed by the central 
government and there is no evidence about whether municipalities are 
implementing some sort of evaluations at local level. The starting point is the 
explanation of the budgetary process and how the federal budget is made on the 
basis that evaluations are performed under the results-based budgeting as the core 
of policy evaluation.  
 
The second part describes in detail whether those programmes achieved effectiveness 
once they have been assessed based on whether [or not] changes are classified as 
amendments, status quo, learning process, cancelation or no data available. It is 
important to bear in mind that the revision is limited to the health sector 
programmes from 2007 till 2014 as explained in the methodology section in order to 
have the same point of comparison with those of Mexico. Both countries combine 
performance monitoring indicators and in-depth evaluations. One of the assumptions 
to be analysed in the following sections is that presumably the policy evaluation has 
a better performance when there is expertise in the field. For this, the discussion not 
only focuses on the results but also on the political factors directly related to the 
success or failure of evaluation, this is, its effectiveness.  
 
In this context, the study of the DIPRES (Hawkesworth et al., 2013: 7) between 2000-
09 found that 7% of evaluations led to the termination of programmes, while the 91% 
of those results led to some modifications such as the programme redesign, minor 
changes and reassignment of the programmes to other agencies (Arenas & Berner, 
2010: 69 cited in Hawkesworth et al., 2013: 7). Thus, the following sections will 
compare such results. Some references to the quality of evaluations are mentioned 
but not analysed. Alongside this, the review of budget discussion at Congress from 
2007 to 2014 is presented, mainly to verify whether those recommendations made as 
a result of evaluations are used for decision-making and such programme 
improvement could be addressed to evaluation.  
 
Lastly, this chapter will discuss the level of influence of each political/institutional 
factor such as intra governmental relations, quality of bureaucracy, level of 
democracy, policy evaluation framework and degree of autonomy in favour of 
effectiveness. Also, the chapter brings key aspects of the preceding chapter ‘Policy 
evaluation in Chile’ (historical perspective), which contribute to analyse such 
variables. The analysis is mixed with key data of informal interviews with politicians 
and officials202 to shed light on current practices of decision-making regarding the 
effectiveness of evaluation. Concerning this, the number of interviewees is low due to 
limited access to conduct them face to face. Some conclusions of this chapter are the 
noticeable period of time when bureaucracy led the policy evaluation to an effective 
process positioning the country operating a M&E system at the forefront of the 
international scenario. However, the results over time evidence some asymmetries of 
the institutional factors reviewed here jeopardizing this leading position.  
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The names of the people interviewed were changed in order to keep confidentially of personal data. 
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The budget process “Results-based Budgeting” 
To start the discussion, it is important to bear in mind that the health sector 
represents a major area of public resources inside the Chilean government. As 
mentioned in the methodology chapter, in 2013, this sector represented 7.5% of the 
total health expenditure as a share of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), whereas 
the media of the OECD countries was around 9.3%.203 In the Budget Law of the FY 
2015, the amount was of $6,128 millions of cl pesos equivalent to $9.7 millions of us 
dollars204 (including health agencies of the Army) representing approximately the 18% 
of the total budget ($34,788 millions of cl pesos equivalent to $55.4 millions usd). 
 
Indeed, the draft budget law 2014 states that of every two (Chilean) pesos of increase 
in the budget, one goes to the health sector,205 and during the budget law 2014 and 
2015, this sector represented the third largest source of the budget, which was less 
than the education and work sector (see DIPRES). These figures demonstrate the 
priority of the sector in the budget, which comprises the National System of Health 
Services and the Health Services to the Armed Forces. In terms of programmes, the 
sector offers a large number of services. However, in contrast to the Mexican case, in 
Chile there is no evidence about the total of programmes currently being operated 
by the government.206 
 
Regarding the budgetary process, it is important to explain how the federal budget is 
made in Chile because similarly to Mexico and other countries evaluation is linked to 
the results-based budgeting (see figure 9). In Chile, the MoF formulates the draft 
budget law in the period between July and September from the previous fiscal year 
and sends it to Congress to be enacted no later than September 30th. Once the draft 
budget arrives to Congress, it is revised by the Special Budget Committee207 and 
turned to the Lower Chamber (Chamber of Deputies). The preliminary version is sent 
to the Senate (Upper Chamber) for discussion and approval. Once both chambers 
approve it, this is passed to the executive and the president enacts it as the Budget 
“Law” by Constitution (art. 72). The promulgation of the draft by the president 
should not exceed 60 days from the moment when it first arrives to Congress.  
 
Regarding the results of evaluations of the so-called “public programmes” should 
feed the budgetary process inside the government in two ways. Firstly, as an input for 
the tailoring of the budget performed by the executive (MoF), process in which 
evaluations are needed to identify the performance of each public programmes and 
agencies to decide which of them needs more resources or at contrary, these could be 
reduced due to poor performance. Secondly, during the revision by Congress, who 
also have priorities in terms of citizenry demands and sector performance e.g. 
education, health, security sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
203
Health at a Glance 2013: OECD. 
204
On June 2015, the exchange rate was of $627.64 clpesos per $1 us dollar. 
205
Initiative of draft budget law 2013 of 30/09/2013. 
206
The number of programmes currently operated by the government was requested to the Ministry of Health (via 
transparency Law) However, the response (office letter no. 1606, 28/10/2014) referred to the website already 
reviewed, which does not show the exact amount of programmes. 
207
According to Congress Law (art. 19) both finances commission of low and upper Chamber integrate the committee; 
the former has 13 deputies included the president of the commission, while the latter has 5 deputies members.  
~ 110 ~ 
 
 
 
Figure 9 
Budget cycle in Chile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data from the DIPRES, author’s own elaboration. 
 
The effectiveness of evaluation in the health sector 
According to the budgetary process, between 2007 and 2014, there were 54 
programmes of the health sector in operation. During that time, 13 programmes had 
been assessed, that is to say, the 24% of programmes of the health sector were 
evaluated (see chart 3). Unlike in Mexico, in this case, each programme had 
performed only one evaluation from the different five types available. As shown in 
chart below, by looking up at the amendments in such programmes it is indicated 
that 4 of the 13 programmes evaluated took these results for further improvements 
on them. For instance, the programme tratamiento de la obesidad (treatment of 
obesity) under responsibility of the FONASA, Undersecretary of Public Health and 
Undersecretary of Healthcare Network had performed an evaluation of public 
programmes (EPG). This process resulted in 7 recommendations suggested by 
evaluators, 4 of them were implemented while 3 were not even mentioned in the 
report to following up results.  
 
Another examples of these amendments are the programmes comisión de medicina 
preventiva e invalidez (commission of preventive medicine and disability) and 
programa de prevención y control del VIH/SIDA (prevention and control of HIV/AIDS) 
both operated by the Undersecretary of Public Health. In the first case, the 
commission’s aim is to guarantee access (beneficiaries) to healthcare protection. In 
2008, a comprehensive spending review (ECG) was performed from which most (15) 
of the 21 recommendations suggested by evaluators were implemented. Whereas the 
HIV programme’s aim is to reduce morbidity, transmission, discrimination and 
mortality of diseases related to HIV-AIDS. Derived from the evaluation of public 
programmes (EPG) in 2010, there were implemented 10 of 12 recommendations 
proposed by evaluators. 
 
Continuing with the review of categories, from the 13 programmes assessed there are 
5 classified in the status quo. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, a 
programme is placed in the status quo category when recommendations taken for 
further improvement are less than 30% of the total suggested. For instance, the 
programme’s National Health Fund’s (FONASA), which aims at optimizing the 
health finances sector and reinforcing auditing activities, in 2011 performed a 
comprehensive spending review (ECG). The report issued by FONASA after 
evaluation does not mention specific actions as a result of 17 recommendations 
suggested by evaluators (see table 6 annexed).  
 
Discussion/approval 
Execution Evaluation 
Tailoring/formulation 
System of 
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Another example is the programme campaña de invierno (winter campaign), which 
until 2007 was run by the Undersecretary of Public Health but in 2008 was 
reallocated to the Undersecretary of Healthcare Networks within the same ministry. 
There was no evaluation performed in those years to evidence that such 
reorganisation was due to it. This means that policy-makers often made decisions 
without any support by objective data.   
 
Chart 3 
Effectiveness of evaluation in the Chilean health sector 2007-2014  
 
 
 
Source: data from the DIPRES. 
*Programmes selected for budgeting process belong either to the amendments or 
status quo categories. 
The classification of “no data” refers to those programmes in which there is no 
information available about them or any action taken by policy-makers. Thus, it is 
not possible to track any recommendation neither the evaluation. 
 
Regarding the elimination category, only the programme de apoyo al recién nacido 
(newborn health support) was canceled and merged into the programme de apoyo 
biopsicosocial (of bio psychosocial support) as result of evaluation.208 However, the 
latter programme was not included in the budget 2007-2014 (see table 6 annexed) 
and the former still had funds in the budget law 2014. The condition of this 
programme is similar to Zaltsman’s (2009: 460) interviewees of DIPRES who alluded 
that “political considerations make it usually very difficult to terminate programs or 
to cut down their budgets”, even in programmes with negative evaluations.  
 
A reason why termination of a programme/policy is rare209 might be due to the 
tendency of survival inherent in those agencies known as “dynamic conservatism”, in 
which, administrators act as “antitermination coalitions” to preserve organisational 
routines (de Leon, 1978 cited on Dahler-Larsen, 2000: 82) because they [evaluations] 
threaten the stability of administrators (Vedung, 1997 cited on Dahler-Larsen, 2000: 
84). Yet, de Leon adds that termination is always a political decision, which becomes 
more difficult when it refers to a comprehensive policy (sector) than a specific 
programme.  
 
                                                          
208
See Ministry of health’s response of the evaluation of public programme (EPG) in 2011. Available at: 
http://www.dipres.gob.cl/595/articles-76586_doc_pdf.pdf 
209
In his study-survey of 275 municipalities in Denmark about evaluation practices by external consultants, de Leon 
shows that adjustments of programmes are near to 80% whereas termination rates are extremely low (near 1%). 
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Moreover, the tracking of health sector programmes indicates that some were 
cancelled without evidence of the reasons of termination. For instance, the Programa 
de desarrollo indígena MIDEPLAN-BID (programme of indigenous development) 
and another classified as “others”, which belong to the National Health Fund 
(FONASA), only come into sight in the budget for two and three years respectively 
and silently disappeared afterwards. Other examples are the programmes Secretaría 
y administración general hacienda (finances administration) and Portal integrado de 
comercio exterior SICEX (international trade website) of the Institute of Public Health, 
which only operated during 2011. To sum up, from the total of 54 programmes of the 
health sector, 12 were cancelled during the period 2007-14 without any evaluation or 
supporting argument for the action taken. 
 
Concerning the total of programmes assessed, only the programme red de urgencia 
(emergency network) is classified as no data, which means there is no information of 
the programme operation, neither of its evaluation. According to the office letter of 
the DIPRES (see annex 3) in 2013, the programme run by the Undersecretary of 
Healthcare Networks should have performed an evaluation of organisational 
spending (or comprehensive spending review ‘EGI’). However, there is no such 
programme in the budget 2007-2014, neither data of evaluation results in the 
DIPRES’ webpage. In this, there is a lack of transparency by operators to mention 
either the reasons why evaluation had not been performed or to publicize its results.  
 
The following programmes are classified as in progress. In the first place, the three 
recommendations of the programme bono AUGE are still on the waiting list and 
despite the operators agreed with these suggestions and are working on them there is 
no evidence of action taken. These refer to the need of: i) improvement of the system 
to register recipients and patient queues; ii) improvement of mechanisms of 
coordination by interconnecting diverse health services (interagency coordination); 
and iii) improvement of the healthcare services educating recipients about the 
services provided. 
 
In the same situation is the programme training of medical specialists and 
subspecialists, which has six recommendations in the process to be implemented. 
These refer to: i) the identification of the gap between both programmes for better 
planning in the medium-term; ii) the redesign of the programme components; iii) the 
development of a mechanism to link supply to demand; iv) the development of a 
cost study of the programme; v) the strengthening of the monitoring and control 
mechanisms; and vi) the establishment of a division between roles and responsibilities 
of both programmes. The agency only issued the evaluation report but there is no 
evidence about any action taken by operators. 
 
Besides these significant results in the effectiveness of evaluation, there are some 
inconsistencies between programmes evaluated and those pointed out in the budget. 
For instance, the programmes tratamiento de la obesidad (treatment of obesity), 
comisión de medicina preventiva e invalidez (commission of preventive medicine and 
disability), compras a privados: programa prestaciones valoradas (purchase from 
private sector), programa de formación de especialistas y subespecialistas (training of 
medical specialists and subspecialist) and programa de prevención y control del VIH 
sida (prevention and control of VIH) have developed an evaluation. However, none 
of them are classified in the budget as a specific programme. 
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Moreover, it is difficult to track variations on programmes due to evaluations 
because there is no such level of disaggregation in the budget. Unlike Mexico, in Chile 
it is not possible to compare the draft budget – per programme – prepared by the 
executive and changes made by Congress before being approved. This is similar to 
Zaltsman’s (2009: 461) statement, 
And, according to most of the interviewees, such recommendations exert great influence on 
the president’s budget bill and, thereby, on the national budget law as well. Nevertheless, 
none of these effects could be detected in the agencies’ budget documents. 
 
The fact that the budget is quite aggregate in terms of programmes,210  seldom 
provides strong arguments for establishing causal links between branches of 
government and institutional arrangements (formal and informal) such as power, 
party systems or control over budget. Some examples of these inconsistencies can be 
found in the programmes coordinated by the health care centers, which in some cases 
they are not the same than those established in the budget as it was previously 
mentioned. According to the formal request made through the transparency Law to 
the health care center of the region of Maule of the total of programmes coordinated 
by it, this argued of having 31 programmes (see annex 5) ordered by the Ministry of 
Health. From this total, 23 are different from those stated in the budget such as the 
programmes of solid residues (residential, hazardous and non-hazardous), potable 
water, dental health, and prevention of tuberculosis, of cardiovascular disease, of 
cancer, among others.  
 
Likewise, in the health care center of Osorno 20 of a total of 27 programmes are 
different from those mentioned in the budget (see annex 6). The reason for this might 
be that there are programmes operated only at the local level (state and 
municipalities). Furthermore, it was requested to the Ministry of Health – via 
transparency Law – about how many and which are the programmes comprised in 
the health sector and the amount of money spent by DIPRES to coordinate such 
evaluations. However, during the time this study was taking place it had not replied 
yet. Apart from the budgetary discussion and regarding the ex-ante evaluation, 
there is no data (results) about them at least in the health sector, in spite of a DIPRES’ 
top official presented some results during the annual meeting in the OECD,211 saying 
that around 88 of non-social programmes have performed an ex-ante evaluation 
during 2008-2013. Thus, the focus of this type of evaluation might be of the non-
social programmes but it is not clearly defined in the methodology.  
 
Differences could be also found in the programme operational contingencies, which is 
sui generis in terms of operation. The Undersecretary of Public Health operated this 
programme only during 2007. Nevertheless simultaneously, from 2007 to 2014 it 
became visible as part of other programmes such as atención primaria (primary 
healthcare), prestaciones valoradas (value benefits) and prestaciones institucionales 
(organisational benefits) operated by the FONASA, a public agency that operates 
separately from such undersecretary.  
 
However, during the same period from 2007 to 2014, this programme also appears 
separately and directly operated by the ministry of health. This means, it belongs to 
other programmes including these previously mentioned and nine more such as 
                                                          
210
In the budget law, most of the programmes are grouped and these are not labeled in sub-programmes. 
211
See the 9th annual meeting of the OECD Senior Budget Officials in 2013 and the presentation by Ms. Paula 
Darville, Head of Management Control Division in the Ministry of Finance. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/9thannualmeetingoftheoecdseniorbudgetofficialsnetworkonperformanceandresult
sberlin7-8november2013.htm 
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subsidios de reposo maternal y cuidado del niño (subsidies of maternity and childcare) 
and subsidios de enfermedad y medicina curativa (subsidies of preventive medicine 
and disease). These programmes varied each year from 2007 to 2014 or were not 
included in the budget each year. Thus, discrepancies on data complicate the task of 
tracking results because the responsibility of the programme is not clearly defined.  
 
Lastly, there are no programmes classified in the status of learning. The reasons might 
be the same pointed out in the methodology chapter such as the difficulty to 
measure them or the few incentives to encourage its use. Furthermore, some 
weaknesses to investigate the effectiveness of evaluation are related to the 
programme structure. The budget law does not clarify which programmes are 
operating separately, instead they are all integrated into few of them, which make 
the task of analyse each programme tougher. In order to distinguish the effects of 
each programme, these will be narrowly defined rather than classified as budgetary 
programmes similar to the budgetary programme structure in Mexico. This 
affirmation agrees to the OECD’s report (Hawkesworth et al., 2013: 9), which states 
that the government implemented a reform in 2011 to define a budgetary 
programme and designing sub-programmes. However, the gap in the classification of 
programmes still prevails. 
 
The effectiveness of evaluation in the Results-based Budgeting 
In this context, attaining successful policy evaluation means the effectiveness for 
taking up results of evaluations and performance indicators for the budgetary cycle 
every year and change in the policy sector. In general, the effectiveness has 
contradictory perceptions regarding the budget process. On the one hand, the study 
of the World Bank (Rojas et al., 2005: 71) mentions that evaluation is present at 
Congress during the budgetary process. Officials running the programmes claim those 
evaluations’ results are considered either for the preparation of budget or for the 
decision-making of sector policies, in the 60% and 50%, respectively.  
 
On the other hand, the same study highlights that the use of evaluations by Congress 
is limited in practice (Rojas et al., 2005: 53), which blocks the budgetary process cycle 
in some way, especially the decisions based on objective criteria that Congress should 
made such as to validate or reject the budget allocated to public programmes or 
sector policies by the executive. At the end, there are no programmes classified in the 
status of budgeting. That is to say, there is no evidence during the budgetary 
discussion and the allocation of financial resources of any implication of a policy or 
programme, neither of changes in the policy health sector due to evaluations made 
either by the executive or the legislature. Thus, the analysis of budget allocations due 
to evaluations is constrained to the resources assigned to the health sector as follows: 
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Table 7 
Financial resources of the Chilean health sector 
 
Year Draft budget Budget approved Comments 
2007 $1,145,997,836.00 $2,219,272,236.00  
2008 $1,329,054,588.00 $2,531,153,989.00  
2009 $1,546,233,506.00 $2,971,985,285.00  
2010 $1,915,181,367.00 $3,331,429,547.00  
2011 $2,381,133,468.00 $3,921,803,728.00  
2012 $4,293,285,000.00 $4,301,644,923.00 
The Chamber of deputies, legislature 359, session no. 89 of 
04/10/2011 proposed the amount of money pointed in the draft 
budget. However, in other session the Chamber increased the 
amount to $4,301,644,923.00, and during the last session of the 
Chamber of deputies, legislature 359, session no. 116 of 28/11/2011, 
$2,580,534,544.00 were approved There is no clue of the reasons 
of such decrease in the budget. 
2013 $2,748,069,959.00 $4,713,209,055.00 
In other session, the Chamber of deputies increased the draft 
budget to $7,852,675,026.00 (Special report of budget account 
16 of the health sector of the draft budget law 2013) but at the 
end, the total of resources approved was of $4,713,209,055.00 
2014 $3,039,310,294.00 $5,217,428,088.00  
 
Source: Health sector budget, Ministry of Health, author’s own elaboration. 
 
Concerning this sector, the review of budget discussion at Congress provides some 
examples of these assumptions. In the draft budget law 2007 sent by the executive to 
Congress, 212  the former requested an increase on budget to this sector of 18.8% 
compared to the previous year. However, it did not mention the results of the sector 
to support the petition, notwithstanding, several deputies rejected the draft.213 In 
those budget discussions, a deputy 214  pointed out that evaluations were not 
considered in the draft and it lacked of mechanisms of transparency and 
accountability. Additionally, another deputy215 argued there were 400 suggestions 
proposed by Congress to improve the mechanisms of evaluation and control, which 
have not been implemented yet.  
 
In the draft budget law 2008, a deputy216 warned out about the need to make the 
budget process more transparent and to increase the number of evaluations of social 
programmes, “Indeed, there are programmes which results are negative, even 
though they are still operating”. Another example was found in the draft budget law 
2009, in which the Special Budget Joint Committee [Comisión Especial Mixta de 
Presupuestos] was committed to reinforce evaluations but did not mention the 
strategy to do it. In those sessions, a deputy argued that the health committee does 
not have criteria to assess, lacks of systems to analyze data and evaluation 
mechanisms to follow-up evaluation results.217 Certainly, in the draft budget law 2010 
extra resources were given to improve the evaluation and management systems.218  
 
In the same year, the Special Budget Committee (see art. 19 of Congress Law) was 
formally constituted – despite having been operated time before – to revise and 
                                                          
212
Chamber of deputies, legislature 354, session no. 97 of 14/11/2006. 
213
At the end of the budgetary cycle 2007 the initial amount of health sector budget was approved $1,145,997,836.00 
214
The deputy Becker a party member of “Alianza por Chile” in the Chamber of deputies, legislature 354, session no. 
97 of 14/11/2006. 
215
The deputy Cardemil of the Chamber of deputies, legislature 354, session no. 97 of 14/11/2006. 
216
The deputy Delmastro in the Chamber of deputies, legislature 355, session no. 100 of 13/11/2007. 
217
The deputy Melero in the Chamber of deputies, legislature 356, session no. 105 of 19/11/2008 and 20/11/2008. 
218
Special report of budget account 16 of the health sector of the draft budget law 2010. 
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inform about these agreements regarding the budget. Over time, it seems that 
evaluation became more relevant for Congress people, at least in the political 
discourse.  
 
Another key point took place in the draft budget law 2012,219 the chief officer of the 
Undersecretary of Health Networks pointed out that results of evaluations were 
important for decision-making regarding allocation of the health care centers. 
Apparently, the evaluation as policy was boosted in the budget decree and the 
discussion emphasizes the fact that evaluation occurred in specific administrative 
process such as the performance evaluation of officials or the environmental impact 
evaluation (system). However, the review of budget discussion did not mention any 
of those evaluations, which had already been performed by external evaluators.220  
 
In 2014, the evaluation took a positive turn and those (evaluations) promoted by the 
DIPRES were used in the budget discussion as a tool for decision-making in different 
areas than the health sector. For example, the Budget Subcommittee’s 221  report 
indicates that the programme Bonificación a la contratación de mano de obra 
(Bonus for workforce hiring) run by the Ministry of Work had unsatisfactory results 
and overlapped to another programme Servicio Nacional de Capacitación y Empleo 
(National Service for Training and Employment ‘SENCE’). Thus, the former was 
cancelled in 2013 and part of its resources will be reallocated via the SENCE. Another 
example is located in the social sector. A deputy222 requested to the Ministry of Social 
Development a report of the evaluation of policies and programmes’ performance 
including their impact in the budgetary process for better decision-making.  
 
One more case was the programme de coordinación reforma judicial (judicial reform 
coordination), for which, the Budget Committee 223  claimed that its continuation 
during 2014 would have depended upon the results by the impact evaluation to 
prove a satisfactory performance but there is not results about actions taken yet. 
However, concerning the health sector there was no mention about any changes due 
to evaluation results. Certainly, as previously shown in table 7 and similar to the 
Mexican case, there is a trend to increase public resources every year with no 
implications of the evaluation as a tool to support decision-making process.  
 
What explain the effectiveness in policy evaluation? 
To explain variation of the dependent variables within this country, the analysis will 
focus on the institutional (political) factors placed in order of their relevance 
influencing effectiveness, including interviews of those key informants. However, it is 
important to point out that the sample obtained is smaller compared to the Mexican 
chapter due to external factors explained in the methodology chapter. Additionally, 
relevant facts and features from a historical perspective inducing or threatening the 
aim of evaluation are also included. Similarly to Mexico, the main reason to keep a 
separate chapter of the variables per country is due to the extensive analysis of data 
needed to explain such variations. However, the comparative study across the 
Mexican and Chilean policies is done in the following chapter. 
                                                          
219
Special report of budget account 16 of the health sector of the draft budget law 2012. 
220
Chamber of deputies, legislature 359, session no. 117 of 29/11/2011. 
221
Report of the third Special Budget Joint Subcommittee of the account 15 of the Work Ministry; bulletin no. 9.117-05, 
07/10/2013. 
222
The deputy Silva in the budget discussion, see report of the first Special Budget Subcommittee of the account 21 of 
the Social Development Ministry; bulletin no. 9.117-05, 18/11/2013. 
223
Report of the Special Budget Joint Committee of the draft budget law 2014; bulletin no. 9.117-05, 25/11/2013. 
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Intra-Governmental Relations (IGR) 
The first factor has three sub-variables: 
i) Forms of coordination: strong, weak or minimum. 
ii) Information: availability of data, timing, reliability and quality. 
iii) Economic resources to support policy evaluation: even or uneven distribution. 
 
To start the analysis, it is important to say that regarding the evaluation at 
intragovernmental level, both the judicial and legislative branches are excluded to 
perform any evaluation (e.g. object under evaluation), consequently to be 
accountable of their performance. In general, the first assumption is that forms of 
coordination prevailing in the Chilean administration are weak and coded “0” 
because the outcome is not existent. This feature is recognized as the opportunistic 
approach or exchange noted by Kaufmann et al. (1985: 801), where the asymmetry 
of roles prevailed between principals and agents, superiors and subordinates, the 
rulers and the ruled as explained in the methodology.  
 
These asymmetries along with particular interests and values in budgeting 
negotiation jeopardize optimal relations boosting informal relations between those 
coordinators of policy evaluation (principal) and users (agent) such as policy 
implementers (government agencies), and NGOs. An example of this economic 
theory of principal-agent (Ross, 1973)224 was during the stage of modernization of the 
first democratic regime of Aylwin. In those days, it seemed that evaluation was strong 
and the relation between the executive and legislative was based on mutual 
consensus both acting as coordinators. Indeed, officials interviewed 225  assure that 
relations between coordinators and operators of programmes and/or Congress are 
effective in terms of coordination.  
 
In 1996, the Chilean Congress realized the importance to establish an evaluation 
system by law similar to other countries such as the National Audit Office in the 
United Kingdom or the General Account Office “GAO” in the United States of 
America. But it was until 2002, when deputies approved the creation of the 
Department of Evaluation of Law226 with the aim to assess regulations enacted by 
Congress creating a network of non-governmental organisations interested on 
evaluation topics.227 Yet beyond their mutual consensus, a counterargument by Tello 
(2011: 248-51) indicates that the lack of intragovernmental coordination was one of 
the major issues to operate such network. Similarly to Aylwin’s administration 1990-
94, the parliament along with the political sphere were excluded of the 
modernisation process accomplished by the executive, reason to call this process as 
extra-parliamentary. 
 
While both branches started from very similar points, the coordination took separate 
pathways after the authoritarian regime stepped down from power. The executive 
began implementing minor management changes – with the same results – in the 
administration such as the goals system and other performance measures as it was 
explained in the first section. Mainly, the evaluation was developed in Frei’s 
administration 1994-2000 thanks to the leadership of a small group of expert officials 
                                                          
224
See methodology chapter for principal-agent theory. 
225
Interviewees #20, 21, 22 and 23. 
226
Proyecto de acuerdo (draft of agreement) no. 69 (see Memoria anual 2010-11 of the Chilean Congress). 
227
Regardless, many evaluations were performed in the meantime between 1995 and 2002 some coordinated by the 
DIPRES and others by the Undersecretary for Social Evaluation (Subsecretaría de Evaluación Social) in the Ministry 
for Social Development (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social). 
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who introduced the modernisation agenda in the governmental routine but without 
any convergence with the legislature.  
 
Another example of these asymmetries took place inside the executive. During the 
presidency of Lagos 2000-06 some clashes between the MINSEGPRES and DIPRES 
arose. In spite of the fact that both agencies had a role coordinating similar 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, as it was explained in the historical section, 
the former attempted to keep control of the Ministry’s Goal System (re-launched in 
2000 as the System for Monitoring Government Programming), while the latter ran 
the SECG.  
 
In the end, agencies followed DIPRES’ requirements and such outcome was or “might” 
have been due to its power in terms of control of the budget. As one MINSEGPRES’ 
official interviewed by Dussauge (2013: 152) affirmed, “the Finance’s dictatorship” 
prevailed, even over the ministry supported by the presidency. The enhancement of 
evaluation mechanisms and availability of data do not mean decision-makers will 
take these results for further improvements. At least not at Congress, where the 
analysis of budgetary process indicates that evaluation is present but not as a 
mechanism for supporting decisions regarding budget in the health sector despite 
some evidence of good results in other areas such as the social or work sectors. 
Although it [Congress] agrees about the quality and timely nature of data, it does 
not seem to use it (Rojas et al., 2005: 53). At least until 2014, the evaluation was only 
in the rhetoric during the budgetary process as explained in the last section.  
 
The second sub-variable is the availability of information (evaluation) in time for the 
planning process of the following year and the budgetary process. In some cases data 
is not available for such process. According to the paper “Evaluación de programas e 
indicadores de desempeño” (Evaluation of programmes’ and performance indicators) 
by DIPRES (2001), the indicators resulting from the evaluation of public programmes 
(EPG)228 and the comprehensive management report (BGI) are considered for the 
budgetary process, specifically in the draft budget. The DIPRES’ paper argues that 
data was used for this purpose; however, there is no evidence to affirm this currently 
occurs.  
 
Of 13 programmes of the health sector assessed, more than a half have performed an 
evaluation of this type (EPG) and should be considered for decision-making. 
However, the review of these 7 programmes assessed shows that 3 of them have not 
informed [yet] 229  in the report to following up results about changes in the 
programmes resulting from evaluation. Thus, this valuable data to formulate the 
budget based on the sector performance did not use it due to its availability and 
coded “0”. This means, data is out of time when it is needed for the tailoring budget 
process in the following year.  
 
The last sub-variable is related to the economic resources to support policy 
evaluation. According to the DIPRES presumably resources are those necessary to 
fulfil evaluation requirements. For this, the World Bank’s study (Rojas et al., 2005: 82) 
agrees that the Chilean evaluation system has a low cost compared to other 
                                                          
228
For this purpose, the EPG has an Interministerial Committee integrated by the Ministry for the Presidency’s General 
Secretariat (MINSEGPRES), Ministry of Cooperation and Planning (MIDEPLAN) and the Ministry of Finance through 
the Budget Office (DIPRES) to coordinate and assure evaluations have been performed. But the latter is responsible 
of the methodologies, provision of resources and reception of evaluation reports, as well to their inclusion in the 
budgetary process.  
229
At the time this thesis took place. 
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countries such as Australia or Canada.230 The examination of resources provided for 
implementing evaluation across public administration has shown these are directly 
administrated by the DIPRES, keeping in mind that evaluations of public 
programmes (EPG) is the most frequent compared to other types of evaluation. The 
table below provides in detail a comparison of resources given for such purposes.  
 
Chart 4 
Resources provided to evaluations across the Chilean public administration 
 
 
 
         Source: Budget Office’s budget (DIPRES), Ministry of Finance, author’s own elaboration. 
 
Regarding these results, and despite there is no data available from the EPG from 
2007 to 2009, there is an incremental trend on resources, especially for the EPG – its 
subsistence might be due to being the one used for the budgetary process –. 
Conversely, there is an important reduction observable in 2013 and 2014 to the set of 
EI, EPN and ECG’s evaluations. This agrees with the fact noted in the policy 
evaluation framework chapter about not having data since 2011 of any of these 
health sector evaluations (EI, EPN and ECG) performed. In the same period reviewed, 
resources for implementing other evaluations (impact, new programmes and 
comprehensive spending review) had an important increment from 2009, the double 
if 2007 and 2009 are compared. 
 
Although, at the beginning an even distribution of public resources ensured operation 
of the policy evaluation, there was a reversible tendency from 2013 and 2014, when 
resources dropped drastically to $870,169.00 Chilean pesos in 2014 (see table 8). An 
increase or decrease of public resources in any area, programme or sector 
corresponding either to the support or lack of interest by policy-makers and 
politicians in the programme referred. Thus, this uneven distribution of resources over 
time is equivalent to a code “0”. Regarding resources granted to the DIPRES as 
coordinator of evaluation, there is no data in the budget to make assumptions and 
there is still not an official response by DIPRES. 
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Indeed, in 2004 the DIPRES developed an indicator to measure the cost-effectiveness of the system “Percentage of 
budget assessed versus budget to be assessed”, see DIPRES. 
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Table 8 
Comparison of resources to perform evaluations 
 
Year Budget executed for 
EPG 
Budget executed for other 
evaluations 
2007 No data $536,211.00 
2008 No data $643,711.00 
2009 No data $1,056,383.00 
2010 $195,855.00 $1,039,688.00 
2011 $202,318.00 $1,033,000.00 
2012 $223,076.00 $1,213,652.00 
2013 $296,352.00 $1,008,420.00 
2014 $272,924.00 $870,169.00 
 
                                   Source: Budget Office’s budget (DIPRES), Ministry of Finance, author’s own elaboration. 
 
Following this, the reduction of resources is not congruent with the intention of the 
current administration to create the National Evaluation Office to evaluate every 
year 25% of the programmes. This means, by 2018 at the end of present 
administration, the total of programmes should be evaluated (see the government 
programme 2014-2018). 231  Thus, distribution of resources reflects the degree of 
support for the policy evaluation, which consequently affects its effectiveness.  
 
In principle, the experience across countries (see OECD DEReC) 232  indicates that 
evaluation needs some leading (O’Toole, 2007: 149) in terms of agency (ies), strategy 
and actors to keep it as the centre of attention over all the public administration’s 
issues. This is particularly so when the task is handling a common programme that 
involves operations across organisational [intra or inter] lines (O’Toole, 2007: 143). The 
evidence confirms the less support (including budget) to evaluation from those who 
are leading, the less commitment from those evaluated for taking-up 
recommendations.  
 
Quality of bureaucracy 
To measure the second variable the following sources are utilised: 
i)  Government effectiveness (The Worldwide Governance Indicators ‘WGI’) 
ii)Evaluation of staff unit in the Chilean government: background, skills, experience 
through interviews. 
 
To start the analysis, it is relevant to bear in mind that for achieving the effectiveness 
of evaluation it is essential that those coordinators and implementers have the skills 
required to lead the strategy, as well as the know-how and technical knowledge to 
fulfil the needs of the evaluation and monitoring systems, data analysis and decision-
making process (see methodology chapter). Thus, the quality of bureaucracy and the 
ability of the government to implement a proper civil service guarantee effectiveness 
in great extent. For example, during the 70s, a considerable number of people went 
out to prestigious universities in the USA or Europe to undertake postgraduate 
studies (Bardon et al., 1985: 1-2).233 Eventually, this will contribute to specialization of 
the high-bureaucracy in political studies for greater management of the public 
                                                          
231
http://www.gob.cl/programa-de-gobierno/ 
232
http://www.oecd.org/derec/ 
233
Indeed, as long as many people studied out the country as those international universities sent academics for 
teaching in the most important universities of Chile e.g. the Universidad de Chile and the Universidad Católica de 
Santiago. 
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administration and to empower a group of academics, who have influenced the 
political debate since the decade of the 1970.  
 
A fact emerged from the diagnostic of the situation in Chile shows that the 
bureaucracy was mistreated for a long time, being characterized by unfit officials for 
positions required and poor salaries gradually reduced (Waissbluth, 2005: 14). The 
salaries of the public sector were lower compared to the private sector for a long time 
(see chart 5). Remunerations dropped drastically during the military regime and 
later on in the 80s along with the State capability to operate the sector (Marcel, 
2002). These eventually facilitated the rise of inefficient bureaucratic structures such 
as the trade unions in the education and health sectors, with a damaged reputation 
perceived by the society. 
 
Chart 5 
Remunerations (real) in the Chilean economy and public sector 1978-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      Public sector         Real index of remunerations 
                      Source: Marcel, 2002. Index 1978= 100 
 
At this point it is important to refer to salaries as a necessary condition for the 
improvement of the quality of bureaucracy, only to the extent that these salaries are 
linked to the capacity of the workforce to offer better services and for better 
decision-making. Thus, the new deal law (further explained) along with fair and 
worthy wages implemented in the last years contributed to improve the quality of 
the Chilean bureaucracy. Waissbluth (2005: 6) even says that the monthly nominal 
salary in Chile has increased from $950 USD in 1987 to $1900 USD in 2003, which 
means the double in almost two decades. Indeed, Marcel (2002: 259) claims during 
those decades, salaries had recovered in around 70%. Certainly, in the 90s, the PMG 
was implemented with the aim – among others – to improve their salaries linking 
remunerations with the improvement of utilities and services (Arenas & Berner, 2010: 
75, Zaltsman, 2009: 454, 459), with the consequent enhancement of public sector and 
officials’ compensations.  
 
The amount per year when the programme started was of 3% and 1.5% of 
remunerations to officials on the extent that the agency had accomplished 90% or 
less of the 90% of organisational goals, respectively (law no. 19.553). Eventually, the 
law no. 20.212 of 2007 modified the percentage up to 7.6% (see table 9). The latter 
authors add that after ten years since this programme was launched it has been 
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consolidated as a mechanism to articulate the human resources policy, 
remunerations and public management improvement. 
 
Table 9 
Evolution of incentives in Chile 1998-2010 through the PMG 
 
 
 
     Source: DIPRES, 2014 
 
A third fact took place after the crisis of corruption mentioned in the first section 
during the presidency of Lagos (2000-06). The Civil Service Office was created 
through the Law no. 19.882 of Senior Public Executive 234  [Ley de Alta Dirección 
Pública] enacted in 2003 (see Figueroa et al., 2011, Guzmán, 2005), which eventually 
helped to enforce the quality of bureaucracy. All the above circumstances could 
explain to some extent the increase interest for boosting the evaluation in Chile, 
mainly after the 90s, where public administrations were strengthened thanks to the 
administrative reforms carried out by the new democratic regimes. The results from 
the four interviews show these officials operating the PbR have a master degree and 
up to 15 years of experience working either in the public service or evaluation 
activities.   
 
For Waissbluth (2005: 10-11) the severe crisis of the public sector, which occurred in 
this century under the administration of Lagos 2000-06, brings up the opportunity 
for an agreement between the government and the opposition to implement many 
reforms including the ley del Nuevo Trato (New Deal law) to define the selection 
process for public officials.  
 
Table 10 
Government effectiveness (quality of bureaucracy) in Chile 
 
Country/year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
CHILE 87 84 85 87 86 86 86 84 
Mexico 59 61 60 60 63 63 63 61 
 
Source: Data from the World Bank (worldwide governance indicators WGI). 
 
Regarding the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI),235 in general the country was 
placed in the 75th and 90th percentile range over the period of 2013, whereas the 
result of the indicator government effectiveness, which measures the quality of the 
civil service amongst others, was of 86 in the scale of 0 to 100. As shown above, the 
quality of bureaucracy is present and coded “1” due to results of the country are 
above 50. 
 
This far, actions taken to boost the quality of the bureaucracy are currently 
addressed to the executive. Bureaucracy expertise plays an important role. During 
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Chilean National Congress Library, 11 of June 2003. 
235
The Worldwide Governance Indicators measure six broad dimensions of governance through six percentile ranges 
in the scale 0-100
th
 of 215 countries over the period 1996-2013, however, here is only included 2013 (see 
methodology chapter). 
 Goal 1998-2003 2004 2007 2008 2009 2010 
90-100% 3.0% 5.0% 5.7% 6.3% 7.0% 7.6% 
75-89% 1.5% 2.5% 2.9% 3.2% 3.5% 3.8% 
< 75% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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Frei’s administration (1994-2000), the officials’ educational background was from 
prestigious universities and expertise in the private sector, thus, their political capital 
was decisive in dealing with politicians for the State’s modernization (Figueroa et al., 
2011: 84).236  
 
This group was lead by Mario Marcel 237  a well-recognized leader with a top-
educational background, whose role as budget director and principal actor inside the 
DIPRES (Armijo, 2002, Figueroa et al., 2011, Guzmán, 2005, Tello, 2011, Waissbluth, 
2005) enabled him to carrying out the modernization agenda across the public 
administration. Indeed, in his preliminary paper delivered to the CLAD, Waissbluth 
(2005: 12-3) affirms that thanks to those “intrapreneurs gerenciales” (executive 
entrepreneurs) inside the DIPRES and the Ministry for the Presidency’s General 
Secretariat ‘MINSEGPRES’ in the 90s, whose role was known as the “reformers engine” 
of the modernization reform, helped to run it less slowly than it was. 
 
However, the decision to make effective the evaluation in a systemic way is not only 
made by the side of the executive, it also depends upon the legislature. Thus, the 
quality of the politicians at Congress is fundamental to perform their responsibilities 
e.g. to improve sector policies and the budgetary process. In this sense, experienced 
politicians are essential to pursue the effectiveness of evaluation. Nevertheless as 
Armijo (2002) argues, in those years, the legislature did not tackle modernization 
reforms due to low impact of the issue. Also due to lack of experienced cadres, as this 
author suggests most of the politicians, who remained at Congress after the military 
regime, came to this new era of governance without any knowledge about 
modernization reforms and how to improve the way budget has been tailored and 
allocated. 238  Thus, since the last two decades the executive has led the 
implementation of policy evaluation and carried it out across public agencies and the 
legislative. These asymmetries in the quality of bureaucracy of branches are might be 
the reason of the gap in the effectiveness. 
 
In the end, the taking-up of recommendations has been influenced “slightly” 
positively by the bureaucracy expertise, despite Congress did not make effective use 
of evaluations for a long time. The review of the budgetary process shows that in 
recent years the legislative agenda has been marginally influenced by bureaucracy 
(executive), highlighting the need of implementing the results-based budgeting 
without relevant results. In Carpenter’s (2010: 15-16) study of power inside the 
pharmaceutical regulation this facet is denoted as the “gatekeeping power”, which 
becomes visible by highlighting the importance of using evaluation results in the 
budgetary process. For this author, power appears in the ability of those who hold it 
to define what sort of problems, debates and agenda should be structured, 
…power exists not only in broad formal authority to direct the behaviour of others 
(directive power) but also in appearances that are less obvious: the ability to define what 
sorts of problems, debates, and agendas structure human activity (gatekeeping power), 
and the ability to shape the content and structure of human cognition itself (conceptual 
power). (Carpenter, 2010: 15) 
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These authors cite Domínguez (1997) to refer to such experienced executives as the ¨tecnopol¨.  
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In his presentation “La dirección de presupuestos avances 2000-2005 y desafíos futuros” in 2006, Marcel argues 
that in the beginnings of the 90s, the DIPRES had 148 officials (75 with degree and 2 postgraduates) and one 
decade later this number increased to 205 officials (140 with degree and 20 postgraduates) (Marcel, 2006). In the 
90s, in general, the proportion of officials working in the Chilean public sector in relation with the workforce of the 
country was of 5.4% (Marcel, 2002: 229), whereas compared to Mexico for the same period was of 11.5% (Rojas, 
2006: 319). 
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The influence of other external factors such as the political environment where evaluation was implemented in the 
90s was not favourable because there was no consensus between the legislative, executive and citizenry.  
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This means, in the day-to-day routine, the bureaucracy shapes and performs policies 
or programmes, and field implementers or policy makers have the opportunity to 
articulate the intended policy as it was enacted by regulations (law, bill, and act) 
into tangible outcomes for society. They have the power to put it [evaluation] in 
action. So, even at this level, on the extent they have power as these executive 
entrepreneurs mentioned above had, they could influence the agenda in favour of 
the evaluation. In regimes like the Chilean, the political support needed to spread 
policies across the public administration could be found at the executive, mainly 
because this branch is backed up by the power of the president and because there 
had been results despite misutilisation by Congress.  
 
Then the capacity of the bureaucracy is relatively strong in terms of enforcing the 
effectiveness of policy evaluation, and it even seems like disregarding the relationship 
with Congress. In the meantime, the legislature has limited its participation as a user 
of data of these results instead of coordinator and decision-maker. Based on the 
latter, it is assumed that effectiveness depends more on to the commitment and 
strong support from the executive rather than on the legislative to exert pressure over 
the rest – public administration – for taking-up actions as result of evaluations. 
 
Level of democracy 
To analyse this indicator, the index developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU), which depends upon the characteristics of the country and could be classified 
into the four categories such as an authoritarian regime, hybrid, flawed or full 
democracy. Of 167 countries of the index, Chile is placed in number 32 of the ranking 
with an overall score of 7.8, which classifies the country as a flawed democracy. 
However, this indicator is coded “0” and consider as an outcome absent. For Heady 
(2000: 516), the connection between these political regimes explains the variation of 
bureaucracies as well. Some assumptions come up such as the fact that Chile went 
through over decades of military regime, which pushed those administrations to 
establish democracy during the 90’s, mainly to focus on assuring minimum standards 
of governance (Figueroa et al., 2011: 71) in order to close this chapter of the history.  
 
Definitely, there is a strong connection between democratic governments and 
effectiveness. Interestingly to say it does not mean that there were not any attempts 
to establish evaluation in Chile before, especially in the previous years of the 
transitional administrations to democracy. As it was previously affirmed, evaluation 
emerged under diverse circumstances and non-democratic governments as well. The 
evolution of evaluation across time shows that effectiveness mostly consolidates into 
democratic environment. For example, after the fall of the military regime and 
despite Aylwin’s presidency (1990-4) emerged from democratic elections, key actors 
e.g. Congress people remained from authoritarianism. Therefore, this might be the 
reason why institutions had the less enhancements and evaluation was rarely 
mentioned.  
 
However, it is possible to find evidence in the political discourse since the democratic 
governments came up to the power. For example, the need of a system of checks 
and balances (Arenas & Berner, 2010, DIPRES, 2005), might be as a result of citizens’ 
request to reduce inequalities. However, regarding society participation, the 
citizenry’s claim has been modest in terms of a system of checks and balance 
(evaluation). Indeed, the Chilean’s society was more concerned about the 
transformation of government in terms of authoritarianism, human rights and 
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freedom. Instead of this, the interest to reinforce democracy (evaluation) arose inside 
the government’s agenda.  
 
The fact the modernization of public management has taken place in most of the 
advanced democracies gives insight that these conditions are necessary but not 
determinant for building the capacity of the State. An example was during the 
Pinochet’s government where the executive led a transformation of the State 
through the downsizing of a number of state enterprises. However, the major 
attempts occurred when this military regime was over. In fact, the PMGP 239 
(including evaluation) was boosted by the government of Frei (1994-2000) as a 
necessary tool for economic development and changing the State’s machinery, not 
only for getting back the democracy (Figueroa et al., 2011: 71-2), even for the 
enrichment of public management. For these authors, the latter joint of governments 
(authoritarian and democratic) influenced political and management decisions, 
which came up with concepts such as efficiency, efficacy, quality, evaluation and 
transparency. Eventually, it will help to the stability of the political system, 
governance and consolidation of the Chilean’s democracy. 
 
Policy evaluation framework 
The variable to measure the balance between design and operationalization and 
how these impact the effectiveness of evaluation is divided in two variables with 
some sub-variables: 
1) Coherence in the design: 
1.1) Matching policy evaluation objectives and outcomes. 
1.2) Overlap with regulations. 
1.3) Holding hearing of interest groups (consensus between actors). 
2) Structure of monitoring and evaluation system: 
2.1) Technical operationalization (easy/difficult). 
2.2) Perception of operationalization. 
2.3) Methodological rigor 
 
The first variable is the coherence in the design in the three levels of evaluation. 
However, all sub-variables are coded “0” due to the following reasons. At the macro 
level, the policy reviewed here is coherent with the Chilean government programme 
2014-18. Indeed, the president’s agenda proposes the creation of an agency (National 
Evaluation Office)240 responsible of evaluation and to coordinate public agencies in 
the cycle of policy making. The latter is linked to the “system of evaluation and 
management control” as the mechanism to improve the quality of public 
expenditure as well as the performance of public agencies for supporting the 
decision-making using the concept of results-based budgeting. Indeed, this system 
(see annex 7) includes several other elements such as the performance indicators, 
evaluations and organisational wage incentive.  
 
Regarding incentives, these are linked to the PMG (Management Improvement 
Programme) through five major areas such as the planning/management control241 
for linking goals to incentives (see DIPRES, 2001a, 2012, 2014) as explained in the 
section of quality of bureaucracy. These subsystems seem to match perfectly in terms 
of coordination at central level by the Ministry of Finance (DIPRES). On the one hand, 
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Political Reform and Modernization of Public Management. 
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http://www.gob.cl/programa-de-gobierno/ 
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This planning/management control area includes the monitoring of organisation’s performance system. 
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the system of evaluation guides the government-ordered evaluation across the 
public administration at the central (macro) level and the regions located in the 
meso level. 242  On the other hand, in the micro level the PMG relates the 
accomplishment of objectives to remunerations but also leads the officials’ 
performance evaluation (individual). However, there are some agencies acting 
separately to this framework, which are not interconnected with the main system.  
 
For instance, some evaluations performed by other agencies such as the evaluation of 
schoolteachers’ performance developed by the Ministry of Education. 243  This was 
enacted by the Law no. 20.501244 and run between a group of scholars, professionals 
and psychologists from the Catholic University of Chile who operate through the 
“communal” evaluation’s coordinator in municipalities. Besides, there is the national 
evaluation system of learning results (SIMCE) coordinated by the Agency of 
Education Quality245 to measure students’ performance. Both agencies belong to the 
Ministry of Education. A third example is the Environmental Evaluation Service246 
(SEA) responsible by the Ministry of Environment, which develops the environmental 
impact evaluation in the public and private sectors. Not all these evaluation 
practices are included in the SECG as an integral system, which converge the 
‘vertical-horizontal’ levels of evaluation.  
 
Furthermore, according to the IDB’s study (Dumas, 2013: 31) it seems to prevail an 
“inflación de monitoreo” (over monitoring) from those coordinators such as the 
DIPRES, UPGC and the Ministry of Social Development enquiring data from agencies 
which deliver public services. These asymmetries make the task to determine the 
impact of each coordinator performing their roles difficult (see annex 7). Regarding 
the interest groups, the review of the literature and the DIPRES and Congress’ official 
documents do not mention a particular interest of inclusion of the NGOs or citizenry 
in the policy evaluation process. As mentioned in the chapter of Mexico, their 
involvement is a common form of any democratic government. Certainly, a main 
objective of a system of checks and balance is the transparency and accountability to 
keep the citizenry informed about government performance. For this purpose, these 
groups represent the interest of the society to ensure its accomplishment. 
 
However, only during the administration of president Lagos 2000-6 it was identified 
the think tank Centre of Public Studies (CEP). This had a relevant role influencing 
the “Acuerdo político-legislativo para la modernización del Estado, la transparencia 
y la promoción del crecimiento” (Political-legislative agreement for the State 
modernization, transparency and the promotion of growth). In 2003, according to 
Figueroa et al. (2011: 86), this centre also promoted the Senior Public Executive 
system described in the previous section. Another example also referred by this 
author is the department of industrial engineering at the university, which helped in 
tailoring and amending some of these policies and developed some research studies 
of specific sectors for a short period of time. In the end, the fact that only one agency 
operates the policy allowed those coordinators of evaluation to attain effectiveness 
more easily.  
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The country is divided in 15 regions, 54 provinces and 346 “comunas” (municipalities). 
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Through the Centro de Perfeccionamiento, Experimentación e Investigaciones Pedagógicas (CPEIP). 
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Library of Chilean National Congress, 08/02/2011. 
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http://www.agenciaeducacion.cl/ 
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http://www.sea.gob.cl/ 
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Regarding the structure of the monitoring and evaluation system there are some 
gaps identified. Firstly, keeping in mind this system uses the same format to 
homogenize the activity of following up recommendations, the exercise of tracking 
them was complex. In some cases, the recommendations diverge once the 
programmes’ operators take them for further changes. For example, in the 
comprehensive spending review (ECG) 2010 of the national supply centre, one 
recommendation was handled by the agency but there was no relation between the 
original version and the report to following up results. In the original version the 
external evaluator suggested “To include the option of contracts management at the 
same level of importance of the others…” While the report mentions that the action 
taken by policy implementers was “Developing a report to determine the level of 
technical knowledge that professionals responsible of contracts should have…” (see 
final report in DIPRES).  
 
Thus, even though both (recommendation and action) are related, the action taken 
does not help to solve the problem. Another issue is the IT platform, which still needs 
further improvements to facilitate technical operationalization, especially once 
recommendations are updated by operators. The evidence indicates that there are 
still some reports missing to following up results such as the evaluations of public 
programmes 2008 and 2013 of the programmes of obesity and purchase to private 
sector, respectively, and the comprehensive spending review 2010 of the programme 
for assessing the experimental health centres. In general, data is not easily available, 
for example, how many programmes belong to the health sector, the cost of each 
evaluation performed and criteria to select which programme should be assessed. As 
result this subvariable is coded “0” as an outcome absent. 
 
Concerning the criteria, the DIPRES noted that the size, amount of budget, 
performance indicators, and programmes, which are facing issues and those 
becoming larger, are the main criteria (Rojas et al., 2005: 63) to select them as a 
priority for evaluation. There is no document available referring to this,247 nor the 
general perception about the lack of criteria to select programmes to be evaluated 
neither by Congress nor by ministries. Another gap is the amount spent by the 
DIPRES to execute its duties as coordinator of the policy. Furthermore, there is no 
data of any impact evaluations (EI) and comprehensive spending reviews (ECG) 
performed since 2011. In the case of the ECG, along with the evaluations of new 
programmes (EPN) both were cancelled by the DIPRES (Dussauge, 2013: 168) but 
there is no official document to validate that. Then some assumptions arose, might be 
that cancelation is the result of some evaluations or reports (Hawkesworth, 2013, 
Muñoz, 2005, Rojas et al., 2005 and Zaltsman, 2009), which highlighted the need to 
do some improvements.  
 
However, as mentioned in the first section, in 2011, the DIPRES replaced the ECG by 
the evaluation of organisational spending (EGI) to improve it (see annex 3) but 
without results available yet. Regarding the ex-ante evaluation, results are awaiting 
due to its recently introduction (2014) as a former evaluation to fit into the SECG’s 
scheme of evaluations. At this point, the evaluation of public programmes (EPG) is 
the only constantly reporting results over the public administration. Moreover, the 
review of the set of EI, EPN and ECG’s evaluations of all sectors reinforces these 
assumptions, which could be generalized to the entire public administration. For 
instance, the EI only appears until 2011 for assessing two programmes of agriculture 
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and education while the others (ECG, EPN) were cancelled. These results are 
contradictory with the executive’s attempt for boosting evaluation through the 
National Evaluation Office. 
 
However, at the time this study took place it is difficult to stand a position due to the 
recent creation of this office with no observable results yet. Viewing these issues on the 
operation of the system and despite centralization of the evaluation, the perception 
of agencies running programmes is positive. Firstly, due to technical prestige of the 
DIPRES (Rojas et al., 2005: 54) but secondly, due to the synchronized constitution 
and budget legal framework, which is not commonly found in OECD countries 
(Dussauge, 2012a: 191). Moreover, the perception about operationalization seems to 
be effective according to those interviewed and coded “1” as a tangible result. For 
instance, an interviewee248 mentioned that the IT website is feasible and easy to 
access to any user. These features “seem” to keep the balance amongst actors and 
regulations avoiding overlapping between them like in the Mexican case. However, 
variables altogether indicate the asymmetries in the system producing a weak policy 
evaluation framework.  
 
Degree of autonomy 
The variable is divided into three dimensions for ranking agencies: 
i)  Policy autonomy: low and high. 
ii) Financial autonomy: low and high. 
iii)Legal autonomy: low and high. 
 
Verhoest et al. (2004) highlight different degrees of involvement 249  of policy 
autonomy. This notion is closely linked to the freedom and control capacity to 
manage their resources and for those who tailor it [evaluation] to decide on 
applications of regulatory framework in general. For these authors (2004: 105), the 
more or less policy autonomy is linked to the level of detail of policy decisions. When 
the agency that coordinates evaluation belongs to the government as here (DIPRES), 
the scenario to achieve the effectiveness could change depend upon the level of 
autonomy of this agency from other factors. In this case, the autonomy of policy 
decisions regarding evaluation is minimum and constrained to the extent to which 
the agency’s head responsible of the programme or policy could appoint the external 
evaluators to perform evaluations government-ordered at the central level. As 
shown in annex 1, a code “0” was assigned to all levels of autonomy due to the low 
performance. 
 
Ideally, the agency’s freedom should be for dealing with a sort of resources such as 
personnel and operational management e.g. the process and procedures for 
organisations’ performance measurement. However, the freedom given to these 
agencies responsible of programme/policy is limited to become independent from the 
executive either to decide or not on individual applications of rules and regulatory 
framework. This means, to operate without getting approval by the agency (DIPRES) 
at central level in activities such as hiring the external evaluators, amongst others. 
Indeed, the general perception of interviewees250 is that autonomy of institutions is on 
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consultation of government and not restricted by any rules set by government. See Verhoest et al., 2004: 105. 
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the extent the external evaluators are independent from the government, neither to 
fully yield for collecting financial resources (Verhoest et al., 2004: 114) as the 
maximum level desirable to have financial autonomy. 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind a topic recently arisen. In the second 
administration of Michelle Bachelet 2014-18, the government programme points out 
to the creation of the National Evaluation Office, which among other goals, aims at 
the developing evaluations,251establishing the guidelines and criteria of evaluations, 
and following up recommendations of evaluations. According to the presidency, the 
top official responsible of this office will be appointed by the Senior Public Executive 
system. With this political decision, the government attains to legitimize the 
autonomy of evaluation throughout an agency specialized in this topic. However, a 
gap identified here is that the National Evaluation Office’s target will be to develop 
evaluations by itself. The mere fact that these evaluations are executed by the same 
agency, which coordinates them across public administration, threatens autonomy, 
mainly, because the executive plays a double role of judge and jury.  
 
The risk observed here is when decision-making came from a particular interest of 
the leader of the executive (president), the top board of the ministry or group might 
control it in some way. This takes the discussion to the next variable (financial 
autonomy). The risk when an organisation is financially dependent by governmental 
funding is that these decisions and processes - policy autonomy - are restricted to a 
superior authorization. This places the agency at the minimum level as Christensen 
(1999) noted, generally, where grants are provided by the central government 
discretionary regulations may apply. Lastly, the legal autonomy is closely linked with 
the latter and remains at the minimum level despite some independence granted.  
 
On the one hand, the government operates as coordinator of the evaluation through 
the DIPRES, which makes the decision-making process easier. This means, this agency 
decides by itself without previous consultation of any other public agency, the 
president, neither Congress. On the other hand, when the parliamentary action is not 
needed the centralisation of decision-making competencies is implied (Verhoest et al., 
2004: 106), which potentially threatens the taking-up of recommendations. In other 
words, inaction by Congress as the representative body of citizenry jeopardizes the 
accountability of government and the effectiveness of policy evaluation. After the 
review of the limitations described here, a last point comes up. The autonomy in all 
three dimensions (policy, financial and legal) is more restricted to those evaluated 
than to the agency leading policy evaluation.  
 
Summing up, the analysis of these variables show that the evaluation process requires 
interaction between organisations, actors and institutional arrangements, recognizing 
that different inter and intra organisational patterns are essential toward an 
effective evaluation. Regardless, on the relevance of a myriad of factors, this research 
highlights the importance of intra organisational cooperation, mainly between 
executive and legislative to influence the flow of actions during the stage of taking-
up results. As it was analysed here, the political dimension of the IGR is also related to 
the evolution of evaluation.  
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programmes will be evaluated. See the economic programme: the strategy of State modernization in the Chilean’s 
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At some point, it seems that evaluation works more effectively in non-democratic 
governments as this case during the military regime, because it is easier to control all 
branches by the president. However, there is no evidence from these years about how 
evaluation influenced the improvement of programmes and the strategic planning 
process, mainly, because there was no transparency and accountability to track how 
effective the policy evaluation was. 
 
Finally, the following chapter will develop extensively a comparison between these 
variables across Chile and Mexico to determine which are the most influential in the 
policy evaluation.  
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CHAPTER 7. A comparative analysis of the institutional factors 
influencing the effectiveness of evaluation 
 
Introduction 
This section explores utilisation from another perspective. As mentioned in the review 
of the literature, utilisation varies according to the settings in different policy sectors 
and countries. Looking at the reasons why the effectiveness of evaluation was 
achieved or not in the programmes assessed, the aim of this exercise is to assess 
whether and how the independent variables explain variation in the effectiveness of 
evaluation and which of these variables has the strongest explanatory power. The 
method is through the analysis of a sample of all the programmes evaluated and 
previously reviewed in the chapters on evaluation in the Chilean and Mexican health 
sectors. It also seeking to explain which country has been more effective using 
evaluations over time. 
 
The chapter is divided into the following sections. The first section introduces the 
categories of recommendations according to the complexity of the task to be solved. 
The second and third part investigate the recommendations of the programmes of 
the Mexican and Chilean health sectors classified either as amendments, status quo or 
cancellations in order to classify them according to the categories and complexity 
established. The next section explores the importance of institutional factors in 
explaining effectiveness. The comparative analysis of these institutional factors across 
and within countries might help to elucidate the intricacies in the utilisation 
(effectiveness) of evaluation and to answer the central question Whether policy 
evaluation is effective across these countries? 
 
Categories of recommendations 
Despite the difficulty to measure the complexity of the tasks (Askim, 2007: 464), the 
following pages will give some indications of whether these results affect the 
programmes/policies by tracking the adoption of the evaluators’ recommendations. 
The analysis identifies eight categories of recommendations.  
 
i. Design of the programme. This group includes modification and improvement 
of the indicators of the MIR (Indicators for Results Matrix), the method of 
measurement, a diagnosis of the problem that the programme would tackle, 
the regulation, guidelines and operating rules (Reglas de Operación ‘ROP’), 
quantification of the programme’s recipients, inclusion of gender perspective, 
implementation of a strategic plan in the short, medium and long term, to 
improve the programme’s goals and objectives and to increase the objective of 
the programme established. 
ii. Process of the programme and healthcare services. This covers interrelating 
services and recipients’ database, increasing the capacity of recipients of the 
medical units and coverage of the programme, strengthening and 
simplification of the programme, opening hours services, homogenisation of 
procedures, an increase in programme resources (finance and infrastructure), 
and an improvement in the system to register recipients. 
iii. Activities linked to the staff and programme operators. These include training, 
supervision and diagnostic analysis of personnel, increase in staff size, and 
implementation and/or standardisation of an incentive and compensation 
programme for staff. 
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iv. Development of a specific evaluation or analysis. These would include costs, 
impact, cost-analysis, results, cost-effectiveness. 
v. Coordination and synergies. These could cover such factors as competences 
between programmes, staff, systems, agencies and branches related to the 
programme at local, regional and federal level. 
vi. IT systems. These could refer to the digitalization of procedures, development 
and improvement of IT systems and services provided, and implementation of 
monitoring systems. 
vii. Survey. This would entail the development of a satisfaction survey for the 
programme. 
viii. Publicity. This would include publicity, promotion and media coverage of the 
programme and its results, transparency and accountability, evaluation culture. 
 
Of these recommendations, the category related to the design of the programmes is 
the only one in which implementation is relatively straightforward, perhaps because 
these are largely desk-based and there is no need for extra funds, coordination or 
other resources to accomplish them. The other seven groups are more complex tasks 
due to the costs, time, coordination, finances, infrastructure and human resources 
needed to implement the recommendations. The following section reviews the 
programmes evaluated. In the Mexican case nine programmes were randomly 
selected due to the extensive nature of the recommendations made by some 
evaluations. For example, the programme health caravans has generated nine 
evaluations and more than one hundred recommendations were proposed by 
evaluators. In the Chilean case all programmes (10) were included in the analysis.  
 
As part of this comparative analysis of recommendations achieved and not achieved, 
it is essential to bear in mind that the evaluated programmes are classified as 
amendments, status quo or cancellations. 252  The database used to determine 
whether or not recommendations have been improved is the SECG in the Chilean 
case and the mechanism to follow-up evaluation results in the Mexican case as 
already explained in the methodology chapter. Moreover, unlike the analyses made 
in previous chapters, for the purpose of this exercise, the progress of recommendations 
has been updated here until 2016 in order to have an accurate overview of such 
changes.253 See annex 8 for a classification of each recommendation along with the 
cases used for comparison. 
 
Evaluation in the Mexican health sector 
The first part of this review concerns policy evaluation of the Mexican health sector. 
The examples analysed here start with the programmes classified as status quo due 
to the small number of recommendations attained by policy makers. We then turn to 
cases where significant amendments were made to programmes and, finally, 
programmes which were cancelled. 
 
Status Quo programmes 
The programme Emergency healthcare operated by the ISSSTE has undergone three 
evaluations. The evaluations EED (Specific Evaluation of Performance) 2009 and 
EED 2010 were merged and conducted simultaneously. While this evaluation only 
made one recommendation – to include indicators (MIR) of impact, services provided, 
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253
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management and quality of service – it was initially rejected. The agency argued 
that the programme was not bound to comply with enforced evaluation results 
(even though the Mexican government’s regulatory framework for policy evaluation 
indicates that all programmes are required to make recommended 
improvements).254  
 
Eventually, in 2010 the recommendation was implemented along with another 
recommendation, which sought to modify the goals according to the reality of the 
programme, as part of a separate cost-effectiveness evaluation. The latter 
evaluation made a number of other recommendations but only one (to implement a 
pilot to standardise triage model in emergencies) is in the process of being 
implemented. 
 
Performance evaluations (EED) in 2009 and 2010 of the programme Health services 
provided across different medical sites operated by the SSA, made four key 
recommendations, none of which were implemented. As in other cases, the agency 
replied that the programme was not required to adopt evaluation recommendations. 
With regard to other recommendations the agency claimed that the problems 
identified were costly to solve and needed interagency coordination between the 
regional hospitals, indicating that the complexity was also a justification for rejection 
of the recommendations. However, more recent reports (agency statement) suggest 
that the recommendations will be eventually adopted.  
 
An evaluation of the programme’s design in 2010 presented five recommendations, 
three of which (relating to the design and improvement of indicators and quantifying 
the levels of potential recipients) were adopted, possibly because they were primarily 
desk job tasks and relatively easy to implement (though other largely desk job 
recommendations were not achieved). There was another evaluation of gender 
developed in 2010 but it was performed to a set of 20 programmes in coordination 
with the National Women’s Institute (INMUJERES). Because INMUJERES was 
responsible for addressing these recommendations, these were not included. 
 
The programme for vulnerable people and families operated by the SSA and SNDIF 
underwent four evaluations. An evaluation of consistency and results (ECR) 
performed in 2007 made seven recommendations, four of which were accepted. 
Again these mainly focused on desk-based tasks such as developing indicators, 
gauging potential demand and conducting national and international research. 
Other recommendations relating to costs management, strategic plans and synergies 
with other programmes were rejected because of complexities relating to 
coordination between different levels of government and agencies. The agency 
argued that the programme had constantly modified its operation due to changing 
requirements and that there was no time to make changes prior the elections of 2012. 
Instead, the agency suggested that the next administration should launch a medium 
term programme to address the issue.  
 
A similar response was given to the recommendation regarding an analysis of the 
synergies between the programme and others. In this case the operators responded 
that the recommendation needed an interagency coordination and suggested solving 
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The mechanism to follow-up evaluation results 2011 invalidated the previous two issued in 2008 and 2010. The 
former noted that the mechanism is compulsory to all public agencies and state enterprises operating budgetary 
programmes and those who have performed any type of evaluation during 2008 and afterwards. See: 
   http://www.coneval.gob.mx/rw/resource/coneval/EVALUACIONES/Mecanismo_2011.pdf 
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it through the intercession of the CONEVAL as coordinator of the policy evaluation in 
the social sector. A 2009 performance evaluation set out four recommendations, all 
of which were accepted except for one relating to the conduct of an impact 
evaluation of the programme (though no reason was given). The recommendation 
of the ECR 2011 was not achieved either and refers to update of the diagnostic which 
stresses the problem that the programme would tackle. The agency did not improve 
it due to the difficulty of measuring all the variety of subprogrammes of this 
programme and added that the following administration could probably achieve it.  
 
The EED 2012 recommendations to improve planning and coordination with other 
organisations were also rejected. The agency argued that changes in the organisation 
of the programme meant that many of the recommendations could no longer be 
accomplished. Based on the categories presented at the start of the chapter, most of 
the recommendations that were achieved for the programmes evaluated above 
belong to the group called ‘design of the programme’. Due to the fact that they are 
desk job tasks, they are more feasible for agencies to implement. When the 
recommendations required coordination between agencies (interagency relations), 
they were generally not achieved. The difficulties of resolving these problems may 
have motivated the decision to split up many of the programmes (though the 
agency statement did not mention whether the evaluation had any impact on such 
decision). 
 
Amended programmes 
This section reviews programmes where policy-makers adopted most of the 
recommendations suggested by evaluators. As was previously mentioned, there are 
15 programmes classified in this category but only four will be analysed here. The EED 
performed in 2009 of the programme of provision of healthcare services operated by 
the IMSS made five recommendations covering a mix of indicative and operational 
reforms. While the agency reiterated its position that responses were not required all 
the recommendations were adopted. For the programme prevention of addictions 
run by the SSA a 2011 design evaluation made five recommendations, three of which 
were implemented (on changes and improvements to guidelines and data) while 
two more operational recommendations were not implemented. The lack of action 
on the latter goals may be due to the recent creation of the Center for the 
Prevention of Addictions and the time needed to ensure the programme operated 
more efficiently. Most of the recommendations refer to its design and were achieved 
thanks to the commitment of operators to improve the programme. 
 
The programme for protection and integrated development of childhood operated 
by two agencies, the SSA and SNDIF has undergone six evaluations. While almost all 
of the recommendations from the first evaluation EED 2008 were achieved, the 
agency disagreed with the findings of the evaluation arguing that they did not reflect 
the current condition of the programme, that the evaluation had been based on old 
data and that they had not been contacted by the evaluators for better data and 
coordination. The only recommendation not achieved from the EED 2008 related to 
the development of a strategic plan, something which the agency argued was not 
possible given the changing needs of the programme and the proximity of elections. 
Therefore, the agency suggested that the next administration should boost a 
programme of medium term to solve these issues.  
 
Subsequent evaluation recommendations, where they were explicit, were achieved 
(in the case of the EED 2010 and ECR 2011 the agency claimed that no 
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recommendations were made though it is not possible to verify this as the evaluation 
reports are not available). The recommendations of an EED evaluation carried out in 
2012 refer to the development of diagnosic – only 19 of a total of 31 were developed 
– per state of the problem that the programme would tackle. Those were not 
implemented either due to legislative changes which reassigned responsibilities for 
Children and Young People’s rights (law) or to difficulties in measuring potential 
recipients and coordinating with other ministries and state-level authorities.  
 
A conclusion of the results of this programme is that in spite of the fact that the small 
number of recommendations not achieved belongs to the category of design of the 
programme, the majority of the ones attained belong to the same group. It is also 
worth noting that the agency appeared to have clear reasons for not implementing 
the recommendations. 
 
In the case of the programme prevention against obesity operated by the SSA, the 
three recommendations made in a 2010 evaluation of design were all implemented. 
However, the improvements were not exactly as suggested by evaluators. For 
example, in order to include gender indicators, the agency organized internal 
meetings to analyse this recommendation but concluded that it was already 
providing the data. Regarding the need to develop regulation of the programme, in 
the agency statement it was pointed out that this was complementary to the 
programme of diabetes and cardiovascular risk and not responsible for solving it, but 
at the end, the agency developed a specific regulation as the evaluators suggested. 
As noted, most of the recommendations attained belong to the categories of design 
of the programme and of the programme’s goals. Thus, given that such categories 
are desk job tasks, an assumption is that all these were achieved due to feasibility to 
be implemented by operators. 
 
Cancelled programmes 
The third set of programmes to review relates to those classified as cancellations. 
Regarding the programme National crusade for the quality of health provision, there 
is no data from the evaluations of design and ECR performed in 2007. However, in 
that year, the programme was cancelled and merged into the programme Sistema 
Integral de Calidad en Salud (SICALIDAD). Indeed, the evaluation of design in 2007 
of SICALIDAD mentioned that the National crusade was the predecessor of this new 
programme. Hence, it might be that the former programme was cancelled due to 
the synergies between them. However, as it was mentioned in the chapter 'The 
effectiveness of policy evaluation in Mexico', there is no evidence to assume that such 
changes were due to the evaluation results.  
 
A 2008 evaluation (EED) of the programme for the Equitable funding of health 
provision operated by the SSA suggested a number of recommendations, all of which 
were adopted though there were no indications of why the recommendations were 
accepted. The programme itself was subsequently cancelled and merged into 
another programme Seguro popular operated by the same ministry of health though, 
again, there is no explicit indication that these changes were the result of evaluation. 
 
The efficient curative care programme operated by the IMSS has been subject to two 
evaluations, one on cost effectiveness and the other on process developed. The first of 
these generated 16 recommendations, only one of which was implemented (on the 
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training of medical units in the methodology of logical framework).255 The second 
evaluation set out a further six recommendations but again only one (requiring the 
development of indicators related to chronic degenerative diseases) was 
implemented. While the agency responsible for the programme agreed with the 
recommendations it indicated that it was not feasible to implement them.  
 
A later update of the agency’s statement issued in 2015, 256  reported that the 
programme merged with another programme called provision to the reproductive 
health to establish a single programme entitled provision of healthcare services with 
the aim of standardising the services provided. In the end, the original programme 
was cancelled but the agency did not provide a reason for this. In the case of these 
cancelled programmes, the role of evaluation does not seem to be strategic for actors 
when decision was made. Perhaps, the programmes’ operators decided to cancel 
them without taking into account the evaluation results even before evaluation was 
developed such as the former programme National crusade. 
 
Table 11 below shows the recommendations of the sample of programmes assessed. 
The review of the recommendations shows that the main problem related to issues of 
design and process (44% and 27% respectively). This is in line with the previously 
mentioned CONEVAL257 evaluation of social policy 2008 that indicated programme 
design was a recurring problem. Whether the programmes were amended, 
unchanged or cancelled, the issue of design was generally one that was reformed, 
particularly around the setting of indicators.  As noted, this is likely to be because 
making such changes is largely desk-based and there is no need for extra funds, 
coordination or infrastructure to accomplish them.  
 
However, it is worth noting the recurrent nature of this problem. Even though 
programmes generally adopted the design reforms recommended in evaluations, 
subsequent evaluations of the same programmes exhibited similar problems. This 
phenomenon (recommendations of the category of design) is also observed in those 
programmes classified as non-social sector. It can be affirmed that programmes 
assessed – no matter if these were classified as status quo, amendments or 
cancellations – have generally taken some actions in terms of improvements when 
recommendations are related to the design category, especially those linked to 
indicators. As previously noted in the sample of programmes reviewed, problems 
about design are usually easier to solve for those policy-makers and operators 
located at the central level.  
 
In contrast to the implementation of design-based reforms, the evaluation 
recommendations regarding reforms of process were generally not followed up by 
agencies, even where other reforms were adopted. These process-based reforms 
would either require the development of a regulatory framework or the 
harmonization of the operation of mechanisms at local level, and would need time, 
interagency and/or intragovernmental coordination, specialized bureaucracy, finance, 
or a combination of these commitments to be attained. Since the extra effort needed 
would certainly delay the decision-making process, policy makers focused on reforms 
which were easier to solve. It is also worth noting that other recommendations which 
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See chapter ‘Broadening understandings of policy evaluation and effectiveness’ for better reference. 
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See the agency statement: 
 http://www.imss.gob.mx/sites/all/statics/pdf/transparencia/evaluaciones/dpm/ppe002/fepi/FE-2014-2015-
PosicionInstitucional.pdf 
257
See “Informe de evaluación de la política de desarrollo social en México 2008” (evaluation report of the social 
development policy in Mexico 2008) by the CONEVAL. 
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were generally not adopted often entailed additional evaluation, greater 
coordination with other agencies or the development of IT systems.  
 
Table 11 
 
Categories of recommendations of sample of programmes assessed across countries 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration. 
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Evaluation in the Chilean health sector 
The second part of this analysis is of the Chilean health sector. In identifying what 
factors were achieved in the programmes, it is of interest to explain the success as well 
as failures of these cases.  
 
Status Quo programmes 
Of the five programmes where evaluations led to no or only modest changes, the 
Comprehensive Spending Review (ECG) for the first of these called experimental 
health centres operated by the Undersecretary of the Healthcare Network 
performed in 2010, identified 25 recommendations but only two were adopted (to 
take into account methods used by other agencies and introduce a new system of 
budgetary control, financial management and programming activities). The 
remainder were not adopted as of the end of 2014. While the agency responsible for 
the policy indicated that all the recommendations were being addressed, two years 
after the evaluation took place in 2012 only two had been resolved. As might be 
expected, most of the recommendations that were not achieved belong to the group 
of the process of the programme, which usually entails time, structure and most 
importantly interagency coordination between the health centres to be achieved. 
 
In the case of the Evaluation of Public Programmes (EPG) in 2013 of the programme 
purchase from private sector run by FONASA, only one of the 11 recommendations 
was adopted (relating to the inclusion of evaluations from other medical units). 
Amongst those not yet implemented were a number which were relatively low cost 
but which required more coordination efforts by policy-makers. There are six other 
recommendations in the waiting list to be improved and another similar number in 
terms of implementing a monitoring system.  
 
The 2013 evaluation (EPG) of the National programme of supplementary food run 
by the Undersecretary of public health set out ten recommendations covering issues 
such as coordination, financial resources and monitoring. However, while the agency 
responsible for the programme indicated that it agreed with the recommendations 
suggested by the evaluators and that it planned to implement them, at the time of 
writing this had yet to happen. These actions include developing coordination with 
other operators of programmes sharing the same objective to improve the nutrition 
of the population. Other activities are scheduled in the short term such as the 
operation of the IT system and a study to analyse the distribution model of services, 
but there is no evidence that such actions have been executed.  
 
The 2012 evaluation (EPG) of the National programme of immunizations operated 
by the Undersecretary of public health made nine recommendations of which three 
have so far been adopted (on monitoring for wastage, improving the IT system and 
reforming budgetary and procurement systems).  It is worth noting that these were 
implemented even though they were relatively complex changes requiring 
coordination and additional funds. Other recommendations – of varying degrees of 
complexity – have yet to be implemented.258 
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At the time this study took place from 2007 to 2014, the evaluation of this programme identified seven 
recommendations and only one was improved. However, for the purpose of this section, when this study was 
updated to 2016, there were identified nine recommendations and three of them adopted. Notwithstanding, this 
programme is classified in the status quo category. 
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Amended programmes 
Four of 13 programmes assessed are located in this category. Four reforms for the 
2008 evaluation (EPG) of the programme of treatment of obesity – run by FONASA, 
the Undersecretary of public health and of healthcare networks – related to 
improving interagency coordination and various data improvements were accepted. 
As noted before, these actions may have been easier to implement because they did 
not need a large amount of money to attain them. By contrast, the three 
recommendations rejected by the operators of this programme dealt with monitoring 
systems and extending the scope of the programme, tasks which required extra 
finances to be executed (as the agency responsible for the programme confirmed 
when it rejected such recommendations due to financial restrictions and the costs to 
accomplish them).  
 
In the case of the 2008 evaluation (ECG) of the programme of the commission of 
preventive medicine and disability operated by the Undersecretary of public health, 
14 of the 21 recommendations were accepted though there was a delay in 
implementing one which required the development of a new IT system for processing 
health services online. Others that were accepted related to the conduct of economic 
impact analyses, monitoring the conduct of staff particularly in relation to the 
provision of medical leave. Many of these recommendations were implemented 
thanks to the commitment of the actors and the deployment of multidisciplinary 
teams to address the problem, in other words, thanks to the interagency coordination. 
An example of this was the commitment of the Department of Finance and 
Administration to improve the financial management of transferring funds to the 
regions timely.  
 
A recommendation achieved regarding the relocation of offices to new facilities 
required funds and was delayed but finally concluded after a year of works. Three of 
the recommendations concerning human resources were cancelled due to the 
reorganisation of the services and major changes such as the creation of the 
Centralized Medical Comptroller to improve services. In cases where the suggestions 
were not achieved such as implementing a management model in two regions, the 
reorganisation of the agency was cited as the reason. However, the fact is the agency 
did reorganize the services and zones for better recipients’ attention. Under these 
circumstances, the recommendation was considered out of context and they did not 
improve it. The agency improved the programme, though, which is the important 
matter but in a different way from that suggested by the evaluators. The remaining 
recommendations were not adopted though the agency gave no reason to justify the 
lack of action. 
 
Most of the 12 recommendations relating to the 2010 evaluation (EPG) of the 
programme of prevention and control of HIV, were implemented, according to the 
operators (Undersecretary of Public Health) mentioned it was thanks to the good 
organisation and commitment of many agencies (e.g. Undersecretary of Public 
Health, Undersecretary of Health Networks, National Health Fund, National Supply 
Center and Institute of Public Health). Such interagency coordination facilitated the 
implementation of actions though in some cases the process was difficult due to 
economic restrictions. The only recommendation the agency did not implement was 
related to the development of an IT system to register statistics and health data 
(though no explanation was given by the operators for the failure to adopt this 
recommendation).  
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The bulk of recommendations (12 out of 18) made by evaluators (ECG) in 2011 for the 
programme National Health Fund (FONASA) operated by the FONASA, have been 
adopted. They were achieved even though they needed additional resources to be 
improved suggesting that FONASA had the funds to make the improvements. Of 
those that were not adopted it may be that these were too costly for FONASA to 
implement. 
 
A 2010 evaluation (ECG) of the programme National Supply Center (CENABAST) 
operated by the CENABAST has an equal amount of recommendations achieved 
and not achieved. It is worth nothing that many of the recommendations that have 
been implemented entail process activities, which would arguably have been harder 
to execute. By contrast those that were not implemented were relatively 
straightforward entailing deskwork (though a few – such as new storage systems and 
paying debts to suppliers – would also have required additional resources). For those 
recommendations that have not yet been achieved there is an office letter issued by 
the center, which mentions an attempt to solve them in the short term.  
 
Cancelled programmes 
Only one of the evaluated programmes was cancelled. The 2011 evaluation (EPG) of 
the programme of newborn health support operated by the Undersecretary of 
healthcare networks was cancelled and merged into the programme of 
biopsychosocial support as a result of the evaluation performed. In the course of this 
change it is worth noting that five of six recommendations suggested by evaluators 
were agreed. Overall, the ministry not only agreed with the results of the evaluation 
but was very positive noting that it [report] “was done thoroughly based on how the 
programme works in both ministries, the evaluation gave us an insight of issues had 
not realized before…”259  
 
Moreover, policy operators agreed to integrate this programme into the programme 
of biopsychosocial support. Thus, evaluation here was effective in terms of decisions 
made by policy makers to improve health services through optimizing the operation 
of both programmes. The only recommendation that was not achieved concerned 
the way in which programme recipients would be measured where the ministry 
responded that it would need to conduct further studies to establish the technical 
and economic feasibility of this proposal.   
 
After the examination of the evaluations and recommendations (see table 11 above), 
a first assumption is that the problem of lack of action can be attributed in someway 
to the complexity of the task as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
particularly in terms of economic resources. Indeed, an assumption of this exercise is 
that quite a few of these recommendations are not achieved due to financial 
restrictions. For example, the Chilean programmes of experimental health centers 
and the national supply center needed to restructure their medical units, 
infrastructure and logistic support but could not achieve this suggestion due to the 
high costs implicit in such improvements.  
 
This is also the case where the programmes need to implement IT and/or monitoring 
systems. Even in the programmes classified as amendments, it appeared that the 
need for additional resources was a constraint on adopting recommendations. For 
example, in the programme of prevention and control of HIV, the evaluator’s 
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See the final report issued by the operators’ programme of newborn health support.  
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recommendation for a consolidation of the IT system to register statistics and health 
data was not achieved probably due to financial restrictions. However, despite the 
complexity of the task there is a large number of recommendations achieved related 
to the process compared to other categories. This result proves that tasks like these 
regarding processes are solved despite complexity and financial restrictions. 
 
It is also worth noting that, based on the responses (agency statement) from some of 
those responsible for the programmes, interagency and intragovernmental relations 
were both a problem and a solution to achieve those recommendations suggested by 
evaluators. In a number of programmes, including those for the commission of 
preventive medicine and disability, the prevention and control of HIV, the national 
programme of supplementary food and the national programme of immunizations, 
the operators mentioned the importance of the IGR either as an obstacle or 
facilitator to solve internal problems. Ultimately, and notwithstanding the many 
recommendations requiring time, infrastructure, human resources and finances, the 
role of IGR was a central determinant of effectiveness thanks to the potential ability 
to negotiate and coordinate actions to the benefit of the programmes.  
 
Regarding the effectiveness of the Chilean policy evaluation, the programme of 
newborn health support is the only programme, which used the evaluation in the 
decision-making process to improve its operation or at least, the only one that 
explicitly acknowledged the evaluation in shaping the actions taken. Indeed, its 
subsequent merger into the programme of biopsychosocial support was in response to 
the evaluation performed in those years. 
 
Table 12 
 
Recommendations achieved of sample of programmes assessed across countries 
 
Focus of 
recommendations 
Number of 
recommendations 
Proportion achieved (%) 
Mexico Chile Mexico Chile 
Design 36 18 25(69%) 9(50%) 
Process 22 59 5(23%) 31(53%) 
Staff and programme 
operators 
1 9 1(100%) 3(33%) 
Evaluation or 
analysis 
8 20 3(37%) 7(35%) 
Coordination and 
synergies 
8 6 2(25%) 3(50%) 
IT systems 6 12 2(33%) 3(25%) 
Satisfaction survey 0 4 0 1(25%) 
Publicity 1 1 1(100%) 0 
TOTAL 82 129 39(48%) 57(44%) 
                            
                           Source: author’s own elaboration. 
 
In a comparative perspective, while there is a slight difference between 
recommendations achieved in both countries (see table 12), the contrast is more 
significant regarding the focus of the recommendations achieved. Whereas in Mexico, 
most of the recommendations achieved belong to the category of design of the 
programme, in Chile they belong to the process of the programme. A first conclusion 
is that, this may be due to the way in which evaluations themselves were conducted. 
For example, recommendations regarding the design of the programmes are not 
recurrent over time in Chile as in the Mexican case because in the former there is only 
one evaluation performed per programme, thus, there were fewer recommendations 
suggested.  
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Moreover, as it was mentioned, as these (design category) are desk-job tasks might 
be easier to solve compared to the rest of the categories, as Greeve (2003) suggests, 
decision to use evaluations increases when the complexity of the task decreases. 
Furthermore, the recommendations relating to the programmes' process represent 
the major number compared to other categories, particularly in Chilean evaluations.  
 
These results are contrary to Greeve’s but agree with Johansson’s (1995) study, which 
emphasizes that there is more data use when actors deal with ‘hard core’ tasks such 
as these implicit in the process of the programmes. Thus, it seems that complexity of 
the task is important in the decision-making for policy-makers and operators when 
they have to decide which recommendations will be atttained. However, regarding 
the other types of recommendations the main area where recommendations of the 
Chilean programmes were made and not achieved were those of IT reforms, further 
evaluations and staff training. In many cases these recommendations were 
characterized by complexity in terms of time, coordination, finances, infrastructure 
and human resources.  
 
Thus, on the basis of the analysis above, there is a partial perspective when it is 
assumed that the achievement of recommendations is linked to the complexity of the 
task. For example, the category of design of the programme is the less complex to 
attain because is a desk-job task, whereas the rest of the categories of 
recommendations are difficult to achieve and the less implemented. However, in the 
Chilean case, recommendations classified as hard tasks and related to the 
programmes’ process were easy to achieve. Moreover, the issue of finance appeared 
to be sometimes a constraint on adopting changes but there were other cases where 
such changes were made, suggesting that in some cases there was a strong 
commitment on the part of policy-makers e.g. category of process of the Chilean 
programmes.  
 
An assumption based on these results is the interest for solving them 
(recommendations) arises from the interest of the actors involved to make effective 
decisions for closing the policy cycle regardless of the complexity of the task or the 
costs of implementing changes e.g. time, coordination, finances, infrastructure and 
human resources.  
 
The influence of institutional factors on the effectiveness of evaluation  
As can be noted, the results by themselves do not provide a clear view of the 
variation in the dependent variable to affirm that either the Chilean or Mexican 
policy evaluation is more effective. The effectiveness varies according to the 
programme and the complexity of the recommendations suggested. Moreover, to 
verify whether evaluation is effective it is necessary to go beyond the results 
presented here to grasp the intricacies of political factors and other country settings. 
These institutional factors are potential influences in terms of the adoption of 
evaluation recommendations.  
 
Applying Mill’s method to this case study, the method of agreement points out that 
probable causal factors found in common while measuring the independent variables 
(annex 1) across countries was the quality of bureaucracy. This is an outcome present 
in both countries; indeed, this factor places the Chilean evaluation system into a 
leading position. However, when these outcomes between countries are compared it 
appeared to be a necessary condition to achieve the effectiveness but not sufficient 
to assume is the only cause of the effectiveness.  
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Indeed, while this factor appeared to have a positive impact on the decision-making 
process appears that other factors are jeopardizing such process. As Ragin (2014: 38) 
noted “In situations of multiple causation, therefore, the method of agreement is 
likely to yield incorrect results”. In cases like these, the method of agreement and 
difference can be used jointly to find factors in common amongst all cases where 
utilisation of evaluations appears or when the factor is absent and effectiveness does 
not occurs. 
 
The differences found amongst these countries were the indicators related to the IGR 
such as the reliability and quality of data, as well as the indicators of the variable of 
policy evaluation framework measuring perception of operationalization and 
methodological rigor. All these conditions impacting positively on the effectiveness of 
evaluation present in the Chilean but absent in the Mexican policy evaluation. The 
availability of data and distribution of public resources related to the IGR are 
outcomes present in Mexico, but not in Chile. Mill notes that the method of 
agreement and difference seeks for the cause of effectiveness in two ways. On the 
one hand, those few cases where evaluations were utilised to find at least one 
condition “X” in common, while on the other hand, those programmes in which 
effectiveness does not occur and have nothing in common save the absence of “X”, 
then “X” is probably the cause or part of the cause of the effectiveness of policy 
evaluation. 
 
After the analysis of the results and factors within and across countries, it was found 
that the dynamics between the different components of government i.e. the IGR 
were decisive in shaping whether or not the recommendations from evaluations were 
adopted. Thus, although the quality of bureaucracy, democracy, autonomy and 
framework of policy evaluation are conditions which influence the effectiveness of 
policy evaluation, they seem less relevant for the purpose of utilisation compared 
with the interest of policy operators to lead changes in some way e.g. cancellations, 
amendments, etc. For instance, in both countries, most of indicators measuring the 
IGR variable have similar results. That is, the IGR are the condition “X” found in 
common either present or absent during the decision-making process. In this sense, 
most of the evidence shows weak forms of coordination, mainly when these refer 
between actors within the legislature and executive, which are based on legal 
authority at central level and on opportunistic incentives to enforce cooperation.  
 
Other relevant findings regarding this variable is the relationship between 
coordinators of the Mexican policy evaluation, which is sui–generis in terms of 
number of actors involved. In addition, an actors’ concern is the absence of 
information in a timely manner, particularly it is out of time to the tailoring budget 
process. On the contrary, there are some differences regarding the indicator of 
reliability and quality of data, which according to Congress people is present in the 
Chilean policy evaluation but perceived as absent in the Mexican. As noted in the 
case study chapter, members of the Mexican Congress do not consider evaluations 
trustworthy, even though these were performed by external evaluators. Conversely, 
availability of data is an outcome present in the Mexican policy, whereas in Chile is 
considered an absent outcome.  
 
Lastly, even though in both countries distribution of public resources have ensured 
the operation of the policy evaluation, there is a reversible tendency from 2013 to 
2014 in the Chilean policy evaluation to affirm that the outcome in this country is 
absent due to an uneven distribution of public resources further explained in the case 
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study chapter. This takes the analysis back to the importance of the political factor 
and the particular interest of these actors involved in the policy evaluation.  
 
This means that no matter how strong the data is and the complexity of the tasks, it 
does not substitute for the capacity of actors to make political decisions based on 
evaluations. Therefore, it is possible to establish a relationship between the 
institutional factors and the decision-making when taking-up recommendations, in 
particular when these refer to the need of coordination and synergies between areas, 
programmes, staff, systems, agencies and branches (IGR) as most of the programmes 
do. Also, in many of the agencies’ statement, the IGR plays an important role to solve 
the main issues mentioned here. 
 
To understand the role of many actors in the effectiveness of evaluation, it is 
important to point out to different dimensions of political relationships within the 
variable IGR. After the analysis of these dimensions at the federal (horizontal) 
level,260 the following relationships are illustrated in the figure below. In the first place, 
there is a pattern of interaction between those operators (bureaucracy) of 
programmes and policies, and coordinators of policy evaluation mostly located in the 
Ministry of Finance ‘MoF’ (DIPRES in Chile and SHCP/CONEVAL in Mexico). The 
former receives evaluations and implement those recommendations suggested by 
external evaluators while the latter is responsible for the coordination of policy 
evaluation but most important for planning of the federal Budget.  
 
In the second place, there is a pattern of coordination amongst bureaucracy or 
programme operators of different agencies to solve problems related to 
recommendations of evaluations, for which two or more programmes are interlinked 
in some way. Lastly, it was identified the role of the president through the MoF and 
Congress. The MoF develops the budget while the Congress authorizes it. Regarding 
evaluation, the MoF coordinates the policy evaluation while Congress oversees its 
effectiveness and use evaluations to lead changes in policy sector.  
 
Figure 10 
Dimensions of political relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Source: author’s own elaboration. 
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The relationship between programmes’ operators and coordinators of policy 
evaluation operates in a way similar to that presented in the agency theory (see 
Eisenhardt, 1989, Mitnick, 1975 and Ross, 1973), in which the principal (coordinators of 
policy evaluation) delegates work to the agent, who is the performer of evaluation 
results (programmes’ operators). For instance, during the implementation stage of 
recommendations, policy makers in both countries operate under supervision of the 
principal. The traditional approach of most of public agencies regarding evaluation is 
to fulfil requirements imposed by coordinators of evaluation, particularly by the MoF. 
However, a problem in the principal-agent relation emerges when these actors do 
not solve an issue or make different actions from those expected or do not implement 
actions as result of evaluations. 
 
It must be remembered that most of public programmes should implement some 
actions after being evaluated. However, most of the Mexican (65%) and Chilean 
(69%) programmes evaluated have made little changes including cancelations or 
even worst, there is no data of changes made. These numbers confirms a disruption 
noted in the agency theory and low commitment to policy evaluation by policy 
operators. Only few exceptions of agencies working almost independently from these 
coordinators across government can be found. For instance, in the Mexican case, the 
Ministry of Social Development ‘SEDESOL’ arises out of the power of coordinators, 
leading changes on programmes based on evaluation results. In part, this can be 
explained thanks to the quality of bureaucracy inside evaluation areas committed to 
the purpose of evaluation. Indeed, the working team of the CONEVAL (coordinators 
of policy evaluation of the social sector) comes from the department of evaluation 
within the SEDESOL who later on founded the council. 
 
Notwithstanding the quality of bureaucracy (actors) as a condition needed to 
advocate such process, it can be affirmed that whether or not the policy cycle is 
closed depends upon the extent to which the IGR are committed to the evaluation 
process and the results of programmes. At this point, the second type of relationship 
between programmes’ operators within public agencies and ministries can be seen as 
important, the potential to bring about change depends on the extent to which there 
is a strong form of partnership between these actors to perform joint actions. For 
example, in the Mexican case, the operators of the efficient curative care programme 
worked in coordination with local health authorities and with other operators of the 
programme provision to the reproductive health to merge both programmes to 
standardize the services provided by them. However, this action was not in response 
to an evaluation recommendation but a strategy made by the IMSS to improve 
healthcare services. 
 
The enormous efforts made by these programme operators required the shared 
action of the IGR to solve a difficult task since the changes called for extensive 
coordination at the local level due to the fact that the healthcare services are 
decentralized and that the local governments operate autonomously, a complicated 
issue to solve by policy-makers and operators themselves. Therefore, the solution of 
these problems depends upon the capacity and interest of local governments. This 
interaction between the federal and local levels is also apparent in the Mexican 
programmes Prospera, reduction of maternal mortality, health caravans, integral 
system of health quality, and the inclusive strategy of food welfare, which needed of 
intergovernmental coordination to operate. 
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In the Chilean case, a set of recommendations of the programme of the commission 
of preventive medicine and disability related to audits, medical leaves and manual 
of health services procedures were implemented thanks to the commitment of the 
actors operating this programme and the deployment of multidisciplinary teams to 
address the problems. In other words, thanks to the interagency coordination. Indeed, 
the operators of the programme of the commission of preventive medicine and 
disability, programme of prevention and control of HIV, the national programme of 
supplementary food and the national programme of immunizations mentioned the 
importance of the interagency and intragovernmental relations either as an obstacle 
or facilitator to improve the programmes.  
 
In other cases, the coordination needed increased the complexity of the task, which 
might be a reason why the recommended improvements were delayed. An example 
of the lack of coordination is the Mexican programme to vulnerable people and 
families, in which the evaluators made recommendations relating to cost 
management, strategic plans and synergies with other programmes. These 
recommendations were rejected because of complexities in the coordination between 
different levels of government and agencies.  
 
Earlier was noted that the effectiveness of evaluation depend upon other 
institutional factors. This means that it is also important to consider the time of 
revision of the policy evaluation, the reviewing of the historical processes and other 
country settings to understand the context under which evaluation occurs. Currently, 
the core of policy evaluation is the Results-based Budgeting, which aims to link 
governmental planning, design, and implementation of public programmes with the 
budgetary process through evaluation. Thus, evaluations should be a key element in 
the allocation of resources within the budgetary process. Also, it should be borne in 
mind that in full democracies Congress is one of the key decision-makers within the 
budgetary cycle operating as a counterweight to the executive. It also has the 
authority261 to assess public policies, programmes and the reports of results sent by 
government agencies overseeing the effective use of evaluations. 
 
At this point, the relationship between the executive and legislature seems to be the 
most important shaping the take up of recommendations with a significant effect 
over time. This is particularly the case when considering the legislature's commitment 
to make use of evaluations, e.g. Congress people advocate policy evaluation at first 
but disengaged later to the systematic evaluation process. For instance, in Mexico, 
concerning the PbR/SED it was expected that after the 2011 draft budget (see the 
case study chapter) when evaluations were considered as part of the drafting process, 
the subsequent years would follow a similar pattern in terms of including more 
programmes in the analysis. However, there has been no equivalent exercise since 
2011 and the Mexican Congress has become a passive actor, even though in 2006 it 
was a key promoter of the PbR/SED strategy and had competence to reinforce the 
role of policy evaluation262 at the time of the strategy’s formulation.263  
 
Indeed, regarding the question of whether policy evaluation matters for the public 
policy and budgetary process, there are further reasons to affirm that evaluation has 
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Internal organisation manual of Deputy Chamber and Senators at Congress, official journal, 24/12/2010 and 
4/06/2010, respectively. 
262
During Budgeting process (PPEF) 2013, deputies such as those from the ‘PRD’ party stressed the importance of 
efficient evaluation mechanisms and strategic expenditure analysis. See daily debates 20/12/2012 at the Mexican 
Congress. 
263
See the statement of purpose of the draft budget 2006, p. 45. The Mexican Congress. 
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not played a formal role in the decision-making process. This analysis found that both 
countries’ legislatures did not use evaluation results to improve policies or to 
reallocate public resources to prioritize sectors such as education, employment, health 
or public security except for a short period in 2014 by the Chilean Congress (see the 
case study chapter).  
 
For instance, the table 3 annexed has shown that from 2007 to 2014 all programmes 
of the Mexican health sector increased their resources every year even in programmes 
with major recommendations related to the process e.g. to optimize the outpatient 
services according to the capacity of the hospital of the programme called health 
services provided across different medical sites; except for the programmes to 
vulnerable people and families, and childcare centers for supporting working mothers, 
which are classified as status quo due to low level of achievement of 
recommendations. 
 
Regarding the Chilean health sector, as table 6 annexed shown all the resources of 
the programmes evaluated from 2007 to 2014 were increased every year except by 
two programmes: bono AUGE and the national programme of immunizations both 
belonging to the status quo category due to low level of achievement of 
recommendations. However, there are more cases located in this category of status 
quo, which were not considered and affected by politicians during budgetary 
discussions.264 Instead, it was found that in this decision-making process the use of 
informal rules to allocate resources prevails. The overall trend in funding for the 
health sector has increased over time regardless of bad performance of programmes 
identified by evaluations.  
 
As mentioned in the studies of evaluation for the Chilean and Mexican health 
programmes, although the availability, timing, reliability and quality of data and 
funds – elements to measure the IGR – are settled to support the operation of the 
policy evaluation, the decision to lead this process rests with those actors who are 
interested in acknowledging the performance of government. For example, in Chile, 
during the 2000s when the reliance on evaluation was enhanced by a shared 
commitment between politicians at Congress and officials inside the executive. 
However, the strong coordination between actors which underpinned those efforts 
was fragmented. 
 
Another significant finding from the interviews with politicians is that evaluations are 
not used for budgeting purposes. In the Mexican case, some of them prefer to use 
data produced by the Superior Audit Office of the Federation (Auditoría Superior de 
la Federación ‘ASF’) and Centre of Public Finances – both belonging to the 
legislature –, as common users rather than as coordinators and decision makers of the 
evaluations developed. This shows the limited use and coordination of the policy 
evaluation by Congress, as well as its limited autonomy as watchdog. In a full 
democracy context, Congress would have the autonomy to prevent misuse of 
evaluations giving it freedom from the executive to impose sanctions on policy 
operators who misused them including the MoF.  
 
By contrast, the flawed democracy prevailing in both countries empowered the role 
of the president and the executive, who have had a strong influence in this process 
                                                          
264
It is important to mention that the programmes of the health sector revised in both countries are those that 
developed an evaluation. Thus, maybe there are more programmes increasing or reducing resources every year but 
these are not considered in the analysis. 
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controlling the results of evaluations through the MoF, despite few attempts to 
remove the total control over the budget held by this ministry such as in the Mexican 
case.265  Moreover, Congress has not operated as counterbalance to the excessive 
power of the executive and has not overseen the achievement of recommendations 
per programme as it should do. In the end, what prevails in these flawed democracies 
is the way the IGR are arranged, which exposes the political agenda of the party in 
power. 
 
In both countries, when the opposition party came to power, the political agenda 
was focused on developing the Results-based Budgeting strategy. Indeed, both 
countries’ legislatures have been committed to the evaluation process through the 
approval of the budget presented by the MoF, which responds effectively to the 
attempts of the executive to operate the strategy. However, despite policy advocacy 
by Congress people and bureaucracy when evaluations were needed to lead changes 
in policy sector or specific programmes there was no strong evidence of utilisation by 
these actors nor opposition parties over time. This understanding explains why many 
followers including Congress in both countries encouraged evaluation at the 
beginning but currently reflect on the atomisation of the various actors due to many 
parties in power with different interests regarding the purpose of evaluation. It might 
be that these actors have different values, perspectives and above all priorities from 
those advocating the policy (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984: 208).  
 
Based on these results, perhaps one reason for the limited use of evaluations is that 
findings disrupt the existing context, which inhabits human, social and political 
relationships (Abma, 2006: 186) and might cause political instability. For example, 
the programme of newborn health support run by the Chilean Ministry of health, 
which after the evaluation taken in 2011 was canceled and merged into the 
programme of bio psychosocial support. Although the evaluation report did not 
mention it, this action might have generated tension and political instability inside 
the ministry due to a reduction in the budget and a downsizing of the bureaucracy. 
As Radin (2007: 370) states “depending on where one sits, evaluation can be looked 
at as a management tool which is necessary for intelligent decision-making or as an 
unwarranted intrusion on management discretion”.  
 
Although, comparatively there is more use of evaluations by the executive than the 
legislature it is not sufficient to assure that effectiveness of policy evaluation prevails 
over time. One reason to explain these asymmetries is perhaps that programmes’ 
operators are enforced by the MoF to use evaluations, whereas Congress members 
are not obliged to oversee the effectiveness because there is not an upper body, 
agency or even citizenry exerting some pressure over them to do so. Therefore, to 
respond to an important question for this research, it can be affirm that policy 
evaluation rarely matters for closing the public policy and budgetary process. 
 
Regarding the conditions required to make policy evaluation effective, it is clear that 
the quality of bureaucracy and skilled personnel operating the policy is closely linked 
to the IGR. For the purpose of evaluation it is necessary to recruit competitively 
cadres to lead the evaluation process. Indeed, the results of the indicator of 
government effectiveness, which measures perceptions of the quality of bureaucracy, 
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Deputy Ricardo Monreal of ‘Movimiento Ciudadano’ party sent an initiative of law to amend article 23 of the Federal 
Law of Budget and Fiscal Responsibility ‘LFPRH’ to establish some boundaries to the SHCP regarding reallocation of 
public resources once budget is approved, reducing discretionary and quality of budget cycle. However, this initiative 
was rejected later on. See daily debates 15/11/2012 and 30/04/2013 at the Mexican Congress. 
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issued by the WGI places both countries above the average (see annex 1). However, 
according to the case study chapters, there is a significant gap between them. For 
instance, the Chilean goverment scores 86 while the Mexican average is 61.  In the 
case of Chile, the quality of bureaucracy seems relevant for that purpose but its 
influence depends upon the time under review.  
 
The time when Marcel was leading the strategy (see case study chapter) from 2000-
06 under the DIPRES (MoF) was when the commitment to evaluation was strongest. 
It is important to bear in mind that this study does not include that period in the 
analysis but the DIPRES’ study mentioned in the case study chapter noted that 
during that time, 91% of the recommendations led to some changes in the 
programmes. This happened thanks to the experience, knowledge and leadership of 
a group of officials, who were decisive in promoting evaluation. The top Chilean 
bureaucracy, whose educational background and political capital developed in the 
private sector helped to put the evaluation agenda in the spotlight. Moreover, they 
were able to develop a consensus with legislators who advocated this policy 
(indicating the importance of good intragovernmental relations). In these 
circumstances, the Chilean evaluation system emerged as one of the strongest and 
most recognized monitoring and evaluating systems in the world, and became 
influential to other countries such as Mexico. 
 
The subsequent period from 2007 to 2014, revealed different outcomes. Although this 
analysis underlines the high standards of the Chilean civil service compared with 
other Latin American countries (see table 10), the taking-up of recommendations has 
been influenced “slightly” positively by the bureaucracy expertise. In other words, 
though the experienced Chilean bureaucracy has acknowledged the importance of 
taking up the recommendations there is no effect on programmes and many of the 
recommendations have not been taken yet as shown the results of evaluations 
performed between 2007 and 2014 (see chart 3, table 6 and 10). Thus, the fact of 
having experienced cadres such as the Chilean bureaucracy has not guaranteed the 
effective use of the programmes’ recommendations over time. 
 
According to the case study chapters and annex 1, the quality of bureaucracy is an 
outcome observed across and within countries over time but the effectiveness of 
policy evaluation is constrained to a specific period of time. This raises the question 
why there has been no continuity between the quality of officials and the 
effectiveness of evaluation in the later period? A conclusion is that those executive 
entrepreneurs led by Marcel from 2000-06 had advocated public agenda including 
the effectiveness of evaluation – despite misutilisation by Congress –, because the 
executive was backed up by the president (see case study chapter). Thus, this isolated 
time period of the Chilean policy evaluation seems to be relevant thanks to the 
commitment of a few of the high-bureaucracy rather than a systematic process 
acknowledged by the bureaucracy. 
 
Regarding the difference between the Chilean and Mexican bureaucracy, there is 
another factor interlinked between these countries called democracy. In this sense, it 
was expected that these emergent democracies had developed a strong civil service 
over time to fulfil the needs of evaluation but the findings suggest something 
different. The Chilean democracy started earlier in 1990 and the country was aware 
and interested in the modernization of the State. The reconstruction of democratic 
institutions needed top executives leading the modernization agenda. A group of 
qualified officials supported by the president took that challenge and reorganized 
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the strategic public services including policy evaluation. Conversely, the Mexican 
democracy began in 2000 and despite the government boosted the career civil 
service since 2003, this did not ensure that personnel become more skilled as noted 
by Guerrero (2007) and Pardo (2005; 2007). Nor was a leading group of qualified 
officials identified to implement the reform of the State.  
 
Moreover, comparing this variable with others, the quality of bureaucracy matters to 
the extent that other actors inside Congress and executive work in partnership (IGR) 
to ensure evaluation utilisation not only to improve public policy but to close 
budgetary cycle. However, despite the years of experience in evaluation topics of the 
people interviewed, neither in the executive nor legislative branches was it possible to 
establish the experienced cadres necessary to assure the effectiveness of policy. 
Comparing both countries, the Chilean bureaucracy is supposed to be more effective 
than the Mexican regarding coordinating and the effectiveness of evaluations. Indeed, 
this factor is a key question formulated at the beginning of this research. However, it 
seems there is no difference between having professional cadres leading the 
evaluation, except during the period ruled by Marcel from 2000-06.  
 
Given these results, it is difficult to conclude that the quality of bureaucracy prevails 
over other factors in which evaluations take place, except in the 2000s in the Chilean 
administration due to the reasons already mentioned. One reason for this might be 
that in developing economies a sort of “elite” and “oppressive” bureaucracy could 
emerge (Goodnow, LaPalombara, cited on Heady, 2000: 498-9), whose power could 
hinder the development of democratic policies (i.e. evaluation) despite the 
commitment of the qualified bureaucracy. As examined here, the strong influence by 
the presidents – in both countries – and the centralization of government transform 
the decision-making process into political negotiations by those involved in the policy 
and those operating the programmes. As Riggs (cited on Heady, 2000: 497) affirms, 
“the bureaucrats tend to appropriate of the political role”. 266  For instance, the 
evolution of evaluation in both countries shows that the control and power of 
bureaucracies has enhanced it from the centre of the executive.  
 
This occurs mainly because the executive is where the resources are provided (DIPRES, 
SHCP) and political decisions are protected either by this “elite” bureaucracy, the 
chief of the executive or both. In the case that those responsible for decision-making 
recognize evaluation as necessary, the process become more effective or, if the 
contrary, they could block any effort when considering unnecessary or harmful. Here, 
it seems that such bureaucracy is only interested in the development of evaluations 
and the political discourse of accountability but not in the effectiveness of such policy 
over time. In his study of the bureaucracies and political systems “Public 
Administration. A comparative perspective”, Heady (2000) agrees with Riggs and his 
fieldwork in Thailand arguing that “transitional” societies – similar to the Chilean and 
Mexican societies – seldom find a balance between political institutions and the 
structure of bureaucracy. 
 
Finding the balance between the political and bureaucratic power becomes a 
difficult task given the excessive authority exerted by the president through this elite 
bureaucracy e.g. MoF, which is even more powerful than Congress. It might be as 
Heady (2000: 518-9) suggests that the lack of balance is the result of the 
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In Almond-Coleman and Banks-Textor’s (cited on Heady, 2000: 512) study, they noted that 19 of the 27 developing 
country bureaucracies analysed had had an excessive participation in political roles, whereas in developed ones, 
only 6 of the 30 analysed did so. 
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bureaucracy heritage since independence, and the pressure for solving public 
problems forces the bureaucracy to appropriate a political role. But it may also be 
due to the fact of being emergent democracies, which have yet to differentiate 
between the roles of the executive and legislature. Particularly, the role of the 
legislature which should operate as a counterweight to the executive acting 
independently as a society’s watchdog of the State’s activity, and concerning 
evaluation, encouraging its utilisation (effectiveness).  
 
Another assumption may be that there is not a merit-based civil service ensuring the 
officials’ commitment to the policy. This is mainly due to the centralized regime, 
which affects the implementation of an impartial civil service and the non-separation 
of the legislative branch from the presidency. These issues are located at the micro 
level (Jordan et al., 2008: 24) where obstacles are related to bureaucracy and how 
inexperience could delay the effective implementation of policy-making and 
utilisation of results.  
 
These issues also transform decision-making into political decisions regardless the 
quality of bureaucracy. Therefore, any attempt to improve public policy has to bear 
in mind the human factor. It might be as Arellano (2000: 137) suggests the civil 
service is more linked to the establishment of rigid or semi-rigid criteria rather than 
the assumption of improvement of organisations’ efficiency. Hence, the quality of 
bureaucracy is one factor in the decision-making process on the use of evaluation but 
it is not the decisive one. 
 
This raises the question of the influence of democracy on effectiveness. The case study 
chapters characterised both countries as flawed democracies. The transition to a full 
democracy requires the strengthening of transparency and accountability and a 
mechanism of checks and balances. The shift to a more democratic system of 
governance needs an effective mechanism of evaluation essential to the process of 
change. However, as a result of these flawed democracies (see annex 1) what has 
been found is the introduction of policies such as the results-based budgeting mixed 
with the traditional approach of taking decisions (i.e. decisions enforced by the 
President) and retaining power through the control of public resources. This process 
has taken place in an uneven way and is contingent upon institutional factors such as 
those mentioned here.  
 
It could be argued that, while a democratic state has not been a pre-requisite for the 
establishment of a system of evaluation, it has been for its effectiveness. To illustrate 
this, it is worth noting that in Mexico there were several efforts to introduce 
evaluation mechanisms in the past – even before the democratic elections of 2000 –, 
whereas in Chile, there were a few attempts during the military regime to establish 
them. However, only in a democratic context, were the results of evaluation 
considered for improving the way of governing through better policies and 
programmes. In such democratic contexts, those responsible for programmes are 
aware of the consequences when not taking action based on the recommendations. 
Besides that, an effective counterbalance system by the legislature should operate 
along with the oversight provided by the NGOs, academics and citizenry. The latter 
should represent the demand-driven approach noted by Weisner (2011), whose 
interest claim for effectiveness of evaluation. 
 
In spite of the fact that both countries are located in the same category of flawed 
democracies, there are several differences between them. For instance, regarding the 
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functioning of government, the democratic structures in Chile are stronger than those 
in the Mexican case. The Chilean government scores 7.8, whereas Mexico obtained 
6.68 (see the case study chapters). This means that even within the same category, 
the effectiveness of democracy varies across countries and political systems. However, 
despite the interest placed in creating conditions to operate evaluation as a system 
similar to any democratic State, the asymmetries and some gaps in the operation of 
the policy are visible. The failure to make use of evaluations could be the result of the 
weaknesses of the government in a number of respects. These could be in the way 
that policy is conducted, in the system of checks and balances or in the operation of 
the legislature. 
 
One reason for the failure to use evaluations is that there is no mechanism to 
encourage these practices nor to impose sanctions where evaluations are misused or 
government funds are misappropriated. In spite of the efforts to bring evaluation 
onto the government agenda and to achieve effectiveness, the shadow of 
presidentialism prevails over public action. This might appear to be contradictory 
because in both cases, the emphasis on evaluation was driven by the government’s 
agenda rather than by pressure from citizens. Indeed, it could be said that the success 
of policy evaluation depends upon the president’s interest. For example, in Mexico 
the Presidential Goals System carried out during the presidency of Fox (2000-06) 
was successful because it was directly monitored by him as was the implementation 
of the PbR/SED.  
 
The fact is that such governments in transition to democracy tend to favour 
presidential power over the others branches of government without any opposition 
by the legislature. Regarding the question Under what circumstances decision-makers 
are likely to use evaluation results? it seems that evaluation is effective, at least in 
these countries, to the extent that it is important for the president. An example of this 
is the Chilean case where the president was able to negotiate with the legislature and 
to make evaluation a priority on the government’s administrative reform agenda. 
Yet the incipient democracy has failed to lay the foundations of a comprehensive 
policy evaluation. What is found instead is a weak policy evaluation framework, 
which is not harmonized with other evaluation and monitoring systems. Also, the 
prevalence of presidentialism in these fragile democracies has not provided 
autonomy to the bureaucracy coordinating the policy; indeed, they need the 
president’s approval through the MoF when major changes in programmes are 
necessary.  
 
The role of Congress is also weak and ambiguous when it should be a counterbalance 
of the executive promoting the effectiveness. Certainly, Congress members should 
review the achievement of these recommendations across time to verify whether or 
not the evaluations have improved programmes. Whereas there are some examples 
of the effectiveness of evaluation in some of the programmes reviewed, being a 
“flawed” democracy would be a constant disruption of such effectiveness every 
presidential term, in which those advocating the policy depend upon the president’s 
interest on it.  
 
Regarding whether the framework of policy evaluation has an influence on its 
effectiveness, it is important to bear in mind the vision of an integral system. Ideally, a 
coherent framework requires a feasible and flexible system to be implemented by 
operators and users. In these countries there appears to be an imbalance between 
the design and operationalization of the policy evaluation. Concerning the indicator 
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that investigates connection between policy evaluation outputs with outcomes, 
although in Chile there is a balance of the policy evaluation at the macro, meso and 
micro levels (see case study chapter), there is a gap to gather other evaluation 
systems developed by other agencies at the horizontal level.  
 
Furthermore, in both countries, the indicators measuring overlaps in the policy 
evaluation framework with similar regulations, and measuring whether policy 
coordinators hold hearings to find consensus, evidence that such outcomes are absent 
(see annex 1). For instance, as mentioned in the case study chapters, there are aroud 
12 evaluation and monitoring systems including the PbR/SED operating across the 
Mexican central government under the responsibility of different actors and agencies, 
while in the Chilean case there are three evaluation systems operatively disconnected 
from the main system SECG (see annex 4 and 7). Thus, a myriad of monitoring and 
evaluation systems and practices result in the marginalization of policy evaluation 
and their results. This situation clearly reflects the difficulty in linking these systems 
into a comprehensive model to be used by policy-makers.  
 
In some instances, however, policy operators follow up recommendations and pay 
more attention to evaluations of those who exert more political control. An example 
is the Mexican programme Prospera, which is the most evaluated in the course of 
time and controlled by political actors due to the large amount of economic resources 
invested in it. In such a case, policy-makers are aware of the importance of taking up 
the recommendations because many actors inside and outside the government 
oversee the programme. In the case of Mexico, it was also found that the mechanism 
to follow-up evaluation results issued in 2008 was not clear in terms of which 
agencies should report the recommendations attained. In 2011, the coordinators 
amended this regulation, which is compulsory to all public agencies and state 
enterprises operating budgetary programmes and those who have performed any 
type of evaluation during 2008 and afterwards.  
 
In the meantime, there were some programmes which recommendations were not 
attained due to an ambiguous framework. For example, after the evaluation of the 
programme Health services provided across different medical sites took place, the 
agency replied to policy evaluation coordinators (CONEVAL, SFP) that this 
programme was not subject to the mechanism to follow up evaluation results and 
did not implement any suggestions made by evaluators. Conversely, the programme 
of provision of healthcare services implemented the recommendations even though 
the agency replied that the programme was not subject to the mechanism to follow 
up evaluation results. 
 
In other cases, there are no evaluation reports available to verify the achievement of 
recommendations e.g. the programme for protection and integrated development of 
childhood, or there are differences between what evaluators suggested and actions 
taken by the agencies such as the programmes of prevention against obesity and the 
national supply centre. In these cases, the coordinators of the policy did not follow up 
the agencies’ results to verify whether or not the recommendations were achieved, 
nor did they assess the coherence of the recommendations suggested and attained, or 
the time needed to implement these. Regarding the latter, in Chile, the experimental 
health centres are examples of such gaps in terms of time, i.e. the time when 
evaluators formulate recommendations and when policy-makers achieved these. In 
this particular case, two years had passed since the evaluation took place in 2012 
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until 2014 when the agency issued a report of the results of the recommendations 
attained.  
 
Another consequence of the fragmented framework is the emergence of internal 
conflicts due to the diversity of authorities conducting evaluations. Here, the policy 
coordinators need to devise strategies to ensure a full convergence of all the 
evaluation systems spread out across public agencies such as the school teacher’s 
performance evaluation, SIMCE and SEA in the Chilean case, as well as the myriad 
developed by the Mexican government. For this, only top-level officials and 
politicians inside both branches are able to ensure cohesion and legal harmonization 
with the policy evaluation. 
 
This process should also clarify the roles and responsibilities of those involved in the 
evaluation process both internally and externally. On the external side, the inclusion 
of interest groups such as the NGOs and academics, provides a better understanding 
of this modernization and democratic governance trend, contributing to the on-
going process of representing citizenry and widespread social accountability. Similarly, 
a better co-governance between branches might internally simplify the 
operationalization of evaluation. An option for this simplification is through a strong 
and single evaluation system with some important implications to the policy. First, it 
would eliminates the overlapping responsibilities between different authorities. 
Secondly, the definition of one authority regarding evaluation would reduce internal 
conflicts between policy-makers and coordinators. Thirdly, a feasible system would 
change the puzzling image of the policy framework design. In the end, these features 
seek to potentialise the effect of evaluation inside (micro, meso and macro level) and 
outside (interest groups) of the government. 
 
Regarding the structure of M&E system, in both countries, the indicators of technical 
operationalization of the system and methodological rigor indicate that these 
outcomes have not yet been achieved and still need to attain a higher technical level 
of sophistication to gather the large amount of data needed by many actors across 
agencies. In the Mexican case, the range of systems brings practical difficulties for 
technical operationalization and monitoring purposes, whereas in Chile, the IT 
platform needs further improvements to facilitate its operation. However, the 
perception of operationalization by actors is more positive in the Chilean case 
compared to the Mexican. As mentioned in the case study chapter, officials and 
politicians surveyed point out to a difficult, rigid and unfriendly system.  
 
Regarding the rigor of the system, there are problems in both countries in terms of 
the order in which evaluations should be performed (see annex 1). An example is 
when policy coordinators determine to execute an evaluation of process without 
considering the need to perform an evaluation of programme’ design in the first 
place. As mentioned earlier, this is the result of the lax oversight of the policy by such 
coordinators as well as the lack of sanctions to those who misused evaluations. These 
discrepancies within the framework hinder the operationalization of the system and 
reduce the possibility to make effective use of evaluations.  
 
The results attributable to the evaluation system’s operationalization provide 
arguments to affirm that the framework of policy evaluation is still ambiguous and 
complex, which makes the evaluation less effective. Nevertheless, the relevance of 
this factor does not seem to be a determinant of the effectiveness itself. The fact is 
that the design of the policy as the basis for a coherent evaluation system should be 
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connected to the efforts of the bureaucracy to improve the coordination (IGR) which 
would ensure that evaluation functioned as a single process, and contributed to the 
implementation of recommendations.  
 
Lastly, the variable of autonomy is understood as the ability of an agency in terms of 
its competences, powers and functions to operate independently from a hierarchical 
supervisory body (executive); as Christensen (1999) notes, exempted from full political 
supervision by the central head of authority. Nevertheless, it is also a notion that 
varies relying on the approach of those involved. On the one hand, for those inside 
the executive, autonomy is perceived as the “freedom” to decide whether to conduct 
evaluation or to use external evaluators. On the other hand, from an external view, 
autonomy relates to the independence of the agency running the policy evaluation 
from those who will be assessed, that is to say from the executive (DIPRES and 
SHCP/CONEVAL in Chile and Mexico, respectively). Nevertheless, in these cases, the 
autonomy of evaluation is restricted to the selection of the evaluator in performing 
such evaluations but not to the agency coordinating them. 
 
In both countries, either the evaluation agency or agencies coordinating the policy 
evaluation have low capacity regarding policy, financial and legal autonomy toward 
pursuing policy evaluation goals (see annex 1). That is, the results show that there is 
limited autonomy granted to these agencies to decide themselves what matters are 
important (Verhoest et al., 2004) exempted from central supervision (Christensen, 
1999). In spite of positive improvements such as the emergence of “independent” 
agencies in Mexico such as the CONEVAL or INEE to build credibility in its institutions, 
these are not sufficient for the purpose of autonomy and still operate under 
supervision of the Ministry of Finance ‘SHCP’ (legal), partly funded by central 
government (financial) and do not decide on individual applications of general rules 
(policy).  
 
In the Chilean case, the autonomy of agencies is currently constrained to the hiring 
process of external evaluators by the Ministry of Finance ‘DIPRES’. While the 
executive’s aim is to create the National Evaluation Office to coordinate policy 
evaluation independently of central government, the top official responsible for this 
office will be appointed by the executive threatening its autonomy because the 
executive plays a double role of judge and jury (see case study chapter). As noted in 
the methodology chapter, the credibility of evaluation results depends upon the 
extent to which the agency that coordinates evaluation is operationally independent 
from the executive branch to prevent the coordinating agency from playing the roles 
of judge and jury. The state of the art of autonomy is one in which policy and 
decision-makers, users and actors involved (stakeholders) are independently willing 
to use and exchange data (evaluations) for further decisions. 
 
However, regarding one of the questions established in this research The policy 
evaluation is effective to the extent that the coordinating agency keeps some control 
through political power, despite this seems contradictory and the excessive control 
clashes with the vision of a democratic government and autonomy of public agencies, 
who wants to implement an effective system of check and balances. The historical 
analysis and hierarchical bureaucracies seem to confirm that the authority pursued 
by the government (executive) becomes necessary to exert some control and political 
power over the rest to influence the taking-up of the recommendations and making 
evaluations effective. For Hojlund (2014: 39) this is a coercive adoption mode, in 
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which organisational rationality is not a priori and agencies are forced upon by one 
or more organisations in order to implement evaluation results.  
 
The autonomy of the evaluating agency raises questions of the degree of political 
control and the role of the executive. As implied before, at least at the beginning of 
the strategy, the adhesion of most of the public agencies to the PbR/SED (Mexico) 
and the SECG (Chile) was because the budget takes priority and the Ministry of 
Finance (SHCP and DIPRES) led the strategy. Maybe the reason for this was due to 
the historical subordination of agencies and bureaucracy to the president and MoF, 
which prevails to some extent in transitional democracies. However, this 
subordination did not last long to strengthen the use of evaluations in the course of 
time. Thus, the autonomy of coordinators of the policy is needed to develop 
evaluations in terms of quality and objectivity amongst others, but also to guarantee 
the effectiveness of evaluation.  
 
However, a potential risk threatening the autonomy of the agency coordinating 
policy evaluation is when this is located within the executive, which powers and 
functions are restricted for demanding the effectiveness of evaluation from the 
judicial and legislative branches. Therefore, the use of evaluations is bounded to 
public agencies of the executive. At the end, actions needed should be similar to the 
statement noted in this research that the more autonomous those who are 
responsible for policy evaluation, the more credible and effective the evaluation. 
 
Moreover, the autonomy is more likely to be shaped by other factors such as a full 
democracy, which are closely related and make a difference if these were entirely 
operated as they should. In this sense, a full democracy agrees those coordinators of 
policy to be autonomous from the decisions of the executive improving the 
relationship (IGR) between branches elucidating the roles and responsibilities of those 
involved in the evaluation process both internally and externally. For example, if 
these coordinators were from an autonomous Congress could oversee the 
achievement of recommendations even to impose sanctions to those who misuse 
evaluations. 
 
Studying results across countries aims drawing some conclusions to address the central 
question of whether policy evaluation is effective across these countries? As noted in 
the methodology chapter, the Chilean policy evaluation is known worldwide as one 
of the strongest and most recognized M&E systems. Thus, it was expected that the 
former was more effective than the Mexican and the outcomes were constant over 
time. However, after comparing institutional factors to establish a causal relationship 
among them, a first conclusion is that policy evaluation is not effective across and 
within these countries in the course of time. If all country settings such as the 
democratic context and institutional factors are settled to operate, why is policy 
evaluation not effective? Presumably all these factors are not effectively working 
together. 
 
This leads the discussion to the political factor, in which the IGR are the constant 
factor either to accomplish or not the effectiveness of evaluations performed, as 
many of the programmes revised here, which despite the complexity of the tasks 
(recommendations) and financial restrictions were solved thanks to the commitment 
of programmes’ operators e.g. national programme of immunizations and of 
treatment of obesity. Moreover, when it is referred that politics matters is because a 
significant number of recommendations attained respond to a political factor which 
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inhabits in the decision made by actors, who have the power either to achieve or not 
the effectiveness of evaluation. 
 
Even though other factors such as democracy, autonomy of evaluators, policy 
framework and quality of the bureaucracy ceteris paribus or influence the 
evaluation process in some way, the IGR are the factor on which they differ and 
occurs as a constant circumstance in many programmes. This seems to be the likely 
cause or at least part of the cause that remains as decisive and immovable to attain 
effectiveness. Therefore, the power to impact any programme through evaluation is 
on the extent those actors are committed to use evaluations to bring about changes 
in policies. Moreover, a real interest to achieve the effectiveness of evaluation is 
evident to the extent in which it would be a priority to look at. 
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CHAPTER 8. Conclusions 
 
The study has set out to explore the effectiveness of policy evaluation in Chile and 
Mexico, drawing upon the theoretical debates on the nature and purpose of 
evaluation, particularly with regard to its contribution in bringing about changes in 
policies and programmes. Central to the research is to identify the institutional factors 
which are likely to influence whether evaluation is effective and the circumstances 
under which this occurs. It also attempts to explain the differences in effectiveness 
between these countries, recapitulating the main empirical findings presented in the 
case study chapters, and the institutional factors examined in the comparative 
chapter.  
 
In principle, the evaluation of policy encourages the notion that findings will 
determine some specific actions to avoid their misuse or symbolic use.267 This means, 
avoiding the status quo and finding out whether or not the programme has 
addressed its objectives. Evaluation will also lead to actors’ involvement in any 
changes in programmes and policies. However, through the evidence obtained, it can 
be affirmed that evaluation is of limited value in supporting decision-making. This 
slight effectiveness of evaluation evidences a gap between the expectation that 
evaluation should create public value in the form of better policies and the extent of 
change in policies and programmes once they have been assessed. The study of the 
health sector programmes assessed from 2007 to 2014 shows that the effectiveness of 
evaluation was achieved in the Mexican programmes in 33%, whereas in the Chilean 
programmes was of 31%.  
 
Thus, most of the Mexican (67%) and Chilean (69%) programmes evaluated have 
made little changes and classified as status quo, or were cancelled without evidence 
that evaluation was considered in such decisions. Therefore, policy evaluation rarely 
matters for closing the public policy and budgetary process. When utilisation of 
evaluations was further explored in the comparative chapter to elucidate which 
country has been more effective and whether the achievement is linked either to the 
complexity of the task or the costs of implementing changes, the findings are the 
following. Comparatively, there is a slight difference between recommendations 
achieved in Mexico (see table 12), where most changes related to the design of the 
programme, while in the Chilean health sector, the majority of the recommendations 
achieved related to process. 
 
As noted, recommendations concerning design are largely desk-based and less 
complex tasks which might be easier to solve compared to those which are more 
costly to finance. It cannot be asserted that this is the pattern followed by both 
countries given results of the Chilean programmes (see table 12), in which policy 
makers solved most of the recommendations classified as hard tasks due to the costs 
of implementing changes e.g. time, coordination, finances, infrastructure and human 
resources. But compared to Mexico, Chile has achieved slight less number of 
recommendations. Therefore, regardless of the complexity of the task and the issue of 
finance, the interest in solving recommendations arises from the interest of the actors 
involved in those programmes evaluated to make effective decisions for closing the 
policy and budgetary cycle.  
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The symbolic use means that evaluation could be used only to justify a pre-existing position of an agency (Mark & 
Henry, 2004: 36). 
~ 159 ~ 
 
 
 
To verify whether evaluation is effective it is necessary to grasp the intricacies of 
political factors and other country settings. In this sense, this chapter argues that 
evaluation often fails to translate into action on the part of the policy makers; 
instead there is a noticeable gap in the decision-making process even if, as Hill (2009: 
8, 278) notes the idea that “the policy process should involve the explicit identification 
of objectives, translated as effectively as possible into action and thus susceptible to 
evaluation afterwards dies hard”. This gap between evaluation and change is seen in 
the analysis of the health sector process where there has been a limited take-up of 
findings over time. Although, stakeholders acquired evaluations political factors 
minimized their effectiveness. This is in line with Mayntz’s (1994: 80-4) argument that 
the political factor is implicit in government decisions including policy design, even 
dominating over technical or social aspects of the policy.  
 
This sceptical view about the extent to which evaluation is effective and the narrow 
action by policy-makers were noted by scholars in the review of the literature 
(Dahler-Larsen, 2005, Dye, 2011 and Hill, 2009) which highlight the limited 
connection between findings and policy improvement. As mentioned in previous 
chapters, evaluation could be a two edged sword. On the one hand, it promotes 
efficiency, transparency and accountability but on the other hand, it exposes 
corruption, inefficiency and “bureaucratic” government procedures to external 
scrutiny. This implies political risks that not everyone wants to assume especially when 
it refers to programmes, which represent votes, even when findings suggest major 
changes or cancellation.  
 
These political risks are also related to the most pressing issues for the academic 
literature such as the subtle nuances of ethics, intended and unintended influence, 
beliefs, values, rational and subjective, as well as decisions and nondecisions (Askim, 
2007, Bachrach & Baratz, 1963, Christie, 2009, Dahler-Larsen, 2000, Fleischer & 
Ledermann, 2011, Kirkhart, 2000, Teirlinck et al., 2013 and Weiss, 1979), which 
regularly transform the decision-making into a political process.  
 
Regarding those factors fostering the effectiveness, although it is difficult to have 
control of all factors, it should bear in mind which elements are the most important. 
After the review of all the variables mentioned in the chapter ‘Broadening 
understandings of policy evaluation and effectiveness’ such as the evaluation 
capacity building, the role of evaluator, stakeholders’ involvement, and intentionality 
(Fleischer & Christie, 2009), or the organisational context, the political context and 
the intentions of the evaluation demand argued by Teirlinck et al. (2013: 374), 
amongst others, institutional factors such as the quality of bureaucracy, level of 
democracy, policy evaluation framework, the degree of autonomy and 
intragovernmental relations were selected as the most important helping to explain 
the differences in the effectiveness of policy evaluation across Chile and Mexico.  
 
As earlier mentioned, these factors embrace those relatively under-explored variables 
addressing the question of whether are the most influential institutional (political) 
factors shaping the effectiveness of evaluation? Comparing these factors between 
countries and based on Mill’s method, the only outcome present in both countries is 
the quality of bureaucracy. Particularly, in Chile during the 90s, the quality of the 
bureaucracy operating the policy evaluation was the determinant factor shaping 
effectiveness, as it was concluded in the chapter ‘The effectiveness of policy 
evaluation in Chile’. In this case, the presence of skilled personnel in the decision-
making process would help to achieve recommendations more effectively, because 
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these people would understand the role of evaluation in improving policy. However, 
based on the rate of effectiveness achieved in programmes or policies, this variable is 
not sufficient to assume it is the only cause factor shaping the impact of evaluation 
on policy change. 
 
In exploring the influence of these factors, the Intra Governmental and Interagency 
Relations (IGR) are the condition either present or absent during the decision-making 
process and for the purpose of utilisation. The element necessary to transform the 
decision-making is the action of and relationship between those actors implicit in this 
process. This variable is highly useful in the evaluation process as influences the final 
decision whether or not to take up recommendations and make further changes to 
programmes and policies. Given this, the IGR are understood as the set of decisions 
and nondecisions made by actors, who should be seeking for better coordination and 
commitment in favour of evaluation. Indeed, in many agencies’ statement the 
relevance of the IGR is highlighted as a factor in addressing issues raised by 
evaluations. In particular, these refer to the need of coordination and synergies 
between areas, programmes, staff, systems, agencies and branches.  
 
As mentioned in the comparative chapter, most of the evidence shows weak forms of 
coordination, mainly between actors within the executive and legislature in which, 
the former make little use of evaluations and fulfil requirements based on legal 
autorithy at central level by the MoF while members of Congress have not utilised 
evaluations to bring about changes in policy or to plan the federal Budget. An 
exception was the FY 2011 in Mexico, when both branches worked together for the 
first time in the draft budget under the approach of the results-based budgeting. It 
can therefore be stated that some discrepancies in the styles of ruling relations (IGR) 
between these branches remain. More commitment by the MoF and Congress is 
needed for taking-up recommendations as established in the RbB when tailoring and 
approving the budget, and by public agencies for better decision-making of sector 
policies. 
 
The significance of the IGR factor depends on the extent to which actors inside 
branches could work harmoniously (co-governance). However, this is a reminder of 
the real world of policy, where decision-making, negotiation and chaos occur in 
political arenas. Although the effectiveness of policy evaluation is perceived valuable 
by those involved in the decision-making process, as Weiss (1993: 94) noted, policies 
and programmes are the result of political decisions, have a political stance and enter 
into political arena to feed decision-making. In this context, politics is the art of 
government whose power has the ability to achieve a desired outcome (Karlsson & 
Conner, 2006: 227). Whereas for Dahl (1984: 9-10 cited on Karlsson & Conner, 2006: 
226) defines it as a pattern of control, power or authority influencing relationships.  
 
The mere act of engaging in evaluation constitutes a set of political decisions. It is not 
a neutral political fact aside from power, even though evaluators try to avoid it 
(Monnier, 1996: 173). In the end, evaluation is the judgement of data, to value 
premises, intimately linked to ethical issues in a political context. In practice, data 
could be biased in favour of particular interests of policy-makers. Hence, there is a 
negative connotation of politics and how evaluation becomes adulterated when 
both are mixed and the evaluator adopts a standpoint – neutral, sensitive or critical 
– (Karlsson & Conner, 2006: 225, 231-7). This works in a similar way to Simons’ (2006: 
243) approach on “ethical dilemmas” where the decision emerges from the 
~ 161 ~ 
 
 
 
evaluation, and the choice taken between alternatives or solutions depends upon the 
ethical view of policy makers.  
 
As much as the results provided by evaluations could be interesting and relevant, the 
decision by which evaluation leads to changes in policy, programme, plan, project or 
even personnel often relies on political arenas. Thus, after testing variables one 
conclusion is that the political factor in the IGR is decisive for the effectiveness of 
policy evaluation, including the RbB strategy in both countries. After reviewing 
historical processes of evaluation in emerging economies, this is similar to Weiss’s 
arguments (1976, 1987 cited in Pawson & Tilley, 1997: 12), when refers to political 
decisions as gradual accretions of choices that sometimes appear as a political U-turn.   
 
The best explanation for this assumption is before and after the fiscal budget 2011,268 
where the debate around budget at the Mexican Congress clearly lacked of any 
criteria based on results to allocate (decrease or increase) public resources. As result, 
the budget was tailored based on political factors, on the ability of deputies of every 
commission to defend the budget items of specific sectors, programmes or projects. 
These arrangements appear to be a form of political “libertinaje” (libertine) with 
Congress misusing its political power to distribute finances to programmes subjectively. 
These actions maximise the benefits to particular political party (ies) instead of 
national priorities. Besides that, policy evaluation coordinators need to call for 
support from Congress members every administrative period (4 and 3 years in Chile 
and Mexico, respectively) because they are easily removed from their positions and 
new actors came in the legislature. 
 
In the end, the strategy called results (based, for, of) budgeting should operate as an 
incentive that every country – depending upon the context, regime and institutional 
capabilities – implement or boost through its government agencies to ensure better 
results. Whether policy evaluation matters not only for the budgetary process but 
also for the public policy, hence, effectiveness is widely acknowledged for closing this 
process helping to create public value. However, in the Mexican case, the majority of 
programmes assessed (67%) have not achieved yet the evaluation results for 
improving them and closing the policy cycle, these figures include cancelation of 
programmes. Regarding the budgetary cycle, the review from 2007 to 2014 shows 
that only in 2011, the draft budget was formulated based on results (see case study 
chapter).  
 
Similarly, the Chilean policy evaluation has almost had the same results as concluded 
in the case study chapter. Many of the sampled programmes assessed (69%) have not 
implemented the recommendations suggested by external evaluators yet, neither, 
evidence of the use of evaluations of the health sector for the budgetary process 
during the same period analysed. As concluded in previous chapters, there is a trend 
to increase public resources every year with no implications of evaluations as a tool to 
support decision-making. In this sense, an idea that merits consideration is that policy 
evaluation will be more efficient when using the budget as incentive (positive or 
negative) to guarantee evaluations results are taken into account in the policy 
process.  
 
For scholars as Wiesner (2002: 138), there are reasons to assume that the key to 
develop evaluation capacity (demand-led) is to assure a linkage between 
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As mentioned, only in the 2011 budgetary process (purpose statement), the SHCP sent to Congress the budgeting 
proposal based on objective data from evaluations in order to allocate public resources. 
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evaluation results and budget allocations. Given the extent to which evaluation 
results do not affect the budget allocation process, it will be difficult to develop real 
evaluation which is demand-led and reliable. Evaluation can hardly be boosted itself, 
it needs incentives such as the budget (RbB and PbR/SED) to be adopted 
homogenously across public agencies, as Wiesner (2002: 146) argues, 
Given importance of institutional factors, evaluation will be boosted on the extent on 
which has a solid regulatory backup, and closer to budgetary process. The key for 
developing evaluation capacity is when it comes from the demand [citizenry]…  
 
Therefore, budgeting should not be seen as part of the evaluation process; it is only 
an outcome of the policy process and should be considered part of an incentives 
structure and not a purpose itself. However, it is important to bear in mind a concern 
in the Mexican case. If evaluation takes the PbR/SED as incentive, it is likely to 
contradict objectives enacted by the Constitution, at least those related to the social 
sector. According to the first article “all human rights and guarantees for their 
protection noted in this regulation and in international trades cannot be restricted or 
suspended, except when established by the Constitution”. Additionally, article 18 of 
the General law of social development claims that “programmes and public resources 
allocated to social development cannot be reduced, except when established by 
Congress when approving the Federal Budget”.  
  
Moreover, this law enacted that the amount of finances cannot be less than the 
previous year (article 20). Hence, there is a potential risk of threatening the 
Constitution and basic constituencies’ rights when incentives are negative as result of 
evaluation and finances need to be cut back. However, fewer attempts have been 
made to introduce negative incentives when results are not achieved or evaluations 
are not developed. There are no consequences to programmes that have not 
developed the government-ordered evaluations such as the following programmes 
of the Mexican health sector: childcare centers for supporting working mothers, 
reduction of diseases, and improvement of medical facilities, amongst others. In the 
Chilean case, examples of this are the programmes of experimental health centers 
and the national supply center. This raises the question of what coordinators should 
do when policy implementers fail to arrange for evaluations to be conducted?  
 
Despite these problems, the evaluation strategy has continued over time, mainly due 
to the leadership of the MoF. Thus, the reason why evaluation works might be 
because the ministry responsible for the strategy’s coordination is also responsible for 
the budget management. As mentioned in the key questions, evaluation is effective 
on the extent to which the coordinating agency keeps some control through political 
power and the monopoly of finances. Certainly, such political control explains the 
effectiveness of evaluation in some programmes across countries. 
 
From the discussion thus far, it is clear that evaluation is an essential activity 
influenced by politics, and takes place within a political context. Despite bias being 
inevitable sometimes, the scenario where it occurs should be acknowledged for 
closing the policy cycle. In the first place, Knill & Tosun (2012: 175) note a number of 
factors that complicate the process such as the identification of policy goals, 
appropriate definition and measurement of performance indicators, isolation of a 
policy’s effects from other factors, and the political context. These should be identified 
in order to make evaluation more effective. 
 
Secondly, there should be recognition of the stakeholders, bureaucrats, politicians, 
and non-governmental members of policy subsystems, who deal with government 
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issues and the policy [evaluation] in question (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995: 168). Vedung 
(cited in Bundi, 2016: 2) noted that “scholars have completely left the parliament as a 
demander of evaluations out of discussion, although parliamentarians are an 
important stakeholder of evaluations”. In line with this, intervention by constituency, 
researchers, academics, private consultants (consultancy firms), lobbyists, think tanks, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and professional associations of 
evaluators269 as promoters of use of evaluations that advocate collective demands 
and exert power over policies and their policy-makers should be considered. This is 
labelled as the most difficult issue to deal with, due to human factors.  
 
Rationality of political decision-making, evaluation process and personnel are 
interrelated spheres, which depend upon them. Indeed, the findings in Nicholson-
Crotty & Miller’s (2012: 365-6) study of bureaucratic effectiveness influencing 
legislative process shows a positive relation to enhance the policy process. For 
Knoepfel et al. (2007: 243-9 cited in Hill, 2009: 282) the process represents a 
particular form of advice, where information and recommendations are used 
strategically either to support the status quo, to attack policy developments or for 
further changes by governments, and need participation of stakeholders and 
opponents to achieve them.  
 
In this line, the scope of democratic governments is to take off public issues from the 
status quo, which traditionally remains private, as Cochran & Malone (2005: 45-6) 
argue “the political system has a bias in favor of the status quo and will resist the 
addition of new issues to the policy agenda”. By contrast, the role played by interest 
groups mentioned above expands the scope of the programmes into the public arena. 
These groups are “intimately linked to the extent to which democracy itself 
consolidates” (Hague & Harrop, 2004: 177), closing gaps between society and State, 
gaining territory for the transparency of public action, and acting independently 
from the State. Thus, if governments want to be democratic should assume these 
groups as a force interacting with the State.  
 
Thirdly, the predominant use of the implementation theory rather than 
programmatic theory (Weiss, cited in Rogers, 2007: 64) could also be a limitation. The 
former is based on activities, intermediate – also immediate – outcomes, 
practitioners’ assumptions and logic models, whereas the latter adopts a theory-
based evaluation, outcomes, looking at the quality of the theory, alternative causal 
explanations and perspectives, and mechanisms of change. This implementation 
theory might not provide a scientific basis for policy making, which result in bias of 
the outcomes achieved. An example of this is when the results-based budgeting (RbB) 
strategy is considered as the core of policy evaluation.  
 
That is to say, when the RbB (Chile) and PbR/SED (Mexico) are considered the core 
feature of policy evaluation as other countries do, it is clearly assumed the failure 
(effectiveness) of this policy. This is due to the strategy is limited to the intermediate 
outcomes and activities related to the budgetary process as Weiss suggested in the 
implementation theory. Conversely, the programmatic theory or theory-based 
evaluation should be a comprehensive model including all paths taken by evaluation 
results and systems operated by other agencies. This should be a model looking for 
alternative causal explanations of effectiveness based on the State capacity-building 
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For example, the National Academy of Mexican Evaluators (ACEVAL), American Evaluation Association (AEA), and 
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and administrative reforms; a strategy from a perspective of results-based 
management with the aim of consolidating a comprehensive policy evaluation. 
 
Theoretical contributions and policy implications of the thesis 
This dissertation makes a number of contributions to the debate on policy evaluation. 
The first of these relates to the political nature of evaluation. The key for better 
understanding and achieving a successful evaluation process is to bear in mind that 
politics along with ethical issues could affect any attempt to implement an objective 
and scientific method. A key finding of the research is that the political factor in the 
IGR is decisive for the effectiveness of policy evaluation. Recognising political 
constraints is a precondition for usable evaluation research, as Weiss (1993: 94) noted, 
The policies and programmes with which evaluation deals are the creatures of political 
decisions... 
Because evaluation is undertaken in order to feed into decision-making, its reports enter 
the political arena... 
And perhaps least recognized, evaluation itself has a political stance...  
 
To understand the effectiveness [or not] of policy evaluation takes the discussion to 
the public sector reforms in emerging economies and the gap of the State’s capability 
to adopt and implement such policy. As mentioned in the chapter ‘Broadening 
understandings of policy evaluation and effectiveness’, the institutional capability is 
explained in terms of the factors presented here. Significant transformation of the 
government requires changes in the services and programmes delivered, career civil 
service, accountability systems, monitoring and evaluation practices, deregulation, 
transparency and efficiency of public resources. However, evaluation is always 
disruptive and could modify the stability of the programme and the status quo of the 
public agencies in some way. This is a strong reason why bureaucracy is reluctant to 
feedback from evaluations. They find evaluation results as something with negative 
repercussions, which might affect organisational routines. 
 
In developed economies, evaluation did not emerge itself, it needed political support 
given by administrative reforms. Moreover, the “innovative” ideas of the New Public 
Management ‘NPM’ (results-based budgeting, performance evaluation, indicators, 
incentives) have operated in countries widely transparent, with a solid regulatory 
framework and civil service (Arellano, 2002: 14). However, the countries analysed 
here should not be seen as adopting administrative reforms in the same way as 
Dussauge (2009: 449) and Pollit & Bouckaert (2004: 8-9) claim. The stance of these 
scholars is similar to Llerenas & Huerta’s (2004: 233) opinion, who suggest that this 
reform was an intermediate managerialist strategy, 
...it naively assumed that it was possible to arrive at economic, efficient and effective 
government without changing the nature of elite power relations within the state... This 
is because the transformation of administration also requires the transformation of 
politics. 
 
For instance, in the Mexican State, the transformation of the government has been 
difficult to achieve due to presidential control over the governmental apparatus 
(Arellano & Guerrero (2003: 2-3). This characteristic prevails in hybrid regimes due to 
serious weaknesses in the functioning of government, political culture and 
participation (EIU democracy index). The approach adopted in Mexico is about 
building capacity providing institutional remedies to do old things in different ways 
and discover new things that need to be done but cannot eliminate retrograde 
tendencies (Jones & Kettl, 2003: 12) within the system. Although according to this 
index both countries have moved to one regime more likely to a flawed democracy 
characterized by a diverse composition at Congress, competitive elections, less loyalty 
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to the president and transformation of the government apparatus, some political 
control still prevails, which is considered as an institutional factor inhibiting the 
evaluation process.  
 
To balance such political control, the legislative branch should operate as a system of 
opposition and counterbalance of the executive and as a democratic entity 
representing constituency. 270  The findings in Bundi’s research (2016) of the Swiss 
parliament confirm the importance of demand for evaluation by the legislature. 
Indeed, those parliamentarians who request evaluations do so because they want to 
fulfil their oversight function to achieve an accountable government. However, the 
reality is this does not work in practice as full democracies such as Switzerland. In 
these emergent economies, other actors are needed demanding more evaluations’ 
use such as those who belong to the oversight committee inside Congress, the more 
experienced or in a leading position and those having a positive attitude toward 
effectiveness. A reason for this is without opposition parties and leaders, society is less 
able to demand accountability and transparency from the executive.  
 
In this sense, what government in these developing countries has been doing is 
moving through a transformation, which could fully implement the policy evaluation 
and promote government’s efficiency, a “neutral” reform, as Arellano & Guerrero 
(2003: 11) claim ‘that technically improves government efficiency through 
administrative techniques’. For others like Cejudo (2008: 123), referring to the NPM 
experience, the reforms are: 
Timid organisational reforms that may alter the managerial jargon and some practices, but 
do not affect the centralized and hierarchical structure of the public sector, do not grant more 
autonomy to public agencies, [and] do not base budgetary decisions on performance 
assessments… 
 
The evidence shows the RbB does not work as it was thought, so the budget is an 
incentive but not the main objective. Once evaluation arrives at Congress, they 
(deputies) have the decision-making to close the policy cycle but also could take 
different pathways. On the one hand, the evaluation results could be taken for 
better budget decision. On the other hand, they could get rid of the problem or those 
high-risk271 programmes through eliminating or reducing their finances. At the end, 
these are choices made by individuals, whose actions are based on subjective 
judgments in order to obtain particular benefits. An exercise of comparison between 
the budgetary process in Chile and Mexico, shows that they oscillate in the middle of 
the interest group determinism and process of viewing politics of budget (Rubin, 2010: 
354-5). In the “determinism” vision, the interests dominating the budget are 
represented by the weaker or dominant actors.  
 
Another contribution is that in countries with “presidentialism” regime systems such as 
these, the power is on the side of the dominant party, and these dominant actors are 
usually close to the president. Indeed, there will be a clash in the budgetary goals if 
the dominant party is the same of the president representing broad coalitions, 
leaving aside priorities of the narrowed coalitions who hardly try to favour their 
budget goals. This is the “process” viewing centered on budget politics, achieving 
funding to particular programmes through the ability of political actors doing 
tradeoffs and negotiations of the narrow amount of budget negotiable. Following 
                                                          
270
See the results of the Commission of Citizen Participation at Congress (Cardozo, 2006: 206). 
271
Particularly risky those programmes of the social sector, which might influence in a negative way the political 
campaign and ballots (votes). 
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the discussion of the budgetary process, unlike what is commonly known, the 
executive plays a key role in the RbB strategy and allocation of finances. The MoF is 
responsible for the budget tailoring making initial arrangements of allocation of 
resources of each programme.  
 
In this context, the study of Ugalde (2014: 10) is important for the Mexican case. This 
scholar asserts to say that the available amount of finances or the so-called “bolsa 
negociable” at Congress for negotiations during the budgetary process is around 6 to 
10% of the total budget once the MoF elaborates the draft budget. Thus, most of the 
negotiations have taken place inside the executive without any transparency of such 
modifications (increase, cut) in the budget. As this author says “The fact that 90% of 
the budget is allocated does not mean this is ‘unbudgeable’ but Congress turns the 
look over the 10% in order to attain their party’s goals and votes”. So, the differential 
power between actors – budget office, head of ministries, lobbyists, legislators, 
governors and local authorities – has a different level of power depending upon the 
party in the power. 
 
Despite the fragmentation of the budget process and political actors, this has not 
persuaded Congress to use performance data systematically once they receive 
evaluations by the executive. The empirical findings of this study show that 
evaluation use has slightly increased at the agency level (executive) compared to the 
legislative. To some extent, progress can be observed in terms of the strategic 
planning process e.g. programmes are better aligned to national objectives. Indeed, 
in both countries most of the recommendations implemented and recurrent over 
time are related to the design of the programme as indicated in the comparative 
chapter. Furthermore, some agencies are using evaluation and performance data to 
make internal management decisions. This is the reason to refer to this strategy as 
policy evaluation instead of results-based budgeting. Moreover, based on empirical 
findings, depending on the extent to which evaluation is constrained to the budget 
process and decisions are limited to the allocation of government grants, the strategy 
has failed.  
 
Despite a low rate of effectiveness, in a broad perspective, evaluation has been 
slightly effective because results have been used – marginally – as a deliberate effort 
to improve programmes. The theoretical arguments of this thesis suggest that the 
policy evaluation should be linked to incentives such as RbB, considering what 
Wiesner (2002: 138) suggests, to develop a real demand-led evaluation system.  
 
Limitations and recommendations 
As a consequence of the methodology, the scale of this research has been limited in 
terms of the comparative perspective of the countries reviewed while the focus was 
also limited to the health sector programmes operating at the central level 
addressing the question of whether a cross-national comparison of the evaluations of 
the health sector might be used to infer or generalize findings to other sectors. 
However, the results offered here only could provide possible explanatory reasons 
about why some policy evaluations perform better than others. Additionally, the 
study encountered a limitation regarding the interviews of the Chilean bureaucracy, 
politicians and academics due to restrictions of resources. To compensate for these 
limitations, a documentary analysis of evaluation was conducted based on a large 
database, government material, indexes and international organisations reports with 
the aim of looking towards a patterned variation in the occurrence of the 
effectiveness of policy evaluation in countries with similar conditions. 
~ 167 ~ 
 
 
 
One of the main problems in operationalising “effectiveness” concerned the analysis 
of the recommendations outlined in the so-called agency statements, which are the 
only resource publicly available to provide evidence of the extent to which agents 
have responded to evaluations. However, agency statements are not easily accessible, 
even in some cases evaluations, in practice, these documents are uploaded in pdf 
format in a data repository not in a database system as specified in regulations. One 
of the consequences resulting from this rigid format is that these documents are easily 
interchangeable with one another with the risk to reformulate recommendations 
from those reported by evaluators and deadlines previously committed as noted in 
the case study chapters.  
 
Moreover, the review of results to these working reports and agency statements in 
pdf format could jeopardize the following-up process. In some way, these issues are 
the reason to code the subvariable of technical operationalisation of M&E system for 
both countries as an outcome absent due to these gaps identified. Therefore, what 
would be needed to have done this better is to improve the M&E system, particularly 
in terms of the IT platform. This would have facilitated the technical 
operationalisation of the variable, addressing the problem of missing data and 
recommendations. It also needs to manage the vast amount of information produced 
by diverse agencies such as the Mexican M&E system in an only database.  
 
Another remaining gap which could bias the operationalising effectiveness is the 
acceptance of results by those programmes evaluated. To fill such gap each response 
by decision-makers was considered in order to classify each recommendation with the 
criteria for judging the effectiveness. Last but not least important was the decision to 
operationalise the concept of effectiveness, for which an effective and feasible 
approach was taken instead of a complex conceptualisation offered by scholars as 
explained in the methodology chapter, in order to determine whether programme 
operators use evaluations to lead changes on programmes. 
 
What are the implications of this study for the central problem investigated here 
whether policy evaluation is effective across these countries? The evidence of this 
study calls into question claims that policy evaluation is effective, highlighting instead 
a low rate of evaluations utilised in the policy making process. Nonetheless, it is 
important to look around the context of policy evaluation. From another perspective, 
there is a slightly better result of effectiveness in the Mexican than the Chilean policy 
evaluation, which has been considered a model system to be adopted by other 
emerging economies such as Mexico. Moreover, significant improvements have taken 
place in government, enhancing planning, use of evaluations and boosting 
evaluation culture, including changing behaviour of actors.  
 
Indeed, regarding exclusion of the judicial and legislative branches to perform any 
evaluation (e.g. object under evaluation), the Mexican Congress has taken an 
important step forward on this. At the beginning of year 2017, it was enacted an 
agreement to implement the Performance Evaluation System within the Chamber of 
Deputies,272 which represent a relevant effort by Congress to be accountable of their 
performance. This effort is coherent with initiatives launched by international 
organisations and professional associations of evaluators such as Eval Partners, which 
support the parliamentarians’ movement for evaluation273 through the key principles 
                                                          
272
Official Journal, 06/03/2017. 
273
https://www.evalpartners.org/globalparliamentariansforum/background   
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of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) “No one left behind” and the Global 
Evaluation Agenda 2016-2020. See also “Ten reasons for parliamentarians to engage 
in evaluation policy process”274 
 
Future studies should include a number of large-scale countries’ evaluations and 
wider policy sectors e.g. education, energy, social, to discuss the extent to which these 
sectors follow the same pattern of effectiveness as the health sector analysed here. 
Such empirical findings will contribute to confirm whether effectiveness of policy 
evaluation is extensive to all sectors for further generalizations. Most importantly, this 
thesis highlights the relevance of looking at other factors (see chapter ‘Broadening 
understandings of policy evaluation and effectiveness’) for understanding how and 
whether these factors could change the results, particularly, the need to bring 
questions of leadership, power and control into the analysis to ensure a 
comprehensive perspective. 
 
The understanding of major similarities and differences of independent variables 
across countries has potential for prediction once generalizations are validated. 
Similarly to deductive reasoning and what Hague & Harrop (2004: 70) pointed out 
‘The ability to predict is not only a sign of systematic knowledge but it also gives some 
base for drawing lessons across countries’. These government experiences will help to 
draw inferences about causes of policy evaluation stagnation or possible explanatory 
reasons about why some policies are more effective than others. 
 
Final statements 
This thesis has contributed to the theoretical field of evaluation in discussing whether 
policy evaluation is effective across countries, raising the question what is evaluation 
if nobody wants to take it for further decision-making in the policy process? A central 
strand might be to construct better programme theories (Weiss, 2007: 78), as the 
backbone for public policy process and interventions. For this, the research questions 
have been answered with a clear statement for each question. It is therefore 
important to reinforce some statements for the acknowledgement of the significance 
of the study. For instance, evaluation has become a commonplace across 
governments but still faces resistance by decision-makers due to several factors 
already discussed here. These factors jeopardize the effectiveness of policy evaluation. 
Therefore, the wider significance of this research is on the extent it can enter into 
political arenas as ammunition for debate.  
 
With the aim to impact political stances and influencing the way policy evaluation is 
conducted by actors and to maximise its use for decision-making, legitimise and give 
direction to political decisions, and to acknowledge the topic, as Weiss (2004: 161) 
affirms “Utility is what evaluation is all about”, the government reforms should move 
forward to develop a wider policy evaluation, using performance information and 
ensuring the effectiveness (modifications, funding, cancellation or learning process) of 
evaluation in the policy process.275  
 
Moreover, to enhance the use of evidence, Walter et al. (2005: 352-4) suggest having 
collaborative and interactive communication between researchers and policy-
makers to ‘test out’ findings within local contexts, to offer technical, financial, 
                                                          
274
http://www.pfde.net/images/pdf/101.pdf  
275
In the beginning, Medina (2007: 26-7) points out that ‘external evaluation was performed for accountability and 
transparency purposes, not for linking results with the budgetary decision making, planning or learning process’. 
However, many political issues influenced this transformation. 
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organisational and emotional support as well as to include incentives for promoting 
research use and enabling debate about implications. However, these scholars’ 
suggestions are also those that are most resources intensive such as partnership 
development – to strengthen the IGR –, well-funded facilitative programmes and 
multifaceted interventions (Walter et al., 2005: 355). 
 
Morever and based on the assumption that evaluation emerges more effectively in a 
context of financial crisis, therefore, it is fundamental to know about those 
programmes performing well for better and efficient decision-making concerning the 
allocation of finances. In fact, governments are facing spending constraints and 
shrinking financial incomes, for instance, México depends upon oil income, but this is 
currently a downturn due to the need of financial resources for exploration of new oil 
fields and drilling in deepwater fields, amongst others. The lack of funds constitutes a 
strong device for strengthening effectiveness in the public agenda. In the experiences 
studied here, what makes the difference between governments is the institutional 
capabilities such as leadership, technical and practical skills, knowledge, experience, 
institutional efficiency and the modernization of the public management, amongst 
others.  
 
In a wider perspective, these governments also need to understand that the strategic 
planning process is the best way for economic growth, transparency and 
accountability. Conversely, a poor process would have a negative impact on the 
budget. In this sense, evaluation should impact values, judgements and priorities of 
policy-makers more accurately, ensuring that evaluative facts and better knowledge 
influence the trade-offs in decisions. Evaluation will be effective when it is based on a 
consensus among political and non-political actors and when the government 
machinery is centred upon outcomes facing resistances from those supporting the 
status quo.  
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List of acronyms 
APF: Federal Public Administration (Administración Pública Federal). 
ASF: Federal Superior Audit (Auditoría Superior de la Federación).  
CONACYT: National Council of Science and Technology (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia 
y Tecnología). 
CONEVAL: National Evaluation Council of the Social Development Policy (Consejo 
Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social). 
COSEFF: Monitoring and Control Financial System of the Federal Public Expenditure. 
EIU: The Economist Intelligence Unit.  
FY: Fiscal Year 
IGR: Intra Governmental and Interagency Relationships. 
LOAPF: Federal Government Organic Law (Ley Orgánica de la Administración 
Pública Federal). 
OIC: Internal Audit and Control Units (Órganos Internos de Control). 
MoF: Ministry of Finance. 
PbR/SED: Results-based Budgeting and Performance Evaluation System. 
PEF: Federal Expenditure Budget (Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación). 
PND: National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo). 
RbB: Results-based Budgeting. 
SECODAM: Ministry of the Controllership and Administrative Development 
(Secretaría de Contraloría y Desarrollo Administrativo). 
SECOGEF: Ministry of the General Controller of the Federation (Secretaría de la 
Contraloría General de la Federación). 
SFP: Ministry of Public Administration (Secretaría de la Función Pública).  
SICEG: System for Government Monitoring and Evaluation (Sistema de Control y 
Evaluación Gubernamental). 
SIG: Management Indicator System (Sistema de Indicadores de Gestión). 
SIMEP: Presidential Goals’ System (Sistema de Metas Presidenciales). 
SHCP: Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito 
Público). 
SNPD: National Democratic Planning System (Sistema Nacional de Planeación 
Democrática).  
SPP: Ministry of Planning and Budget (Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto). 
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List of interviews  
 
MEXICO   
IM1 Senior Official, ASF, February 20, 2014 
IM2 Middle-Level Official, SHCP, February 24, 2014 
IM3 Senior Official, SSA, February 24, 2014 
IM4 Middle-Level Official, SHCP, February 25, 2014 
IM5 Senior Official, SSA, February 26, 2014 
IM6 Middle-Level Official, SSA, February 26, 2014 
IM7 Middle-Level Official, SNDIF, February 27, 2014 
IM8 Former Deputy, March 9, 2014 
IM9 Deputy, Budget Commission, March 13, 2014 
IM10 Middle-Level Official, CEFP, March 13, 2014 
IM11 Deputy, March 13, 2014 
IM12 Middle-Level Official, STPS, March 18, 2014 
IM13 Deputy, Oversight Commission, March 25, 2014 
IM14 Deputy, Budget Commission, March 25, 2014 
IM15 Deputy, March 26, 2014 
IM16 Deputy advisor, March 27, 2014 
IM17 Middle-Level Official, SFP, March 14, 2014 
IM18 Middle-Level Official, SFP, March 15, 2014 
IM19 Middle-Level Official, SFP, March 27, 2014 
  
CHILE 
IC1 Deputy, Health Commission, June 13, 2014 
IC2 Deputy, Budget Commission, August 7, 2014 
IC3 Senior Official, Ministry of Health, August 19, 2014 
IC4 Academic expert, University of Chile, September 9, 2014 
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Annex 1 
 
Measurement of independent variables  
 
 
 
Note: 0 = condition low/outcome absent; 1 = condition high/outcome present.  
Source: author’s own elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variabl
e 
Intra-governmental relations 
Quality 
of 
bureaucr
acy 
Level of democracy Policy evaluation framework Degree of autonomy 
Indicator 
Forms of 
coordination 
 
Information 
Economic 
resources 
(treasure) 
Government 
effectiveness 
(WB) 
Authoritarian 
regimes/ 
hybrid or 
flawed 
democracy 
Full 
democrac
y 
Coherence in the design Structure of monitoring and evaluation system 
Policy 
autonomy 
Financial 
autonomy 
Legal 
autonomy 
Sub-
indicator 
Strong/weak
-minimum  
Availability 
of data 
Timin
g 
Reliability 
and 
quality 
Even/Uneven 
Matching 
policy 
evaluation 
objectives 
and 
outcomes 
Overlap 
with 
regulation
s 
Holding 
hearings 
of interest 
groups 
 
Technical 
operationalizati
on  
EASY/DIFFICU
LT 
Perception of 
operationalizati
on 
EASY/DIFFICU
LT 
Methodological 
rigor 
High/Low High/Low High/Low 
Méxic
o 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
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Annex 2 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY EVALUATION 
This questionnaire is part of the research strategy to find out the differences in the 
effectiveness of policy evaluation across countries. Therefore, your point of view is high 
valuable for understanding of the way in which evaluation is managed across countries. 
Thanks for your response. 
1. Gender:        F            M  
2. What is your scholar degree? BA              MA              PhD              Another   
3. Job position  
4. How many years of experience do you have? 
 In government  
 In the evaluation area   
5. What is your role regarding programmes’ evaluation? 
 
 
 
6. Can you describe the framework of policy evaluation (Annual Evaluation 
Programme, mechanism to follow recommendations, time of execution, 
coordination between the executive and legislative)? 
 
 
 
7. Can you describe your programme/institution’s approach to developing and 
implementing evaluation?  
 
 
   
8. Do you utilise evaluation results?                        YES         NO 
9. For what purpose do you use them?  
 
Questionnaire: The effectiveness of policy evaluation. 
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10. At what stage of the policy process? 
 
11. Is the data resulting from the evaluation? 
Available on time 
Reliable 
Good quality 
12. Please describe whether and in what ways the following factors have facilitated or 
hindered the development of evaluation in your programme/institution?   
Economic resources 
Human resources  
Time 
Evaluation system 
13. How does the relationship between the strategy coordinators and your institution 
influence the effectiveness of evaluation? 
 
14. How does the relationship between Congress and your institution influence the 
effectiveness of evaluation? 
 
15. Can you describe the form of coordination between the executive and the 
legislative regarding evaluation?  
 
 
16. Considering that autonomy is when the public agency can decide for itself which 
matters it considers most important and that decisions concerning policy-making 
are independent and not subject to influence from by factors and actors, can you 
describe the level of autonomy do you have regarding evaluation? 
 
 
 
Questionnaire: The effectiveness of policy evaluation. 
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Annex 3 
 
Office letter 1761. DIPRES in Chile 
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Annex 4 
 
Evaluation systems and monitoring practices in Mexico 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluations 
(performance 
and legality of 
public 
resources)
System for 
Government Control 
and Evaluation (SICEG)
‘Career Civil Service’ 
Performance 
Evaluation Subsystem
Performance 
Agreements (State 
enterprises)
Results based 
Budgeting (PbR)
Performance 
Evaluation 
System (SED)
Budgetary-programmatic 
evaluations  (quarterly)
Economic evaluation of 
incomes and expenses
Evaluation of 
social sector
Evaluation 
of 
education 
sector
Indicators of 
government 
performance
Management 
indicators 
approval
Performance 
indicators 
approval
Evaluation of 
programmes 
(budgetary)
Federal 
Expenditure 
Budget 
(financial year)
Incentives 
(negative/positive)
Performance Model 
of Control and 
Oversight Bodies 
(MIDO)
Environmental
impact
evaluation
Evaluation 
of climate 
change
Evaluation
of social 
impact
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Annex 5 
 
Healthcare programmes of Maule 
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Annex 6 
 
Healthcare programmes of Osorno 
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Annex 7 
Source: author’s own elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
~ 209 ~ 
 
 
 
Annex 8 
 
 
Categories of recommendations across countries 
 
 
 
 
 
DESIGN OF 
THE 
PROGRAMME
PROCESS OF 
THE 
PROGRAMME
ACTIVITIES 
LINKED TO 
THE STAFF 
AND 
PROGRAMME 
OPERATORS
TO DEVELOP 
A SPECIFIC 
EVALUATION 
OR 
ANALYSIS
COORDINATI
ON AND 
SYNERGIES
IT SYSTEMS
PROGRAMME
’S 
SATISFACTIO
N SURVEY
TO 
PUBLICIZE, 
PROMOTION 
AND MEDIA
ISSSTE/EMERGE
NCY 
HEALTHCARE
EVALUATION 
SPECIFIC OF 
PERFORMANCE
To include indicators 
(MIR) of impact, 
services provided, 
management and 
quality of service
X
COST 
EFFECTIVENESS
To modify the goals 
according to the 
reality of the 
programme
X
implementation of a 
pilot to standardize 
the triage model in the 
emergency areas
X
To include more 
indicadors and modify 
the main one
X
To develop a design 
or impact evaluation X
SSA/HEALTH 
SERVICES 
PROVIDED 
ACROSS 
DIFFERENT 
MEDICAL SITES
SPECIFIC OF 
PERFORMANCE 
(EED)
Implementing an IT 
system for monitoring 
the services provided 
and results per unit 
and at local level
X
To optimize the 
outpatient services 
according to the 
capacity of the 
hospital
X
To finish the regional 
hospitals under 
construction
X
To implement specif ic 
indicators of quality 
and programme 
satisfaction per unit 
and services 
provided
X
DESIGN
To amend the problem 
that the programme 
w ould tackle
X
The evaluator 
suggested to 
consider a proposal 
for the problem that 
the programme w ould 
tackle
X
To improve indicators 
(MIR) X
To make coherent the 
design of the MIR X
To quantify the 
potential of the 
recipients of 
programmes
X
SSA/PROGRAM
ME FOR 
VULNERABLE 
PEOPLE AND 
FAMILIES
OF 
CONSISTENCY 
AND RESULTS 
(ECR)
To develop national 
and international 
research to show  the 
correlation betw een 
the programme and 
services provided
X
To improve indicators 
(MIR) X
To modify the problem 
that the programme 
w ould tackle
X
To quantify the 
programme’s 
recipients
X
Implementation of a 
costs system X
The development of 
strategic plans at the 
short, medium and 
long term
X
An analysis of the 
synergies betw een 
the programme and 
others
X
To update of the 
diagnostic w hich 
stresses the problem 
that the programme 
w ould tackle
X
SPECIFIC OF 
PERFORMANCE 
(EED)
To quantify the 
potential of 
programme’s 
recipients
X
To develop an ECR X
To develop an 
evaluation of impact X
Subprogrammes, 
strategies and 
activities needed to 
be reorganized for 
better coordination
X
To include the SSA 
and SNDIF into the 
decision-making 
process to group the 
subprogrammes for 
better institutional 
planning
X
To coordinate the 
strategic planning 
actions at the local 
level
X
To improve 
coordination betw een 
the child defence 
programme and the 
Ministry of Social 
Development 
(SEDESOL)
X
MEXICAN HEALTH SECTOR
Status Quo  category
CATEGORIES OF RECOMMENDATIONS
AGENCY/ 
PROGRAMME
TYPE OF 
EVALUATION
RECOMMENDATI
ON IMPROVED
RECOMMENDATI
ON NOT 
IMPROVED
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IMSS/PROGRA
MME OF 
PROVISION OF 
HEALTHCARE 
SERVICES
SPECIFIC OF 
PERFORMANCE 
(EED)
To include 
performance 
indicators (MIR) per 
medical unit
X
Implementation of 
preventive actions 
targeting teenagers, 
male and elderly 
people
X
Inclusion of indicators 
to measure such 
preventive actions
X
Measurement of the 
rate of mortality of 
breast cancer
X
Further increase the 
goal established for 
the detection of 
breast cancer in 
w omen by 25%
X
SSA/PREVENTI
ON OF 
ADDICTIONS
DESIGN
The development of 
operating rules 
(Reglas de Operación 
’ROP’) and guidelines 
for the programme
X
The improvement of 
indicators (MIR) X
The implementation of 
a data system to 
exchange information 
w ith programmes 
w ith complementary 
actions
X
Programme operators 
should consider the 
three main problems 
(tobacco, alcohol and 
drugs) to strengthen 
the services provided
X
Including gender 
strategies and 
recipients living in 
rural areas and 
immigrants
X
SSA-SNDIF/FOR 
PROTECTION 
AND 
INTEGRATED 
DEVELOPMENT 
OF CHILDHOOD
SPECIFIC OF 
PERFORMANCE 
(EED)
A diagnostic of the 
programme, w hich 
serves to validate its 
operation
X
The development of 
an impact evaluation X
The quantif ication of 
the programme 
recipients
X
The establishment of 
a standardized 
process to select the 
programme recipients
X
To publicize the 
programme and its 
results
X
The development of a 
strategic plan for the 
short, medium and 
long term
X
To identify the 
services provided to 
the programme 
recipients
X
To use the data 
census to quantify 
the programme 
recipients
X
To develop a 
diagnostic per each 
state of the problem 
that the programme 
w ould tackle
X
The quantif ication of 
the programme 
recipients based on 
the measurements of 
poverty
X
To strengthen 
synergies w ith the 
ministry of social 
development to 
coordinate efforts to 
tackle the problem
X
The homogenization 
of the operation of 
the mechanism of 
social protection at 
local level
X
SSA/PREVENTI
ON AGAINST 
OBESITY
DESIGN
The improvement of 
indicators (MIR) X
The inclusion of those 
indicators related to 
the gender 
perspective
X
The development of 
regulation, guidelines, 
operating rules and 
monitoring system to 
operate the 
programme
X
Amended programmes
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SSA/NATIONAL 
CRUSADE FOR 
THE QUALITY 
OF HEALTH 
PROVISION
DESIGN NO DATA NO DATA
OF 
CONSISTENCY 
AND RESULTS 
(ECR)
NO DATA NO DATA
SSA/EQUITABL
E FUNDING OF 
HEALTH 
PROVISION
SPECIFIC OF 
PERFORMANCE 
(EED)
To homogenize the 
problem that the 
programme w ould 
tackle in the diverse 
documents issued by 
the agency
X
To improve indicators 
(MIR) X
To improve 
coordination and 
responsibilities 
betw een the different 
units operating the 
programme
X
To implement a data 
system including 
impact indicators and 
results of the 
programme
X
To develop strategic 
plans at the short, 
medium and long term
X
To establish a 
procedure of 
accountability and 
transparency of the 
programme
X
IMSS/ 
EFFICIENT 
CURATIVE 
CARE
COST 
EFFECTIVENESS
To develop an 
evaluation of 
consistency and 
results
X
To improve the data 
system of the 
programme to timely 
results
X
Training of medical 
units in the 
methodology of 
logical framew ork
X
The medical units 
should be faster to 
open the cost centers
X
The medical units 
should coordinate the 
catalogue of the cost 
centers w ith other 
departments or 
agencies
X
To develop the 
regulatory framew ork 
of the cost centers
X
To include all the 
elements needed to 
develop the cost 
centers study
X
To upgrade the cost 
of the dietetic and 
nutrition center
X
To refine and update 
the accountable and 
budgetary categories
X
To consolidate the 
data system of 
results and effects of 
the medical 
interventions
X
To develop indicators 
related to quality of 
the life of the 
recipients
X
To use the model of 
territorial distribution 
of the effects for the 
purpose of 
developing indicators
X
To link the indicators 
of hospital mortality to 
matters such as 
demography, 
diseases and 
disorders
X
The policy operators 
should consider the 
behavioural patterns 
of cost-effectiveness 
made by other 
departments and 
centers
X
To define the 
universe of diseases 
to be monitored 
based on the cost-
effectiveness 
approach
X
To generalise the 
actions to all health 
centers to improve 
the quality in services
X
PROCESS
To develop indicators 
linked to chronic 
degenerative 
diseases
X
To strengthen the 
connection of the 
programming, 
budgeting and 
provision of services
X
To supervise the 
process of check-up 
and medical 
examination
X
To improve the IT 
system X
To develop studies of 
medical management, 
audits and provision 
of sanitary services
X
To revise the correct 
allocation of 
economic, human and 
material resources to 
provide quality in the 
health services
X
TOTAL 
MEXICO
39 43 36 22 1 8 8 6 0 1
Cancelled programmes
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UNDERSECRETA
RY OF THE 
HEALTHCARE 
NETWORK/EXPE
RIMENTAL 
HEALTH 
CENTRES
COMPREHENSIV
E SPENDING 
REVIEW (ECG)
The consideration of 
a specif ic model and 
methodology by other 
agencies to be 
compared w ith the 
programme
X
Implementing a costs’ 
system to improve 
budgetary control, 
f inancial management 
and programming 
activities
X
Restructuring medical 
sites, homogenising 
w ith other sites in the 
health sector
X
Updating the 
remuneration system X
Training of 
executives X
Transferring of the 
programme funds 
timely
X
Transparency of the 
transferring process X
Considering a 
specif ic model 
(CRSCO and Hospital 
L. Tisné) to be 
duplicated in other 
medical sites
X
Improving 
coordination betw een 
agencies to enhance 
the implementation of 
health policies
X
Focusing the 
strategic planning on 
specif ic issues
X
To delegate to a 
professional of the 
department of 
Management Control 
the responsibility of 
the institutional 
management
X
The improvement of 
the health centres X
To design and use 
specif ic indicators 
(MIR)
X
To define the scope 
of management of the 
health centres
X
Implementing a model 
for recipients and the 
f inancial model of the 
programme
X
To include the 
strategic objectives to 
all health centres
X
To implement 
Responsibility 
Centres
X
To implement the 
model GRD X
To improve IT 
systems X
To revise w hich 
model is more 
eff icient to provide 
emergency services
X
To implement 
performance 
indicators of human 
resources
X
To strengthen the 
evaluation mechanism X
To evaluate the 
participation of the 
health centres w ith 
the academia
X
To implement a 
programme 
satisfaction survey
X
To transfer the 
programme 
satisfaction survey to 
other services
X
Status Quo  category
CHILEAN HEALTH SECTOR
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FONASA/PURCH
ASE FROM 
PRIVATE 
SECTOR
EVALUATION OF 
PUBLIC 
PROGRAMMES 
(EPG)
The inclusion of 
evaluations from 
other medical units
X
Developing a forecast 
of the demand for the 
medical services
X
Strengthening audit 
activities and a study 
of costs
X
The improvement of 
indicators (MIR) X
Implementing a 
monitoring system X
Implementing a 
monitoring system 
(similar to previous)
X
Developing a 
comparative analysis 
of costs of the 
provision of services 
betw een the public 
and private sector
X
Restructuring the 
process of public 
bidding and 
procurement
X
Outlining of the set of 
deficiencies of the 
programme
X
Strengthening the 
programme X
Developing some 
mechanisms of 
evaluation of internal 
management of the 
programme
X
UNDERSECRETA
RY OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH/NATIO
NAL 
PROGRAMME 
OF 
SUPPLEMENTA
RY FOOD
EVALUATION OF 
PUBLIC 
PROGRAMMES 
(EPG)
Reformulating the 
programme’s aim 
according to the 
activities really 
performed and the 
inclusion of health 
services for people 
w ith obesity
X
Establishing 
interagency 
coordination and 
synergies w ith other 
programmes
X
To develop a cost-
benefit and feasibility 
analyses
X
To develop IT 
systems and 
strengthen of the 
human resources
X
To develop a 
monitoring system of 
indicators (MIR)
X
To develop a market 
research of products 
for better public 
bidding and 
procurement
X
To monitor of 
programme’s 
satisfaction
X
To develop a market 
research of dairy 
products considering 
international public 
bidding
X
Making a 
benchmarking studies 
of the impact of poor 
nutrition
X
Forecasting the 
demand of health 
services to improve 
the budgetary 
process of the 
programme
X
UNDERSECRETA
RY OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH/NATIO
NAL 
PROGRAMME 
OF 
IMMUNIZATION
S
EVALUATION OF 
PUBLIC 
PROGRAMMES 
(EPG)
Establishing a system 
for monitoring 
vaccine w astage and 
analysis of the 
overpurchase 
process
X
Strengthening and 
promoting of the IT 
system
X
Improving the budget 
system and f inancial 
managment including 
a control mechanism 
of the public bidding 
process and 
procurement
X
To be aw are of the 
demographic and 
epidemiological 
changes affecting the 
programme
X
To establish an 
annual programme of 
staff training
X
To publicize of the 
programme per year X
To improve 
coordination betw een 
areas inside the 
agency
X
To develop a study to 
qualitatively measure 
the operation of the 
recipients in terms of 
vaccination
X
To quantify the 
programme recipients X
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FONASA, 
UNDERSECRETA
RY OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH AND 
OF 
HEALTHCARE 
NETWORKS/OF 
TREATMENT OF 
OBESITY
EVALUATION OF 
PUBLIC 
PROGRAMMES 
(EPG)
The improvement of 
interagency 
coordination w ith 
other sector 
programmes w ith 
similar objectives
X
The implementation of 
a study of cost-
effectiveness for the 
medical and surgical 
treatment
X
The improvement of 
indicators (MIR) X
The improvement of 
techniques to 
measure the 
programme
X
Implementing a 
monitoring system X
Expanding the 
number of recipients X
Developing a 
database system to 
register recipients
X
UNDERSECRETA
RY OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH/COMM
ISSION OF 
PREVENTIVE 
MEDICINE AND 
DISABILITY
COMPREHENSIV
E SPENDING 
REVIEW (ECG)
The development of a 
feasibility and 
economic impact 
analyses
X
The implementation of 
an IT system for 
processing health 
services online, 
w hich includes the 
registration of time 
employed in activities 
and processes
X
Increasing the hours 
of specialists doing 
expert’s report of 
medical leaves
X
Establishing a 
guideline to define 
days to rest up per 
pathology
X
Identifying tendency 
of doctors w ho 
issued a high number 
of medical leaves
X
Increasing audits for 
checking compliance 
of days to rest up 
through home visits
X
Increasing the 
number of months for 
calculating the income 
to pay medical leaves
X
Developing a risk 
indicator of medical 
leaves
X
Developing a study 
measuring time to 
process medical 
leaves
X
Implementing a 
manual of procedures 
of all health services 
of the commission
X
Establishing an audit 
programme of the 
provision of the sub-
products
X
The implementation of 
the human resources 
policy established in 
the modernization 
plan
X
The completion of the 
transferring process 
of personnel to other 
agencies
X
The development of a 
study of the staff 
size
X
The process to 
transfer funds should 
be timely
X
The distribution of 
economic resources 
should be per region 
and disaggregated 
per item
X
To move off ices to 
new  facilities X
Implementing a 
management model in 
tw o regions
X
The development of a 
technical feasibility 
study of transferring 
some health services 
to other agencies
X
The implementation of 
the electronic medical 
license
X
The department 
(CCAF) should not 
receive incomplete 
forms of medical 
leaves
X
Amended programmes
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UNDERSECRETA
RY OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH/OF 
PREVENTION 
AND CONTROL 
OF HIV
EVALUATION OF 
PUBLIC 
PROGRAMMES 
(EPG)
The establishment of 
a unit to coordinate all 
sector agencies
X
To strengthen 
preventive actions to 
vulnerable recipients
X
To implement a 
multisectoral 
collaboration in the 
preventive strategy
X
To develop a 
mechanism to 
strengthen citizenry 
participation
X
To assure that the 
preventive actions 
have enough 
economic resources 
to meet their goals
X
To find a funding 
mechanism to have a 
stock of condoms to 
vulnerable recipients
X
To proceed w ith the 
preventive test of HIV X
To strengthen an 
integrated healthcare 
model of HIV
X
To continue 
developing specif ic 
studies used for 
evaluations and the 
redesign of strategies
X
To decentralize the 
decisions related to 
therapies and control 
of stock
X
To improve the 
mechanism of 
purchase and pay of 
medicines and other 
medical consumables
X
To link the IT system 
to register statistics 
and health data
X
NATIONAL 
HEALTH FUND 
(FONASA)/NATI
ONAL HEALTH 
FUND
COMPREHENSIV
E SPENDING 
REVIEW (ECG)
The improvement of 
indicators (MIR) of six 
different types (one 
recommendation per 
indicator)
X
The improvement of 
indicators (MIR) of six 
different types (one 
recommendation per 
indicator)
X
The improvement of 
indicators (MIR) of six 
different types (one 
recommendation per 
indicator)
X
The improvement of 
indicators (MIR) of six 
different types (one 
recommendation per 
indicator)
X
The improvement of 
indicators (MIR) of six 
different types (one 
recommendation per 
indicator)
X
The improvement of 
indicators (MIR) of six 
different types (one 
recommendation per 
indicator)
X
The development of 
an analysis of the 
strategic agency 
goals
X
The development of a 
profile of personnel 
required
X
The development of 
mechanisms to 
transfer f inancial 
resources
X
The availability of 
data to the center 
desk
X
The list of recipients X
The development of a 
f iscal system X
The improvement of 
w orkload planif ication X
The development of a 
diagnostic of the 
agency tasks
X
The development of a 
comprehensive IT 
healthcare system
X
The development of 
an audit system X
The monitoring of 
w aiting time and 
patient queues in 
medical services
X
The development of a 
mechanism to control 
the programme costs
X
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Source: author’s own elaboration. 
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CENABAST/NAT
IONAL SUPPLY 
CENTER
COMPREHENSIV
E SPENDING 
REVIEW (ECG)
To keep running tw o 
main activities, w hich 
represent the core 
business of the 
programme
X
To include the job 
position of contract 
management at the 
same level of 
importance than the 
other positions
X
To review  the 
contracts w ith 
customers and 
suppliers
X
To strengthen the 
programme of f iscal 
discipline
X
To calculate the fee 
charged by the 
center
X
To redefine the vision 
of the programme X
To develop the 
activity of logistic 
support
X
To consider the 
proposal of logistic 
support made by the 
evaluator
X
To improve the 
activities to storage 
medicines
X
To pay off debts w ith 
suppliers X
UNDERSECRETA
RY OF 
HEALTHCARE 
NETWORKS/NE
WBORN 
HEALTH 
SUPPORT
EVALUATION OF 
PUBLIC 
PROGRAMMES 
(EPG)
Transferring of all 
health services of 
this programme to the 
programme of 
biopsychosocial 
support
X
Developing an 
assessment by the 
Ministry of Health and 
Ministry of 
Cooperation and 
Planning regarding 
the conditions of the 
Chilean childhood to 
strengthen its 
development
X
Transferring roles 
and functions to the 
programme of 
biopsychosocial 
support
X
Including in the 
current hospital 
services some 
logistic improvements, 
the control of storage 
of medicines (quantity 
and quality) and the 
improvement of the 
activity of logistic 
support
X
Developing a 
satisfaction survey 
once the new  
database of 
programme recipients 
has been defined
X
Redefining the 
quantif ication of the 
programme recipients 
based on new  criteria 
to set those 
recipients
X
TOTAL 
CHILE
57 72 18 59 9 20 6 12 4 1
TOTAL 96 115 54 81 10 28 14 18 4 2
Cancelled programmes
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Table 1 
Planning, control, monitoring and evaluation practices in Mexico 
 
 
 
 
Government 
institution/System/Regulation 
Year of 
publication 
Objectives/Goals Year of 
conclusion 
Arguments/ 
Reasons for disappearance 
Special Efficiency Commissions [Comisiones 
Especiales de Eficiencia] 
1926 To organize public services to streamline government 
agencies. 
No data available SPP, 1988 
General Planning of the Republic Law [Ley 
sobre Planeación General de la República] 
1930 To establish the National Planning Office as an advisor. To 
coordinate government institutions’ activities regarding 
geographic, economic and social characteristics. 
No data available SPP, 1988. Oropeza, 2005: 85 
Programme Commission of the ‘Partido 
Nacional Revolucionario’  
1933 Integrated by government officials and party members, 
which were responsible for the 1st. Sexennial Plan. 
1940 This was not an economic 
development plan. The Plan and 
Programme Commission were 
dissolved in the next administration. 
Sexennial Plan 1934-1940 1933 To establish a first planning plan by the National 
Revolutionary Party. 
1940 
Special Advisor Committee [Comité Asesor 
Especial] 
1935 To coordinate national planning policies, it was created by 
the President Lázaro Cardenas  
1940 
Sexennial Plan 1940-1946 
 
1940 This is the last military government (post-revolutionary). In 
those years emerged the first efforts to assess public 
resources.  
1946 SPP, 1988 
Industrial Development Fund [Fondo para el 
Fomento Industrial] 
1941 To support industrial sector and the ‘Bank of Mexico’ was 
responsible for it. 
1944 This lacked of funds to promote 
enterprises and disappeared shortly 
afterwards due to the Industrial 
Commission. 
Federal Commission of Economic Planning 
[Comisión Federal de Planificación 
Económica]  
1942 Agency of the Ministry of National Economy. No data available SPP, 1988 
Federal Industrial Development 
Commission [Comisión Federal de Fomento 
Industrial]  
1944 For planning industrial development in the country and 
promoting of new industries. It was created to strength 
activities coordinated by the Industrial Fund. 
1947 Transformations driven under this 
Commission was hampered by two 
factors: technical staff and public 
funding. It was replaced by the 
Investment Commission. 
Ministry of National Property and 
Administrative Inspection [Secretaría de 
Bienes Nacionales e Inspección 
Administrativa] 
1946 To coordinate management performance of government 
institutions.  
No data available SPP, 1988 
Investment National Commission [Comisión 
Nacional de Inversiones] 
1947 To coordinate public investment, it was attempt by 
President Miguel Aleman to restore Industrial Commission. 
1952 In 1954, the Commission change its 
name to‘Comisión de Inversiones’ 
under responsibility of the President. 
In the next administration, the law 
diminished their activities until it 
vanished. 
SPP, 1988 
This law was replaced by the Federal 
Law of State enterprises in 1986. 
Control Law of the Decentralized Agencies 
and State Enterprises [Ley para el Control 
por parte del Gobierno Federal de los 
Organismos Descentralizados y Empresas 
de Participación Estatal] 
1947 To monitor results, which should be consistent with 
purposesthey were created. 
1952 
Investment Committee [Comité de 
Inversiones] 
1953 To organize investment in public and private sector, under 
responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Economy. It was created by President Adolfo Ruiz. 
1954 Public sector disregarded for the 
Committee, and disagreements 
between institutions responsible. It 
was replaced by the Investment 
Commission. 
National Programme of Public Investment 
[Programa Nacional de Inversión Pública] 
1953-1958 To establish goals for economic growth utilised in the 
‘national accounts’. 
1958 Oropeza, 2005: 85 
 Investment Commission [Comisión de 
Inversiones] 
1954 To plan public expenditure, to assign priority for 
investment projects, and to establish a programme of 
public investment in the medium-term. It was created to 
substitute previous Investment Committee by President 
Adolfo Ruiz. 
1958 In spite of being one of the most 
successful initiatives, it diminished 
control when its structure was 
moved to the Ministry of Presidency. 
INAP, 1972: 19. 
Ministry of Presidency [Secretaría de la 
Presidencia] 
1958 To establish general plan of public expenditure and 
Executive branch investments, to plan and control of public 
investment of decentralized agencies and state enterprises. 
It was created by the President Adolfo Lopez. 
1976 This ministry disappeared due to the 
establishment in 1976 of the 
Ministry of Programming and Budget 
SPP. 
INAP, 1972: 47. Lanz, 1987. 
Ministry of National Heritage [Secretaría de 
Patrimonio Nacional SEPANAL] 
1960 (in the 
latter of this 
decade) 
To coordinate investment planning and current spending 
undertaken by the Sub-commission for Investment-
Finance, integrated by general directors of the Ministry of 
Treasury, Presidency and SEPANAL. 
1970 At the beginning of the 1970’s 
Treasury controlled fiscal and 
monetary policy in Mexico in a 
largely conventional, market-
oriented manner, but it confronted 
centers of contention in  
other agencies. Bailey: 1984: 79 
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Inter-agency Commission to formulate 
National Develoment Plans [Comisión 
Intersecretarial para la Formulación de 
Planes Nacionales de Desarrollo] 
1962 To establish national plan for economic and social 
development in the short and medium-terms, to evaluate 
investment projects in terms of quality and importance, 
under responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of Presidency. It was created by President Adolfo 
Lopez and had similarities with the Investment Commission 
(1954). 
No data available It was diminished its activities until 
vanished in the next administration 
due to disagreements between 
institutions, as well as lacking of 
experienced technical staff to 
operate it. However, according to 
the INAP there is no evidence of its 
disappearance. 
INAP, 1972: 22. 
Immediate Action Plan [Plan de Acción 
Inmediata] 
1962-1964 This plan allocate investment programmes within the mid-
term of economic and social policy. 
1964 Oropeza, 2005: 85 
Federal Planning Law (draft project) [Ley 
Federal de Planeación] 
1963 The Comisión de Planeación [Planning Commission] was 
responsibility of Congress (Senate) to draft the Federal 
Planning Law. The law was formulated to coordinate and 
unify different planning criteria of government institutions. 
Also consider mid and long term planning for national 
economic development.  
1963 Did not thrive.This law initiative did 
not achieve consensus and lack of 
internal organization of activities.  
Oropeza, 2005: 86. SPP, 1988. 
Public Administration Commission 
[Comisión de Administración Pública] 
 
1965 The Ministry of Presidency was responsible of this 
Commission. Its aim is for reorganization of federal 
government according to main national sector activities.To 
determine whether should be the ‘adequate’ structure of 
public administration, including regulation and 
administrative reforms. 
1974 In 1971 emerged the General Office 
of Administrative Studies in the same 
Ministry of Presidency to replace this 
Commission. 
Lanz, 1987. Ministry of Presidency, 
1967: 21. 
National Plan of Economic and Social 
Development [Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 
Económico y Social] 
1966-1970 To establish guidelines for public investment, long term 
development and public and private planning. 
1970 Oropeza, 2005: 85-86. SPP, 1988 
Planning Agreement of Federal Investment 
by State [Acuerdo de Programación de 
Inversiones Federales por Entidad 
Federativa] 
1973 Investment programme for every State to assess social 
impact. 
No data available SPP, 1988. 
General Law of Economic and Social 
Planning (project) [Ley General de 
Planeación Económica y Social] 
1975 To establish planning basis of federal public administration 
(APF) and coordination within the state/local governments 
and private/social sectors.  
1975 Did not thrive. 
SPP, 1988. 
Administrative Reform Programme 
[Programa de Reforma Administrativa] 
1976-1982 To link state enterprises activities with their sector, which 
have the same objectives. The administrative reform 
focused on the reorganization of state enterprises and 
ministries, as well as on programme budgeting. 
1982 Bailey, 1980: 11. SPP, 1988. Lanz, 
1987. 
National Planning System [Sistema de 
Planeación Nacional] 
1976 This is the first effort to build a mechanism for planning, 
programming-budgeting, evaluation and control 
government actions as a whole based on four modalities: 
obligatory, coordination, concerted and inductive.   
1983 SPP, 1988. 
This was replaced by the National 
Democratic Planning System in 1983. 
Ministry of Programming and Budget 
[Secretaria de Programación y Presupuesto 
SPP] 
1976 Responsible for planning, programming, budgeting, 
monitoring and evaluation of public expenditure. 
1992 Its disappearance was due to 
conflicts with the SHCP. On one 
hand, the expenditure operation, on 
the other hand, the income. Most of 
the main tasks were transferred to 
the SHCP.  
SPP, 1988. 
Law of Budget, Accounting and Public 
Expenditure [Ley de Presupuesto, 
Contabilidad y Gasto Público] 
1976 To improve public spending control oriented based in 
planning goals and priorities.  
 SPP, 1988. 
This law was replaced by The 
Federal Law of Budget and Fiscal 
Responsibility. 
Federal Government Organic Law [Ley 
Orgánica de la Administración Pública 
Federal] 
1976 To organize federal public administration and state 
enterprises. 
 Currently exists. 
Ministry of Presidency [Assessment 
Coordination Office] 
1977  For conducting analysis progress of government programs 
and national assessment sessions with responsible.  
1983 This office faced problems with the 
Undersecretary of Evaluation (SPP), 
therefore, its efforts were slowly 
fading. It vanished when the 
SECOGEF emerged in 1983.  
Monitoring and Control Financial System of 
Federal Public Expenditure (COSEFF) 
[Sistema de Control y Seguimiento Físico 
Financiero del Gasto Público Federal] 
1976 This system belong to the SPP to ensure further control, 
monitoring, analysis and evaluation of public spending, to 
identify deviations between scheduled and executed 
programmes and projects. 
1992 This system disappears along with 
the SPP in 1992. 
Carrillo and Garcia, 1981. 
Federation Expenditure Budget 
[Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación 
PEF] 
1976 To perform corrective, relevant and timely actions.  Currently exists 
Development Agreement [Convenios 
Únicos de Coordinación] 
1977 For strengthen federalism and decentralization, the 
relationship between federal and local level (planning, 
programming and budgeting).  
 PROPMAP, Official journal, 
28/05/1996. 
Galvez, 1985. 
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Development Agreement [Convenios 
Únicos de Coordinación] 
1977 For strengthen federalism and decentralization, the 
relationship between federal and local level (planning, 
programming and budgeting).  
Afterwards, this ‘Agreements’ were often utilized by the 
SECOGEF to support the System for Government Control 
and Evaluation (SICEG) at local level (Galvez, 1985). 
 PROPMAP, Official journal, 
28/05/1996. 
Galvez, 1985. 
Currently are the Social 
Development Agreements.  
Undersecretary of Evaluation (General 
Office of Analysis for Evaluation) 
[Subsecretaría de Evaluación] 
1977 These units were created in the SPP, to design, execute and 
coordinate national integral evaluation system, to design 
evaluation regulations, to analyse public expenditure and 
the achievement of budgets and programmes. 
1983 At the end of 1977, evaluation 
functions were translated from the 
SPP to the Ministry of Presidency, 
however, structure remained in the 
former.  
According to Internal organization of 
the SPP (Official Journal, 
25/01/1983), this Undersecretary 
disappeared in 1983, and only 
remained the General Office of 
Documentation and Evaluation in 
charge of the Undersecretary of 
Development Planning. 
Bailey, 1980: 27. Moctezuma, 1989: 
88. 
Global Development Plan [Plan Global de 
Desarrollo] 
1980-1982 To link sector programmes within global vision of problems 
and continuing the establishment of the national 
evaluation system. 
1982 SPP, 1988. 
Planning State Development Committees 
COPLADE [Comités de Planeación para el 
Desarrollo Estatal] 
1981 To promote and assist in the formulation, implementation 
and evaluation of State development plans, aimed by state 
enterprises. They operate in substitution of the COPRODE 
which operated between 1980-1981 
 Currently exists.  
SPP, 1988. 
Ministry of the General Controller of the 
Federation [Secretaría de la Contraloría 
General de la Federación] 
1982 This ministry regulates monitoring and evaluation 
activities, as well as responsible for auditing, 
monitoring and evaluation. 
1994 Official Journal, 29/12/1982. 
The evaluation results process was 
so far as it was planned, and more 
correlated with the auditing process. 
In 1994, became into the Ministry of 
the Controller and Administrative 
Development (SECODAM). 
Afterwards the Ministry of Public 
Administration (SFP) until its 
disappearance in 2013. 
The System for Government Control and 
Evaluation [Sistema de Control y Evaluación 
Gubernamental SICEG]. 
1982 It was established under the supervision of the Ministry of 
General Controller of the Federation ‘SECOGEF’ (LOAPF, 
article 32 BIS), operated as a preventative system on the 
basis of Commissioners and Delegates: 
‘...Its aim is to provide elements of judgement for control 
and monitoring of objectives and policies achieved, as well 
as to promote permanent the improvement of public 
management’.  
Since the reformsin 2009 (Official journal, 17/06/2009),it 
was under the control of the Evaluation Management and 
Government Performance Unit in the SFP (before 
SECOGEF). 
2013 Official journal, 29/12/1982. Galvez, 
1985. 
The system disappeared along with 
the Ministry of Public Administration 
(Official journal, 02/01/2013) and its 
functions will be distributed amongst 
the SHCP, and the Presidency Office. 
Planning Law [Ley de Planeación] 1983 Art.3 …will coordinate actions and evaluate results. 
Art.9 The Federal Executive shall establish an Evaluation 
and Compensation System for Performance to measure the 
units of the central federal administration… 
Art.13 makes it mandatory activities leading to plans and 
programs formulation, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation. 
 Currently exists. 
Official journal, 05/01/1983. 
Mexican Constitution [Constitución Política 
de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos] 
1983 To give State authority for conducting and promoting 
economic, political and social development, also planning 
activities, and to establish laws of national planning of 
economic and social development (articles 25, 26,  73) 
 Currently exists. 
Official journal, 03/02/1983. 
 
National Democratic Planning System 
[Sistema Nacional de Planeación 
Democrática SNPD] 
1983 Constitutional reform (art. 26) of 03/02/1983. The system 
establishes a referendum mechanism to collect societal 
participation in the formulation, monitoring and evaluation 
stages. Regarded as mandatory planning in the public 
sphere, the intergovernmental consensus and getting 
involve with the private and social sectors. 
 Currently exists. 
Official journal, 03/02/1983. 
National Development Plan [Plan Nacional 
de Desarrollo PND] 
1983-1988 This plan is mandatory by Planning Law, to determine 
national objectives, strategies and priorities, estimationof 
resources allocated, instruments and responsible of 
 Currently exists and changes its 
objectives every six-year presidential 
term. 
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Federal Law of State enterprises [Ley 
Federal de Entidades Paraestatales] 
1986 This law replaced the Control Law of the Decentralized 
Agencies and State Enterprises. To give management 
autonomy to state enterprises in exchange for 
performance assessment. 
 Currently exists. 
Official journal, 14/05/1986. 
the General Programme for the 
Simplification of the Federal Public 
Administration [Programa General de 
Simplificación de la Administración Pública 
Federal] 
1989 Its main objectives were: i) Consolidate an administrative 
culture which encourages efficiency and productivity in the 
management of government institutions; ii) Promotion the 
quality and transparency of the “evaluation” in the public 
services provided; iii) Prevention and fighting corruption. 
1995 Official journal, 9/02/1989. 
In 1995, the federal government 
started a reform to change the 
planning-programming-budgeting 
comprehensive system. Indeed three 
new programmes were put into 
operation: the New Programmatic 
Structure, the Performance 
Evaluation System and the Public 
Administration Modernization 
Programme. This reasons forced to 
concluding the programme. 
National Programme for Modernization of 
State Enterprise [Programa Nacional para la 
Modernización de la Empresa Pública] 
1990-1994 To restructure of state enterprises, to strengthen 
management autonomy, as well as their efficiency, 
effectiveness and productivity; to improve incentives and 
the performance agreements; and to develop an evaluation 
system to boost efficiency. 
1994 Official journal, 16/04/1990. 
The results were poor due to the 
overlapped regulations, such as 
budgetary and performance 
agreements. 
Social Controller Programme [Programa de 
Contraloría Social] 
1991 This is a tool for control and evaluation to tackle 
corruption.At regional and local level, activities to 
strengthen the SICEGwere focused on the mechanism of 
Social Controller in the National Programme of Solidarity 
and on the effectiveness of resources. 
 Currently exists. 
SFP, 1991. 
Ministry of the Controllership and 
Administrative Development [Secretaria de 
Contraloria y Desarrollo Administrativo 
SECODAM] 
1994 This ministry has the same functions of the SECOGEF but 
reinforce the administrative capacities of public 
administration.  
2003 Official Journal 28/12/1994. 
In 2003 year, this ministry became 
into the Ministry of Public 
Administration (SFP). Official Journal, 
10/04/2003. 
 
 
New Programmatic Structure [Nueva 
Estructura Programática NEP] 
1998 This is one of the two elements of the National Programme 
of Development Financing ‘PRONAFIDE’1997-2000. It is a 
system of strategic indicators (performance) for monitoring 
and evaluation of programmes and main government 
activities, but it also plans to organize them – at federal, 
state and local level - on the basis of budgetary 
programmes to classify public resources into categories 
‘estructura programática’ 
2000 Decree of the PRONAFIDE. Official 
Journal 7/11/1997. 
According to the CEFP (2008: 33), the 
SIMEP interrupted the SED’s 
consolidation, including the NEP. 
Performance Evaluation System [Sistema de 
Evaluación del Desempeño SED] 
1998 The SHCP and the SECODAM sought the implementation of 
an “integral data system”, which later become the SED, an 
essential mechanism inside the strategic planning phase for 
modernization.The SED was a system to transform the NEP 
into a performance measurement model using a results-
based approach.  
Its objectives were designed to strengthen governance, 
achieve results and citizens’ satisfaction, link agencies and 
state enterprises’ performance to institutional objectives, 
and to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of public 
resources. The mission of the system was to ‘contribute to 
raising the productivity of fiscal resources… for better 
decision-making in terms of the planning and execution of 
expenditure, to strengthen the programme evaluation 
process and responsible performance of bureaucracy’ 
(Mejía, 2005: 18). 
 Currently exists with some 
adjustments. 
Decree of the PRONAFIDE. Official 
Journal 7/11/1997. 
Mejía, 2005: 18. 
According to the CEFP (2008: 33), the 
SIMEP interrupted the SED’s 
consolidation, including the NEP. 
Programa de Modernización de la 
Administración Pública [Public 
Administration Modernization Programme 
PROMAP] 
1995-2000 The SECODAM (before SECOGEF) established this mid-term 
programme, which comprises four programmes and 
comprehensible institutional objectives: i) Transform the 
Federal Public Administration into an organization that acts 
efficiently and effectively through a new culture of service: 
ii) Tackle corruption and impunity through control 
mechanisms and effective sanctions.  
2000 Decree of the PROMAP, Official 
Journal 28/05/1996. 
The UDA (Unit responsible of the 
PROMAP), and its plan for 
administrative modernization of the 
Mexican bureaucracy, also had to 
face same difficulties which led to 
the programme producing few 
results. Cejudo (2008: 116-7) 
 
Auditoría Superior de la Federación 
[Superior Audit of the Federation ASF] 
2000 The Supreme Audit Law of the Federation established the 
creation of the ASF to replace the Treasury Accounting 
created since 1824, to confer authority to the Legislative 
 Currently exists. 
Guerrero, 2002: 176. 
Official Journal, 29/12/2000. 
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Auditoría Superior de la Federación 
[Superior Audit of the Federation ASF] 
2000 The Supreme Audit Law of the Federation established the 
creation of the ASF to replace the Treasury Accounting 
created since 1824, to confer authority to the Legislative 
branch. 
Its mission statement is ‘To assess goals, objectives set in 
federal programmes on the basis of strategic indicators 
approved in the budget to verify their performance and 
legality of public resources’. 
It was created for external auditing of federal public 
resources in the three Government branches, autonomous 
constitutional organs, states and local governments, as well 
as individualswhen they receive such resources. 
Even more, has no authority for intervention in 
projects, programmes and on-goingexpenditure, only 
for the Public Account (annually) elaborated by the 
Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP). 
Its regulation is the Law Enforcement and Accountability of 
the Federation [Ley de Fiscalización y Rendición de Cuentas 
de la Federación] (Official Journal 18/06/2010), and one of 
their objectives is related to evaluation: 
‘To assess goals, objectives and performance achieved by 
federal programmes and utilisation of public resources on 
the basis of strategic indicators approved in the budget, 
National Development Plan, sector and regional plans, 
annual programmes, among others’. 
 Currently exists. 
Guerrero, 2002: 176. 
Official Journal, 29/12/2000. 
 
 
The Good Government Agenda [Agenda de 
Buen Gobierno ABG] 
2001 The agenda operates through: Government that costs less, 
Quality Government, Professional Government, Digital 
Government, Deregulated Government, and Honest and 
Transparent Government. It was part of the Strategic 
Model for Government Innovation and Quality [Modelo 
Estratégico para la Innovación y Calidad Gubernamental], 
which was looking for radical transformation from multiple 
perspectives of the federal public administration. 
2006 This agenda disappeared in 2006. 
The main reason for their 
disappearance was the overlap 
between the SFP (the lead 
department) and the Presidency 
Office. Another reason was goals 
being modified to reflect the extent 
to which they could be achieved.  
Pardo, 2007: 899. 
Presidential Goals System [Sistema de 
Metas Presidenciales SIMEP] 
2002 It is a top management evaluation system which identifies 
high impact processes and projects linked to the PND and 
its sector programmes. Its main characteristic was the 
agreement signed between the head of the ministry or 
state enterprise and the president, which established goals 
and deadlines, under supervision of the Unit of Control and 
Evaluation of Public Management in the SFP. 
2006 Accountability Report 2000-2006: 
157. Diener, 2007: 85. Medina, 2007: 
50-1. Mejía, 2005: 21-2. Pardo, 2007: 
899. 
This system disappeared in 2006. 
The main reason for their 
disappearance was the overlap 
between the SFP (the lead 
department) and the Presidency 
Office. Another reason was goals 
being modified to reflect the extent 
to which they could be achieved.  
The National Institute for Evaluation of 
Education  [Instituto Nacional para la 
Evaluación de la Educación INEE] 
2002 It is a public, decentralized agency with financial, technical, 
and operational autonomy for the assessment of the 
education sector. Its roles are linked to the creation and 
development of educational indicators, statistics, tools, 
research and knowledge, as well as the measurement and 
evaluation of education issues. 
 Currently exists.  
Official journal, 8/08/2002. 
The Evaluation and Compensation System 
for Performance [Sistema de Evaluación y 
Compensación por el Desempeño] 
 
2003 The Planning Law in its article 9 pointed out:  
‘The Executive shall establish an Evaluation and 
Compensation System for Performance to measure 
progress of ministries of the Federal Public Administration 
on achieving goals and objectives of the Plan – PND - and 
its sector programmes…’ 
 Currently exists.  
Official journal, 10/04/2003. 
The Ministry of Public Administration 
[Secretaria de la Función Pública SFP] 
2003 This ministry used to be the SECOGEF, afterwards the 
SECODAM until this year. The reform to the organic law  
(LOAPF) transformed the SECODAM into the SFP.  
The aim was to include more functions such as the 
operation of the career civil service of the Federal Public 
Administration, for planning, approval human resources 
structure and establishing regulations as well. 
2013 Official journal, 10/04/2003. 
The SFP disappeared (Official journal, 
02/01/2013) and its functions will be 
distributed amongst the SHCP, the 
new National Anti-Corruption 
Commission and the Presidency 
Office. 
Subsystem of performance evaluation of 
public officials. 
2003 This is a subsystem of the Professional Career Civil Service 
Law  [Ley del Servicio Profesional de Carrera en la 
Administración Pública Federal] was issued by the SFP (Unit 
of Human Resources Policy in the Federal Public 
Administration). 
 Currently exists. 
Official journal, 10/04/2003. 
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The Integral Performance Model of Control 
and Oversight Bodies  [Modelo Integral de 
Desempeño de Órganos de Vigilancia y 
Control MIDO] 
2004 It was implemented by the SFP, on the basis of five indexes. 
Its aim is to ensure the OICs, Delegates and Commissioners 
help to reduce risks of corruption and opacity with a 
preventive approach to control, proper public management 
oversight, and effective corrective measures.  
 SFP, 2004. Franco, 2006: 69. Official 
journal, 7/10/2004. 
In the end, the MIDO could not 
handle these issues and in 2009 
(Official journal, 8/05/2009) it 
disappeared. However, a few 
months later, the SFP attempted to 
re-establish the system under a new 
supervision team, but it had a minor 
impact compared to previous years. 
The National Evaluation Council of the 
Social Development Policy [Consejo 
Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de 
Desarrollo Social CONEVAL] 
2005 To coordinate policy evaluation of this sector and to 
measure poverty, setting up criteria and methodologies for 
both purposes. 
 Currently exists. 
Official journal, 24/08/2005. 
Results-based Budgeting ‘PbR’ 
 
2006 The Federal Law of Budget and Fiscal Responsibility [Ley 
Federal de Presupuesto y Responsabilidad Hacendaria 
LFPRH] establishes the strategy known as PbR, seeks to link 
governmental planning, design, and implementation of 
public programmes with the budgetary process through 
evaluation and the Performance Evaluation System ‘SED’. 
It has two elements, the first is the quality of public 
expenditure through the Medium-Term Programme (PMP), 
which eventually (2008) became the Management 
Improvement Programme [Programa de Mejora de la 
Gestión ‘PMG’] under the leadership of the SFP.A second 
element is the Annual Evaluation Programme (PAE), jointly 
issued by the SHCP, SFP and CONEVAL.  
 Currently exists. 
Official journal, 30/03/2006. 
The National Statistics Office [Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística y Geografía INEGI] 
2006 One of the subsystems of The National System of Statistics 
and Geographical Information is the government, public 
safety and justice system operated until 2009 according to 
the agency, which produces data regarding public 
administration. 
 Currently exists. 
Official journal, 7/04/2006. 
 
 Table 3 
The effectiveness of policy evaluation in Mexico 
Project budget
Budget 
approved
2007 Project budget
Budget 
approved
2008 Project budget Budget approved 2009 Project budget Budget approved 2010 Project budget
Budget 
approved
2011 Project budget
Budget 
approved
2012 Project budget Budget approved 2013 2014 Recommendations of evaluations
IMSS, ISSFAM, 
ISSSTE, SSA, 
SEDENA, PEMEX
A001 Otras actividades 2007
X                    
(ISSFAM)
SEDENA A009
Servicios de salud al personal 
militar y sus 
derechohabientes
ISSFAM A012 Atención médica
ISSFAM A013
Otorgamiento de prestaciones 
socioeconómicas
SSA B001
Construcción de centros de 
especialidad para pacientes 
ambulatorios y de unidades de 
atención hospitalaria
IMSS E001
Atención a la salud pública y 
salud reproductiva
IMSS E001 Atención a la salud pública*
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
X
Ev. of design 2009, 
Ev of gender 2009, 
Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2009, EED 2010, 
M&E card 2014
2,467,957,962 2,467,957,962 A/S/U 2,543,807,036 2,543,807,036 A/U
The INFOMEX report says data is in the SHCP. There is no data of Ev. of design 
2009.
Diagnostic of gender 2008 and Ev. of gender 2009 was the same and performed 
by INMUJERES, 5 recommendations were pointed out by evaluators; however 
those were not implemented by the health sector. 
The M&E card 2014 has not finished yet. In the EED 2009 all recommendations 
(4) were implemented. The recommendations (3) of the EED 2010 were 
attended. The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
ISSSTE E001
Control de Enfermedades 
Prevenibles por Vacunación*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
IMSS E002 Atención curativa eficiente*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X
Ev of gender 2009, 
Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2009, EED 2010, Ev. 
cost-effectiveness 
2013, M&E card 
2014
104,312,435,882 104,312,435,882 S/U 106,358,417,373 106,358,417,373 A/U 146,721,031,540 146,721,031,540 U
The INFOMEX report says data is in the SHCP. 
Diagnostic of gender 2008 and Ev. of gender 2009 was the same and performed 
by INMUJERES, 5 recommendations were pointed out by evaluators; however 
those were not implemented by the health sector.
The Ev. Cost-effectiveness 2013 is in process.
The M&E card 2014 has not finished yet. In the EED 2009 recommendation was 
not implemented. The EED 2010 shows that only 1 of 3 recommendations is 
still improving, the rest are not mentioned in the mechanism to follow up 
evaluation results. The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
ISSSTE E002
Control de Enfermedades 
Transmisibles*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X
Ev. Cost-
effectiveness 2013, 
M&E card 2014
197,037,330 197,037,330 U
The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
IMSS E003
Atención a la salud en el 
trabajo*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
ISSSTE E003
Detección oportuna de 
Enfermedades*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
IMSS E004
Investigación en salud en el 
IMSS*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
ISSSTE E004 Orientación para la Salud*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
IMSS E005 Cobertura de cotizantes 2008
ISSSTE E005
Control del estado de salud de 
la embarazada*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
Ev. Cost-
effectiveness 2013, 
M&E card 2014
169,106,501 169,106,501 U
There is NO DATA of the ev. cost-effectiveness 2013. The M&E card 2014 will 
not be included in the analysis.
IMSS E005 Ingresos obrero-patronales 2008
IMSS E006
Recaudación eficiente de 
ingresos obrero patronales
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013
X Ev of process 2012 5,132,788,106 5,132,788,106 U
The ev. of process 2012 was performed until 2014. Thus, all 18 
recommendations are still improving.
ISSSTE E006 Atención Materno Infantil*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
IMSS E007 Servicios de guardería*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
Ev. of design 2009, 
Ev of gender 2009, 
Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2009, EED 2010, 
M&E card 2014
8,116,057,509 8,116,057,509 S/U 8,403,627,554 8,403,627,554 A/U
The INFOMEX report says data is in the the SHCP. 
There is no data of Ev. of design 2009.
Diagnostic of gender 2008 and Ev. of gender 2009 was the same and performed 
by INMUJERES, 5 recommendations were pointed out by evaluators; however 
those were not implemented by the health sector.
The M&E card 2014 has not finished yet. In the EED 2009 all recommendations 
(3) were not implemented.  The EED 2010 shows that only 1 of 3 
recommendations is still improving, the rest were not implemented. The M&E 
card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
ISSSTE E007 Consulta bucal*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
ISSSTE E008
Atención y Mejoramiento 
Nutricional
2008, 2009
SSA E008
Vigilancia y control 
epidemiológico
2008
IMSS E008
Atención a la salud 
reproductiva*
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
X
Ev. Cost-
effectiveness 2013, 
M&E card 2014
5,188,010,968 5,188,010,968 U
The ev. cost-effectiveness 2013 has 16 recommendations which are still 
improving.
The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
IMSS E009
Prestaciones sociales 
eficientes*
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
X M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
ISSSTE E009 Consulta Externa General*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X
Ev. Cost-
effectiveness 2013, 
M&E card 2014
5,021,978,604 5,021,978,604 U
There is NO DATA of the ev. cost-effectiveness 2013.
The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
Budgetary programmePublic organization
Key budgetary
programme
Amendments = A; Cancelation = C; Learning process = L; Status quo = S; Allocation of financial resources (Increase = I; Decrease = D; Unchanged = U)
Year in the 
federal budget
Indicator of 
budgetary 
process
Type of 
evaluation 
performed
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IMSS E010
Mejoramiento de unidades 
operativas de sevicios de 
ingreso
2009, 2010, 2011 X Ev of process 2012 No data
This programme is not classified in PEF 2012. 
There is no data of this evaluation.
IMSS E010
Otorgamiento de las 
prestaciones de velatorios, 
centros vacacionales y tiendas
2012, 2013
ISSSTE E010
Consulta Externa 
Especializada*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X
Ev. Cost-
effectiveness 2013, 
M&E card 2014
4,459,181,447 4,459,181,447 U
There is NO DATA of the ev. cost-effectiveness 2013.
The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
SSA E010
Formación y desarrollo 
profesional de recursos 
humanos especializados para 
la salud*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X
Ev. of design 2009, 
Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2009, EED 2010, 
M&E card 2014
2,219,464,846 2,190,420,614 A/D 1,863,954,868 1,863,899,951 S/D 2,873,320,175 2,867,254,591 D/I**
The M&E card 2014 has not finished yet. All recommendations (3) of the Ev. of 
design 2009 and EED 2009 were the same and implemented. 
Recommendations (2) of the EED 2010 are not mentioned in the mechanism to 
follow up evaluation results.  In the PPEF 2011 public resources of this 
programme were increased in 48.2%. The M&E card 2014 will not be included 
in the analysis.
ISSSTE E011 Hospitalización General*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X
Ev. Cost-
effectiveness 2013, 
M&E card 2014
3,712,568,406 3,712,568,406 U
There is NO DATA of the ev. cost-effectiveness 2013.
The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
ISSSTE E012 Hospitalización Especializada*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X
Ev. Cost-
effectiveness 2013, 
M&E card 2014
4,487,318,647 4,487,318,647 U
There is NO DATA of the ev. cost-effectiveness 2013.
The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
ISSSTE E013 Atención de Urgencias*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X
Ev. of design 2009, 
Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2009, EED 2010, Ev. 
Cost-effectiveness 
2013, M&E card 
2014
1,251,231,323 1,251,231,323 S/U 1,472,429,535 1,472,429,535 S/U 1,427,929,187 1,427,929,187 U
Only the EED 2009 and 2010 were performed. However, institution 
mentioned did not perform any evaluation before 2013.
The M&E card 2014 has not finished yet. The recommendation of the EED 2009 
is not mentioned in the mechanism to follow up evaluation results. All 
recommendations (3) of the EED 2010 are not mentioned in the mechanism to 
follow up evaluation results. There are not data, check institution letter. There 
is NO DATA of the ev. cost-effectiveness 2013. The M&E card 2014 will not be 
included in the analysis.
PEMEX E013
Servicios médicos al personal 
de PEMEX
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
X
ISSSTE E014 Rehabilitación*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
ISSSTE E015
Investigación Científica y 
Tecnológica*
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
SSA E015
Servicios de asistencia social, 
comunitaria y beneficencia 
pública
2008
ISSSTE E016
Capacitación y Formación de 
los Recursos Humanos en 
Salud*
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
SSA E017
Atención de urgencias 
epidemiológicas y desastres 
naturales
2008
ISSSTE E017
Mantenimiento de Equipo 
Médico y Electromecánico
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013
SSA E018
Atención integral de la mujer, 
salud materna, perinatal y 
reproductiva
2008 X
ISSSTE E018
Suministro de Claves de 
Medicamentos*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X
Ev. Cost-
effectiveness 2013, 
M&E card 2014
4,893,037,744 4,893,037,744 U
There is NO DATA of the ev. cost-effectiveness 2013.
The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
SSA E019
Capacitación técnica y 
gerencial de recursos 
humanos para la salud*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
SSA E020
Dignificación, conservación y 
mantenimiento de la 
infraestructura y 
equipamiento en salud*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
SSA E022
Investigación y desarrollo 
tecnológico en salud*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X
Ev. of design 2009, 
Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2009, M&E card 
2014
1,045,845,663 1,016,361,122 A/D 1,332,455,824 1,406,705,824 I/I**
The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis. All recommendations 
(3) of the Ev. of design 2009 and EED 2009 were the same and implemented. In 
the PPEF 2011 public resources of this programme were increased in 7%
SSA E023
Prestación de servicios en los 
diferentes niveles de atención 
a la salud*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X
Ev. of design 2009, 
Ev. of gender 2009, 
Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2009, EED 2010, Ev. 
Cost-effectiveness 
2013, M&E card 
2014
10,618,827,943 12,015,940,997 A/S/I 12,108,541,400 11,825,285,762 S/D 16,509,532,726 16,509,532,726 U
The ev. of design 2009 was performed until 2010. Ev. of gender 2009 was 
performed by INMUJERES, 5 recommendations were pointed out by 
evaluators; however those were not implemented by the health sector.
There are not results of the EED 2010 in the mechanism to follow up evaluation 
results. Recommendations (2) of the EED 2009 and Ev. of design 2009 
(performed until 2010) were the same and implemented. Recommendations 
(3) of the EED 2010 are not mentioned in the mechanism to follow up 
evaluation results. There is NO DATA of the ev. cost-effectiveness 2013.
The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
SSA E024
Prevención de accidentes y 
atención de daños a la salud 
causados por violencia
2008
SSA E025
Prevención y atención contra 
las adicciones*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X   (from 2010)
Ev. of design 2011, 
M&E card 2014
960,570,768 1,390,246,072 A/I
The Ev of design 2011 shows that 5 of 6 recommendations were attended, 
there is one still improving. The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the 
analysis.
SSA E026
Prevención y atención de 
enfermedades crónico 
degenerativas
2008 X
SSA E027
Prevención y atención de 
VIH/SIDA y otras ITS
2008 X
SSA E028
Prevención y control de 
enfermedades emergentes
2008
SSA E029
Prevención, atención y 
rehabilitación integral a 
personas con discapacidad
2009
SSA E030
Prevención, detección y 
atención temprana del cáncer 
cérvico uterino y de mama
2008
ISSSTE E030 Servicios Deportivos
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013
SSA E031
Promoción de la salud y 
prevención de enfermedades
2008
ISSSTE E031 Servicios Culturales
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013
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   ISSSTE E032 Servicios Turísticos
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
ISSSTE E033
Servicios Integrales a 
Pensionados
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013
SSA E033
Suministro de medicamentos 
e insumos para la salud
2008
ISSSTE E034 Servicios Funerarios
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013
SSA E034
Tecnologías de la información 
y comunicaciones en salud
2008
ISSSTE E035
Capacitación y Formación de 
Recursos Humanos en 
Seguridad Social*
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
SSA E036
Reducción de enfermedades 
prevenibles por vacunación*
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
X
Ev. of design 2009, 
Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2009, EED 2010, 
M&E card 2014
1,144,766,855 1,101,860,545 A/D 1,161,867,569 1,155,072,988 A/D
The ev. of design 2009 was not performed.
Recommendations (3) of the EED 2009 and 2010  were the same and 
implemented. The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
ISSSTE E036 Equidad de género*
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
Ev of gender 2009, 
M&E card 2014
25,038,943 25,038,943 S/U
Institution mentioned did not perform any evaluation before 2013. Ev. of 
gender 2009 was performed by INMUJERES, 5 recommendations were pointed 
out by evaluators; however those were not implemented by the health sector.
The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis. 
ISSSTE E037
Créditos a Corto y Mediano 
Plazo
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
SSA E037
Financiamiento a las 
variaciones en la demanda de 
los servicios y el pago por la 
prestación interestatal de 
servicios
2008
ISSSTE E038
Servicios de Estancias de 
Bienestar y Desarrollo 
Infantil*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
SSA E038
Financiamiento de los 
servicios de alta especialidad 
en un fondo sectorial de 
protección contra gastos 
catastróficos
2008
SSA E039 Vigilancia epidemiológica 2009, 2010, 2011
ISSSTE E039
Programas y Servicios de 
Apoyo para la Adquisición de 
Productos Básicos de 
Consumo para el Hogar*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
ISSSTE E040
Programas y Servicios de 
Apoyo para la Adquisición de 
Medicinas y Productos 
Farmacéuticos*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
SSA-SNDIF E040
Servicios de atención a grupos 
vulnerables
2014 Diagnostic 2014 The diagnostic 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
ISSSTE E041
Servicios Integrales de 
Turismo
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
ISSSTE E042
Atención a Personas con 
Discapacidad*
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
SSA G002 Regulación sanitaria 2008 X
SSA G003 Control y fomento sanitario 2008
SSA G004
Protección Contra Riesgos 
Sanitarios
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
Ev. of process 2012 558,329,261 554,599,228 A/D Recommendations (4) of the Ev. of process 2012 are still improving. 
IMSS J001
Pensiones en curso de pago 
Ley 1973
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
X
IMSS J002 Rentas vitalicias Ley 1997
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
X
IMSS J003
Régimen de Pensiones y 
Jubilaciones IMSS
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
IMSS J004
Subsidios y ayudas para gastos 
de funeral
2008
IMSS J004
Pagar oportunamente los 
subsidios a los asegurados con 
derecho
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013
X
ISSSTE J019
Pensiones por Riesgos de 
Trabajo
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
ISSSTE J020 Subsidios y Ayudas
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
ISSSTE J021 Pensiones por Invalidez
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
ISSSTE J022
Pensiones por Causa de 
Muerte
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
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ISSSTE J023 Pensiones por Retiro 2008, 2009
ISSSTE J024 Pensiones por Cesantía
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
ISSSTE J025 Pensiones por Vejez
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
ISSSTE J026 Pensiones y Jubilaciones
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
ISSSTE J027 Indemnizaciones Globales
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
ISSSTE J028 Pagos de Funeral
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
ISSSTE J029
Cuentas Individuales de los 
Trabajadores
2008
IMSS, ISSFAM, 
ISSSTE, SSA
K000 Proyectos de Inversión 2007
X                    
(ISSFAM)
ISSSTE K011
Proyectos de infraestructura 
social de salud
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
Ev. of design 2013 1,684,287,630 1,684,287,630 U There is NO DATA of the ev. of design 2013.
SSA K011
Proyectos de infraestructura 
social de salud
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
PEMEX K011
Proyectos de infraestructura 
social de salud
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013
IMSS K012
Proyectos de infraestructura 
social de asistencia y 
seguridad social
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
Ev. consistency and 
results 2014
This evaluation has not finished yet.
ISSFAM K012
Proyectos de infraestructura 
social de asistencia y 
seguridad social
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
SSA K025
Proyectos de inmuebles 
(oficinas administrativas)
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
PEMEX K026 Otros proyectos 2010
IMSS, ISSFAM, 
ISSSTE, SSA
K027
Mantenimiento de 
infraestructura
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
PEMEX K027
Mantenimiento de 
infraestructura
2012, 2013
ISSFAM, SSA K028 Estudios de preinversión
2008, 2009 (SSA), 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013
IMSS, PEMEX K029 Programa de adquisiciones
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013
IMSS, ISSFAM, 
ISSSTE, SSA
M001
Actividades de apoyo 
administrativo
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
ISSSTE M002
Gastos Operativos 
Institucionales
2008, 2009
ISSSTE M002
Gastos Administrativos por 
Operación de Fondos y 
Seguros
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013
ISSSTE M003 Gastos de Administración
2009, 2011, 2012, 
2013
IMSS, ISSFAM, 
ISSSTE, SSA
O001
Actividades de apoyo a la 
función pública y buen 
gobierno
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013
SSA O099
Operación del Servicio 
Profesional de Carrera en la 
Administración Pública 
Centralizada
2008, 2009, 2010
SSA P003
Acreditación de unidades 
médicas
2008
SSA P004
Cooperación internacional en 
salud
2008
SSA P005
Evaluación del desempeño y 
de tecnologías médicas
2008
SSA P006
Fortalecimiento del arbitraje 
médico
2008
SSA P007
Información en salud para la 
toma de decisiones
2008
SSA P008
Planeación y desarrollo del 
Sistema Nacional de Salud
2008
SSA P009
Promoción de la salud y 
prevención de enfermedades
2008
SSA P010
Suministro de medicamentos 
e insumos para la salud
2008
SSA P011
Vinculación de la bioética con 
la atención médica
2008
SSA P012 Calidad en Salud e Innovación
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013
X
SSA P013
Asistencia social y protección 
del paciente
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013
SSA P014
Promoción de la salud, 
prevención y control de 
enfermedades crónico 
degenerativas y transmisibles 
y lesiones
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013
X   (from 2012)
SSA P016
Prevención y atención de 
VIH/SIDA y otras ITS
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
X Ev of gender 2009 164,468,515 193,343,247 S/I 165,849,065 243,849,065 I/I**
Ev. of gender 2009 were the same and performed by INMUJERES, 5 
recommendations were pointed out by evaluators, however those were not 
implemented by the health sector and not mentioned in the mechanism to 
follow up evaluation results. In the PPEF 2011 public resources were increased 
in 6.1%.
SSA P017
Atención de la Salud 
Reproductiva y la Igualdad de 
Género en Salud
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
X
 Ev. Cost-
effectiveness 2013
1,145,934,180 1,245,934,180 I There is NO DATA of the ev. cost-effectiveness 2013.
SSA P018
Reducción de la mortalidad 
materna
2010, 2011 X
Ev. of design 2010, 
Strategic ev. 2011
259,493,301 259,493,301 A/U 298,494,664 298,494,664 S/U
This is the same programme as U007 since 2012. Strategic Ev. 2011 it is a 
general public policy and was performed by the CONEVAL and 
recommendations are not mentioned in the mechanism to follow up results. 
All recommendations (3) of the Ev. of design 2010 were implemented. In the 
Strategic Ev. 2011 there are not recomendations (13) mentioned in the 
mechanism to follow up results.
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SSA P019 Prevención contra la obesidad 2010, 2011 X Ev. of design 2010 250,143,789 250,143,789 A/U
This is the same programme as U008 since 2012; however this is a general 
public policy. All recommendations (3) of the Ev. of design 2010 were 
implemented.
IMSS R001
Proporcionar atención a la 
salud pública y salud 
reproductiva
2007
ISSSTE R001
Control de enfermedades por 
vacunación
2007
SSA R001
Diseñar, regular y conducir 
políticas en salud
2007
ISSSTE R001 Gastos de Administracion 2008
SSA R001
Cooperación internacional en 
salud
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013
IMSS R002
Proporcionar atención 
curativa
2007
ISSSTE R002
Control de enfermedades 
transmisibles
2007
SSA R002
Generar la información y 
realizar la evaluación en salud
2007
IMSS R003
Proporcionar atención a la 
salud en el trabajo
2007
IMSS R003
Detección oportuna de 
enfermedades
2007
SSA R003
Desarrollar la protección y 
promoción de la salud
2007
IMSS R004
Llevar a cabo la investigación 
científica y tecnológica
2007
ISSSTE R004 Planificación familiar 2007
IMSS R005
Ampliar la cobertura de 
cotizantes
2007
ISSSTE R005 Orientación para la salud 2007
SSA R005
Impulsar la prevención y/o 
atención del VIH/SIDA en la 
población
2007
IMSS R006
Fortalecer los ingresos obrero-
patronales
2007
ISSSTE R006 Materno infantil 2007
SSA R006
Desarrollar acciones 
específicas para promover la 
atención integral de la salud 
de la mujer
2007
IMSS R007
Administrar Pensiones en 
Curso de Pago Ley 1973
2007
SSA R007
Desarrollar la prevención y 
control de enfermedades y 
atención de urgencias 
epidemiológicas
2007
IMSS R008
Tramitar rentas vitalicias Ley 
1997
2007
IMSS R008
Atención y mejoramiento 
nutricional
2007
SSA R008
Ejercer la regulación, control y 
fomento sanitarios para 
proteger a la población contra 
riesgos sanitarios
2007
IMSS R009
Cubrir el régimen de 
Pensiones y Jubilaciones IMSS
2007
ISSSTE R009 Consulta externa general 2007
SSA R009
Implementar medidas para 
mejorar la calidad de los 
servicios de salud
2007
SEDENA R009
Servicios de Salud al personal 
militar y sus 
derechohabientes
2008
IMSS R010
Tramitar y pagar subsidios y 
ayudas para gastos de funeral
2007
ISSSTE R010
Consulta externa 
especializada
2007
SSA R010
Prestar servicios en los 
diferentes niveles de atención 
en salud
2007
IMSS R011 Otorgar servicios de guardería 2007
ISSSTE R011 Hospitalización general 2007
ISSSTE R012 Hospitalización especializada 2007
SSA R012
Impulsar el desarrollo y 
capacitación del personal 
directivo, administrativo y 
técnico operativo de los 
servicios de salud
2007
ISSFAM R012 Atención médica 2008
ISSSTE R013 Rehabilitación 2007
SSA R013
Formar recursos humanos 
especializados en salud
2007
ISSFAM R013
Otorgamiento de prestaciones 
socioeconómicas
2008
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ISSSTE R014
Atención de urgencias, 
emergencias y desastres
2007
ISSSTE R015
Sistema Integral de Atención 
al Trauma y Urgencias (SIATUR)
2007
ISSSTE R015
Investigación Científica y 
Tecnológica
2008
SSA R015
Dotar de insumos para los 
programas de vacunación
2007
ISSSTE R016
Clínica con Capacidad 
Resolutiva Quirúrgica (CCARQ)
2007
SSA R016
Desarrollo, conservación y 
mantenimeinto de la 
infraestructura en salud
2007
ISSSTE R016
Capacitación y Formación de 
los Recursos Humanos en 
Salud
2008
ISSSTE R017
Investigación científica y 
tecnológica
2007
ISSSTE R017
Mantenimiento de Equipo 
Médico y Electromecánico
2008
ISSSTE R018
Capacitación y formación de 
los recursos humanos en salud
2007
ISSSTE R019 Certificar los servicios de salud 2007
ISSSTE R020
Mantenimiento de equipo 
médico y electromecánico
2007
SSA R020
Brindar servicios de asistencia 
social, comunitaria y 
beneficencia pública
2007
ISSSTE R021
Suministro de claves de 
medicamentos
2007
SSA R021
Desarrollar la investigación en 
salud
2007
ISSSTE R022 Indemnizaciones globales 2007
ISSSTE R023 Pagar pensiones y jubilaciones 2007
ISSSTE R024 Gastos de funeral 2007
ISSSTE R025 Subsidios y ayudas 2007
ISSSTE R026
Pagar pensiones por riesgos de 
trabajo
2007
ISSSTE R027
Proporcionar servicios 
deportivos
2007
ISSSTE R028
Proporcionar servicios 
culturales
2007
ISSSTE R029
Proporcionar servicios 
turísticos
2007
ISSSTE R030
Proporcionar servicios 
integrales a pensionados
2007
ISSSTE R030 Servicios Deportivos 2008
ISSSTE R031
Proporcionar servicios 
funerarios
2007
ISSSTE R031 Servicios Culturales 2008
ISSSTE R032
Capacitar y Formar los 
Recursos Humanos en 
Seguridad Social
2007
ISSSTE R033 Equidad de Género 2007
ISSSTE R033
Servicios Integrales a 
Pensionados
2008
ISSSTE R034
Otorgar créditos a corto y 
mediano plazo
2007
ISSSTE R034 Servicios funerarios 2008
ISSSTE R035
Proporcionar servicios de 
estancias de bienestar y 
desarrollo infantil
2007
ISSSTE R035
Capacitación y formación de 
Recursos Humanos en 
Seguridad Social
2008
ISSSTE R036
Operación y comercialización 
en tiendas
2007
ISSSTE R036 Equidad de Género 2008
ISSSTE R037
Operación y comercialización 
en farmacias
2007
SSA R047
Atender las variaciones en la 
demanda de servicios y el 
pago por la prestación 
interestatal de servicios
2007
SSA R048
Coordinar la afiliación de 
familias al SPSS
2007
SSA R059
Generar información para la 
operación de SPSS
2007
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SSA R060
Realizar acciones de 
evaluación del SPSS
2007
SSA R062
Realizar acciones de 
capacitación para la operación 
del SPSS
2007
SSA R064
Financiar los servicios 
esenciales de salud
2007
SSA R065
Aportar recursos para 
financiar la atención de 
enfermedades que provocan 
gastos catastróficos
2007
SSA R066
Realizar acciones de 
prevención y diagnóstico del 
VIH/SIDA
2007
SSA R067
Realizar acciones comunitarias 
para la detección oportuna de 
enfermedades prioritarias
2007
SSA R070
Desarrollo de infraestructura 
en entidades federativas
2007
SSA R071
Operación de unidades 
médicas en entidades 
federativas
2007
SSA R099
Implantar y operar el Servicio 
Profesional de Carrera en la 
Administración Pública 
Federal Centralizada
2007
SSA R204
Apoyos adicionales para las 
acciones de promoción de la 
salud y prevención de 
enfermedades
2007
SSA R207 Programa de vacunación 2007
SSA R208
Hospital de Especialidades de 
la Península de Yucatán
2007
SSA R210
Hospital Regional de Alta 
Especialidad en Oaxaca
2007
SSA R212
Operación Hospital de Alta 
Especialidad del Bajío
2007
SSA R216
Adquisición de terrenos, 
construcción y equipamiento 
de la planta para la fabricación 
de vacunas antiinfluenza
2007
SSA R219
Operación Hospital de Alta 
Especialidad de Ciudad 
Victoria
2007
SSA R220
Asignación de recursos por 
desempeño a Hospitales 
Regionales de Alta 
Especialidad
2007
SSA R221 Centro Regional de Alta 
Especialidad de Chiapas
2007
SSA R222 Medicamentos 2007
SSA R226
Reforzar las acciones contra las 
adicciones
2007
SSA S037
Programa Comunidades 
Saludables*
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
X
Ev. Consistency and 
results 2007, 
Complementary ev. 
2007, Diagnostic of 
gender equality 
2008, Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2008, EED 2009, EED 
2010, Ev. 
Consistency and 
results 2011, EED 
2012, M&E card 
2014
48,720,876 48,720,876 S/A/U 65,218,253 64,252,806 A/D 67,465,446 65,443,762 A/S/D 115,307,134 100,907,134 S 105,368,939 105,368,939 A/U 117,504,677 114,688,27 S/D
In 2007, the programme changed its name to “Comunidades y Entornos 
Saludables”. 
Diagnostic of gender 2008 and Ev. of gender 2009 was the same and performed 
by INMUJERES, 5 recommendations were pointed out by evaluators; however 
those were not implemented by the health sector.
In the Ev. complementaria 2007 recommendations (21) are not mentioned in 
the mechanism to follow up evaluation results. The recommendations (3) of 
the ECyR 2007 and EED 2008 were the same and implemented. 
Recommendations (2) o the EED 2009 were implemented. Recommendations 
(3) of the EED 2010 are diferent from those implemented. Recommendations 
(3) of the ECyR 2011 are improving. Recommendations (5) of the EED 2012 are 
not mentioned in the mechanism to follow up evaluation results. The M&E 
card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
IMSS S038
Programa IMSS – 
Oportunidades*
2013, 2014 X
Ev. Consistency and 
results 2007, 
Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2008, Ev. of gender 
2009, EED 2009, Ev. 
of process 2009, EED 
2010, Ev. 
Consistency and 
results 2011, EED 
2012, Ev. Cost-
effectiveness 2013, 
M&E card 2014
5,487,613,378 5,487,613,378 S*/U 6,000,000,000 6,000,000,000 A/U 6,000,000,000 6,000,000,000 A/S/U 7,300,000,000 7,300,000,000 A/U 8,000,000,000 8,000,000,000 A/U 8,500,000,000 8,500,000,000 A/U 8,800,000,000 8,800,000,000 U
This programme is classified in the budgetary process until 2013. However, it 
exists time before and has developed evaluation in 2007. It was classified in 
ramo 19 “Aportaciones a seguridad social”.
Diagnostic of gender 2008 and Ev. of gender 2009 was the same and performed 
by INMUJERES, 5 recommendations were pointed out by evaluators; however 
those were not implemented by the health sector.
The ECyR 2007 shows that only 1 of 6 recommendations were attended, the 
rest are improving. The recommendations (2) in the EED 2008 were 
implemented. The recommendations (16) of the Ev. of process 2009 were 
implemented. The EED 2009 shows that only 1 of 3 recommendations is still 
improving, the rest are not mentioned in the mechanism to follow up 
evaluation results. The EED 2010 shows that only 1 of 3 recommendations is 
still improving, the rest are not mentioned in the mechanism to follow up 
evaluation results. The recommendations (17) of the ECyR 2011 are improving. 
The recommendations (4) of the EED 2012 are improving. The M&E card 2014 
will not be included in the analysis. Regarding the ev. cost-effectiveness 2013 
is not possible to identify how many recommendations suggested by 
evaluators and they are still improving. 
SSA-SNDIF S039
Programa de Atención a 
Personas con Discapacidad*
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
X
Ev. Consistency and 
results 2007, 
Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2008, EED 2009, EED 
2010, Ev. 
Consistency and 
results 2011, EED 
2012, M&E card 
2014
382,475,318 381,453,653 A/D 335,826,943 325,876,142 A/D 370,193,774 486,498,354 A/I 34,415,445 234,415,445 S/I 244,525,153 244,525,153 S*/U 258,661,113 258,661,113 S/U
There are several differences between recommendations of evaluators and 
actions taken by organizations.
The ECyR 2007 shows that only 5 of 7 recommendations were implemented 
according to institution letter. Only 3 of 4 recommendations of the EED 2008 
were implemented. The only recommendation of the EED 2009 was 
implemented, however there are more pointed out by evaluators, which are 
the same identified by in the ECyR 2007 and EED 2008. According to the 
institution could not implement recommendations (3) of the EED 2010 due to 
financial restrictions or because those were implemented already 
http://sn.dif.gob.mx/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Anexo_2_ASM_Evaluaciones_Externas_S039.pdf. 
Only 1 of 8 recommendations of the ECyR 2011 was implemented. In the EED 
2012 recommendations (11) are not mentioned in the mechanism to follow up 
evaluation results. The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
SSA S041
Programa Cruzada Nacional 
por la Calidad de los Servicios 
de Salud
2007
Ev. of design 2007, 
Ev. consistency and 
results 2007
80,710,442 80,710,442 S/U
There is no data about ECyR 2007. Recommendations (2) of the Ev. of design 
2007 are not mentioned in the mechanism to follow up evaluation results. In 
2008 changed its name to Sistema Integral de Calidad en Salud. See 
programme S202.
SSA S072
Programa de Desarrollo 
Humano Oportunidades
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
X
Ev. Consistency and 
results 2007, Ev. of 
quality of services 
2007, Diagnostic of 
gender equality 
2008, Impact ev. 
2008, EED 2009, EED 
2010, Ev. 
Consistency and 
results 2011, EED 
2012, M&E card 
2014
3,928,804,439 3,928,804,439 S*/U 3,491,064,688 3,430,216,730 S/S/D 3,474,954,792 3,466,985,864 S*/D 4,958,396,104 4,926,496,104 S/D 5,123,600,000 244,525,153 S/U 5,314,414,228 5,314,414,228 S/U
Ev. of quality of services 2007 is only a proposal of questionnaire. Thus, there 
are no recommendations.
Diagnostic of gender 2008 and Ev. of gender 2009 was the same and performed 
by INMUJERES, 5 recommendations were pointed out by evaluators; however 
those were not implemented by the health sector.
There are several differences between recommendations of evaluators and 
actions taken by institutions.
In the ECyR 2007 only 4 recommendations of 14 were improved. 
Recommendations (12) of the Impact Ev. 2008 are not mentioned in the 
mechanism to follow up evaluation results. Only 1 recommendations of 4 was 
improved in the EED 2009. There are no recommendations of the EED 2010 (2) 
and ECyR 2011 (10) in the mechanism to follow up evaluation results. 
Recommendations (3) of the EED 2012 are not mentioned in the mechanism to 
follow up evaluation results, however, those are the same pointed out by 
evaluators in previous evaluations. The M&E card 2014 will not be included in 
the analysis.
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SSA-SNDIF S150
Programa de Atención a 
Familias y Población 
Vulnerable*
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
X
Ev. Consistency and 
results 2007, 
Diagnostic of gender 
equality 2008, 
Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2008, EED 2009, EED 
2010, Ev. 
Consistency and 
results 2011, EED 
2012, M&E card 
2014
530,776,330 525,865,738 A/D 511,543,394 489,815,146 A/S/D 501,841,902 641,069,788 A/I 381,960,068 381,960,068 A/U 397,690,601 397,690,601 A/U/I** 259,494,531 279,494,531 S/I
Diagnostic of gender 2008 and Ev. of gender 2009 was the same and performed 
by INMUJERES, 5 recommendations were pointed out by evaluators; however 
those were not implemented by the health sector.
In the ECyR 2007 recommendations (3) were implemented.  Recommendation 
of the EED 2008 was implemented. There was only one recommendation of 
the EED 2009 and it was implemented. The only recommendation of the EED 
2010 is still improving. In the PPEF 2011 public resources of this programme 
were increased in .1%. The only recommendation of the ECyR 2011 is still 
improving, however there are more pointed out by evaluators, which are the 
same identified by other evaluations. There are no recommendations 
mentioned in the mechanism to follow up evaluation results of the EED 2012, 
however they are the same pointed by evaluators in evaluations previously 
cited. The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
SSA S174
Programa de estancias 
infantiles para apoyar a 
madres trabajadoras
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
Ev. of design 2007, 
Impact ev. 2007, 
Diagnostic of gender 
equality 2008, Ev. Of 
perception 2009, 
Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2009, EED 2010, Ev. 
Consistency and 
results 2011, Impact 
ev. 2011, EED 2012, 
Ev. of process 2012, 
Meta ev. 2007-2012
1,000,000,000 1,000,000,000 A/I 1,441,034,409 1,499,172,686 I 128,739,936 122,863,566 S/S/A/D 124,273,664 124,273,664 S 202,400,000 202,400,000
S*/S/U/
I**
209,484,000 209,484,000 A/S/U
This programme is classified in the budgetary process until 2009. However, it 
exists time before and has developed evaluations since 2007.
There is no data of Impact Ev. 2007. 
Diagnostic of gender 2008 and Ev. of gender 2009 was the same and performed 
by INMUJERES, 5 recommendations were pointed out by evaluators; however 
those were not implemented by the health sector.
In 2007 and 2008 it was classified in the social sector as S174, later on 
transferred to health sector. Recommendations (10) of the Ev. of design 2007 
were implemented, however these are different from those identified by 
evaluator (6). In the Ev. of perception 2009 there are no recommendations (4) 
in the mechanism to follow up evaluation results. Only one recommendations 
of 2 of the EED 2009 was implemented.  There are no recommendations 
mentioned in the mechanism to follow up evaluation results of the EED 2010, 
however there are the some pointed by evaluators in evaluations previously 
cited. In the PPEF 2011 its resources of this programme were increased by 
61%. Recommendations (4) of the ECyR 2011 were implemented, however 
there are more pointed out by evaluators (19). There are no recommendations 
mentioned in the mechanism to follow up evaluation results of the Impact Ev. 
2011, however there are some pointed by evaluators (5). Recommendations 
(3) of the EED 2012 are improving, however these are different from those 
identified by evaluator (6). There are no recommendations as result of Process 
Ev. 2012 (7) and meta evaluation 2007-2012 in the mechanism to follow up 
evaluation results.
SSA S200 Caravanas de la Salud*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X
Ev. of design 2007, 
Complementary ev. 
2007, Diagnostic of 
gender equality 
2008, Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2008, EED 2009, 
Complementary ev 
2009, EED 2010, Ev. 
Consistency and 
results 2011, EED 
2012, M&E card 
2014
500,000,008
 
 500,000,008 S/S*/U 520,000,000 514,542,236 A/D 615,840,529 614,129,674
S/S*/S*
/D
760,745,734 734,312,234 A/D 726,939,144 726,939,144
S*/U/I*
*
793,792,186 704,096,038 A/D
This programme is classified in the budgetary process until 2008. In 2007 was 
classified as R203. However, it exist time before and developed an evaluation 
in 2007.
Diagnostic of gender 2008 and Ev. of gender 2009 was the same and performed 
by INMUJERES, 5 recommendations were pointed out by evaluators; however 
those were not implemented by the health sector.
Recommendations (7) of the Design Ev. 2007 are not mentioned in the 
mechanism to follow up evaluation results. In the Ev. complementaria 2007 
only 2 recommendations of 29 are improving. The recommendations (2) of the 
EED 2008 were implemented. Only one recommendation of the EED 2009 was 
implemented, however there are more pointed out by evaluators (6). In the 
Ev. complementaria 2009 only 3 recommendations of 33 are improving. In the 
EED 2010 only one recommendation of three was implemented. In the PPEF 
2011 public resources of this programme were reduced -4.8%. In the ECyR 
2011 only 3 recommendations of 20 are still improving. In the EED 2012, 3 
recommendations were pointed out by evaluators and still improving, 
however these recommendations are the same since evaluations of 2007. The 
M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
SSA S201
Seguro Médico para una 
Nueva Generación
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012
X
Ev. of design 2007, 
Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2008, EED 2009, EED 
2010, 
Complementary ev. 
2010, Ev. Of 
Consistency and 
Results 2011, EED 
2012
No data No data A 2,641,185,204 2,641,185,204 A/S/U 2,641,636,393 2,641,533,522 S/D 2,450,000,000 2,450,000,000 A/A/U 2,563,310,066 2,563,310,066 S*/U 2,653,025,918 2,653,025,918 A/U
This programme is classified in the budgetary process until 2008. In 2007 the 
programme classification was not found. However, it exists time before and 
developed an evaluation in 2007. There is no data of Complementary Ev. 2010. 
In the Ev. of design 2007, only 2 recommendations of 4 were implemented, 
this evaluation was developed until 2008. In 2007 the programme 
classification was not found. In the EED 2008, only one recommendation of 3 
was implemented. Recommendations are the same in both evaluations. There 
are no recommendations mentioned in the mechanism to follow up 
evaluation results of the Ev. complementaria 2008 and EED 2009. In the EED 
2010 were identified 5 recommendations, however these are different from 
mechanism to follow up evaluation results. Recommendations (3) of the Ev. 
complementaria 2010 were implemented. Only 3 recommendations were 
implemented of the ECyR 2011, there are 12 more recommendations not 
mentioned in the mechanism to follow up evaluation results. Two 
recommendations were implemented of the EED 2012, however there are 4 
more pointed out by evaluation. Recommendations are the same of EED 2010, 
ECyR 2011 and EED 2012.
SSA S201 Seguro Médico Siglo XXI* 2013, 2014 X
Ev. of design 2013, 
Ev. Cost-
effectiveness 2013, 
M&E card 2014
2,519,425,918 2,519,425,918 U
There is NO DATA of the ev. of design and cost-effectiveness 2013.
The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis. The latter programme 
"Seguro médico para una nueva generación" emerged into this "Seguro 
médico siglo XXI".
SSA S202
Sistema Integral de Calidad en 
Salud*
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
X
Ev. of design 2007, 
Ev. of consistency 
and results 2007, 
Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2008, 
Complementary ev. 
2008, EED 2009, EED 
2010, 
Complementary ev. 
2010, EED 2010, 
Complementary ev. 
2010, Ev. 
Consistency and 
116,414,247 115,622,808 A/D 121,500,000 115,718,875 S/D 188,804,081 164,304,081 A/D 162,587,627 166,587,627 I/D** 163,860,246 163,034,148 S/D
This programme is classified in the budgetary process until 2008. However, it 
exists time before (Programa Cruzada Nacional por la Calidad de los Servicios 
de Salud) and developed one evaluation of two programmed in 2007. See 
programme S041. There is no data of ECyR 2011.
It used to be "Programa Cruzada Nacional por la Calidad de los Servicios de 
Salud", see programme S041. In the EED 2008 only one recommendations of 2 
was implemented. In the Ev. Complementaria 2008, only 2 of 17 
recommendations were implemented. The recommendations (3) of the EED 
2009 are not mentioned in the mechanism to follow up evaluation results. In 
the EED 2010 only one recommendation of 3 was implemented. In the PPEF 
2011 public resources of this programme were reduced -4.9%. There is no data 
of ECyR 2011. There are no recommendations (4) mentioned in the mechanism 
to follow up evaluation results of the EED 2012. The M&E card 2014 will not be 
included in the analysis. 
SSA-SNDIF S250
Programa de fortalecimiento a 
las Procuradurías de la 
Defensa del Menor y la Familia
2014 Diagnostic 2014 The diagnostic 2014 will not be included in the analysis. 
SSA-SNDIF S251
Programa de desarrollo 
comunitario “Comunidad 
DIFerente”
2014 Diagnostic 2014 The diagnostic 2014 will not be included in the analysis. 
SSA U004
Financiamiento equitativo de 
la atención médica
2008
Specific ev. Of 
performance (EED) 
2008
25,459,280,465 25,204,643,096 A/D
This evaluation is part of the U005. All recommendations (6) of the EED 2008 
were implemented. This evaluation is part of the U005.
SSA U005 Seguro Popular*
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
X
Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2008, EED 2009, EED 
2010, Ev. of 
Consistency and 
Results 2011, Ev. of 
process 2012, EED 
2012, Ev. Cost-
effectiveness 2012 
and 2013, M&E card 
2014
41,368,161,540 41,368,161,540 S/U 52,378,927,045 48,842,127,045 S/D 57,267,820,560 56,946,687,061 A/I**/D 65,652,458,192 64,402,458,192 S/D 66,791,938,639 66,791,938,639 U
This programme is classified in the budgetary process until 2008. However, it 
exists time before and developed an evaluation in 2007. It is the same as the 
“Sistema de Protección Social en Salud”. The EED 2008 is the same of the 
U004. There is no data of Process Ev. 2012. There are no recommendations in 
the Ev. cost-effectiveness 2012 pointed out by evaluators. In the ECyR 2007, 18 
recommendations were implemented, only one is still improving. There are 
no recommendations (3) as result of EED 2009 in the mechanism to follow up 
evaluation results. There are no recommendations (3) as result of the EED 2010 
in the mechanism to follow up evaluation results.  In the PPEF 2011 public 
resources of this programme were increased in 12.7%. 7 recommendations of 
the ECyR 2011 are improving, however there are more (4) not included in the 
mechanism to follow up results. There are no recommendations (4) as result of 
the EED 2012 in the mechanism to follow up evaluation results. There is NO 
DATA of the ev. cost-effectiveness 2013. The M&E card will not be included in 
the analysis. 
SSA U006
Fortalecimiento de las Redes 
de Servicios de Salud*
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
Specific ev of 
performance (EED) 
2010, Ev. of 
Consistency and 
Results 2011, EED 
2012, M&E card 
2014
142,170,689 2,611,170,689 I 332,000,000 4,675,200,002 I 50,000,000 2,251,892,641 I
There is no data of any evaluation (EED 2010, ECyR 2011, EED 2012). The M&E 
card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
SSA U007
Reducción de la mortalidad 
materna*
2012, 2013, 2014  M&E card 2014
This is the same programme as P018. The M&E card 2014 will not be included 
in the analysis.
SSA U008
Prevención contra la 
obesidad*
2012, 2013, 2014  M&E card 2014
This is the same programme as P019. The M&E card 2014 will not be included 
in the analysis.
SSA U009 Vigilancia epidemiológica* 2012, 2013, 2014  M&E card 2014 The M&E card 2014 will not be included in the analysis.
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S* = recommendations are classified in status quo when they represent less than 30% of total. 
I** = in 2011 public resources were increased compared to previous year based on evaluation results. 
Note: In the PAE 2007 the “Programa Primer Empleo” of the IMSS has to develop an impact evaluation but there is no evidence that this  programme actually exists in the IMSS neither in 
the STPS. 
*These programmes are considered PART of the social sector and coordinated by the CONEVAL. 
In the “Exposición de motivos del PPEF 2011”, the public resources of the programme U001 (Programa de atención a situaciones de contingencia laboral) were reduced from 30.1 to 29.5 (-
5.8) million of mxn pesos. However, this programme does not appear in the PEF 2010. 
Source: author’s own elaboration. 
 
SSA U010
Apoyos adicionales para la 
prevención y atención de 
adicciones en entidades 
federativas
2012
SSA U012
Programa de Apoyo para 
Fortalecer la Calidad en los 
Servicios de Salud*
2013, 2014
Ev. of design 2013, 
M&E card 2014
3,913,100,000 3,913,100,000 U
There is NO data of the ev. of design 2013. The M&E card 2014 will not be 
included in the analysis.
IMSS W001 Operaciones ajenas 2013
SSA-SNDIF
Estrategia Integral de 
Asistencia Social Alimentaria 
(EIASA)
Ev. of Consistency 
and Results 2007
1,716,821,123 1,709,821,123 S/D
In the ECyR 2007, nine recommendations are still improving but does not 
mention time of execution. However there are more pointed out by 
evaluators. For instance, Programa de desayunos escolares  only 1 of 8 
recommendations is in the mechanism to follow up evaluation results; 
Programa de asistencia alimentaria a familias en desamparo  only 2 of 7 
recommendations; Programa de atención a menores de 5 años en riesgo  only 
4 of 9 recommendations; and Programa de asistencia alimentaria a sujetos 
vulnerables  only 2 of 7 recommendations. 
SSA
Sistema de Protección Social 
en Salud
Ev. of Consistency 
and Results 2007, 
Impact ev. 2008, 
Strategic ev. 2010 
continuing to 2011
27,740,318,419 26,040,318,419 A/D 37,716,201,799 37,355,008,276 S/D 57,181,075,475 53,644,275,475 S/D
In the ECyR 2007 was identified 9 recommendations but there are not 
mentioned in the mechanism. In the Impact Ev. 2008 there are evaluation but 
not specific recommendations pointed out by evaluators, neither in the 
mechanism to follow up evaluation results. There are no recommendations 
(42) as result of the Strategic Ev. 2010 in the mechanism to follow up 
evaluation results. 
RAMO 19
Aportaciones a seguridad 
social
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
It is a set of programmes:
• Servicio médico a pensionistas (R004).
• Cubrir el 11% de haberes y haberes de retiro (R005).
• Programa IMSS-Oportunidades (S038).
• Programa para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos y comunidades indígenas (S073).
• Aportaciones estatutarias al seguro de retiro, cesantía en edad avanzada y 
vejez (R011).
• Cuota social al seguro de retiro, cesantía en edad avanzada y vejez (R012).
• Pensiones de trato especial (R007).
• Pensiones  civiles, militares y de gracia (R009).
• Apoyo a jubilados del IMSS e ISSSTE (R015).
• Adeudos con el IMSS e ISSSTE (R023).
• Apoyo para cubrir el déficit de la nómina de pensiones del ISSSTE Instituto 
Mexicano del Seguro Social (R006).
• Pensiones y jubilaciones en curso de pago (R008).
• Pensión mínima garantizada IMSS (R021).
• Apoyos para cubrir el gasto de operación del ISSSTE Instituto Mexicano del 
Seguro Social (R018).
• Seguro de enfermedades y maternidad (R001).
• Seguro de invalidez y vida (R002).
• Seguro de salud para la familia (R003).
• Promoción al empleo (R022).
• Pagas de defunción y ayuda para gastos de sepelio (R010).
• Compensaciones de carácter militar con pago único (R013).
• Apoyo económico a viudas de veteranos de la Revolución Mexicana (R014).
• 15 programmes are of the health sector.
RAMO 23 R001, R079-103 Provisiones salariales
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
RAMO 33 R001-032
Fondo de Aportaciones para 
los Servicios de Salud (FASSA)
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
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 Table 6 
 
The effectiveness of policy evaluation in Chile 
 
Project budget
Budget 
approved
2007 Project budget
Budget 
approved
2008 Project budget Budget approved 2009 Project budget Budget approved 2010 Project budget
Budget 
approved
2011 Project budget Budget approved 2012 Project budget Budget approved 2013 2014 Recommendations of evaluations
Undersecretary 
of Healthcare 
Networks
Red de urgencia
T his pro gramme 
is no t  listed in the 
budget  2007-2014 
and D IP R ES' 
website. T he 
D IP R ES' o ff ice 
let ter says this 
evaluat io n is  in 
the pro cess o f  
public  aut io n.
Comprehensive 
Spending Review 
(ECG) 2011 Revisar si 
no es la ev. Del gasto 
institucional
The government auction process mentions this evaluation was contracted 
during 2013. Cost of the evaluation is $118,000,000.00 Chilean pesos 
($192,186.00 USD).
National Health 
Fund (FONASA), 
Undersecretary 
of Public Health 
and of 
Healthcare 
Networks
Programa tratamiento de la 
obesidad
T his pro gramme 
is no t  listed in the 
budget  2007-2014. 
T he pro gramme is 
run o nly by 
F ON A SA .
Evaluation of Public 
Programmes (EPG) 
2008
A
Cost of the evaluation is $11,800,000.00 Chilean pesos ($19,202 USD). From 
the total of 14 recommendations suggested by evaluators, 9 were 
implemented whereas 5 of them (no.1,5,6)  did not achieved and cancelled in 
the report to following up results.
Undersecretary 
of Healthcare 
Networks
Establecimientos 
experimentales (Hospital 
Padre Hurtado, Centro Maipu 
y  Cordillera Oriente)
T his pro gramme 
is no t  listed in the 
budget  2007-2014. 
T his is  a set  o f  
pro grammes 
Comprehensive 
Spending Review 
(ECG) 2010
S
Cost of the evaluation is $70,000,000.00 Chilean pesos ($113,877.00 USD). 
The finances each year are integrated by the three hospitals. From the total of 
25 recommendations suggested by evaluators, two were not implemented 
(no. 14,16); the latter neither related between recommendation and action 
taken. There are 23 recomendations not mentioned in the report to following 
up results (no. 1 to 13,15,17 to 25).
National Health 
Fund (FONASA)
Fondo Nacional de Salud
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
Comprehensive 
Spending Review 
(ECG) 2011 
1,880,042,234 2,138,276,030 2,525,362,695 2,805,771,249 3,259,986,303 S 3,587,539,216 3,970,506,948 4.423.129.516
The government auction process mentions this evaluation was contracted 
during 2012. Cost of the evaluation is $90,000,000.00 Chilean pesos 
($146,413.00 USD). It is also named as "Ev. de gasto institucional" 
(Organizational spending ev.) The report issued by the organization is quite 
general and does not mention specific actions as result of 17 
recommendations suggested by evaluators. Only 2 of these recommendations 
were implemented. Report available at: 
http://www.dipres.gob.cl/595/articles-124665_doc_pdf.pdf
National Health 
Fund (FONASA)
Caja de previsión de la 
Defensa Nacional
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
National Health 
Fund (FONASA)
Programa de Desarrollo 
Indígema MIDEPLAN-BID
2007, 2008, 2009
National Health 
Fund (FONASA)
Sistema Chile Solidario. In 
2013 is "Ley no.20.595 and 
Sistema Chile Solidario"
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
National Health 
Fund (FONASA)
Sistema de Protección 
Integral a la Infancia
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
National Health 
Fund (FONASA)
Curativa cargo usuario
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
National Health 
Fund (FONASA)
Otros 2007, 2008
National Health 
Fund (FONASA)
Bonificaciones de salud
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
National Health 
Fund (FONASA)
Subsidio cajas de 
compensación de asignación 
familiar
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
National Health 
Fund (FONASA)
Programa de atención 
primaria (1)
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
National Health 
Fund (FONASA)
Programa de prestaciones 
valoradas (2)
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
596,747,650 651,070,947 704,919,362 759,005,607 938,136,303 1,139,270,829 1,335,510,368
National Health 
Fund (FONASA)
Programa de prestaciones 
institucionales (3)
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
National Health 
Fund (FONASA)
Compras a privados: Programa 
prestaciones valoradas
T H IS 
P R OGR A M M E 
IN C LUD ES 4 
D IF F ER EN T  
P R OGR A M M ES 
OF  T H E SA M E 
D IF F ER EN T  
OR GA N IZ A T ION S
. T his pro gramme 
is no t  listed in the 
budget  2007-2014.
Evaluation of Public 
Programmes (EPG) 
2013
S
This is a programme under responsibility by the FONASA, MINSAL, providers 
which do not belong to the Sistema Nacional de Servicios de Salud (SNSS), SS, 
public network hospitals and the Purchasing or procurement office and public 
contracts (Dirección de compras y contratación pública). Integrated by four 
programmes: compra de prestación diálisis, de camas integrales, de 
prestaciones bono AUGE, de otras prestaciones. There are 11 
recommendations suggested by evaluators, however there is no report to 
following up results.
National Health 
Fund (FONASA)
Bono AUGE (Programa de 
Acceso Universal de Garantías 
Explícitas)
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
It  belo ngs to  the 
pro gramme 
"P R EST A C ION ES 
VA LOR A D A S"
Evaluation of New 
Programmes (EPN) 
2013
6.269.428 4.112.000 1.252.926 A 3.051.814
The final report says is an impact evaluation 2013 but the government auction 
process mentions this evaluation is of impact and performed during 2011. Cost 
of the evaluation is $80,000,000.00 Chilean pesos ($130,145.00 USD). There 
are 3 recommendations suggested by evaluators but there are still improving. 
There is only a report by the organization, which mentions some actions taken.
Institute of 
Public Health
Instituto de Salud Pública (4)
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
Institute of 
Public Health
Secretaría y administración 
general hacienda
2011
Institute of 
Public Health
Portal integrado de comercio 
exterior (SICEX)
2011
National Supply 
Center
Central de Abastecimiento 
del Sistema Nacional de Salud
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
Comprehensive 
Spending Review 
(ECG) 2010
4,713,138 5,103,635 5,492,046 6,210,093 S 6,330,720 6,068,430 6,106,199 7,300,501
Cost of the evaluation is $70,000,000.00 Chilean pesos ($113,877.00 USD). 
From the total of 10 recommendations suggested by evaluators, one was 
implemented (no. 6) but there is not relation between recommendation and 
action taken, 2 were implemented (no.2,7), as well as the recommendation 
no. 8, which has 3 different suggestions but only one was implemented. There 
is one recomendation not implemented (no. 10) and five are not mentioned in 
the report to following up results (no. 1,3,4,5,9).
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Programa de fortalecimiento 
de la estrategia digital de 
Chile
2007, 2008
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Ley de accidentes del trabajo 2007, 2008, 2009
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Subsidios por accidentes del 
trabajo
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Programa nacional de 
alimentación complementaria
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
Evaluation of Public 
Programmes (EPG) 
2013
30,095,146 33,171,792 35,228,443 35,756,870 44,381,835 45,624,526 46,947,637 S
There are 12 recommendations (3 of design, 3 of management, 3 of 
eficacy/quality, 2 of efficiency and 1 of economic) suggested by evaluators, 
however there is no report to following up results.
Budgetary programme
Public 
organization
Key budgetary
programme
Amendments = A; Cancelation = C; Learning process = L; Status quo = S; Allocation of financial resources (Increase = I; Decrease = D; Unchanged = U)
Year in the 
federal budget
Indicator of 
budgetary 
process
Type of 
evaluation 
performed
~ 232 ~ 
 
~ 2 ~ 
 
 
 
 
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Programa de alimentación 
complementaria para el 
adulto mayor
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Programa nacional de 
inmunizaciones (in 2009 
Programa ampliado de 
inmunizaciones)
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
Evaluation of Public 
Programmes (EPG) 
2012
13,362,902 13,924,144 15,933,062 30,260,258 30,011,137 24,176,007 S 26,337,208
From the total of 7 recommendations suggested by evaluators, only one was 
implemented (no. 3), two were not implemented (no. 1,5) and four are not 
mentioned in the report to following up results (no.2,4,6,7).
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
29 healthcare centers (5)
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Programa contingencias 
operacionales
2007
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Programa campaña de 
invierno
2007
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Programa de enfermedades 
emergentes
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Fondo nacional de 
investigación y desarrollo en 
salud
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Comisión de medicina 
preventiva e invalidez
T his pro gramme 
is no t  listed in the 
budget  2007-2014. 
Comprehensive 
Spending Review 
(ECG) 2008
A
Cost of the evaluation is $47,000,000.00 Chilean pesos ($76,460.00 USD). 
From the total of 21 recommendations suggested by evaluators, one was 
implemented (no. 1) but there is not relation between recommendation and 
action taken, 8 were implemented (no. 3,4,13,14,15,19,20,21), as well as the 
recommendations 6 to 11 were integrated into one and implemented except 
by two (no. 10,11), which were not implemented. The recomendations 16,17 
and 18 were cancelled because the programme is reestructuring. Lastly, three 
recommendations were not implemented (no. 2,5,12).
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Programa de prevención y 
control del VIH sida
T his pro gramme 
is no t  listed in the 
budget  2007-2014. 
Evaluation of Public 
Programmes (EPG) 
2010
A
Cost of the evaluation is $11,400,000.00 Chilean pesos ($18,546.00 USD). 
From the total of 12 recommendations suggested by evaluators, 10 were 
implemented, one (no. 8) was not implemented and one was partially 
implemented (no.4).
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Fondo único de prestaciones 
familiares y subsidios de 
cesantía
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Subsidios de reposo 
preventivo
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Subsidios de enfermedad y 
medicina curativa
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Subsidio de reposo maternal, 
art. 196 código del trabajo
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Atención primaria, ley no. 
19.378. In 2012 was called 
"Programas especiales, 
atención primaria"
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Secretaría y administración 
general hacienda
2011
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Subsidio de reposo maternal y 
cuidado del niño
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Portal integrado de comercio 
exterior (SICEX)
2011
Undersecretary 
of Public Health
Instituto de seguridad laboral
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013
Undersecretary 
of Healthcare 
Networks
Subsecretaría de redes 
asistenciales
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013
Undersecretary 
of Healthcare 
Networks
Programa campaña de 
invierno
2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
Undersecretary 
of Healthcare 
Networks
Inversión sectorial de salud 
(loans) 
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
Undersecretary 
of Healthcare 
Networks
Sistema de Protección 
Integral a la Infancia
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
Undersecretary 
of Healthcare 
Networks
Programa de apoyo al recién 
nacido
2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014
Evaluation of Public 
Programmes (EPG) 
2011
7.741.980 12,366,456 13,150,019 C 13,518,220 13,910,248 14.216.165
From the total of 9 recommendations suggested by evaluators, one  was 
cancelled (no.2) and one was partially implemented (no.3). The programme 
was merged to the Programa de Apoyo Biopsicosocial (PADB). However, this 
programme was financed in the budget 2014.
Undersecretary 
of Healthcare 
Networks
IVA concesiones hospitalarias
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
Undersecretary 
of Healthcare 
Networks
Reintegro crédito - IVA 
concesiones
2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014
Undersecretary 
of Healthcare 
Networks
Programa de formación de 
especialistas y 
subespecialistas
T his pro gramme 
is no t  listed in the 
budget  2007-2014. 
Evaluation of Public 
Programmes (EPG) 
2014
A
There are 6 recommendations suggested by evaluators but there are still 
improving. There is only a report by the organization, which mention some 
actions taken.
Undersecretary 
of Healthcare 
Networks
Subsidio fijo a la construcción 2013, 2014
Superintency of 
Health
Superintendencia de salud
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
Superintency of 
Health
Índice referencial variación 
gasto sistema ISAPRE - INE
2013, 2014
Healthcare 
centers (28)
Fondo único de prestaciones 
familiares y subsidios de 
cesantía
2007, 2008, 2009
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
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Healthcare 
centers (28)
Subsidios de enfermedad y 
medicina curativa
2007, 2008, 2009
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Healthcare 
centers (28)
Subsidio de reposo maternal, 
art. 196 código del trabajo
2007, 2008, 2009
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Healthcare 
centers (28)
Ayudas económicas y otros 
pagos preventivos
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Healthcare 
centers (28)
Subsidio de reposo maternal y 
cuidado del niño
2007, 2008, 2009
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Healthcare 
centers (28)
Centros de prevención de 
alcoholismo y salud mental
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
T H IS 
P R OGR A M M E IS 
N OT  IN C LUD ED  
IN  T H E 
UN D ER SEC R ET A
R IES
Healthcare 
centers (28)
Atención primaria, ley no. 
19.378
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Healthcare 
center 
Metropolitano 
Central, 
Metropolitano 
Sur-Oriente
IVA concesiones hospitalarias 2010
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Healthcare 
center 
Metropolitano 
Central, 
Metropolitano 
Sur-Oriente
Reintegro crédito - IVA 
concesiones
2010
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Programme 
operational 
contingencies
Atención primaria
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Programme 
operational 
contingencies
Prestaciones valoradas
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Programme 
operational 
contingencies
Prestaciones institucionales
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Programme 
operational 
contingencies
Atención primaria, ley no. 
19.378
2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Programme 
operational 
contingencies
Fondo único de prestaciones 
familiares y subsidios de 
cesantía
2007, 2008, 2009
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Programme 
operational 
contingencies
Subsidios de enfermedad y 
medicina curativa
2007, 2009
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Programme 
operational 
contingencies
Subsidio de reposo maternal y 
cuidado del niño
2007, 2008, 2009
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Programme 
operational 
contingencies
Subsidio de reposo maternal, 
art. 196 código del trabajo
2007
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Programme 
operational 
contingencies
Subsecretaría de salud pública 2007
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Programme 
operational 
contingencies
Subsidios de reposo 
preventivo
2007
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Programme 
operational 
contingencies
Ayudas económicas y otros 
pagos preventivos
2014
T H IS IS N OT  A  
P R OGR A M M E
Programme 
operational 
contingencies
Indeminización de cargo fiscal 2014
T H IS 
P R OGR A M M E IS 
N OT  IN C LUD ED  
IN  T H E 
UN D ER SEC R ET A
R IES
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 Source: author’s own elaboration. 
S* = recommendations are classified in status quo when they represent less than 30% of total. 
(1) This programme provides services to the 28 healthcare centers (Arica, Iquique, Antofagasta, Atacama, Coquimbo, Valparaíso-San Antonio, Viña del Mar-Quillota, Aconcagua, Libertador 
General Bernardo O'Higgins, Maule, Ñuble, Concepción, Talcahuano, Bío-Bío, Arauco, Araucanía Norte, Araucanía Sur, Valdivia, Osorno, Chiloé, Aysén del General Carlos Ibáñez del 
Campo, Magallanes, Metropolitano Oriente, Metropolitano Central, Metropolitano Sur, Metropolitano Norte, Metropolitano Occidente, Metropolitano Sur-Oriente) and the programme of 
operational contingencies (Programa de contingencias operacionales). In 2009 was included the hospital Padre Alberto Hurtado and the healthcare center of Reloncaví. 
(2) This programme provides services to the 28 healthcare centers (Arica, Iquique, Antofagasta, Atacama, Coquimbo, Valparaíso-San Antonio, Viña del Mar-Quillota, Aconcagua, Libertador 
General Bernardo O'Higgins, Maule, Ñuble, Concepción, Talcahuano, Bío-Bío, Arauco, Araucanía Norte, Araucanía Sur, Valdivia, Osorno, Chiloé, Aysén del General Carlos Ibáñez del 
Campo, Magallanes, Metropolitano Oriente, Metropolitano Central, Metropolitano Sur, Metropolitano Norte, Metropolitano Occidente, Metropolitano Sur-Oriente), the programme of 
operational contingencies (Programa de contingencias operacionales), Hospital Padre Alberto Hurtado, Centro de referencia de salud de Maipú, Centro de referencia de salud de Peñalolén 
Cordillera Oriente and the agreements of provision of health benefits (convenios de provisión de prestaciones médicas). In 2009 was included the healthcare center of Reloncaví. In 2011 
was included Bono Auge. 
(3) This programme provides services to the 28 healthcare centers (Arica, Iquique, Antofagasta, Atacama, Coquimbo, Valparaíso-San Antonio, Viña del Mar-Quillota, Aconcagua, Libertador 
General Bernardo O'Higgins, Maule, Ñuble, Concepción, Talcahuano, Bío-Bío, Arauco, Araucanía Norte, Araucanía Sur, Valdivia, Osorno, Chiloé, Aysén del General Carlos Ibáñez del 
Campo, Magallanes, Metropolitano Oriente, Metropolitano Central, Metropolitano Sur, Metropolitano Norte, Metropolitano Occidente, Metropolitano Sur-Oriente), the programme of 
operational contingencies (Programa de contingencias operacionales), Hospital Padre Alberto Hurtado, Centro de referencia de salud de Maipú, and Centro de referencia de salud de 
Peñalolén Cordillera Oriente. In 2009 was included the healthcare center of Reloncaví. 
(4) This programme includes the programme Undersecretary of Public Health and the programme to international organisations. In 2014 the programme to international organisations does 
not appears. 
(5) This programme provides services to the 29 healthcare centers (Arica, Iquique, Antofagasta, Atacama, Coquimbo, Valparaíso-San Antonio, Viña del Mar-Quillota, Aconcagua, Libertador 
General Bernardo O'Higgins, Maule, Ñuble, Concepción, Talcahuano, Bío-Bío, Arauco, Araucanía Norte, Araucanía Sur, Valdivia, Osorno, Chiloé, Reloncaví, Aysén del General Carlos 
Ibáñez del Campo, Magallanes, Metropolitano Oriente, Metropolitano Central, Metropolitano Sur, Metropolitano Norte, Metropolitano Occidente, Metropolitano Sur-Oriente). It also includes 
the healthcare center of Maipú in 2007, 2008, 2011 but does not appear in 2009 and 2010. In 2011 included Centro de referencia de salud de Peñalolén Cordillera Oriente. 
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